THE POLITICS OF THE
BLACK "NATION"
A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR
RETROSPECTIVE

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Acknowledgments

The Editor offers special thanks to Joseph P. McCormick who organized the symposium which anchors this volume of the National Political Science Review (NPSR). We acknowledge as well those contributors who prepared manuscripts for the panels for the National Conference of Black Political Scientists which yielded papers for this symposium.

The Editor extends deep gratitude to Paula McClain who served as the founding Book Review Editor for the NPSR and whose duties in that capacity end with this volume. A very warm welcome is extended to Allison Calhoun-Brown, Georgia State University, as incoming Book Review Editor.

Special thanks to Associate Editors Robert C. Smith and Cheryl M. Miller, and colleagues in the discipline who served as reviewers and made completion of this volume successful.
Editor's Note

This volume of the NPSR is anchored by a symposium on The Politics of the Black "Nation," the book authored by Matthew Holden in 1973. Twenty-five years provides an interesting and fulsome time span upon which to base a retrospective on this book, and to simultaneously reflect upon the evolution of that which we refer to from a practical perspective as the black liberation struggle, and what we more formally call, in scholarly terms, African American politics. Much has changed during the past twenty-five years, yet many things remain much the same. On reflection, one is immediately struck by the fact that in the present age, there is not much talk about "a black nation," certainly not much talk in as many disparate voices as was the case during the mid-seventies and the decade prior. Yet there is a persistent sense of separateness in that there is constant thought and talk of "Black America" as a significantly separate communal entity, as a racially and culturally distinct community holding to social, political and economic interests which overlap with those held by other groups, but which hold special significance and poignancy for African Americans. Indeed, there remains much thought about, and declarations of participation in, "the black liberation struggle," a struggle in the sense of a sociopolitical movement, organized in some level of group consciousness, if no longer in organizational fact or reality. Hence, the notion of a black nation still resonates with a certain and ready sharpness for both activists and scholars alike.

Given his sense of urgency and purposiveness of action and voice, Holden's apparent perception of the nature of the times in the early seventies stands, in the main, in sharp contrast to how analysts of African American politics tend to perceive the nature of the present age. Holden seems to have felt that the early seventies were a time of great hope and great possibilities, while twenty-five years later, scholars of African American politics are inclined to speak of a struggle which has exhausted itself, and of a deep malaise in the psychological, social, and political spaces where "revolutionary" fervor and a more purposeful politics once sprang forth. Yet it is not totally clear whether Holden felt that in the early seventies we were on the brink of some major development in terms of the liberation struggle, or whether he felt that some major opportunity was about to be lost. While many analysts are inclined to date the decline in national interest in the resolution of the race issue to the first term of the Reagan presidency, it is interesting that Holden dated this decline as developing in the early seventies.

An interesting portrait of Holden the man emerges from this book and the retrospective presented here, or at least from the stance which he took in
authoring this work. Implicit in the overall perspective of this work is an assumption that there was a way, a preferred way which could be prescribed, for directing, as it were, the course of the black liberation struggle. It is also interesting that Holden felt that he could lay out a five-year plan for Black America, which presumably might be adopted and followed. This seems to imply a belief that the then next five years were not only critically important strategically, but were as well somehow socially and politically malleable, or perhaps predictable. He apparently felt comfortable prescribing what things should be like in five years from his writing. This is not so much a rare stance for a writer or scholar-analyst, it is rather that given the retrospective of twenty-five years, one easily sees the fallacies and some folly in the very idea of such a bold act of social and political prescription. Moreover, Holden’s stance seems to have assumed that there was an organized movement, and that some specific persons were in charge of its planning and direction. At least, his stance seems to have assumed the existence of some fixed set of processes and structures or institutional entities through which a five-year plan could be deliberated, processed, and possibly executed. In reality, the organizational presence and efficacy of Black America might well have been more apparent than real. Indeed, when one reflects upon the organizational base of Black America in the present age, one is not inclined to think of a wealth of organizations which are imbued with either an engaging and compelling agenda, the ability to execute a grand strategy, or a passionate hold on the imaginations or hopes of African Americans at the mass or elite levels of the community.

The core thrust of Holden’s work is its decidedly serious foray into strategy and strategizing regarding the political advancement and repositioning of the race. It was very serious business which Holden undertook and the work is a largely unparalleled merger of scholarship and praxis. The work continues to offer multiple lessons in both areas for present age analysts and activists alike. Not least among them are the lessons to be learned from assessment of how the prospects for Holden’s proposed strategies unraveled in the face of change and time and conflicting agendas, and how the possibilities for those strategies were undermined by forces of unpredictable and ineluctable change. The dynamics of the context within which Holden completed this work are discussed by Robert Smith in his contribution to the symposium and are extracted in a separate excerpt which helps to introduce the symposium. The remaining articles in this volume contribute to the anchoring theme by providing an interesting contrast between the concerns of what was an historical moment fully pregnant with hope, and the present moment in which the disparate concerns of the moment reflect the uncertain, and possibly unraveling state of “The Black Nation.” The question which this volume begs is that of how might the next twenty-five years in the life course of “The Black Nation” unfold?

Matthew Holden is the Henry L. and Grace M. Doherty Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. Holden is immediate past president of the American Political Science Association. Professor Holden is currently at work on a sequel to The Politics of the Black “Nation.”

Georgia A. Persons
Introduction to the Symposium:  
The Politics of the Black  
"Nation" Revisited

Joseph P. McCormick II

Howard University

The retrospective essays in this volume grew out of two panels that were held at the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS) in Atlanta, Georgia. I had the pleasure of organizing these panels. I did so knowing that 1998 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of what many of my colleagues consider to be one of the more influential books in the field of black politics, Matthew Holden’s The Politics of the Black “Nation.” In 1973 the companion volume to the “Black Nation” entitled The White Man’s Burden was also published. Two other significant books in the field of black politics were also published that year: Charles Hamilton’s edited volume The Black Experience in American Politics (Hamilton, 1973), and, yes again, Matthew Holden’s The Divisible Republic (Holden, 1973). I must confess that I was unfamiliar with the title The Divisible Republic until my Howard colleague Donn Davis indicated that he was familiar with this book and had read the same. The more we talked, it appeared that we were apparently discussing the same subject matter. What for me was a mild mystery was clarified by a trip to Howard’s Moreland-Spingarn African-American collection where I found a copy of The Divisible Republic. From its table of contents I discovered that this 600–plus page book consists of two parts: Part I is entitled The Politics of the Black Nation, while Part II is entitled The White Man’s Burden. Thus in 1973, not only were we presented with a set of essays that Mack Jones characterized in a 1974 review of these two books as being, “extremely challenging and provocative with great heuristic value for those concerned with developing alternative public policies, …” we are also presented a black scholar’s innovative example of how one might package and market two sets of ideas for the price of one. The field of black politics was not to see such a double-barreled effort from an African-American political scientist until Robert Smith’s publication of
Racism in the Post Civil Rights Era (published in 1995) and his We Have No Leaders: African Americans in the Post-Civil Rights Era, published one year later.

Professor Holden is currently at work on a revised edition of The Divisible Republic and those of us who have written the retrospective essays for this symposium trust that we might have as much influence on this revised volume as his earlier work had on some of us. Each of these seven essays focuses on one of the seven essays in The Politics of the Black "Nation." In May of 1997 I communicated with Matthew Holden and proposed the two panels that resulted in this symposium. At that time I wrote the following to Professor Holden:

I would like to organize two panels in which we—the panelists—revisit each of the essays in [The Politics of the Black "Nation"] and essentially focus on three questions: (a) What do these essays say? (b) What assumptions does Holden make about the "Black Nation" at the time that he writes? and (c) How have both objective conditions (i.e., the external world), and the "Black Nation" changed over the course of the past twenty-five years, such that Holden's assumptions might now be altered, if at all?

The participants in this symposium are some of the most productive scholars in the field of black politics. The reader will have the opportunity to get a sense of what Holden argued in each of the seven essays that make up his seminal volume and to see how we think Holden's observations have stood the tests of time. As Michael Preston writes at the outset of his contribution: "One of the major tests of good scholarship is whether time will render it useless. Another significant test is how one answers these questions: 'Does the work say anything useful?' and if so, 'How well does it say it?' Matthew Holden's The Politics of the Black 'Nation,' published in 1973, answers both of these questions in the affirmative." The contributions by Davis (on Essay I) and McCormick (on Essay II) examine some of the conceptual and analytical fundamentals that shape this book: Holden's notion of a black "quasi government," and his discussion of the three forms of external politics practiced by leaders of the black "nation" over time. Davis raises serious questions about the applicability of the concept "nation" to what Holden describes in this first essay. McCormick recaps Holden's tripartite political leadership typology and considers its applicability to what has occurred in the black "nation" over the past twenty-five years.

At the close of Essay II, Holden devotes considerable discussion to what he calls the "politics of withdrawal," its various forms, and why this form of political behavior is fundamentally irrational. Jones (Essay III) revisits Holden's more detailed treatment of the "politics of withdrawal," while Preston (Essay IV) provides us with some understanding on what Holden considers to be a rational strategy. In Essay IV Holden tells us that the rational strategy that he recommends be pursued by black leaders "would be aimed . . . at saving the opportunity for a decisive break with institutionalized racism" (Holden, 1973: 131). Such a strategy however would have to be pursued in the time frame 1971 to 1976. The component parts of his rational strategy are examined in detail in the last three essays of his book. Professors Pinderhughes (Essay V), Jones (Essay VI), and Smith (Essay VII) provide us with a discussion of what Holden had to say in these essays and what
happened over the course of the past twenty-five years in the areas where Holden called for change.

The essays from *The Politics of the Black "Nation"* as they are titled in the original work and which are discussed in this volume are as follows:

- Essay I, "Centrifugal Influences in Black Politics"
- Essay II, "Clientage, Opposition, and Withdrawal: Three Forms of External Politics"
- Essay III, "Politics as Collective Psychiatry: A Critique of Withdrawal"
- Essay IV, "Toward Regrouping"
- Essay V, "The Next Five Years: I. Morale and Objective Capacity"
- Essay VI, "The Next Five Years: II. Organizational Options"
- Essay VII, "The Next Five Years: III. Modifying Political Tactics"

References


The Politics of the Black "Nation": Significance and Context of the Book

Robert C. Smith

San Francisco State University

I have repeatedly stated [to anyone who will listen] that The Black "Nation" is the single best treatment of black politics by an academic political scientist extant. Indeed, in my view, it ranks with Harold Cruse's The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual and Kwame Ture (aka: Stokely Carmichael) and Charles Hamilton's Black Power as seminal works of those of us scholars of the Civil Rights generation. I have consistently turned to The Black "Nation" in my research and writing, from my first professional paper delivered at an annual meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), which was a partial text of Holden's "Black quasi-government" thesis (Smith, 1978).

A major strength of the book is that it is multidimensional. It deals perceptively with issues of class, culture, ideology, organizations and leadership, both internally and as these issues relate to the external relations of the black "nation" with whites. It is at once also theoretical, analytical and descriptive. It is also a work of ideology and strategy. Ideology is central to Holden's work. He is an integrationist (see comments on Essay V by Michael Preston in this volume). Indeed, as I have written elsewhere "... the book may be viewed as the academic manifesto of the integrationist wing of the black leadership group in the United States. As such, it is probably the most systematic and cogent defense of integration extant" (Smith, 1983: 75). In his advocacy of integration, Holden analytically dismisses its alternatives—revolutionary struggle and most forms of black nationalism (what he rather primly calls "withdrawal") as "nothing short of romanticism" (Holden, 1973: 96–130) (see also the comments by Charles E. Jones on Essay III in this volume). I will have more to say about Holden's integrationism later in this retrospective essay, but first a word about the origins and context of the book.
Origins and Context: The Race Crisis of the 1960s

The origins and circumstances of The Black "Nation" are critically important to any retrospective evaluation of the work. First, the book was written "on the run so to speak" and with a sense of urgency. Holden writes, "most of the essays were written between the summer crisis of 1967 and the latter part of 1969, although the basic theme was formulated in 1964 and many editorial or substantive changes were made in 1970 and 1971" (1976, 213). (For a revised version of the 1964 lecture, see Holden, 1972). Elsewhere, he notes that 1970 was the first year of "relative quiescence" in race relations in five years, thus, it was appropriate to reflect on how the race problem might be resolved, as public interest in the problem was beginning to dwindle as other issues (the war in Vietnam, environmentalism) were seizing the attention of the press and public.

Second, the book is not your standard social science inquiry. As Holden candidly states, the book has no consistent design or methodology or data, because, he says, of the absence of adequate conceptual apparatus related to race and even good descriptive data on some issues (1973: xiii). Thus, Holden writes (1976: xiii),

Consequently, I have gone far beyond what I know and can demonstrate to piece together such fragments of reported experiences as may substitute for systematic data, and to impose upon these fragments conceptions from widely disparate fields . . . in the social sciences. The resulting interpretation is thus hypothetical (a series of reasoned speculations) and no more. These papers are a trial run (first emphasis Holden's, the second mine).

Holden, in a postscript, writes that the book is informed by two basic biases. The "central bias," he writes, is the "conviction of Black-White interdependency" (1973: 212), and another "important bias" is the belief that "rationality is supremely important to the achievement of desirable political results" (1973: 213). At first glance these biases might appear unremarkable. However, given the temper of the times they are fighting words. For what Holden is attempting here is a not so subtle attack on black nationalism and revolutionary struggle, suggesting first that separatism and revolution (seen as rejections of interdependency) are unworthy goals and by implication irrational. Having staked out this ideological ground, Holden then lays out the book's central project (1973: 212):

As a political system the United States includes two sociocultural nations "locked into each other in a relationship which has historically been "imperial". Imperial in the sense that the White element has been dominant over the Black element. The present question is one of encompassing Black and White within a republican norm—within a political community or a shared moral order understood to be the common enterprise and concern of both its Black and its White members. The problem of transforming an internal "empire" into a full-scale republic is that to which, given the bias noted, these essays have been devoted. (Emphasis in original)
In the Mirror of Time: 
Unbound Interests and the 
New Black Leadership: 
A Retrospective Critique of Essay I: 
"Centrifugal Influences on 
Black Politics"

Donn G. Davis

Howard University

This essay is a retrospective critique and analysis of the first of seven essays, "Centrifugal Influences in Black Politics," that appeared in Matthew Holden's Politics of the Black Nation. This landmark contribution to the literature on black politics was first published in 1973. Twenty-five years later, considerable American national experience, combined with events and circumstances that have directly affected American politics in general and black American politics in particular, have illuminated not only the strengths and weaknesses of Holden's seminal analysis, but have also left us, via the wonder of hindsight, better able to gauge the utility and instructional value of his analysis. It is however, necessary to call attention to certain intellectual signposts, which, as they appear upon the landscape of Holden's analysis, are confusing if not misleading. To be fair to Holden it should be noted that he calls attention to these markers by explaining the meaning that he ascribes to them and their intended use within the context of his analysis (Holden, 1973: 1).

The first of these concepts is Holden's use of the term "nation" to describe "the social and economic relationship of one group to another." Holden's preferred use of the term appears to be related to the normative intent of his analysis which, according to him, intends to demarcate the vast social and economic gulf that lies between black and white America. A direct statement from Holden disavows any relationship between the term "nation" as he em-
ploys it in this analysis and "the idea that separate 'nations' are, as a matter of right, entitled to separate governments or juridical institutions" (Holden, 1973: 1). For more limited purposes this might have been sufficient, to simply make mention of the fact that the term "nation" was a single word substitute for social and economic disparities both too numerous and too complex to enumerate here. However, within the context of an analysis to which subject matter ranging from leadership, politics, and decision-making, to governments ("quasi-governments"), "liberation" and power; etc., are so important, the relatively loose use of a term which, in a larger context, conveys a more or less precise meaning, does conceptual damage to the limited purposes of the analysis at hand. Within the parameters of a discussion centered upon the socioeconomic, political, and cultural dynamics of a particular group, i.e., African Americans and the impact and consequences of white America's national oppression (both de jure and de facto) of that group, both his analysis and this critique would be better served by the use of terms and descriptive categories limited to the empirically observable action and reaction of the parties involved, at least insofar as one can be shown to occur in relationship to the other. For example, the United States is a "nation" (although arguably one not completely evolved) which has a history of disorganizing and oppressing a large sector of its population (Franklin and Moss, 1988), severely limiting their participation, first by holding them as slaves and later: by degrading them and proscribing their activities as legally free men and women. This sector of the population, a numerical minority best recognized by its African descent, has responded to their predicament in a variety of ways from one time to another (Branch, 1988, 1998; Forman, 1972), but only rarely, at specific and clearly identifiable times in its history, has it responded in a manner consistent with the strivings associated with the nascent "nation." Far more often (and more intense) have been the manifold efforts by African Americans to achieve "deliverance" through inclusion and participation in American society as it is presently ordered.

With the possible exception of two devastating world wars, no other large-scale human undertaking has so indelibly marked the twentieth century as nationalism, a phenomenon whose most basic characteristics and strident forms are somewhat easy to identify, if not unmistakable. Human bonds woven from history, territory, language, culture, religion (more often than not) and, yes, race and/or ethnicity, are very powerful and well-recognized well-springs of nationalist sentiment. Yet neither of these phenomena alone, or any combination of them, are quite as powerful or necessary as nationalism's least tangible component: the aspiration or the will of a given group to create a sociopolitical organism uniquely reflective of its creators and committed almost singularly to their welfare and historical perpetuation (Kohn, 1945; Emerson, 1962; Kedourie, 1993). The heart of this organism is usually a government, an instrumentality through which the will and the desire of its creators to remain distinctive and to be self-determining is manifest and actualized. This collective will struggles for its own liebenstrum and organizational structures through which independent decisions of its own may be made. A common manifestation of this will to be independent, when it exists within a larger dominant structure, is the creation of a provisional government, which is generally regarded as part of the apparatus necessary to achieve the
group's liberation from what it generally regards as oppressive domination and illegitimate authority. Insofar as the terms "nationalist" (or "nation") have any precise meaning or analytical value, it is when they are employed in relationship to a group's aspirations and strivings consistent with the achievement of these objectives. Otherwise, any appropriation and use of such terminology when, in fact, it is some other process that is being described or examined, can only lead to conceptual confusion and misleading or false conclusions.

Excepting the emigration/irredentist, and racially driven organizing of Marcus Garvey in the 1920s (Garvey, 1992; Cronon, 1969), and more recently the far more politically formal expressions, ideological clarity and organizational efforts of the Republic of New Africa (Obadele, 1975), African Americans have not, in any significant numbers, acted in any way purposefully consistent with traditional behavior and nationalist objectives. The Republic of New Africa, for example, is the lone black nationalist organization in the U.S. to have demarcated a specific territorial claim, assessed historical damages, and delivered a formal claim for recognition and reparations to the U.S. State Department, as well as having established a provisional government to act on behalf of the New African nation. Notwithstanding the lack of popular support, this behavior is most consistent with the widely accepted definition and expressive behavior of twentieth-century nationalists.

Contrary to these manifestations of nationalism, Holden's use of the term "nation" is more consistent with a loosely constrained rubric with both early and recent entries (Walker, 1829; Delaney, 1852; Pinkney, 1976: X; 1989), almost all of which play loosely with the descriptive and analytical precision of the term nationalist, generally in the context of pronouncing or discussing what is referred to as black American nationalism. Various categories and analyses attempt to sort out and expound on the correctness/incorrectness, relative merits and limitations of black "cultural nationalism," "revolutionary black nationalism," and other related variants, up to and including the so-called "hip-hop nation" (Henderson, 1996; Smith, 1997). However, the concern here goes beyond the mere precision of language. To wit: Does the use of the term "nation" in these analyses, which is usually employed in conjunction with the often stated goal of black "liberation," mean that African Americans view their freedom from racial oppression in America as ultimately attainable only within the framework of an independent, self-determining black nation state with its own independent government? Or, does such usage mean that black liberation will come with the complete incorporation of the full array of black political imperatives and cultural forms into American culture and the American body politic? Does black liberation require any form of black control over national institutions or those cultural forms distinctive because of some unique relationship to blacks? Any theoretical construct or analytical approach which appropriates the language of nationalism or nation-building struggles to explain black American aspirations will ultimately give rise to these questions, and such questions may become unsettling because the best evidence available suggests that blacks, by a large majority, do not wish to be part of a separate (self-governing) nation (Dawson, 1993). Likewise, a survey of the Million Woman March, an event which might reasonably be expected to have drawn participants with at least
nominal political and racial consciousness, if not persons who were highly conscious and focused in their behavior, as it relates to black aspirations, produced moderate and low percentages (51.9 and 13.5 percent respectively) of blacks who strongly agreed with the proposition of establishing either an independent black political party or a separate black state (McCormick, et al., 1997).

In light of these questions and survey research findings, it can be argued that even a strong sense of racial consciousness (Tate, 1993), a shared history of oppression, many shared cultural forms, a history of physical, though not exactly territorial separation, and a shared socioeconomic marginality that has thus far been enduring, have not produced any large-scale or virulent nationalism among African Americans. Rather, these objective facts and opinions from survey research form the basis of a narrow foundation upon which African American nationalist tendencies and sentiments rest. Thus far these facts and opinions have not been sufficient to produce among the majority of blacks a very distinctive collective or group compulsion to form a national entity to safeguard their present and future interest as a people, although this is not to say that such will not or could not occur in the near or distant future. Fairly recent history provides a number of poignant reminders in this regard (Browne, 1968). Hardly any of these are more revealing than the fact that, although widely propagated, European Jewry had little regard for the idea of returning to Zion before the 1930s, after which an external "accelerator" (Johnson, 1966) of horrifying magnitude completely altered mass Jewish opinion regarding this prospect. The accelerator in their case was German Nazism and Adolph Hitler's Third Reich.

African Americans, as much as any Americans, have imbibed the American myth of a unifying "melting-pot" which, if the myth became reality, would lead ultimately to universal inclusion and participation. This end has been the goal of the broadest, most intensive and most salient struggles staged by African Americans over the course of their history on American soil: from abolition to compromise and racial uplift, to racial adjustment and gradualism, to desegregation, integration and reform (Cruse, 1968). In spite of the efforts of early emigrationists—Delaney, Turner (Henry McNeil), Garvey and others, integration into the mainstream of American society has been a major issue on the black majority agenda for most of the present century. For a time, the racial caste experience of legal segregation obviated political choice for African Americans, and in the process probably created a semblance of racial unity more artificial than real. It is not an unreasonable proposition to argue that slavery, in every aspect of how it functioned as an institution, was by design a profoundly more disruptive force, with regard to efforts by captive Africans to unite, than it was a unifying force. Thus, with the end of dejure segregation and the gradual emergence of choice, the reed-like, and mostly artificial, foundation of any meaningful black nationalist aspirations was dealt a serious blow. It would be difficult to hold otherwise, given the knowledge that the victims of racial segregation almost certainly knew that they had been forced together for all the wrong reasons.

Professor Holden knows, of course, that the low resource labyrinthine politics of the black nation, which he has described perhaps better than anyone else (Holden; 1973: 3–9), has not, historically, been directed towards the erec-
tion of autonomous black institutions and independent decision-making. Rather, the struggle has been to amass influence sufficient to favorably affect the distribution of resources and services so as to make the best of a bad situation.

**Black Leadership: The Guard Has Changed**

One of the primary objects of Professor Holden’s inquiry, and one of the areas to which his earlier work contributed most, was his descriptive analysis of the operations and functional character of black leadership; the means—subtle and near formal—by which a few black social and political elites made decisions for the group. Not surprising, this is probably the most altered dynamic of black political life over the twenty-five years since Professor Holden’s original work appeared. Some changes are profound, while others are new only in the guise in which they present themselves. Still we can ask, “What, exactly, is it about black leadership that has changed?” The best answer should admit that, on its surface, virtually everything, and in its substance very little.

Most notably, there is a new and relatively large (although certainly not huge) group of what can be called formal black leaders whose legitimacy and base of operation lie outside of the black community. These individuals have been either elected or appointed by constituencies in which the people (or individuals in the case of appointments) and their interests may be—but frequently are not—majority black. (A few, in fact, have been majority white.) This development has given rise to the possible emergence of what some scholars have called the deracialized black leader (McCormick and Jones, et al. 1993). If—at least in America—this is not an oxymoron, it is certainly a unique phenomenon and open to debate, in that it describes a functional contradiction, since black leaders are almost never selected or respected for their leadership on issues not perceived as being related to race in general or blacks in particular.¹

Less complex than this contradictory phenomenon, the interlocking elites who make up the “quasi-government”² described by Holden were but a multiple of the local and national needs intercessors (Bardolph, 1959). These elites, minus significant formal authority, were challenged to meet the subsistence needs of the group and “to get things done” for blacks, which more often than not meant persuading a number of highly placed whites to support their cause. In as much as these individuals were, generationally, and from one time to another, more likely than not to be the same people (see, for example, *Ebony* magazine’s annually published list of “The 100 Most Influential Black Americans), it is fairly accurate to refer to them loosely as leaders. Each of them, with the exception of those whose status is derived from high corporate positions or their stature as entertainers, or athletes, was usually the leader of one or another of an assortment of civic, social, fraternal and service organizations. However, to the extent that the concept of leadership indicates a very specific purpose, and a consciously organized teleological component, it is probably misapplied when used to describe a black group as randomly aggregated as the *Ebony* group. The same conclusion would hold today for the leaders of Holden’s “quasi government” of the black nation.³

In the case of the *Ebony* group, it is not sufficient to know that they have
“influence.” One needs to know with whom they are influential, and even more importantly, how exactly, do they use their influence and for what purposes? Today, unlike twenty-five years ago, their purposes are likely to diverge in direct correspondence to the availability of a variety of different opportunities and possibilities. It is at precisely this point where serious questions arise as to whether any particular individual or group is or is not a leader in terms of black American interests.

For reasons including but much greater than the scarcity of resources, the centrifugal influences, postulated by Holden in Essay I, to effect and largely determine the behavior of the leaders of his “quasi government” are far greater and more consequential today than could have been imagined in 1973. Holden’s leadership elites faced the burden of “[assembling and utilizing] various combinations of the fundamental political resources: money, office, prestige, technical knowledge, the capacity for eliciting a mass response, or the capacity for utilizing physical force” (Holden, 1973: 4–5). They were also severely limited in the choice of options available to them. If we recall that Holden’s analysis was centered on activities, which took place in the late 1960s, it becomes apparent that black elites during that period were operating within a far more restricted field of choice than is the case today. While it is true that formal dejure segregation was dead at the time that Holden wrote, its spirit was still very much alive, and non-legal racial discrimination was nonetheless an ever-present fact of black life. However, Holden made his observations on the eve of an emerging dynamic, which would change the landscape of black political decision-making for the foreseeable future.

The ensuing decade of the 1970s was about to produce an expanded black middle class and a nascent black political leadership, both with a host of interests no longer bound by rigid racial considerations, and a number of which were (and still are) more directly related to preserving and enhancing their new status than the furtherance of mass black interests.

Legal racial segregation and the severe proscription of black opportunities were the greatest unifiers of black Americans from the end of the Civil War to the 1960s. (Before this period chattel slavery in the absolute was the great bond.) Next to segregation the most effective unifier of blacks was the mid-1950s to mid-1960s movement to abolish segregation and gain access to the socioeconomic and political opportunity structure of American society. The black struggle in the U.S. for democratic rights and full participation is far from complete, but its initial stage created breathing room for a suffocating dream, along with renewed hope and some tangible results. As Professor Holden’s book went to press in 1973, a tenuous black middle class was already eight years into an expansion that would triple its size by the early 1980s. A few hundred elected officials scattered around the country would multiply to more than 6,800 before the end of the 1980s (Tate, 1993). A handful of black members of Congress (only nine at the outset) founded the Congressional Black Caucus just four years before the publication of Holden’s book (Clay, 1992). But in less than a decade their number would exceed twenty and diverging interests would begin to surface. Simultaneous with this development, the number of viable informal organizations in the black community—the largest source of the leaders identified by Holden—began a decline in numbers that has continued to the present period.5
During the 1960s and early 1970s the black community was rife with informal community-based organizations (Forman, 1972). As used here, the term "informal" should be thought of in almost exactly the same sense in which Holden employs the term "formal." It is used to describe those organizations which are neither the product of nor vested with any official or governmental authority, i.e., they do not have their origin in any elective or appointed body of government, and they are not headed or led by officials with any form of governmental or legal status. The difference, for example, may be said to be the same as that which exists between the Congressional Black Caucus and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. While these types of organizations were certainly affected by a number of centrifugal forces which often lead them in different and sometimes conflicting directions (Smith, 1996), one could agree with Holden's general conclusion that the professional leadership and the staff of most of these (1960s-early 1970s) organizations which provided blacks with leadership were very closely associated "with black interests, ambitions, and moods." (Holden, 1973: 6). He further defined this formal group of black leaders when he told us that there was among them "not only interdependence (emphasis added) but also a high degree of stability of symbolism," such that "At any moment, the things to be believed, admired, rejected, denied, debated are well known to most people." Ultimately, there was, in Holden's opinion, "a decided stability to the ideological cleavages [within the black 'nation'] over the question [of] how to meet the white world." (Holden, 1973: 7) Perhaps most important of all, Holden states that, in addition to a certain kind of stability, his leadership designation "applied to those who make a specific effort at organizing politics to change the structure of race relations." (Holden, 1973: 7). This observation, one would assume is made for the principle purpose of addressing his primary concern: "How to organize and bring about a more equal power arrangement between the races in America." This, for Holden, appears to be the sine qua non of black leadership in America. It is also the noblest purpose that one can attribute to this thorough and soul-plowing effort by a scholar who attempts to decode the American racial conundrum near the close of the twentieth century. There is a relatively simple axiom here: in the case of African Americans, because the history of domination/subordination is so clearly beyond question, and because the results have been so devastating, it is equally clear that those blacks who claim to be leaders and who are not consciously seeking to remediate and alter the power equation between blacks and whites, are simply not leading black people, at least not in any way consistent with the advancement and progress of the race. This, to be sure, is simple enough, but probably too simple to describe the predicament that black people in America confront at the end of the twentieth century.

The abolition of "the great unifier" of de jure segregation has unleashed both political and socioeconomic class tensions among blacks that did not and could not have proliferated during the unquestioned heyday of white supremacy. There were a number of relatively fragile and anemic class formations in the segregated black community, for the most part mirroring the class structure of American society (Frazier, 1965; Hare, 1970). Yet, their growth and strength stopped at the border of the segregated ghetto. This has not been
the case for nearly two generations now, and the partial, but significant, removal of artificial barriers to black participation in American society at large since the civil rights movement has led to the evolution and growth of a black middle class with a varied economic base and enough political freedom to rationalize its existence in relationship to non-racial values and interests. In fact, it has become politically trendy (and one suspects rewarding) to join groups and air opinions that either question or outright oppose policies and programs that have been traditionally thought of as being most consistent with the needs and interests of the oppressed black community. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the national black community of the 1950s-1960s could have produced or would have countenanced the “victim blaming” (some would say “anti-black”) barrages of black neo-conservatives such as Ward Connerly, Clarence Thomas, Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell et al. Holden’s 1973 work does not and had no real need to examine this fairly recent phenomenon, because it had not become either as noticeable, or as troubling and materially damaging as it is today. Yet it could have been predicted.

W.E.B. DuBois is probably as well known for his theory, promotion and work on behalf of “The Talented Tenth” as he is for any of his many contributions during a long and prodigious career. Most notably, he prescribed a critical historical mission for this class of gifted black folk. He believed that they would become the lever with the principal responsibility for “uplifting” the race. Not known for his mistakes, DuBois appears, for a time, to have seen a single edge of this two-edged sword, and as James Baldwin would say, “he lived to tell the tale.” DuBois later recognized the mistake of this formulation. First, DuBois himself (DuBois, 1952) and then Paul Robeson (Robeson, 1971) fell victim to what could easily be labeled perfidious behavior on the part of the emerging black middle class. Less subjective, and more analytically precise, this should be recognized as the natural behavior of any class with a compelling interest of its own. It is virtually indisputable that DuBois initially failed to assess the possibility that his Talented Tenth—given an independent and narrowly restricted opportunity to develop and evolve—would become a relatively privileged class with its own interests, clearly distinct and apart from those of the black masses, and the first order of business would be for this class to maintain, protect and perpetuate itself. Ordinarily, this normal and predictable development would not totally disrupt or derail the movement of a determined “nation” towards freedom. However, if the “nation” is but a collection of fragmented ideas, and its “leadership” is only a thin column of self-interested individuals, behaving more and more like a class, then unity, purpose, and collective action (essentials for a nation) become problematic and extremely difficult to marshal. This, I would argue, appears to be a more accurate characterization of the black situation in America today than the condition analyzed by Holden at the end of the 1960s. In fact, Holden himself broached this problem ever so succinctly:

Collective action frequently does require substantial popular participation and support, but such support does not arise spontaneously. It requires somebody to mobilize it. The mobilizers are either people found in the leadership and subleadership strata of existing organizations or they are people capable of manipulating such leadership. (Holden, 1973: 8)
Few Leaders, No Ideology, No Galvanizing Struggle, No Gain: Black America in the 1990s

From the mid-1950s, throughout the 1960s, and for the first part of the 1970s, many of the brightest young (and not so young) black Americans risked life, limb, and future promise (such as it then was) to provide leadership for the black masses. These were critical times, and few selfish purposes or social functions that one could serve were more important or highly regarded than the serious engagement of time and energy on behalf of one's own oppressed community. Altruism, however, was not entirely responsible for the relatively large number of people available to lead. There is also the fact that other options were in relatively short supply. Eventually, however, the struggle itself created enough room for a number of individuals to move away from the fray, and this "victory"—as limited as it may have been—has proven very costly. It is well known, for example, that, historically, all great reform and revolutionary movements have relied upon middle class (or, in the case of blacks, pseudo middle class) intellectuals for leadership. Usually these are people who, for a variety of reasons, which they associate with the ruling regime, are initially disaffected and later radicalized. Their number during the Civil Rights Movement and the more radical decade that followed was legion (Forman, 1972).

A critical mass of black America's foremost intellectuals and best-educated professionals sided with and placed themselves in the service of the black masses during the mid-1950s-early 1970s. King, Baldwin, Baraka, Cruse, and many others provided a moral, social, cultural and political critique of a racially repressive and divided social order which they believed to be exploitative and morally bankrupt. Malcolm X articulated the raw anger felt by many blacks over their dehumanizing treatment as second-class citizens. These voices, riding literally on the "Winds of Change" emanating from the decolonization struggles being waged in Africa, Asia, and Latin America gave rise to the activism of Moses, Hamer, Forman, Carmichael/Ture, Newton, Obadele, Davis (Angela), Brown (Rap), Jackson (George), Koen, and countless others who laid their lives on the line in defense of black human rights and the claim to some measure of control over the affairs of black communities in America (Hamilton and Ture, 1967). Less active in the frontal (often physical) challenge to American racism and anti-democratic policies and social conventions, others, most notably the Nation of Islam, denounced American hypocrisy and racial injustice and claimed the right to form a separate black nation, compelled, they stated, to do so by the evil (devil-like) nature of white people and the inability of blacks to live with them in peace.

There were most certainly centrifugal (or "disunifying") forces within this aggregation of collective black opposition to white oppression, but such forces were not, at least in the first stage of the black resistance movement, sufficient to disaggregate black resistance to the point that any significant number of resistors would (or could) become either unwittingly complicitous or witting partners to the systemic oppression of their own people. Such is more or less precisely the difference between the objective conditions affecting black leadership today and what Professor Holden saw twenty-five years ago.

The black masses no longer have, nor may they rely upon, the
uncompromised commitment and exclusive leadership of a middle-class black intelligentsia. In far too many instances, in fact, they may expect just the opposite. From the Supreme Court of the United States to the Board of Regents of the University of California (and many points in between), blacks may now be certain that other blacks will act against what the majority of them believe to be in their best interest. It is safe to say that this would never have occurred twenty-five years ago.

One of the most destructive centrifugal forces of the late 1960s-early 1970s was an ideological debate centering on whether the oppression of blacks in America was in fact racial in its origins, or whether racial oppression was but a distorted superstructural effect of the real culprit, class oppression. While racial oppression was an immediate and undeniable reality, the burning issue was whether it was the root or the tree. Black activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s fought one another and more than a few died over this issue. Even now the debate smolders, and answers for many are not satisfactory, probably because the right questions have not been asked, and the issue needs to be reframed. For example, the central question may not be whether the problem is solely race or class, but how much explanatory power is provided by either approach? When the question is posed this way, Justice Clarence Thomas and Regent Ward Connerly become very helpful as empirical indicators of the likely behavior of a certain kind of black, presumed by status to be a “leader,” when black interests are at stake. By using some set of objective criteria related to recruitment, socialization, and political association, it could well be possible to know for which “leaders” race is a secondary factor and class the primary factor in their pattern of behavior (see Smith’s [1996: 133–134] discussion of this issue). Such behavior (or race loyalty profiling) would never be foolproof, but one can imagine situations in which such an evaluative approach might be helpful, inasmuch as the black community might have an early alert in instances where its interests were likely to be seriously threatened or compromised, if not outright betrayed. Otherwise, black interests, already seriously compromised by the hard right-wing turn in the American legal and public policy process, may be permanently damaged. Professor Robert Smith (1996: 133) sounded the alarm on this point when he recently wrote in reference to the “incorporation” of Black elected and appointed officials:

This recruitment and socialization process results in a hierarchical, institutional model of Black leadership that threatens to render the indigenous mass base of the Black community leaderless or, in the worst case, the creation of a leadership group opportunistically working against the collective interests of the race in pursuit of narrow personal or political advantage. (Smith, 1996: 133)

To a degree, in my opinion sufficient to cause concern if not alarm, this process has and continues to take place. One of the clearest indications of what I euphemistically refer to as leadership estrangement, is the non-ideological character of incorporated, systemic black leadership. To the extent that elements of this leadership are willing to broach black issues and problems at all, it is from a conventional reformist perspective, which does not subject a biased system to any serious analysis, or demand that challenge or question its pervasive inequality or basic values and assumptions. There is also a
marked tendency to accept systemic defenses that are decidedly avoidance-oriented, ahistorical, and unaccountable. The best example is a nearly four centuries late proffer of colorblindness and meritocracy. This is chiefly the means of arriving at the weak conclusion that a mildly remedial policy such as affirmative action is either asking too much or that it constitutes reverse racism. Serious black leaders would (and should) question such aberrant conclusions.

This is the policy and intellectual minefield that Matthew Holden will confront in revisiting a topic that is far thornier today than when he engaged it in 1973. On the plus side of the ledger, he will be working with far more facts and a body of literature that has grown to be broad and fairly deep. He will also have the bountiful information assembled in the wake of the two (1984 and 1988) Jesse Jackson campaigns for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, which answers one of his surface level concerns in a glance: black political and community leaders have not attempted to amass financial, technical and bureaucratic resources—at least not for a single, well-defined purpose—since the last Jackson campaign. This is consistent with some of the politically quixotic behavior observed by Holden in his earlier study. Not much else, however, is the same, and the difference may be correctly viewed as both good, very bad, and uncertain.

Notes

1. This was clearly demonstrated during Jesse Jackson’s 1988 presidential campaign when mid-western white farmers, who perceived Jackson as being back on their issues, wore paper bags over their heads while showing support for him at rallies.

2. In addition to the questionable use of the term “nation” to describe a unique set of social conditions and political sentiments not reasonably consistent with the most widely accepted meaning of the term, Holden also introduces us to several other terms whose ordinary meaning is stretched and blurred within the confines of his highly personalized intellectual constructs. For example, both “quasi government” (emphasis mine) and “leadership,” as he employs these terms, have added or different meanings in the context of Holden’s analysis. This is true even when we are told that he means something other than the ordinary or most accepted definitions of these terms.

3. His “quasi government,” reduced to its essence, is defined by Holden as the aggregated ability of a relatively stable group of “interdependent elites” (leaders of the “major Black socioeconomic institutions”—service [“uplift”], mutual-aid, self-interested, and recreational) to exercise influence and power—as if invested with at least some degree of legal governmental authority” (See Holden, 1973: 3-4).

4. Holden’s “centrifugal influences” refer primarily to conflict and tensions arising from the competition among groups for scarce resources. This competition has the result of dissolving common purpose and propelling groups away from one another, excepting periods of short-term unity around highly symbolic and intense issues. Holden adds—with great insight—the cultural context as a critical determinant of centrifugal influences and behavior.

5. The decline of informal organizations referred to here is a reference to what is commonly known as grassroots (political) organizations. There may have been a proliferation of black professional and occupational groups over the past
twenty-five years, but few of these have been noted for their leadership of black mass opinion or protest on behalf of black interests. Most sponsor a yearly gathering at which, to be fair to them, lip-service may be paid to black causes. They then return to what preoccupied them before their meetings—individual and interest group advancement.

6. This is one of the central and driving concerns of Holden’s work here and elsewhere, and it rests squarely on the assumption that black politics has virtually no other legitimate purpose—at least none that Holden would regard as rational.


References


The Politics of the Black "Nation"

Clientage, Opposition, and Withdrawal: Three Forms of External Politics: A Reexamination of Essay II

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I initially attempted to read The Politics of the Black "Nation" while I was a graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh, a little more than two decades ago. My formal fields of study were American Government (with a concentration in urban politics) and Comparative Politics (with a concentration in the politics of development). Holden's work came in my informal, unofficial third field of Black Politics, which I had to teach myself, for there were no specialists in this area at Pittsburgh. Perhaps the most provocative sentence in this book is the one that opens the second essay: "White supremacy is the single most important fact in the environment of black politics. How to cope with White supremacy is the single most important issue overtly debated within Black politics" (Holden 1973: 42).

For every white American who has asked over the course of our history in this country, "What are we going to do about these black folk?" there have been numerous black Americans who have asked, "What are we going to do about these white folks?" Politics, a form of behavior in which individuals and groups attempt to exert their wills for the purpose of securing valued ends both diffuse and specific, by its very nature is complicated. It is complicated by the racial nature of the adversarial relationship, but it is further complicated, when the protagonists have a mutually interdependent relationship as well.

Since the seventeenth century, white supremacy—an ideology developed by Europeans to justify and to rationalize their forceful domination of native peoples in Africa and in the Americas (Thomas, 1997)—has been forced to undergo a series of changes. The major reason for this change has been because of the resistance and challenges to it that have been made by the once subjugated African, who over time became an African American. As we shall see below, Holden's second essay in The Politics of the Black "Nation" is part
of a long tradition in the social sciences by black scholars who have written about the resistance to and challenges directed toward white supremacy by African Americans. Before turning to an examination of the tripartite scheme which is at the core of Holden’s second essay, a brief detour to consider the work of other scholars whose work constitutes the essential elements of this tradition of resistance and challenge to white supremacy is in order.

Black Leadership Typologies: A Brief Review of the Tradition

In 1901, W.E.B. Du Bois published a critical review of Booker T. Washington’s then recently published autobiography *Up From Slavery* (DuBois 1901). In this review DuBois introduced a tripartite scheme of black leadership that he later refined in his seminal essay, “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others” (a part of DuBois multidimensional masterpiece *The Souls of Black Folk*). This typology of black leadership included at least two types of political behavior that challenged white supremacy. DuBois’ typology was built around three themes: (1) revolt and revenge; (2) accommodation to the will of the greater group; and (3) determined self-realization and self-development (DuBois, 1903: 45–46). For each of these themes, DuBois postulated an accompanying leadership type. Given the contextual setting of his discussion however, this typology was incidental to his more fundamental purpose in this seminal essay, a critique of the racial accommodationist, Booker T. Washington.

A little more than nine decades after DuBois advanced his leadership typology, and two decades after the publication of *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* political scientist Martin Kilson (1995) also offered us a tripartite typology of black leadership in an essay published in the leftist journal *Dissent.* Kilson called the types in his leadership schema: (1) pragmatic-radicals (descended from the radicalism of the Niagara Movement and DuBois and later seen in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, co-founded by DuBois); (2) the systemic-radicals (largely Marxist in orientation and whose behavior was once seen in the politics of one-time Communist Party members Benjamin Davis, Paul Robeson, Richard Wright and Ralph Ellison); and (3) ethno-radicals (who Kilson also calls black nationalists and identifies Garveyites, Black Muslims and Afrocentrists as historical examples). Unlike the work of DuBois which was fundamentally propagandistic in nature (see Rampersad, 1990), Kilson devotes the bulk of his analytical attention in this essay to a critique of the ethno-radical leadership type, its appeal to African Americans, and the inability of those associated with this leadership category from entering into biracial electoral and legislative alliances, seen by Kilson, it should be added, as essential for bringing public policy to bare on addressing various aspects of the black predicament.

Just one year after the publication of Kilson’s essay, historian Manning Marable (1996) brings forth yet another tripartite scheme for understanding what he calls “three general approaches to the struggle for Black empowerment in America” (Marable, 1996: 101): (1) “inclusionists” or integrationists (who have relied on coalitions with white political parties or organizations in order to achieve reforms in the political order, but who have generally remained silent on making any recommendations for change in the operation
of the economic order); (2) black nationalists (who have relied on building all-black institutions to provide goods, services, and education to African Americans, and who reject the values and ideals of white America); and (3) the "transformationist" or multicultural democratic approach which "argues that institutional racism [the behavioral manifestation of the ideology white supremacy] cannot be dismantled unless the power, privileges, and property of elite whites are redistributed more democratically to oppressed Americans" (Marable 1996: 100). Marable calls for a "new Black leadership" and advances a rather ambiguous vision of black politics that calls for structural transformation through inclusionist means.

The work of DuBois, Kilson, Marable, and Holden reflects the attempts by these scholars to describe various responses to white supremacy. While there are some similarities that link these efforts—that span from variations of the inclusionary category to a range of separatist tendencies—each of these scholars gives at least one of the categories in his typology more analytical attention than the other. Their respective contextual and historical setting and the nature of American race relations at the time that each scholar wrote shaped each of these efforts. As we shall see, these observations apply to Professor Holden's tripartite classification scheme of the black "nation's" external responses to white supremacy, the topic that is at the core of Essay II.

Holden's Three (plus) Forms of External Politics

One might suspect that the tripartite schema that Holden offers us in Essay II was perhaps influenced by DuBois' contribution written almost 100 years earlier. In Holden's scheme of things, "external politics" refers to the political posture or political stance that the black "nation" takes vis-à-vis the white "nation." For each form of external politics, there is an attendant leadership type:

**Clientage**

"One set of claimants for Black leadership," Holden tells us, "have generally assumed that no direct challenge to white supremacy is likely to be fruitful, and have consequently sought to acquire the resources of change from external (white) support." "The practitioner of this strategy," he adds, "accepts, in other words, the role of client to some external source." (Holden 1973: 42). While perhaps the most famous figure in the black "nation," with whom we associate this form of external politics and leadership, is Booker T. Washington. In Essay II Holden also reveals to us the outlooks of other black client-types: Isiah T. Montgomery, a one-time slave owned by Jefferson Davis who later settled the town of Mound Bayou, Mississippi, and William Hooper Councill, who had been president of Alabama A. and M. College (Holden 1973: 44-45).

**Opposition**

Holden's second form of external politics has two sub-types: constitutional opposition and moral opposition. With regard to moral opposition, Holden
points out: "Where clientage overtly accepted the White man as master, and sought to subvert him, constitutional opposition interpreted him as opponent and sought to activate him to accept that interpretation under his own rules of law and conventional politics." (Holden 1973: 53). Though not mentioned by name, one might offer the example of DuBois of the period from 1905 (with the founding of the Niagara Movement), through the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), to 1934 (when DuBois broke with the NAACP), as emblematic of the notion of constitutional opposition that Holden might have had in mind. Such a suspicion is reinforced given Holden’s rather detailed focus in Essay II on the NAACP and its strategies and tactics centering on national level lobbying and litigation in the federal courts (see Holden 1973: 53–61).

The second type of opposition Holden calls moral opposition: He describes this form of external politics this way: “Like constitutional opposition, it accepted the notion of some common framework of legitimacy between White and black. But it stated that common framework in terms of human rights or moral rights, rather than in conventional political terms.” (Holden 1973: 63). Perhaps one of the most theoretically significant things that Holden tells us about this type of external politics is that “Moral opposition contained the capacity, which constitutional opposition lacked, to popularize large-scale participation in the civil rights movement” (Holden, 1973: 63). Without a doubt, Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. and his colleagues in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference epitomized what Holden had in mind when he wrote of the moral oppositionists (see King, 1964; Lawson, 1987; Branch, 1988; and Garrow, 1988).

Withdrawal

Holden’s third type of external politics differs fundamentally from the first two. Inherent in his discussion of these first two types of external politics is one of Holden’s major thematic concerns and biases in this book, the interdependency of blacks and whites in the same geo-political space. However, it is with his third type, that such interdependency is rejected either tactically or more fundamentally. Holden makes the differences between these types rather clear when he writes: “withdrawal is different from both clientage and opposition in the sense that it does not accept the inescapability of the Black-White connection. It differs further from clientage in the refusal to accept the proposition that White supremacy cannot be challenged directly; it differs from opposition in rejecting the idea that Black-White associations are inherently useful” (Holden 1973: 42–43). He adds to this description of withdrawal: “it is more likely to activate the symbols of ‘independence’ and very open and explicit defiance of almost all ‘White values’” (Holden 1973: 42–43).

Holden further divides withdrawal into three separate, though thematically linked, varieties: (a) genuine separatism, (b) tactical withdrawal, and (c) value withdrawal. Genuine separatism is described as the “least important but by no means unimportant variety of withdrawal [politics]” (1973: 68). Holden further delineates genuine separatism into the sub-categories, “cultural separatism” and “political or institutional separatism.” It is with this second sub-category, that he directs our attention to Marcus Garvey’s “dream of an Af-
rican nation state” and the Republic of New Africa, whose members once called “for the creation of a separate nation state out of five states on the Gulf of Mexico” (Holden 1973: 69). I now find it remarkable, though I gave no thought to this point twenty-five years ago, that in his discussion of what he calls “genuine separatism,” Holden makes no mention of the connection between Marcus Garvey and his the Universal Negro Improvement Association on the one hand, and Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam on the other. As a matter of fact, while a scant two sentences in Essay II are devoted to the Republic of New Africa (RNA), no mention is made of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam. Arguably, an absence of any attention to the Nation of Islam, raises the prospect that Holden did not see these religious nationalists as meaningful examples of “genuine separatism,” its public rhetoric notwithstanding.

The second variety of withdrawal Holden calls tactical withdrawal: “A great many people seek withdrawal from those areas in which they think themselves unlikely to win (or in which they see nothing of importance) to an area in which they think they are likely to win (or in which then do see something of importance)” (Holden 1973: 70). He further divides tactical withdrawal into two sub-categories — caucus separatism and street level populism. The first of these two sub-types Holden describes in this way:

I refer to a means of action which does not really propose much genuine institutional separation between Black and White, but which does propose to reallocate decision-making authority in such a way that some specific members of the Black bourgeoisie gain a larger role. One version is the “Black-caucus” format which shows up in the world of the university, in social work, in professional societies and notably in the predominately White churches. (Holden 1973: 70–71)

Finally, “street level populism,” is characterized by Holden as an external form of politics meant to apply to “the growing participation of lower-middle class and lower class persons in Black-community ventures, and to their growing resistance against the participation of ‘professionals,’ ‘middle class people,’ and ‘Ph.D.’s’” (Holden, 1973: 71). The institutional locus of this sort of political expression was in the ranks of community action agencies of the 1960s, and 1970s, spawned initially by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Holden reveals what appears to be his contempt for this form of external politics when he writes, “While there are many advantages associated with street-level populism, and while decision makers in some existing institutions (notably local government institutions) find this new mood inconvenient or even nerve-wracking, my hypothesis is that street-level populism neither has, nor could have, nor is intended to have any decisive effect on American social structure” (Holden, 1973: 72–73). Hence, one must infer that something like street-level populism is to be dismissed by serious practitioners of black politics because it does not confront, challenge, and seek to eradicate white supremacy.

The third and, final, variety of “withdrawal” politics Holden calls value withdrawal. This form of withdrawal is at the opposite end of a would-be withdrawal continuum in terms of its importance accorded by its thoughtful inventor. In this regard Holden writes, “The most important form of withdrawal [value withdrawal] is also the most confused, for it is a complex and undis-
disciplined tendency to withdrawal not from specified institutions, as is the case with tactical withdrawal, but from major values, in terms of which oppositionists have normally formulated their political preferences" (Holden 1973: 73). A close reading of this section of Essay II indicates that Holden has one-time Stokely Carmichael, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and other early adherents to the notion of black power in mind when he constructed this category. Lest we forget, in his rather detailed discussion on "value withdrawal" in Essay II, Holden also devotes some discussion to manifestations of this form of external politics in the programmatic behavior of the Black Panther Party (see comments by Charles E. Jones in this volume).

Holden's Position on These Forms of External Politics

Writing in the early 1970s, Holden saw a troubling evolution in the external politics of the black "nation" from an accommodationist clientage politics of the late 1890s, to various forms of withdrawal of the late 1960s. By the early 1970s Matthew Holden was troubled by the widespread evidence of tendencies of various shades of withdrawal within the black "nation." Race consciousness was on the rise in the aftermath of the articulation of a need for "Black Power" (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967). Black caucuses, and black assemblies were very much in evidence in those primarily northern and mid-western urban centers where there was a critical mass of black folk (e.g., a wide array of black organizations came together for the first National Black Power Conference in 1967). The bulk of his most critical commentary in Essay II, in fact, is devoted to these various shades of withdrawal.

However, Holden dismisses these forms of withdrawal—which he subsumes under the label of the "politics of collective psychiatry"—because of the general unwillingness of their adherents to interact with whites for the purpose of bringing about power sharing and transforming America from an imperial state to a republic one (see Holden 1973: Postscript, 213). As he makes clear later in his book—specifically in Essay IV—(see comments on Essay IV by Michael Preston in this volume) Holden is also contemptuous of the politics of withdrawal, in all of its forms, because it is, in his view, fundamentally irrational.

The State of External Politics: Twenty-Five Years Later

A number of events of the past twenty-five years would suggest that Holden was far too much concerned about these various manifestations of withdrawal within the black "nation" and far less concerned with the prospects of the Republican Party gaining majority party status and its move to the ideological right on issues of racial reconciliation. Two sets of forces were at work in the late 1960s and early 1970s that put most of the manifestations of withdrawal politics in check: political repression and political incorporation. Few in the black "nation" in the late 1960s and early 1970s realized that various forms of political repression were being orchestrated by state-sanctioned clandestine forces, based in the white "nation," against some of the more militant adherents of withdrawal politics in the black "nation." Marable, for example, reminds us, that "COINTERPRO [an FBI program to eliminate
radical political opposition in the United States through a variety of surreptitious means] and the fratricidal struggles between [black] leftists and dogmatic separatists had reduced nationalist movements to a whimpering, self-flagellating set of marginal sects" (1991: 147; see also Churchill and Wall at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/conintel.htm. 28 December 1999).

At the same time that this repression of the more radical adherents of withdrawal was taking place, the legislative victories—the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—of the Civil Rights Movement (driven by direct action protest) eventually led to what Hanes Walton (1988) calls the "institutionalization of the Civil Rights Revolution." The efforts of the moral and constitutional oppositionists, in conjunction with the support of their then sympathetic liberal white allies, had produced favorable public policy responses. The black moral and constitutional oppositionists had gained the support of a Democratic president, Lyndon Johnson, and a Congress dominated by the Democratic Party in both the House and the Senate, in exchange for black electoral support. Johnson and Democrats in Congress won major victories in the 1964 elections. What many black leaders did not fully realize however, was that this quid-pro-quo essentially transformed them from one-time oppositionists into clients of the Democratic Party, though somewhat unlike the black accommodationist clients of the Republican Party of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Booker T. Washington et al.), who eschewed electoral politics and accepted the then racial status quo. These black Democratic clients in the 1960s and 1970s called on their Democratic patrons in Congress, and in the executive branch of the federal government, to use the federal authority to programmatically create conditions of racial equality.

It did not take black leaders long to realize that the major piece of civil rights legislation of this era—the Civil Rights Act of 1964—was a largely passive effort to ameliorate the harsher effects of institutional racism. More active efforts to remove racial impediments in the opportunity structure were needed many black leaders reasoned. The issue of passive versus active ameliorative public policy however, was what eventually caused the liberal coalition that had produced these policy victories to come apart (Steinberg, 1995). In the aftermath of President Lyndon Johnson’s June, 1965 commencement speech at Howard University in which he called for “not just legal equity but human ability—not just equality as a rights and a theory but equality as a fact and as a result” (Johnson quoted in Steinberg, 1995: 114). Black leaders more forcefully began to call for most aggressive efforts on the part of the federal government to create conditions of equal opportunity. This opened the door for various affirmative action programs and minority set-aside programs in the area of federal contracting.

Such a shift from more passive ameliorative policy efforts to more active ones was not without controversy, and political damage. In this regard, Edsall and Edsall write, “Liberalism had unleashed forces that its leaders could neither control nor keep within the confines of traditional political negotiation, and the once-dominant, left-center league began to crack” (1992: 49). Over time, the Republican Party carefully took advantage of this fraying consensus in the Democratic Party.

It is perhaps prophetic that Holden considered the possibility of the Re-
publican Party forming a majority coalition with appeals to race as a major component in the glue that kept this coalition together. Although he does not make this point in Essay II, in Essay IV where he spells out his "rational strategy" for making a "decisive break with institutional racism" (Holden, 1973: 131), he urged measured political responses by black leadership within a very short time frame, i.e., within five years. If such action was not taken in this time frame he argued, "the chances are that the Republican party will have chosen to consolidate a national majority on an antiblack basis" (Holden, 1973: 139). With remarkable prescience, he goes on to write, "We may believe that the [Republican] party would become—indeed, has become—the center of resistance born of a generalized unease about "things gone sour," that this generalized unease is antireform and would, under some circumstances, be functionally equivalent to 'antiblack' (1973: 139).

The prophetic accuracy of Holden's consideration of the Republican party constructing an "antiblack" majority coalition can be seen in the observations of Edsall and Edsall who again tell us that: "The GOP has positioned itself just where the overwhelming majority of white Americans stand on racial policy: in favor of the principle of equality, but opposed to the enforcement mechanisms developed by the courts and the federal regulatory system" (Edsall and Edsall, 1992: 13).

Notwithstanding the accuracy of the prediction that the Republican Party could become a more racially conservative political formation by constructing an "antiblack" majority (that first demonstrated its clout in presidential elections and later in congressional contests), Holden did not foresee that this conservative majority coalition would include black voices (Singer, 1981; Jones, 1987; Applebome, 1991; and Rueter, 1995). These black neo-conservatives (to distinguish them from the Booker T. Washington era black conservatives), were not merely accommodationists to prevailing racial order, but they actively opposed policy-related efforts to ameliorate racial inequality (Williams, 1982; Sowell, 1984; Loury, 1985; and Steele, 1990). In effect, these black neo-conservatives became the Republican Party's principle critics of all forms of race-specific public policy. Over time, these black clients of the conservative wing of the Republican Party would experience a growth of various interconnected organizations (e.g., Headway Magazine; Project 21; the National Congress of Black Conservatives; Black America's Political Action Committee; and the Center for New Black Leadership) far more extensive than anything seen among the black folk who are clients of the national Democratic Party, e.g., old line civil rights organizations (the NAACP, SCLC, the Urban League), and black Democratic elected officials in Congress and at the state and local levels.

We should not fault Professor Holden for failing to predict the coming of black neo-conservatism. By the same token, he did not envision a move to the right on the part of the Democratic Party in its effort reconstruct an electoral majority in presidential elections after suffering losses at the polls in 1980, 1984, and in 1988. The epitome of a successful electoral strategy of blending largely symbolic concessions, such as cabinet appointments, for its more liberal supporters—black folks—with more instrumental policies (e.g., the 1994 crime bill; and the 1996 welfare reform legislation) for more fiscally and socially conservative voters—who tend to be white and vote Republican, was
seen in the election of William Jefferson Clinton to the White House in 1992 and again in 1996 (Pliawsky in Ruetier, 1995: 385–398). Clinton’s center-right public policy posture along with the fact that he has had to govern for five of his eight years in office with Republicans in control of the House and the Senate, have all but guaranteed the impossibility of any race-specific policy initiatives that would benefit African Americans in particular, from coming to fruition. Hence, the black liberal clients of the Democratic Party have been able to get very little from the Clinton administration other than symbolism.

For reasons that I have touched on above, radical adherents of the politics of withdrawal have all but disappeared from the American scene since the mid-1970s. Various practitioners of tactical withdrawal (such as NCOBPS) continue to exist but perhaps without the ideological fervor that was seen in the early 1970s. The one organizational advocate of what Holden calls genuine separatism, the Republic of New Africa, continues to operate within the territorial borders of the United States, not having made any more progress toward its objective of establishing a separate nation—carved from five southern states—for descendants of enslaved Africans than when it was founded in 1968.

As was pointed out above, in his discussion of genuine separatism Holden made no mention of the Nation of Islam. Events of the past twenty-five years indicate that such a decision then is still warranted, but perhaps more so than when The Politics of the Black “Nation” was first published. The Nation of Islam under Louis Farrakhan, characterized here as “a rhetorical advocate of territorial separatism” (this is one of ten goals that this organization advocates and has openly advocated since 1960), embraces another type of external politics, that Holden could not have anticipated. I refer to this new type of external politics as “inclusionary ambiguity.” On the one hand, the ideology of the Nation of Islam takes the position that “the time in history has arrived for the separation from the Whites of this nation” (one of twelve points found under “What the Muslims Believe” in its weekly newspaper The Final Call). On the other hand, in 1984, Farrakhan involved his organization in the Jesse Jackson presidential campaign, for the first time in his life registered to vote, and encouraged members of the Nation to do the same. In 1990, evoking the notion of a fear of a “sell out” (see Holden’s discussion on this point in Essay I), on the part of a number of African Americans politicians who had been elected in the 1980s, Farrakhan encouraged at least three members of the Nation to run for public office (Gardell; 1996: 312–313). Farrakhan’s positions therefore reflect the ambiguity that has characterized the political behavior of many in the black “nation” since the early nineteenth century (Cruse, 1967). Farrakhan who has been one of the black “nation’s” most strident critics of white supremacy, squandered a golden opportunity at the Million Man March, in October 1995, (which he organized; see McCormick, 1997) by failing to issue a direct challenge to overt guardians and defenders of white supremacy. Farrakhan instead turned this event into what Professor Holden would perhaps call the “politics of theater.” In this regard, it is perhaps appropriate to close this retrospective essay with some comments from Holden on the “politics of theater” that characterize the “inclusionary ambiguity” that has become emblematic of the Nation of Islam under Farrakhan’s leadership:
Politics as collective psychiatry may take many forms, one of which is politics-as-theater, an entertainment which reaffirms or inspires the audience in feelings which it may have but not see recognized and respected by others, or which it even may have disguised from itself. Politics-as-theater allows leaders to build their relationship upon ritual practices, which may have little or no effect upon achieving declared objectives. But the harder it is to achieve declared objectives, the more likely is it that a theatrical and ritualistic politics, serving the function of collective psychiatry, will in fact predominate! (emphasis added; Holden, 1973: 86)

Unfortunately it seems that twenty-five years after the publication of this seminal work, the programmatic challenges to white supremacy that Holden called for (see comments on Essay V by Dianne Pinderhughes in this volume), have not occurred. The practitioners of inclusionary politics that has been described herein—the modern day black neoconservative accommodationists and the one time moral and constitutional oppositionists—have become the willing clients of the two major political parties. The leaders of these two camps can do little else without paying a great cost to themselves and to the relationships that they have developed with their white patrons. The other organization within the black "nation" that has been at least a rhetorical critic of white supremacy has under its current leadership chosen instead to practice what Holden calls politics-as-theater. The scholarship of Matthew Holden, Jr. has helped us to put these events of the past twenty-five years in some sort of analytical perspective, yet regrettably the opening line of Essay II remains with us: "White supremacy is the single most important fact in the environment of Black politics" (Holden, 1973: 42).

References


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At many professional conferences over the past twenty years, several colleagues and I have often engaged in an academic version of the UPI college football coaches "top-ten" poll. But, instead of identifying the "top-ten" teams of the week, our task was more daunting: to identify the "top-five" most influential books on black politics of all time. These discussions have been among the most memorable from my conference experience. I remember heated arguments about which books rightfully belong in the canon of black politics. Also, I remember how over the years some seemingly classic African American works quietly slipped from their top-five spot, as newer works replaced them. What struck me time and time again was the consistent appearance of The Politics of the Black "Nation" among the "top-five." Among different colleagues at different conferences, Holden’s work always manages to make the list. The appearance is so consistent that it leads one to suggest that Holden’s landmark study rightfully belongs among the canon of black politics. In any case, Matthew Holden’s highly acclaimed work has exhibited a staying power that defines it as a classic work in the field of black politics.

Holden’s thought-provoking collection of essays examines the African American response to the enduring racial schism in the United States. In this work, Holden identifies the salient dynamics of black politics, assesses black political strategies and offers prescriptive political options to guide the leadership of the black "nation."

His innumerable insights, theoretical concepts and propositions have proved instructive for students of black politics. For example, McCormick and Smith’s penetrating analysis of Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential bid
(McCormick and Smith, 1989) utilizes the “cultural prism” concept, a concept taken from the first essay in Holden’s classic text. Similarly, Holden’s notion of clientage politics (see Holden, 1973: 43–52) has been instrumental in furthering our understanding of the predicament of African American leadership—as evident in Adolph Reed’s provocative and controversial assessment of Jesse Jackson’s first presidential campaign (Reed, 1986).

This contribution to the Holden symposium revisits Essay III, “Politics as a Collective Psychiatry: A Critique of Withdrawal.” In Essay III, Holden assesses the various black power strategies that cut across the American political landscape during the late 1960s and early 1970s. At times, he offers a brutally honest, if not scathing indictment of these strategies. This retrospective essay is organized as follows. First, Holden’s objectives in Essay III are summarized. This section identifies the assumptions that undergird his critique and delineates the major observations drawn from his assessment. Next, Holden’s analysis offered in Essay III, in terms of which ideas have withstood the test of time, is evaluated with particular emphasis on the relevance of these ideas for contemporary black politics.

Misguided Black Nationalists: Holden’s Critique of the Politics of Withdrawal

In Essay III, Holden expresses grave doubts about the attention given to the nationalist forms of black politics that characterized the black power era (1966–1975). During this period, the concept of black power served as the catalyst for a variety of different forms of black nationalism: These forms ranged from the corporate-inspired black capitalism advocated by the Congress of Racial Equality under the leadership of Floyd McKissick in his creation of Soul City, North Carolina, to the revolutionary politics of the League of Revolutionary Workers and the Black Panther Party. Also included was the culturally focused Los Angeles-based “US” of Maulana Karenga and the Republic of New Africa which advocated the creation of a black nation-state. In many black communities, black nationalist organizations flourished, such as the Student Organization of Black Unity (SOBU), Black United Fronts, and Pan Africanist groups. Indeed, this period constituted the zenith in independent black radical politics (VanDeburg, 1992).

Holden subsumes these various black nationalist strategies under “the politics of withdrawal,” one of three forms of “external politics” practiced by the leaders of the black “nation” (see: Holden, 1973, Essay II, 42–95). This heyday of black nationalism deeply concerned Matthew Holden. For the most part, he found these efforts irrelevant, politically ineffective and dangerous to the personal welfare of African American people. He proceeds to examine five manifestations of the “Politics of Withdrawal”—his euphemism for black nationalist tactics. He labels the five manifestations as “ritual and illusions” (Holden, 1973: 97). They include: (1) the ritual of a connection with the “Third World”; (2) territorial separatism; (3) armed struggle as a political tactic; (4) “street-level populism”; and (5) the notion of “community control.” In Essay III, Holden evaluates the problems and implications of each of the aforementioned ideas.

Before discussing Holden’s critique of these ideas, it is important to iden-
tify the primary values and assumptions underlying Holden's critique of these notions. It is also important to identify the primary values and assumptions underlying Holden's critique of the "politics of withdrawal." At least two assumptions undergird Holden's analysis. First, he advocates the use of a rational decision-making model as a method for evaluating black political tactics. This model, Sharkansky (1982: 213–214) tells us contains the following steps:

1. Identify the problem.
2. Clarify goals, and then rank them according to their importance.
3. List all the possible means or policies for achieving each goal.
4. Assess all the costs and benefits that would seem to accrue from each alternative policy.
5. Select the package of goals and associated policies that would bring the greatest relative benefits and the least relative disadvantages.

Holden argues, "the strategic-tactical conception most likely to be productive will be one scrupulously rational, ruthlessly unsentimental" (Holden, 1973: 125). Furthermore, he suggests that using a "politics of rationality" ensures the selection of the most optimal political strategy. A rational decision-making model, he argues, avoids the likelihood of adopting tactics, which are emotionally satisfying, but politically ineffective. Holden explains that "the task before blacks, therefore, is to find those ways of coping with their own development in a hostile environment which will be effective rather than self-defeating, rational rather than sentimental" (Holden, 1973: 125). The "politics of rationality, he tells us "depends upon the emotional self-discipline which allows one to master both unreasonable optimism and unreasonable despair" (Holden, 1973: 126). In other words, Holden argues that it is incumbent upon black leaders to adopt strategies which reflect a realistic assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the so-called "black nation." Holden contends that political behavior emanating from a "politics of collective psychiatry"—which is how he would characterize all black nationalist formation—falls woefully short of the criteria associated with the politics of rationality.

His overall conclusion and prescription that both white and black people should be committed to the politics of peacemaking is largely a function of his commitment to integration—the second premise underlying his critique. He maintains, like most proponents of integration, that there is an inherent interdependence between white and black people in America. Holden claims that "the United States contains 'two nations,' whose fate is inevitably common. The two do not have the option of separable outcomes" (Holden, 1973: 96–97). As we will see, this integrationist precept profoundly shapes his analysis.

The first "illusion" Holden tackles is the political concept, the "Third World." During the 1960s, black progressives suggested a commonality and political solidarity between the plight of African Americans and that of non-white developing countries. Holden lambastes the "Third World" idea. He writes, "it is psychologically comforting to entertain such an idea. As practical politics, this idea is nonsense" (Holden, 1973: 97). First, he maintains that
non-whiteness does not automatically confer the common interests needed for effective global multiracial coalitions. Secondly, Holden argues that the economic self-interests of the so-called "Third World" countries would preclude these nations from promoting the interests of black Americans. In this regard, he writes,

They could not afford to do so, could not ordinarily have the leverage to do so, and would be forsaking the necessities of their own citizens if they tried to do so.

To imagine otherwise is to be forsaking the necessities of their own citizens if they tried to do so. To imagine otherwise is to be naïve in the extreme. (Holden, 1973: 97)

Holden was equally critical of the second "illusion" of the "politics of withdrawal"—territorial separatism. One of the most prominent advocates of the separatist black nation-state strategy was the Republic of New Africa (RNA), an organization founded by Gaidi and Imari Obadele in Detroit in 1968. In 1971, the Republic of New Africa moved its headquarters to Mississippi. The RNA's primary objective was to create a sovereign black nation among the five southern states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina (Obadele, 1975). Holden raises a host of logistical concerns about territorial separatism. For example, he discounts the probability that the United States government would provide the needed capital to form a separate black nation. Moreover, he expresses skepticism about the economic viability and military capabilities of a black nation-state that such an illusion would produce. He laments,

Were we able to deal in imaginative might-have-beens, we could suppose it a historical misfortune that the realities of the nineteenth century forbids some Black equivalent of the Mormon settlement in Utah, such as the now-dead dream of a Black state in Oklahoma. But the dreams of history can have no merit unless they are reconcilable with the logistical-economic-technological-administrative realities of the present. (Holden, 1973: 103)

Similarly, Holden voices practical objections to the idea of community control—the third illusion. Community control means that black people should administer the key institutions of their community. Members of the black community, as opposed to white bureaucrats, would manage functions such as education, health care and law enforcement. Holden opposes community control, adding that "the local community is simply not the critical decision unit but a mere subordinate facilitator and no amount of decentralization will ever cure that" (Holden, 1973: 118). Simply put, major decisions with potential macro-level impact are not formulated at the local level, he tells us. Finally, Holden questions the assumption that black control automatically translates into improved policy responsiveness. He notes, "it does not follow that their decisions would automatically produce superior results (although they might not produce inferior results)" (Holden, 1973: 116).

Also, Holden questions the notion of "street-level populism"—the fourth ritual of the politics of withdrawal. Historically, black nationalist social movements have particularly resonated with the working class and working poor of the African American community. These movements often advocate the grassroots mobilization of lower-income segments of the black community.
Holden defines the political activation of this sector as "street-level populism." He writes that this "refers to the growing participation of lower-middle class and lower class persons in black-community ventures and to their growing resistance against the participation of professionals, middle-class people and Ph.D.'s" (Holden, 1973: 162).

Holden argues that "street-level populism" adversely impacts black leadership. According to Holden, this expansion of lower class participation is undergirded by authentic claims of blackness. As a result, Holden maintains there are unrealistic expectations of group unity and a proclivity to deter to the "folks" styles, which serves to marginalize black middle-class leadership. Black middle-class members either make "folks" style appeals to their constituents or they "accede to a populist mythology that true leadership springs from the brothers and sisters on the street." Consequently individuals from the black middle-class, Holden maintains, are reluctant to assume a leadership role in the African American community.

Holden reserves his most scathing criticisms for the tactic of political violence as a means of advancing black interest—the fifth illusion of the politics of withdrawal. Black politics scholar Manning Marable (Marable, 1991: 110) notes, “Remarkably few Black nationalist and Black Powerites had advocated violence against white-owned property, the subversion of authority, or the seizure of state power.” From Holden’s perspective, this is a welcome relief due to the grave consequences stemming from the doctrine of armed rebellions. He identifies two dire ramifications of employing political violence: "...eroding that very Black unity which its advocates profess to want, and eliciting measures and forms of white coercion upon the whole Black population, against which the advocates of armed rebellion themselves are inherently unable to offer serious defense” (Holden, 1973: 104).

However, Holden, like Frederick Douglass, does not totally discount the desirability of political violence. He reminds us “it is conceivable that there would be circumstances in which a prudent and rational organization of collective self-defense would be legally defensible and otherwise be appropriate” (Holden, 1973: 105). Nevertheless, Holden doubts the political utility of the doctrine of armed rebellion and is equally skeptical of the military capability of black people to implement this tactic effectively. Holden retorts, “from a strictly technical point of view, neither Mao nor Giap nor Che Guevara provides any clues for warfare in behalf of a large minority population in an industrial society” (Holden, 1973: 107).

In short, Holden’s commitment to integration filtered through the analytical lens for political rationality, renders the aforementioned tactics of black nationalism ineffective. During the golden age of black nationalist politics twenty-five years ago, Holden concluded that the tactics of withdrawal were irrational, risky, and sometimes irresponsible. To what extent do Holden’s observations have merit for contemporary black politics? This line of inquiry is the focus of the next section of this retrospective essay.

The Contemporary Relevance of Holden’s Observations

Twenty-five years after the publication of *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* many of Holden’s observations remain valid. The staying power of this book
speaks to the seminal quality of Holden’s important contribution to the study of black politics. For example, Holden correctly underscores the state’s repressive response to the advocacy of the doctrine of armed rebellion. The experience of the Black Panther Party, which explicitly organized on the basis of armed resistance, represents one of the many black powerite organizations that became a target of government repression. Indeed, black activists, such as Sundiata Acoli (Clark Squire), Sekou Odienga (Nathaniel Burns), Mundo We Langa (David Rice) and Eddie Conway remain in prison today as a result of their activism in the Black Panther Party (Grady-Willis, 1998). Holden’s insightful observation that “violence will at sometime be used within Black politics even more than against whites” continues to have merit (Holden, 1973: 108–109). One only has to consider past inter—and intra-organizational conflicts which have been resolved by violence against fellow black activists. Moreover, few observers will disagree with Holden’s observation that black people lack the technical capabilities to wage successfully a military campaign against the United States. Nevertheless, it remains paradoxical that black people in United States are one of the few people relegated by Holden to achieve liberation without a military component of some form or the other.

Similarly, Holden’s critique of territorial separation rings true twenty-five years later. Notwithstanding the tireless efforts of Imari Obadele and the membership of the Republic of Africa over three decades, the concept of the black nation-state model remains an unattainable political objective for many of the logistical reasons detailed by Holden.

In a broader sense, Holden is also correct twenty-five years later that black people should be hesitant to depend on Third World countries for political support. Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War reinforces his observation. Black Panther member Kathleen Cleaver (Cleaver, 1998) notes that the international section of the Black Panther Party in Algiers, Algeria was eventually shut-down because of the Algerian government’s need to sell liquefied gas to the United States oil companies. However, twenty-five years later its appears that Holden overestimated the opposition to imperialism and oppression by non-white people throughout the world. Cuba’s refusal to return Assata Shakur to the United States is a prominent example. Furthermore, this shared common interest once gave rise to a host of progressive movements across the globe. Despite varied heritages and languages, left-wing formations in England (Black Panther Movement), Israel (Black Panther Party of Israel), Bermuda (Black Beret Cadre), Australia (Black Panther Party), and India (Dalit Panthers) drew from the organization founded by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale in the United States in their respective struggles against oppression and worldwide imperialism.

Where Holden does miss the target is his assessment of “street-level populism” and its attendant consequences. Over the course of the last twenty-five years there has been an appreciable decline in the participation of the lower socioeconomic sector of the African American community. Indeed, rather than the destruction of the black middle-class leaders forecasted by Holden, leaders from this strata have actually flourished during transformation from protest to politics during the post-civil rights era. Moreover, the decline of grassroots mobilization spawned by black nationalism has eliminated an important mechanism of accountability of this leadership class. Consequently,
the militant advocacy of black policy issues is often a remnant of yesterday's radial black politics. In retrospect, many aspects of Holden's logistical critique remain true today. Unfortunately, however, Holden views all forms of withdrawal as a function of despair. All forms of withdrawal, he maintains, suffer from an absence of political rationality. The notion of political rationality as a strategy to guide the black struggle against institutional racism is the topic of investigation in Essay IV in *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* the next selection in this volume.

**References**


Looking Backward While Moving Forward:
Comments on Essay IV:
"Toward Black Regrouping"

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One of the major tests of good scholarship is whether time will render it useless. Another significant test is how one answers these questions: "Does the work say anything useful?" and if so, "How well does it say it?" Matthew Holden's *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* published in 1973, answers both of these questions in the affirmative. In my opinion, this is what good scholarship should be about. Given that the papers that make up this symposium were originally presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), it is proper to put some of the discussion in the context of the maturation of our organization.

Since Holden published his book in 1973, NCOBPS has had twenty-seven (27) presidents (only three had been selected before 1973). We have moved from Federal City College (in Washington, DC) and PASCAL's Motor Inn (in Atlanta, Georgia) to the Western Peachtree Plaza in downtown Atlanta. Our annual conference has grown from one panel an hour to at least four concurrent sessions every ninety minutes. We now have a credit rating that allows us to move from place to place without a hassle. Black politics is an established area of intellectual inquiry in the curricula of many colleges and universities. We have more black political scientists now than ever before and while we have a long way to go—we have made substantial progress.

Howard and Clark-Atlanta universities, combined, are still the top producers of black Ph.D.s in the United States. We have witnessed the growth of black elected officials (BEOs) in our cities, counties, states, and at the national level. We have helped them get elected and criticized them when we did not like what they have done. We have watched and applauded as some of our colleagues have gone up the ladder of success and been sad to see some fall.
We have had riots and rebellions, assassinations and deaths, successes and failures. From the 1970s to 1990s, we have been witness to some progress and change, all the while fighting off some regressive forces, which continue to threaten our very existence.

Twenty-five years after the publication of *The Politics of the Black “Nation”* (hereafter: *The Black “Nation”*) we look back and ask: How well did it stand the test of time? My answer is that Holden addressed many of the key issues of the time in a manner that challenged us to think differently about how we should approach the subject matter of black politics in a “rational” fashion. That some of his points missed the mark is no surprise; that he was on target on so many points, is perhaps more surprising.

As much as I admire Matthew Holden’s work, what he had to say was not brilliant. Instead it was the work of a thoughtful scholar who sat down and wrestled with some pressing issues of the early 1970s in a way that others had not. He produced, for those who could follow his reasoning, a provocative piece of work that still has some relevance for us today. Let me address what he had to say in Essay IV of *The Black “Nation”*.

In Essay IV, “Toward Black Regrouping,” Holden argues that a rational strategy of the sort that he advocates, “… would be aimed at saving the opportunity for a decisive break with institutionalized racism” (1973: 131). He argues that this opportunity would present itself over the next twenty years and that black leadership needed to be poised to take advantage of this opportunity.

His basic argument is that social change is partly a function of generational change and that the complexity of generational change would lead to a new group of white elites to whom racial matters are not just a matter of blind belief in the inferiority of blacks but an understanding of the falsity of the claim that had been held until the 1970s. He states that the white college-age population of the later 1920s and 1930s was the first to believe that the inferiority of blacks was not self-evident and that by 1960 the white college-age population was the first to learn in any significant numbers that substantial racial equality ought to be a major objective. This feeling, Holden points out, grew in the 1970s. Yet, this scholar was aware that this feeling was not universally shared among whites. The attitudes of white people toward substantial racial equality, as an end to be enthusiastically pursued via the public policy process, were “middling,” i.e., lukewarm, and had a moderate to conservative bias. Yet a politically rational strategy, Holden argues in this essay, dictates that an understanding of white people’s unhappiness with the system must be understood by black leaders and that projects geared to the pursuit of substantial racial equality must be framed in a way that could be supported by ordinary white people (1973: 133–134). Such a proposition reveals one of the major themes that runs throughout *The Black “Nation”*: “the inescapable interdependence” between black and whites in America.

In the remainder of Essay IV, Holden addresses the following issues: the “inescapable interdependence” of blacks and whites; the question of integration as an objective; and setting a time horizon for the sort of action that is advocated in Essays V, VI, and VII. The basic questions are these: Can blacks find common ground with whites? And if so, how, and around what issues? Is integration a better strategy than the alternatives presented by other
groups? And, is the next twenty years a reasonable time frame in which to accomplish the kind of political objectives—in five-year increments that Holden says are important? Twenty-five years after Holden boldly put forth his vision we ask: Have we achieved the objectives that he called for? and Were these reasonable objectives to pursue?

In the preface to The Black “Nation,” Holden makes a small but important point when he indicates that: “There are many intelligent people, mainly of the “conservative” sort . . . who appear to believe that no urgent action to reduce Black-White conflict is essential. Indeed, some are willing to risk increasing that conflict by invoking governmental and private force more sharply against signs of Black discontent” (1973: xi). Some of these racially conservative sentiments that Holden expressed in 1973 are still, if not more pervasive in 1999. Consider the following:

- Racial conservatives are even more provocative today (than they were twenty-five years ago) as they seek to challenge gains made by African Americans in the 1960s;
- In California, a conservative governor, Pete Wilson, and his black “client” Ward Connerly enthusiastically promoted Proposition 209. The aim of this public policy, it appears, has been not to unite, but to divide blacks and whites, especially white moderates from liberal blacks, and other racial minorities.
- The words “three strikes and you’re in jail for a very long time”—replacing similar such words of the 1970s, “law and order”—are the new code words to contain the growing “others“: Latino and black criminals. Fear of crime is a wedge issue for racial conservatives to unite whites against African Americans and other minority groups; and
- Proposition 187 in California was aimed at immigrants (read: Latinos), as in the current attacks on bilingual education. The point here is that not just blacks, but other racial minorities are under attack from racial conservatives as well.

What is new in the 1990s compared to 1970s is this: In 1970s racial liberals still held the moral high ground—albeit somewhat tenuous. In the 1990s conservatives are becoming more politically aggressive and, perhaps more importantly, have succeeded in taking the moral high ground. Their language is the old language of the Civil Rights Movement and they have, thus far, won the public relations battle. Racial conservatives have convinced significant portions of the American voting public, that groups who exercise very little political power have nonetheless used the power of the state to advance their interest at the expense of whites. Holden did not miss the possibility that racial conservatives could become bolder and more racially reactionary. In his explanation of the need for black leaders to construct and pursue a rational political strategy in five-year increments he observed twenty-five years ago that:

If a more reasonable course of action cannot be discovered by that time [over the course of the next twenty years, i.e., by 1993], the chances are that the Republican party will have chosen to consolidate a national majority on an anti-black
basis... We may believe that [this] party would become—indeed, has become—the center of resistance born of a generalized unease about "things going sour," that this generalized unease is antireform and would, under some circumstances, be functionally equivalent to "anti-black." (Holden 1973: 139)

Holden, it appears, envisioned the possibility of what came to be called the "Reagan Revolution" that dominated American presidential politics between 1980 and 1992. He did not foresee however, that such an ideological shift, made possible by a series of presidential election victories, would also enable racial conservatives to capture the moral high ground and win the public relations battle.

Throughout the rest of Essay IV, Holden raises several significant questions and makes a number of observations: First, he asserts that white elites by the early 1990s should be less prejudiced than those in 1971. Holden based his argument on generational change and argued that such change would be slow but steady. There is some evidence to suggest that this is true but one is left to ask how much difference it has made. The answer is certainly "some," but if the question asked is: "Has enough racial progress been made?" The answer is likely to be "no!"

Holden also suggests that new white elites will open up the system when pushed by public policies and when, more importantly, it means more profits and/or status for themselves. Thus, he expected new white elites to bring not love but more tolerance and acceptance to the arena of public opinion; he did not expect the new white elites to be missionaries, but to be open to change. As indicated above however, he also raised the prospect that racially conservative politics could grow stronger. While events over the course of the past twenty-five years indicate that Holden was correct in this regard, he failed to see that increased reported racial tolerance on the part of whites has not translated into a more racially progressive public policy stance in terms of efforts to close the socioeconomic gap between blacks and whites.

Holden has also called on black leaders in this volume to pursue courses of action which could be meaningful to ordinary white folk. Has this been done? The answer is "no," but it should be clear that black leaders have yet to call for an approach based on class similarities that black folk might share with whites. In that regard, the policy options advocated by black leaders have been circumscribed what Holden would call the "racial schism."

As previously mentioned, Holden writes in this essay of the "inescapable interdependence" between blacks and whites. Certainly while this interdependence (which is of a demographic and ecological nature, Holden argues—1973: 135), is arguably inescapable, the overall power dynamics of the larger society are such that blacks are much more dependent on whites and thus this situation makes for a very unbalanced form of interdependence.

In related part of this discussion in Essay IV, Holden tries to explain the concept of "integration" as a political objective that should be pursued by both blacks and whites. He basically argues that no other political outcome is more desirable than integration. He describes integration as follows:

Integration is the result, which exists when two (or more) diverse parties are brought together in what is a common political enterprise and a common structure of respect, even though each of the parties may also have certain additional enterprises and structures (self-development) particular to itself. (Holden, 1973: 137)
Operationally, what would involving blacks and whites in the United States look like? How would we be able to recognize it when we encounter it? Holcen offers this description:

We should know it by substantial evidence that race would not predict the distribution of either material benefits or psychic esteem in any significant degree. We should be unable to predict that a disproportionate number of the individuals treated with contempt and disesteem, a disproportionate number of the children dying at birth, a disproportionate number of prisoners in jail, or a disproportionate number of educated men would be of one race or another. It would be this spread of life chances, individual and "institutional," across a wide range within each group that would indicate integration. (Holden, 1973: 137-138)

Do we have an integrated polity? I think the answer is obvious. Is it better than other alternatives? Probably so, but the other alternatives (see Jones' discussion above on the "politics of withdrawal") have not been fully tested.

Holden's last point in Essay IV is about setting a time horizon for the accomplishment of certain strategic objectives. Setting a time horizon as a part of a rational strategy that Holden advocates at the outset of this essay. Holden argues that we may never reach all of our goals, but we also will never make progress unless we have some goals to reach. In 1973 Professor Holden was an optimist in the face of deep pessimism and cynicism. He was keenly aware of the wrongs of American society—but noted that progress was being made, albeit slowly. If this is true, the question he raises is whether we will be prepared to take advantage of what is offered when the opportunities present themselves. He also provides us with a systematic way to try and analyze what changes might occur and which issues will still need our attention. Setting time horizons may not always work, but they provide benchmarks for assessing progress toward our objectives.

Let me conclude by stating that Holden was quite aware of the fact that the problem of the "color line" did not end in 1973. It is clear that he expected it to exist up through the early 1990s. What he did not anticipate is that while the debate on issues of the "color line" would still be apparent in the 1990s, this debate would become multiethnic and multiracial in character, rather than just black and white. To the degree that blacks make progress in, for example, states like California, it would be in conjunction with other "people of color." Over the course of the twenty years following the publication of The Black "Nation," the sort of rational strategy called for by Holden in this and subsequent essays in this provocative volume was never fully pursued by black leadership in the United States. What were the particulars of such a strategy? Answers to this question are explored in the remaining retrospective contributions to this symposium.

Note

1. The Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations, based on a national telephone survey conducted in early 1997 reports: "In keeping with their generally positive and optimistic view of the state of race relations in their community and across the country, Whites express very tolerant personal racial attitudes, and give little indication in response to survey questions that they have strong preju-
dice against members of the opposite race. The tolerance expressed by White Americans has increased substantially over the last thirty to forty years, and Whites are now much less likely to object to several racial situations which were reacted to more negatively in previous years" (Gallup, 1997: 20).

References


Toward Black Regrouping: Comments on Essay V: “The Next Five Years: I. Morale and Objective Capacity”

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Matthew Holden is a colleague whom I have come to know over the years within the domains of political science, who has offered continuing encouragement, and direction in my intellectual development, and my ideas. My responsibility is to comment on Essay V, “The Next Five Years: I. Morale and Objective Capacity.” Grounded in what he calls “political rationality,” one of the major themes that runs throughout this seminal volume, Holden argues at the outset of Essay IV (see the previous contribution from Michael Preston), that “rational strategy would be aimed, . . . at saving the opportunity for a decisive break with institutionalized racism” (Holden, 1973: 131). If such a break was to occur however, he tells us “the next five years (1971–1976) constitute the critical zone in which certain strategic measures ought to be initiated or accomplished” (Holden, 1973: 138). It is in Essay V where Holden programmatically addresses what he feels black folk must do to maintain an “integrated polity.”

My comments focus on the following issues addressed by Holden in Essay V:

- Leadership
- The Power Problem
- Education
- Economic Equalization
- Communal Order and Equal Protection under the Law
Leadership

At the outset of Essay V, Holden offers a courageous discussion on one of the attributes that a rational black leader must possess: self-confidence, particularly when faced with an unclear and unpredictable situation. Holden writes "[A]nother part of [Black Leaders'] obligation is to call to the attention of their followers certain basic realities and certain alternative approaches. Those who . . . say . . . what the audience already wants to hear . . . encourage the audiences to engage in self-delusion which is at best wasteful and at worst self-destructive (1973: 144-5). He notes that the very fact of "leadership" creates intersecting problems: crises of conscience related to feelings of failure, leadership perquisites unrelated to job performance, and questions of group loyalty. It is these combinations of factors that perhaps lead to the continuing discussions over failures of or the absence of leadership, when the questions are related to how "leaders" approach problems.

An interesting case of this appeared in Chicago politics from the 1970s through 1987. Political scientist Michael Preston's work about the Chicago political environment in the early 1980s described the lack of and the crisis in political leadership (Preston, 1982a). It was only a year or two after this article was published that Congressman Harold Washington was elected to the Mayor's office even though there had not been any significant change in the character of black political leadership. Although Washington's first term was a difficult one he was able to address the resistance inside the city council, to focus on the political reality of needing electoral support from outside his constituency and therefore to win re-election in 1987. After Washington's sudden death at the end of the year, the city's black leadership was unable to address its internal differences in order to avoid competition at the polls between black candidates; unable to register voters to turn out the largest number possible among black voters; and unable to develop a strategy to appeal outside of the core constituency in order to develop a winning electoral majority. Their failures in these areas led to the election of Richard M. Daley in 1991 and his re-election in 1995. In fact, the size of the vote won by black candidates after Washington's death has generally declined, and turnout has fallen (Preston, 1982a; Finderhughes, 1997).

Michael Preston could argue that leadership was a problem in 1982, yet almost immediately after Washington's election the perception of a leadership problem vanished. The wonderfully broad range of Washington's leadership talent, including his charisma and status as native son to Chicago's black community, oriented people toward thinking about "The Man, Not the Plan," although he had specifically asked them to consider the reverse. Washington had attempted set the process of strategic thinking in motion by forcing those who asked him to run for mayor to build a strong, broad-based electoral coalition which reached out beyond the confines of the black leadership group. After Washington's death all of those lessons—unity among the African American voter base, strong voter registration efforts and effective turnout, and maintenance of a multiracial electoral coalition—were lost. Black leaders fought each other, without a coherent strategy.
The Power Problem

Holden discusses the power problem as collective psychiatry (see Essay III). Black politics, Holden argues, has been "A drive toward 'Black pride'... a search for higher morale, through the discovery of something which is 'ours' in a social world where nearly everything valued is 'theirs'" (Holden, 1973: 146-7). An article touching on strikingly similar sentiments appeared on April 7, 1998 in the New York Times. Reporting on conflict between African Americans and South Africans: "Junette Pinkney, a former producer for 'The Phil Donahue Show'... said that being in a country where most people are Black has been wonderful." There is an enormous psychic relief. Here I feel there's the possibility of being at home in a way that America will never be home." Another person described a friend who "cut his two-year contract short after nine months. He was practically in tears," lamenting that "If a Black man cannot be accepted here, where can he go?" (NYT 4/7/98: 9A).

The cultural comfort and similarity that many African Americans describe in their visits to South Africa do not ameliorate the powerful economic, social, cultural and ethnic differences that remain between blacks and whites or among those in South Africa from different continents. Many expect that racial similarity, homogeneity and majority status will increase their sense of power and clarify any differences. The reality contradicts this thinking. The point is that the generation of a collective psychiatry sufficient to sustain a socially reinforcing and politically effective black liberation mobilization is not an easy accomplishment.

Education

Holden's discussion of education moves quickly into a critique of two strategies used in northern urban areas: desegregation and community control. Holden saw the former as inappropriate given the size of the black population in northern urban areas, and the latter as a variant of the morale or self-confidence problem discussed earlier in Essay V.

Community control, comparable to Hanna Pitkin's descriptive representation, is not necessarily equivalent to substantive representation. In areas outside major metropolitan centers, the size of the black population would be so small that community control would not be politically useful. In this analysis. Holden predicts and frames the conflicts that arose in the late 1980s and the 1990s over the majority minority electoral district strategy conceptualized by the litigative wing of the civil rights movement: in the urban areas, successful creation of majority black districts may put descriptive and substantive representation at odds. In rural areas with smaller proportions and concentrations of blacks, it is difficult to create such districts, and there is no discussion of how people in such circumstances should proceed (Guinier, 1994).

Holden then turns to a discussion of the strategic changes that would be necessary in the education system given the shifts in the overall economy with the reduction in the number of manufacturing jobs and the increase in the number of service-related jobs. Given such changes, Holden says that the major objective of education strategy must be "To enhance the likelihood that
at any given level of the economy, and particularly in those levels which lead to the most desirable prizes in industrial and financial enterprises, the proportion of Blacks should steadily increase” (Holden, 1973: 150).

While there has certainly been some considerable expansion of the black population that is well educated, such progress has been tenuous and has not moved as far, nor has it been as stable, as might have been anticipated by the hopes and expectations prevalent in the early seventies when Holden was writing this book.

Control of public education at the elementary and secondary levels has in many major metropolitan areas shifted into black control. The schools are majority black, the school boards, superintendents, the teachers and teachers’ unions are often black. At the same time whites have created new systems of private, often Christian schools at the elementary and secondary levels across the country, while many others now educate their children at home. Recently states have begun to create new public entities, charter schools, under virtually private control, which are supported with public funds. Debates about integration are virtually superfluous with blacks and whites questioning the validity of busing and aggressive desegregation programs.

Several factors differentiate late twentieth-century public education from a quarter century earlier. Public schools no longer exist as the common educational resource that Holden addressed in the early 1970s. Instead, a complex mix of public, private, charter, religious, and home schools now make addressing black educational achievement even more difficult. The rejection of educational achievement by many black youth as “white” and therefore something not a desirable value to embrace has caught the public African American educational establishment by surprise. Hence, the challenges to achieving effective education of the black population has become a greater, not lesser, challenge even as blacks have gained control of many major urban school systems.

Economic Equalization

This is the second area where Holden maintains that black folk must develop an “objective capacity for action.” His recommendations for income support, economic growth, a program to attack job discrimination, and “an increase in the proportion of Black capital holders and the proportion of capital they hold” (Holden, 1973: 154) are striking to the extent to which the direction of national policies, once briefly focused in the direction of Holden’s recommendations, have more recently sharply diverged from his recommendations.

The enactment of welfare reform legislation during President Clinton’s second term (Public Law 104–193) repudiated the social welfare policies of the Roosevelt era. The conservative leadership of the Republican party and the Democratic Leadership Council have been even more resistant to race-based or economically redistributive programs.

Recent research has shown a definitive shift in the distribution of resources across racial and economic lines in the U.S. in recent decades. Oliver and Shapiro (1996), Smeeding and Rainwater (1995), and Wolff (1995) show that within the U.S., and when the U.S. is compared to other nations, blacks hold
only 25 percent of the wealth of whites; that the net worth of the top 1 percent of wealth holders has risen relative to the rest of the population within the U.S.; and that the net worth of the top 1 percent has risen even more dramatically in comparison to Sweden and the UK. (Oliver and Shapiro: 1996: 100; Wolff, 1995: 23-28).

Given the disintegration of the industrial economy, the poorest of the poor within the black population are now more sharply differentiated from both the black middle class and the small but new and growing black upper class, which is attached to corporate, governmental and educational sectors. These latter groups need not be chastised for their existence since some of the civil rights movement’s goals were certainly to open up opportunities in these areas for larger proportions of the black population. Some numbers of blacks now have such opportunities, but affirmative action programs, which are now undergoing withering attacks across the country, achieved these changes. Since the other kinds of reform Holden proposed such as educational achievement are still in flux, the coming decline in the number of blacks who attend competitive public colleges and professional schools is certainly a serious possibility.

Communal Order and Equal Protection under the Law

One could write at some length about this third area where Holden sees a need for strategic action, but I need only mention, the failed War on Drugs, the deplorable Rodney King episode and the Los Angeles riots, and the trial of O. J. Simpson, to make a pivotal point. One could persuasively argue that we have less communal order than we did a quarter of a century ago particularly when reflecting on the drug and gang wars which have raged over the past quarter century, killing off large numbers of young black men. Equal protection under the law is also a problem as the numbers and proportions of black males in prisons and the numbers subject to capital punishment have risen sharply. The creation of private sector incarceration programs have added another type of tension to concerns about creating criminal justice policy which protects order without abusing the citizenry.

Conclusion

There is considerably more space within which black people of means operate at the end of the twentieth century than twenty-five years ago when Holden completed The Politics of the Black “Nation.” They have considerably greater discretion to decide what kinds of black people they want to be, where they want to live, how much education they want to obtain. Blacks are also far from immune to racial discrimination as recent cases involving the Texaco Corporation, Denny’s, and the appearance of the acronym, DWB (Driving While Black) have made clear.

In the areas of black regrouping as well as morale and objective capacity, blacks’ communal base is much weaker at the end of the twentieth century. The migrations to the north, the challenges of the civil rights movement, the conflicts over the gang wars have weakened major sectors of the infrastructure. Another weakness arises from definitions of what the group ought to
be able to do, how united it ought to be, which makes the illusion of unity an attractive mirage. Robert Smith's *We Have No Leaders* (1995) is a meticulous study of the evolution of black political life "From Protest to Politics," but one that ends up for the most part, judging black leadership negatively for not having achieved group unity, notwithstanding the attendant pressures of institutional racism.

Holden's prescience in the early 1970s that basic achievements rather than ideologically driven goals were to be valued is, I think, borne out. The black political and social infrastructure that was present in the 1970s has been eroded and the larger society has moved away from policy changes in the public sector over which so many battles were fought from the 1950s through the 1980s. Now the private sector has expanded, and the public sector is downsized, divided, weaker and more constrained. The black population has penetrated and gained power primarily in the public sector, and only to a more limited degree in the private. The growth of information technology in the service sector means that basic educational qualifications of thirty years ago are outdated. The kinds of changes in education that Holden called for have occurred with black folks regrettably lagging behind their white counterparts. The explosion and concentration of wealth has also shaped the black population's capacity for political influence but it is unclear at this juncture as to what this influence has actually been.

After nearly fifty years of challenging the white "nation," the black "nation" is understandably subdued and in some ways exhausted. What was a clear vision for Holden in 1973 remains something which the "Black Nation" can value, even though much of what he called for in the time horizon from 1971 to 1976 has not been realized.

References


Politics and Organizational Options: Comments on Essay VI: “The Next Five Years: II. Organizational Options”

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I had the honor of reviewing Matthew Holden’s two books, The White Man’s Burden and The Politics of the Black “Nation” in 1974. At that time, I concluded that his books reflected the efforts of a good man and a good mind in serious thought. Re-reading these books almost twenty-five years later, my assessment remains the same. As a long time admirer of Professor Holden, I share his passion for rigorous logical analysis and I admire the tenacity and boldness with which he makes and defends his points. And I am always heartened by his willingness to listen to counter arguments. Indeed in that brief historical moment of the 1960s and 1970s when the black academy was alive with debates that mattered, Holden and I exchanged more than a few notes in which we challenged each other’s ideas about the nature of our predicament and remedies for transforming it. To resume that dialogue now that we have both been chastened by history and experience and humbled by the ineluctable conservatism inflicted by age is an opportunity for which I am grateful.

Each of the participants in this symposium was asked to respond to one of the essays in The Politics of the Black “Nation.” My assignment was Essay VI, “The Next Five Years II: Organizational Options.” This essay was designated as item “II.” because the preceding essay in which he had addressed the morale and objective capacity of the black “nation” had been labeled item “I.” In Essay V. Holden called for “substantial improvement . . . in [Black] self-images and in the capacity for collective action” (Holden, 1973: 166).

Before preparing this commentary, I re-read both of the above mentioned books in their entirety and was overcome with a desire to re-do my review. However, I shall resist the temptation to go beyond the scope of my assign-
ment. By way of a general review of the book, suffice it to say that after debunking a variety of alternatives such as nationalism, territorial separatism, violence and armed rebellion, as irrational strategies born of collective psychiatry (see comments by Charles E. Jones in this volume), Holden offers integration as the most rational objective of the black struggle in the United States (see comments by Michael Preston also in this volume). In Essay VI Holden discusses views regarding what must be done organizationally within the then next five years, 1971–1976, if the promise of integration as a rational strategy was to be realized.

Integration, according to Holden "... is the result which exists when two (or more) diverse parties are brought together in what is a common political enterprise and a common structure of respect, even though each of the parties may have additional enterprises and structures (self-development) peculiar to itself" (Holden, 1973: 137). In his view, integration is a state of mind and a process through which diverse groups recognize and act on their interdependence. Holden's operational definition of integration would be a society in which there would be "substantial evidence that race would not predict the distribution of either material benefits or psychic esteem in any significant degree" (Holden, 1973: 137).

To activate the process toward integration, according to Holden, a higher level of unity within the black community would be a necessary prerequisite. He recognizes that this is a theme that has always been a part of community rhetoric and he correctly argues that the constant discussion about the need for unity and the incessant lamentations about its absence only aggravate the problem. He admonishes us to quit talking about it and to build organizational structures and institutions through which unity could be developed and sustained. In that light, he calls for the creation of a national mechanism for collective judgment comprised of black leaders (no more than 150) that would debate issues and render the equivalent of advisory opinions to the black "nation" as a whole. This national body would have a loose working relationship of sorts with local formations. The latter, in turn, would defer to declarations of the former based upon the sagacity of its insights. All of this is in keeping with his basic theme that the black community is a "nation" of sorts with what he calls a "quasi-government" (see comments by Donn Davis in this volume).

The mechanism for collective judgment would be supported by a "... more refined and sophisticated internal bureaucracy" (Holden, 1973: 174). The bureaucracy would develop means for extracting resources from the community to fund an enhanced capacity for self-help. Structures for generating information to provide a rational basis for collective judgment and actions along with agencies for monitoring and administration are also cited as organizational prerequisites. Finally, Holden called for the development of think tanks that would "... bring more penetrating and analysis into alliance with political purpose" (Holden, 1973: 180). These were the organizational structures, Holden opined, that must have been put in place during the 1971–76 period if the momentum generated by the intense struggles of the 1960s were to continue and eventually bring about the integrated society. Although he never argued that such organizational mechanisms would guarantee progress toward integration as he defined it, he implied that such an outcome was a rea-
sonable outcome. It is important to note that Holden insisted that these structures had to be funded and controlled by the black community if their prescribed roles were to be fulfilled.

Holden’s views on the organizational prerequisites for continued advancement apparently were shared and acted upon by many others. Numerous national agendas forming formations and think tanks were created during the black power era. The important question for this retrospective analysis, however, is this: “To what extent did their formations set in motion the process of change that Holden envisaged?” To that question we now turn.

As Robert Smith has insightfully documented, the period under investigation was one of “… great ideological and organizational ferment” (Smith, 1996: 32). Numerous efforts, sponsored by groups across the ideological spectrum including nationalists of various stripes, Marxists, Pan Africanists, and mainstreamers, were made to establish national black organizations at both grassroots and elite levels. The most ambitious and perhaps the most significant of the new formations was probably the national Black Political Assembly that grew out of the Gary Convention of 1972. Indeed the Gary effort not only embodied practically all of the notions present in Holden’s suggestion but it went even further to include a combination of grassroots mobilization and elite consultation. The Gary experiment included representation from existing national organizations and it allowed for both geographical and functional representation. Holden’s concern that large deliberative bodies would degenerate into disunifying spectacles was also taken into account by the establishment of a national council that would function between the periodic plenary conventions.

The effort to create a comprehensive national organization reflected in Gary and other organizational departures was complemented by intense organizing along functional and regional lines. Dormant black organizations in various professions were activated and new ones were formed in other instances. The National Conference of Black Political Scientists, for example, grew out of that ferment. In areas of American society in which blacks constituted a critical mass for the first time such as philanthropic foundations and corporate bureaucracies, independent black organizations were also created. Kwame Toure’s admonition to “organize, organize” became the watchword.

Regarding the development of think tanks, here too Holden’s prescription found fertile ground. In Atlanta, the Institute of the Black World was created while the Joint Center for Political Studies was chartered in Washington, DC. The Institute for Educational Policy was founded in Washington, DC, under the auspices of Howard University. Nationalists formed the Institute for Positive Education in Chicago. Other less well-known institutes were founded elsewhere.

In spite of the organizational fervor of the 1970s, however, as we take this retrospective look, we are forced to conclude that the organizational ferment of the period did not produce the results anticipated by Holden. The Gary Convention and most of the other organizations proved to be either stillborn or short-lived. Many of the newly formed black professional organizations soon lost their appeal and were deserted by their members who quickly returned to their white counterparts such as the American Political Science As-
sociation. The newly formed black think tanks had a similar fate. The Institute of the Black World went out of business after less than a decade of productivity. The Institute for the Study of Educational Policy at Howard died amid speculation that the cause was not entirely unrelated to certain political concerns. The Joint Center has been something of an exception. It continues to thrive but it does so with the largesse and considerable direction from sources external to the black community. Of the four think tanks mentioned, only the Center for Positive Education survives as an independent black organization.

That the organizational ferment of the 1970s did not begin to bring into being the integrated society that Holden envisaged is obvious so we need not spend time debating that issue. Instead we will explore the question of why matters evolved as they did. It would be easy to say that the explanation lies in the fact that the new organization, for the most part, were not independently funded and that therefore were open to external manipulation as Holden suggested they might be. However, that would still beg the fundamental question of why matters evolved as they did. Why was the enthusiasm for developing independent black organizations not accompanied by a willingness to fund them internally? To what extent were efforts made to develop mechanisms for sustaining the organizations through internal resources? What accounts for the answer to the foregoing question? Were there logical reasons for Holden to assume that black people in the United States would see the need for developing an independent internally funded organizational structure to facilitate the work of what he called the “quasi-government” of the black “nation” and that they would act on that perception? Why did it not happen? In short, why did Holden’s implied predictions miss the mark? Three possible explanations come to mind.

To begin, I am inclined to think that Holden’s initial theoretical point of departure may not have been the optimum one for developing prescriptive insights for moving the black struggle forward. The idea of conceptualizing the black community in the United States as a “nation” has a certain descriptive utility. By calling attention to the stable procedures that regulate competition and conflict among different groups pursuing their interests within the black community and by highlighting the pattern of activities between black groups and groups external to the black community, the idea of the black “nation” with a quasi-governments captures the dynamics of politics within the community. However, I believe that conceptualizing the black community as a “nation,” even when quotation marks are used to indicate the tenuousness of the characterization, has prescriptive disutility that offsets its descriptive value. That is to say that I believe that analytical descriptions of the black community as a “nation” leads to prescriptions for actions that we should not expect to happen given the experiential reality of the black community in America. Second, I believe that matters evolved contrary to Holden’s expectations or certainly his hopes because he underestimated the significance of white racism, feelings of white superiority and black inferiority on white and black behavior and on public policy decisions that are made in such a sociocultural context. And third, in my view Holden failed to understand the extent to which the material subordination of blacks is a systemic condition of the American political and economic systems and the
therefore he under-estimated the extent to black-white conflict is something of a zero sum game. Let me elaborate.

Starting with the idea that the black community is a “nation” with a culture in the process of being formed and an internal “quasi-government” that suffers from a pattern of high demands and low support, Holden’s prescriptions call for measures designed to moderate the level of demands being made on the government while increasing the level of support and deference it receives from the black population. After more than twenty-five years of arguing to the contrary, I am prepared to challenge the theoretical utility of classifying the black community as a “nation”; or short of that, I am prepared to argue that conceiving the black community as a “nation” has theoretical and empirical utility only if we use the term “oppressed nation.” I have little enthusiasm for using the term “oppressed nation” because of the historical baggage that it brings. However, if we wish to retain the idea of the black community as an oppressed “nation” because of its descriptive adequacy, it would have to be encased in a theory that specified the critical elements of an “oppressed nation.” Such a theory would have to explain all of the shortcomings and debilities that Holden and others discuss as the centrifugal forces that explain the pattern of high demands and (Smith, 1996: 32), low support for the “quasi government.” That is to say that the pattern of demands and supports are not merely functions of competition and conflicts among leaders and groups competing for scarce resources within the black community, but rather they are functions of the oppressed character of the black community spatially interspersed among and culturally dominated by its enemies.

Let me expand my argument about the limited prescriptive utility of conceptualizing the black community as a “nation.” My reservations are not merely ideological. I also have questions about its empirical adequacy as well. Many would agree that there are both material and subjective conditions that may be used to determine whether a group of people constitutes a “nation.” A land base and control of a state apparatus are material indicators while a key subjective element in the determination of whether a “nation” exists is whether the people involved perceive themselves to be members of that “nation” and/or are prepared to pledge to it loyalty and support. Do they believe that the “nation” exists? Do they view themselves as being part of it? These are critical questions. We know that black people in the United States control no land mass nor state apparatus and I am unaware of any evidence that a critical mass of black people in the United States view themselves as subjects of or loyal to the hypothesized black “nation.” To the contrary, there is abundant anecdotal evidence that for better or worse, worse in my view, black loyalty and allegiance remain firmly attached to the United States. This is no small theoretical quibble given the role of the American “nation” state in the continued subordination of black people in the United States. Feelings of loyalty to the American state limit the range of responses that one should expect black people to endorse or act upon.

I see no reason to challenge the assumption that the first loyalty of the preponderance of black people is to the American state rather than to the putative black “nation.” How else, for example, can we explain the fact the first loyalty of many blacks including black professionals is to the predominantly white organizations rather than the black one, as in, to the American Politi-
cal Science Association rather than the National Conference of Black Political Scientists? How else can we explain our reflexive deference to the so-called two-party system and our unwillingness to consider other options? How can we explain why status and prestige in the non-black world is the best predictor of status and prestige within the black community? Prescriptions derived from a theoretical model that assumes loyalty to a quasi-government of the black “nation” will likely miss their mark.¹

Returning to our main concern, absent subjective feeling of a national identity and loyalty to the quasi-government, Holden’s call for a national black organization with the moral authority to levy taxes or otherwise assess the general black community in some manner and then allocate those resources in the name of the black “nation” was doomed to go unheeded. It was as much of a pipe dream as are the objectives of those organizations Holden decried as the “politics of withdrawal” of those engaged in collective psychiatry (see the comments by Charles E. Jones in this volume). However, once the black community is viewed as a “nation,” the establishment of a body for collective judgment with the power to tax is a logical prescription. In turn, the failure to develop such a capacity leads logically to hard wringing over the pathology of the black “nation” that is unwilling to allocate material resources for community advancement. Recognizing that it is in fact not a “nation,” or that it is an “oppressed nation” if we must cling to the concept of “nation,” would lead to other questions that might yield greater prescriptive insights.

The second speculation regarding why Holden’s expectations were not borne out was that he underestimated the significance of feelings of white supremacy and black inferiority in influencing white behavior (probably black behavior as well) and resultant public policy deliberations. While making the obligatory reference to the prevalence of white supremacist ideas, Holden intimates that there is a sizeable segment of the white community, the “middling,” that is neither morally committed to integration as he has defined it nor morally committed to some modern version of the Ku Klux Klan. He also maintains that there is a certain interdependence between these “middling” whites and blacks. The task of black leadership, according to Holden, was to recognize the level of interdependence and “... to formulate the projects of Black action in terms which can be pertinent to these ordinary White people” (Holden, 1973: 174). Presumably ordinary white people are those with whom blacks can find common ground based upon common or at least non-antagonistic interests. At the time when the book was written, Holden was concerned that black leaders and groups may have been too intransigent in making demands and denying the level of interdependence between black and white interests that exists. He argued that “[W]hite America sowed the wind in a long history of sheer domination. It now reaps a whirlwind of black rebellion. The question is whether black America will also sow the wind” (Holden, 1973: 136). In this instance, Holden assumes that race is but another value or variable in the white calculus of self-interest. The fact seems to be, however, that race not only occupies a preferred place in the value hierarchy of many “middlin” whites but that it commands a highly exalted place. For considerable numbers, it may be the transcendental value.

As already noted, apparently a sizeable segment of black organizations and
leadership shared Holden’s view on the need to de-emphasize race in order to appeal to whites. Deracialization became a fashionable term and for some an attractive political strategy. However, rather than broadening the support base for public policies thought to be more in line with black interests, black organizations and black interests became more and more isolated in American politics. In the meantime white conservatives succeeded in raising to prominence a critical mass of well-trained, strategically place black ideologues such as Clarence Pendleton, Ward Connerly, and Clarence Thomas, to name but a few, who helped legitimize the anti-black conservative agenda. The whirlwind spiraled.

My third speculation on why Holden’s expectations did not come to pass has to do with the nature of the American economic system. There is the question of the extent to which black exploitation is a systemic function of the American economic system; and to the extent that it is, the question becomes “To what extent is the black-white conflict a zero sum game”? or at least perceived to be so by “middlin” whites? Elsewhere, a colleague and I have argued (Barker and Jones, 1994) that material debilities such as unemployment, inadequate education, poor housing, poverty level wages, etc., are all routine systemic outcomes of American capitalism grounded in the ideology of white supremacy and that institutional racism is the behavioral mechanism used to allocate them disproportionately among blacks. To reduce, say, unemployment among blacks is, in turn, to increase white unemployment; or to increase the volume of government contracts going to black firms is to decrease the number going to whites. Indeed much of the contemporary controversy over affirmative action and business set-asides reflects a general realization of this perception. The “middlin” whites who are morally committed to neither integration nor the modern version of the Ku Klux Klan are morally committed to maintaining their position of material domination. Thus, Holden’s prescription that black organizations and leadership should find the common ground with “middlin” whites is a much more complex task than he seemed to imply. To realize the implied goals of the black “nation” may require fundamental transformation of America, as we know it. Studying the predicament of the black community from a different theoretical context may yield different and more useful prescriptive insights, insights that may allow us to understand better the circumstances under which certain behaviors may or may not be expected.

Note

1. Let me note here that I am not addressing the juridical argument advanced by my good friend, colleague, and warrior Imari Obadele and the Republic of New Africa, that black people in the United States constitute a “nation” because their right to self determination was denied at the time of emancipation. That is another argument, and one that deserves attention but to raise it now would distract from this response to Holden’s work.
References


Modifying Political Tactics: Comments on Essay VII: "The Next Five Years: III. Modifying Political Tactics"

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This retrospective essay focuses on Essay VII, "The Next Five Years: Modifying Political Tactics," one of three final chapters in The Politics of the Black "Nation" (hereafter: The Black "Nation") in which Matthew Holden, Jr. discusses strategies for change. Before turning to the retrospective critique of this specific essay, I should like to discuss the overall volume and its contributions to the development of the black politics field.

First, as Professor Joseph McCormick indicated in his call to organize this symposium, I have repeatedly told him and any one else who would listen that The Black "Nation" is the single best treatment of black politics by an academic political scientist extant. Indeed, in my view it ranks with Harold Cruse's The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual and Kwame Ture (aka: Stokely Carmichael) and Charles Hamilton's Black Power as the seminal works of those of us scholars and commentators of the Civil Rights generation. I have consistently turned to The Black "Nation," the book, in my research and writing, from my first professional paper delivered at an annual meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), which was a partial text of Holden's "Black quasi-government" thesis (Smith, 1978).

A major strength of the book is that it is multidimensional. It deals perceptively with issues of class, culture, ideology, organizations and leadership, both internally and as these issues relate to the external relations of the black "nation" with whites. It is at once also theoretical, analytical, and descriptive. It is also a work of ideology and strategy. Ideology is central to Holden's work. He is an integrationist (see comments on Essay V by Michael Preston in this volume). Indeed, as I have written elsewhere "... the book may be viewed as the academic manifesto of the integrationist wing of the Black lead-
ership group in the United States. As such, it is probably the most systematic and cogent defense of integration extant" (Smith, 1983: 75). In his advocacy of integration, Holden analytically dismisses its alternatives—revolutionary struggle and most forms of black nationalism (what he rather primly calls "withdrawal") as "nothing short of romanticism (Holden, 1973: 96–130) (see also comments by Charles E. Jones on Essay III in this volume). I will have more to say about Holden's integrationism later in this retrospective essay, but first a word about the origins and context of the book.

Origins and Context: The Race Crisis of the 1960s

The origins and circumstances of The Black "Nation" are critically important to any retrospective evaluation of the work. First, the book was written "on the run" so to speak and with a sense of urgency. Holden writes, "most of the essays were written between the summer crisis of 1967 and the latter part of 1969, although the basic theme was formulated in 1964 and many editorial or substantive changes were made in 1970 and 1971" (1976: 213). (For a revised version of the 1964 lecture, see Holden, 1972). Elsewhere, he notes that 1970 was the first year of "relative quiescence" in race relations in five years, thus, it was appropriate to reflect on how the race problem might be resolved, as public interest in the problem was beginning to dwindle as other issues (the war in Vietnam, environmentalism) were seizing the attention of the press and public.

Second, the book is not your standard social science inquiry. As Holden candidly states the book has no consistent design or methodology or data, because, he says, of the absence of adequate conceptual apparatus related to race and even good descriptive data on some issues (1973: xiii). Thus, Holden writes (1976: xiii):

Consequently, I have gone far beyond what I know and can demonstrate to piece together such fragments of reported experiences as may substitute for systematic data, and to impose upon these fragments conceptions from widely disparate fields... in the social sciences. The resulting interpretation is thus hypothetical (a series of reasoned speculations) and no more. These papers are a trial run.

Given this background, let me turn now to a brief discussion of the book's basic themes as a preface to my retrospective on Essay VII.

Holden's Two "Nations"

Holden in a postscript writes that the book is informed by two basic biases. The "central bias," he writes, is the "conviction of Black-White interdependency" (1973: 212), and another "important bias" is the belief that "rationality is supremely important to the achievement of desirable political results" (1973: 213). At first glance these biases might appear unremarkable. However, given the temper of the times they are fighting words. For what Holden is attempting here is a not so subtle attack on black nationalism and revolutionary struggle, suggesting first that separatism and revolution (seen as rejections of interdependency) are unworthy goals and by implication irratio-
nal. Having staked out this ideological ground, Holden then lays out the book's central project (1973: 212):

As a political system the United States includes two sociocultural nations "locked into each other in a relationship which has historically been "imperial". Imperial in the sense that the White element has been dominant over the Black element. The present question is one of encompassing Black and White within a republican norm—within a political community or a shared moral order understood to be the common enterprise and concern of both its Black and its White members. The problem of transforming an internal "empire" into a full-scale republic is that to which, given the bias noted, these essays have been devoted.

It should be noted, that here in this postscript, Holden, a bit coyly, accepts two of the fundamental premises of black nationalist thought; that in fact blacks and whites are separate peoples and that indeed the relationships between these two peoples are colonial, or as he prefers imperial. "Republican" government, given these premises, is, to say the least, difficult to accomplish. More often than not, premises of these sort result in what Holden rejects—revolutionary separation or in what he seeks for black folk to undo, continued imperial domination.

"Integration" as the Objective

To get around this conundrum and give nationalism its due, Holden develops an intriguing view of integration. A concept isomorphic to the times but one that has enduring value. Writing that integration is superior to its alternatives, Holden writes (1973:136) that this is not fully appreciated because,

The very word has been so far brought into disrepute that it excites alarm, anger, despair and disgust in the minds of many who contribute to symbol making [the Black intelligentsia] in Black Politics, being often deemed in opposition to self-development. The idea that "integration" and "self-development" exclude one another is utterly false, when the concept is treated seriously.

What is a "serious treatment" of this concept? Holden's formulation is two-pronged. First, distinguishing it from desegregation (a mere technique, he says), integration, properly understood, is "The result which exists when two (or more diverse parties are brought together in what is a common political enterprise and a common structure of respect, even though each of the parties may also have additional enterprises and structures (self-development) peculiar to itself" (1973: 137). In other words, as Holden sees it, integration and some forms of nationalism are not incompatible.

The second prong of Holden's notion of integration is empirical. He writes, "How would we actually know an 'integrated' polity if we saw one?" We should know it by substantial evidence that race does not predict the distribution of either material benefits or psychic esteem in any significant degree"(1973: 137). In other words,

An integrated polity would be one without significant racial inequality and without ideologies of racial superiority and inferiority.
In this formulation, Professor Holden is once again a bit coy and also somewhat disingenuous. What rational nationalist or Marxist revolutionary would disagree with these formulations? With these objectives? I would venture to say none (see Cruse, 1987; Walters, 1973; Davis, 1981; Baraka, 1975). Holden’s argument here recalls Malcolm X’s famous but erroneous formulation in “The Ballot or the Bullet” speech, where he argued there was no difference between nationalists and integrationists in objectives since both wanted “freedom.” The difference, Malcolm said, was over means: you [the civil rights leadership] believe “integration” will get you freedom, while we believe nationalism will get us freedom. But, he argued, we both agree on the goal.” Similarly, as when Holden wrote over twenty-five years ago, today Minister Louis Farrakhan and Angela Davis might agree on the objectives of “integration,” but the black nationalist minister would say the way to get there is through “nationalism” and the communist Professor Davis would say that the path must be traveled by “socialist revolution.” Is it possible that Professor Holden is a “closet nationalist?” A “socialist smuggler?” As I will show below, as with his nationalists and radical antagonists, the Achilles’ heel of Holden’s ideology is strategic not substantive, a matter of means not ends.

The Five-Year Time Horizon

In order to make reasonable progress toward his preferred goal of integration Holden in the last three essays of The Black “Nation,” lays out strategies or “means to ends.” Noting that reasonable progress had been made in the previous twenty years, it made sense for Holden to establish some reasonable time frame to accelerate the progress toward the objectives of integration. Five years, he writes, “seems terribly important” because “The assumption is that the next five years (1971–76) constitute the critical zone in which certain measures ought to be initiated or accomplished” (1973: 138).

Several reasons are offered for this particular time frame (including giving a new born black baby—for the first time—a clean, competitive slate with whites and because 1976 coincides with the bicentennial of the Constitution). There are two critical reasons that Holden offers. First, he writes, “This total time is thus short enough to lie within the horizons of quite ordinary people, but long enough to permit decisive change if there is a political will” (1973: 139). The second critical reason that Holden—surprisingly—describes as “narrow” and “realistic,” is:

If a more reasonable course cannot be discovered by that time, the chances are the Republican Party will have chosen to consolidate a national majority on an anti-Black basis . . . [and] the Democratic Party could have little recourse but to follow—both for managing its own internal anti-Black problems and in order to maintain its competitive position. (1973: 139-40)

To anticipate the conclusion of this retrospective essay, integration may be as much a fantasy as nationalism. Suffice it to say here that the Republican Party has consolidated a functionally anti-black majority coalition (see Carter: 1996) and since the 1980s, the Democratic Party has been following their lead (Smith, 1996: Chap. 10).
The Next Five Years: Modifying Political Tactics

It was necessary to go over in some detail the origins and political-ideological context of the book (thus duplicating to some extent the efforts of other essayists in this volume) in order to establish a framework for my analysis of Essay VII. What I will do in the remainder of this retrospective essay is review Holden’s strategic or, as he prefers, “tactical” prescriptions in light of the events of the last twenty-five years. Fortuitously for me I have just completed two books—which employ some “Holdenian” formulations: analyzing the status of racism and the ideology of white supremacy (Smith, 1995) and black politics (Smith, 1996). I draw generously from my two books in this critique of Essay VII, but like Holden, in some cases, I will have to go beyond what I know and can demonstrate.

In Essay VII Holden discusses the following tactical problems: The detente gamble, electoral politics, and bureaucratic and administrative politics. I will assess each in turn and then offer and overall assessment of the book in my conclusion.

*The Detente Gamble*

Holden’s first prescription is for detente between African Americans and Americans of eastern and southern European descent living in the cities of the northeast and mid-west. This idea appears to be largely a product of the times, with little retrospective relevance. At the time of his writing there was much talk of discrimination against “White ethnics” and the rise of a white ethnic movement, symbolized by the publication in 1971 of Michael Novak’s *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: The New Political Force of the Seventies*. Holden essentially accepts this proposition and suggests that it creates a basis for cooperation rather than conflict between Blacks and white “ethnics,” since both have faced discrimination and together constitute the core population groups in urban America. He notes that even if these white groups migrate to the suburbs, leaving the central cities to blacks, they nevertheless will constitute a crucial voting bloc in state and national politics. And he writes that if not brought into a broad progressive coalition they “...will almost surely be absorbed into retrogressive policies based on fright” (1973: 191).

It is difficult to document the extent to which black and white ethnic leaders attempted detente. However, to the extent that they did their efforts were not very successful, either in local or national politics. This is in large part because, as Orlando Patterson (1977) argues, the revitalization of white ethnic consciousness in the 1970s was a reactionary response to black demands for integration. Thus, the idea of detente was probably futile since the white ethnic communities and their leaders had little interest in joining in common cause with blacks. To the contrary, then and now, they wished to distance themselves—spatially and politically—from blacks.

Twenty-five years later they have successfully done so. The work of Massey and Denton (1993) meticulously shows the spatial isolation of ethnic whites from blacks in the major cities of the northeast and mid-west. Politically they have become, as Holden suggested they would without detente, the basis of “a successful northern version of the “southern strategy” (1973:189). In other
words, these white ethnic groups became in the 1980s what the media referred to as “Reagan Democrats.” This group also constitutes the basis of support for the election of conservative governors in the mid-west. It is not likely that this could have been avoided, given the range of social and political behavior available to blacks and their leaders. This is because, to state it crudely, these people do not like blacks. Writing in the aftermath of the 1984 presidential election Stanley Greenberg, the political scientist and 1992 Clinton pollster, wrote,

These White Democratic defectors express profound distaste for Blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything they think about government and politics. . . . Blacks constitute the explanation for their vulnerability and for almost everything that has gone wrong in their lives, not being Black is what constitutes being middle class, not living with Blacks is what makes a neighborhood a decent place to live. These sentiments have important implications for Democrats, as virtually all progressive symbols have been redefined in racial and pejorative terms. (Greenberg, 1985: 13, 18)

In 1992 Greenberg and others persuaded Bill Clinton that the only way these white ethnic Reagan Democrats could be brought back into the Democratic coalition was by running a campaign that symbolically distanced the Democratic Party from blacks and their concerns (Smith, 1996: Chap. 10). In the detente gamble, blacks lost. But the deck was stacked from the beginning of the game by the unwillingness of reactionary white ethnics to participate.

Holden mentioned conflict and coalitions with other racial minorities only in passing but twenty-five years later conflict and coalitions with what he called “Spanish-speaking peoples and Orientals” is far more pressing than the issue of white ethnic detente. This is because since 1973, major American cities of the northeast, mid-west and west have been transformed by the massive influx of immigrants, legal and illegal, from Asia, Central and Latin America. Although African American leaders both nationally and locally have attempted to build “rainbow coalitions” with these groups, they have not met with much success. Increasingly in many cities, there is heightened competition and conflict between blacks and these groups over jobs, political office, contracts, and ethnic status (McClain, 1990; Waldinger, 1996; Tilove, 1996).

Electoral Politics

Holden begins his analysis of electoral politics by putting it in its “proper perspective.” He writes,

The first step is to cease the plaintive litany “electoral politics doesn’t work for Black people.” That view is manifestly wrong, and is not believed by many who state it; otherwise the advocates of this view could logically propose only abstinence from electoral politics. Rather, the basic point is that the tradeoff process involved in the exchange of votes for favorable governmental decisions is too slow (and cover too narrow a range) relative to the needs of the occasion. It is not that the process does not work, but it works all too badly. (1973:193)

A fair enough perspective, perhaps. But the words “too badly” may more appropriately border on “not working at all,” insofar as the need is for fun-
damental change and reform. In the concluding chapter of my detailed chronicle of the last twenty-five years of black participation in electoral and other forms of conventional politics at the national level I write, "This book provides dismal, detailed evidence of the irrelevancy of Black Politics in producing in the last twenty-five years benefits for most Blacks, especially the imperative to reconstruct and integrate the ghettos into the mainstream of American society" (Smith, 1996: 277).

Some of the reasons for my woeful conclusion are related to the failure of the black leadership to act on some of Holden's prescriptions discussed below. But only some. The more basic explanation—the systemic one—is that integration, if possible, requires fundamental change, and electoral politics in the United States—or anywhere else for that matter—does not produce such change except in times of real or perceived system crisis.

Since system crisis is difficult—virtually impossible—to generate, one has to rely on the routines of electoral politics. In this context I examine Holden's prescriptions.

Party Politics

Holden argues that to be maximally effective blacks should cast a "strategic" or "balance of power" vote and not be in a position of "... providing support to the Democrats—regardless of what the Democrats did or failed to do" (1973: 194). As is well known, despite the tireless advocacy of our colleague Ronald Walters (1980, 1988) the black vote in the last twenty-five years has remained a "captive" of the Democrats, even as that party has moved away from the liberal agenda (Walters, 1983). In Holden's formulation, however, it is difficult to see how the situation could be different. This is because, unlike Walters, he rejects the idea of a national "black" independent political party while also deeming the Republican Party "essentially inhospitable" (1973: 196). In deference to Holden—although this is not a part of his analysis—even those most favorable to a "black" political party (including this writer) are hard pressed to figure out how to overcome the institutional and ideological barriers to its formation as revealed throughout the 1970s, in the experiment initiated at the 1972 Gary Convention (Smith, 1996: Chap. 3).

Avoiding this self-imposed conundrum, Holden argues that the objective should be to penetrate the Democratic Party and "achieve a position similar to that which the Irish Democrats achieved between World War I and the Korean conflict" (1973:195). That is, a minority so critical that the party would not act on critical issues without its assent. Blacks have achieved this objective. They constitute about 20 percent of the Democratic Party's national vote; 18-20 percent of its convention delegates, 20 percent or more of the national committee and important positions in the party and convention hierarchies. Thus, as Walters writes, blacks have achieved a "sustained institutional base of power within the party" but, he concludes, "In the final analysis, racism, lack of political influence and other tangible and intangible factors often limit real influence within actual decision making organs of the party institution, and certainly within presidential campaigns, even though Blacks may have impressive titles" (Walters, 1988: 67).

Although Holden rejected the feasibility of a national black political party,
he argued that a local party (akin to the "Jewish" Liberal Party in New York) could play important strategic and policy roles in local and state politics. Blacks, however, have not elected to form such a party, except on an ad hoc basis as in Chicago. Those political formations formed by blacks in the rural south have for a variety of reasons withered away (Frye, 1980). Urban black mayors and other black city leaders have not only refused to attempt to form a party but have generally failed to build any kind of viable political organization (Nelson, 1990), preferring instead ad hoc, personalized political structures.

Congressional Politics

In congressional politics Holden's principal concern was to avoid the defeat of incumbent black representatives so that the black congressional delegation could obtain seniority and positions of committee leadership. Again, rather coyly, he writes that black congressmen should not be challenged or defeated on some "ritual test of 'Blackness'" (I assume he is referring here to possible black nationalist candidates). In the last twenty-five years, black members of Congress have rarely been challenged on the basis of blackness or anything else (except ambition). Consequently, they have accumulated considerable aggregate seniority and important positions of party and committee leadership. However, research on blacks disavows that they have been able, even incrementally, to advance much of the post-civil rights era black reform agenda (Berg, 1994: Chap. 6; Smith, 1996: 8; Singh, 1998).

Holden also suggested that blacks identify and develop strategies to lobby white congressmen who have substantial black populations in their districts. In cooperation with the Joint Center for Political Studies, the Congressional Black Caucus developed such a lobbying strategy. However, except perhaps on the District of Columbia home rule bill, most students have found this lobbying process to have had little impact on the targeted legislators (Jones, 1989; Champagne and Rieselbach, 1995; Singh, 1998).

State and Local Politics

On the assumption that blacks in the near term would constitute the governing majority in many cities, Holden noted that the power of city governments are limited by state constitutional and legislative authority and therefore if blacks are "serious about social change" attention must be paid to "seeking strategic entry" into state government (Holden, 1973: 200).

Systematic data on black participation in state policy systems are not available, in large part because such data are difficult and time consuming to collect. Thus, except at the highly visible level of state executive and legislative offices, we know very little about black penetration of state governments and even less about their impact on state policy making.

The election of Douglas Wilder as governor of Virginia provoked enormous media and scholarly attention, even generating a somewhat new conceptual apparatus—deracialization—as a means to understand the Wilder and related campaigns (McCormick and Jones, 1993; Jones and Clemons, 1993; Perry, 1991). Although some research is underway, as of now we know little about
the impact of Wilder's administration on state policies relating to African American interests.

Wilder is the only black to penetrate the highest level of state government, although Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley almost made history in his effort to become California's first black governor (Pettigrew and Alston, 1998; Henry, 1987). Two blacks have been elected lieutenant governor, three have been elected secretaries of state, five comptroller or state treasurer, and one black has been elected a state attorney general, and one the head of a state's department of education. Again, nothing is known about the policy impact of these officeholders. Of these offices only the attorney general (and to a lesser extent the superintendent of education) has significant policy-making responsibilities; the others are largely ministerial.

Policy-making responsibilities in state government are disproportionately concentrated in the scores of boards and commissions appointed by the governor, the executive cabinet, and the senior civil service, areas woefully neglected by the academic community (see Holmes' 1994 work on Georgia).

A bit more work has been done on black participation in state legislative politics. Blacks have been elected to state legislative office in forty-two states and formed legislative caucuses in most of those where they are a significant presence. Like their counterparts in Congress, however, the black legislative delegations in the states are relatively small and thus have not been able to exert much of an impact on legislative outcomes affecting African Americans, although there is some variation from state to state (Covin, 1993; Miller, 1990; 1994; Coleman, 1985; and Holmes, 1994). All in all, there is really not sufficient data or research to go beyond narrow description of this aspect of Holden's propositions regarding state politics.5

Bureaucratic-Administrative Politics

Holden's final political prescription is for "vast improvement in the practice of administrative politics by blacks. Here Holden argues, "Administration is so fundamental an element of governance that those who are unsuccessful in penetrating the administrative process are very unlikely to get what they need or want" (1973: 204, emphasis in original). He goes on to write, "For it is through the day-to-day interventions of administrators that policy outcomes are followed, ignored or wholly controverted" (1973: 204).

Two bureaucratic-administrative levels are important: the civil service—especially the senior ranks—and the top-level cabinet and other senior officials appointed by the president. At this writing, data were not readily accessible on the current representation of blacks in the senior civil service. In 1969, blacks constituted 1.2 percent of "supergrade" civil servants. By 1980 the number was 5 percent and then down to 4.2 percent by 1984 (Cavanagh, 1987). This decline came about as a result of the Reagan administration's "downsizing" of the bureaucracy, especially its urban, social welfare, and civil rights components where blacks tend to be concentrated. The numbers may be even less today, given that "downsizing" has continued under the Clinton administration. Research on the policy impact of these senior bureaucrats is not available.

We know a little more about black presidential appointees. Their numbers
increased from 2 percent in the Johnson administration, 4 percent in the Nixon administration, 12 percent in the Carter administration, 5–6 percent in the Reagan and Bush administrations, and to more then 14 percent in the Clinton administration (Smith, 1981; Smith, 1996: Chap. 4). Until the Reagan administration, black appointees tended to be concentrated in the urban, social welfare and civil rights bureaucracies. Reagan appointed several blacks to non-traditional positions and the Clinton administration accelerated this pattern of appointments to positions not related to civil rights or social welfare.

Holden wrote in Essay VI that “The symbol of Black exclusion is the White House staff itself” (1973: 205). While presidents from Eisenhower on have tended to have assistants for race-related issues, blacks still (with exceptions here and there, such as Bush’s assistant for congressional relations and Clinton’s director of OMB) are excluded from the inner core of White House advisors and top-level positions in the Executive Office of the President. For example, Christopher Edley, Jr., a former assistant to President Clinton, writes, “For all the great success the Clinton administration has had in achieving racial diversity in the cabinet, the sub-cabinet and the judiciary, the situation has been tame when it comes to the President’s own White House staff” (1996:89). Edley goes on to observe that in the Office of the National Economic Council, the Domestic Policy Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Council on Environmental Quality, there were nearly 750 senior staffers and not one of these were black.

While there has been some black penetration of the bureaucratic-administrative apparatus, it is not clear that the policy impact has been commensurate. As with state politics the need is for more research. The available research presents a decidedly mixed picture. For example, in the Nixon administration black presidential appointees were vigorous advocates of black interests, i.e., Arthur Fletcher’s efforts in designing the principles and implementing the strategy for affirmative action (Smith, 1996: Chap. 5). But in the Carter administration the black assistant attorney general for civil rights and the black Solicitor General prepared a brief in the seminal Bakke case that argued that the principles of affirmative action violated the Constitution (Smith, 1996: Chap. 5). Christopher Edley played an important role in developing the Clinton administration’s “Mend It, Don’t End It” affirmative action compromise, a policy that while preserving the principle of affirmative action, has also in all likelihood, resulted in a decline in its effectiveness.

In the two Reagan administrations, black appointees, with the exception of Secretary Samuel Pierce (of the Department of Housing and Urban Development), were faithful functionaries in carrying out policies widely perceived to be adverse to black interests on civil rights (Smith, 1996: Chap. 5). In some recently completed work, Walton and Smith (forthcoming) report that the four black cabinet secretaries in the first Clinton administration were no more active in promulgating civil rights, anti-discrimination regulations than their white counterparts.

Despite his emphasis on the centrality of the bureaucratic process in modern politics and his call for increased black participation, this mixed picture would not surprise Holden. For he wrote that “no executive appointee, no senior bureaucrat, automatically represents the interests with which he has,
in the past, been most identified merely because of that past identification” (1973: 206).

Conclusion

On first glance, in terms of analysis and prescription, it appears that Holden’s propositions hold up pretty well after twenty-five years. That is, he identified some critical areas requiring attention, and African American leaders and organizations have by and large pursued many of them with varying degrees of success. How far, however, have these approaches moved the society toward the goal of integration? Let me answer with a quote from a paper I wrote several years ago, that includes a critique of Holden and integrationism. In making his case for the ideological primacy of integration, Holden dismisses radicalism and nationalism as unrealistic; as romanticism; as fantasy. In response I quote from the work of Sterling Stuckey, the distinguished historian of black Nationalism. The quote that I offer is perhaps the most telling criticism of Holden’s liberal integrationism. Stuckey wrote (1972: 29),

When nationalists advocated the total removal of their people from America—and few indeed have been those who have thought this strategy realistic or desirable—it should not be said that even they, considering centuries of merciless oppression of Afro-Americans—were less realistic than believers in the American dream. Moreover, the record seems to suggest rather the opposite; that those people of color (and their White allies) who believed in the absorptive powers of America were vastly more deluded than those Blacks who decided to depend mainly on their own people, their own energies in a hostile land. (quoted in Smith, 1993: 214)

Following this quote, in a note I write,

For example, Holden in his critique of nationalist programs in the 1960s argues that integration is the only rational goal for Blacks in the United States. Pursuant to that goal he proposed a series of five-year strategic plans in such fields as education and politics that by 1976 would have set in motion a process where race would not predict the distribution of “material benefits or psychic esteem in any significant degree”. . . . A generation later his thinking seems almost as farfetched as the goal of a separate nation, as “race” more and more predicts life chances in the United States in nearly every important area—education, health, mortality, the economy, office holding and mental health. (Smith, 1993: 223)

Twenty-five years after Holden wrote The Politics of the Black “Nation,” race certainly continues to predict material well-being in the United States, in some areas like elementary and secondary education, and in health, in ways more adverse than when Holden wrote (see Jaynes and Williams, 1989; Hacker, 1992; Smith, 1995: Chap. 4). Race continues, to some degree, to be a useful predictor of the distribution of psychic esteem (Cross, 1991; Smith, 1995: Chap. 5) in ways unfavorable to blacks. Twenty-five years later, one has to conclude that Professor Holden, the acuity of his analysis notwithstanding, got it wrong.

In this volume we have focused on The Politics of the Black “Nation” which analyzes the black side of the color line—the internal economic, cultural, in-
stitutional and ideological arrangements of the black "nation," and how the internal processes of the black "nation," might be more rationally rearranged. Perhaps at some time in the future, we can have in the pages of this respected journal, another symposium, but one that focuses on The White Man’s Burden, the companion volume that examines the white side of the color line (Holden, 1973b). For as Holden writes, “In the end, however, the effect of any rational strategy will depend on Whites” (1973:209). To me—a scholar who is committed to black nationalism—this is the Achilles’ heel of Holden’s position and all liberal integrationist thinking. As Professor Stuckey observes, amongst a hostile people we must rely on our own people, their energies and their resources.

Notes

1. Malcolm X delivered the “Ballot or Bullet” speech initially in a debate with Louis Lomax in Cleveland on April 3, 1964 (see Brietman, 1965).
2. The notion of a "socialist smuggler" is borrowed from Dahl and Lindblom (1976: 380) where they write, "with its indiscretions, incremental change is a method of ‘smuggling’ social reform into society. If that fact were more widely understood, there would be more smugglers at work as well as some learning of the smugglers' skills" (quoted in Manley, 1983: 380).
3. Holden correctly notes (1973: 209–10) that it is superficial, inaccurate and arrogant to refer to eastern and southern European groups as “ethnic” and Anglo-Protestants as non-ethnics. Thus, he uses the term with reservations.
4. Although relatively few blacks have been defeated in their re-election efforts, in the last decade thirteen senior blacks have voluntarily left the Congress. This large number of resignations and retirements is due in part to the frustration of members, as they have become more and more isolated in an increasingly conservative Congress.
5. Holden worried that state governments might seek to restrict or remove the powers and responsibilities of city governments as they came under black control (1973: 200), presumably because these governments might undertake serious reforms of some sort or another. This has not occurred, perhaps because black urban regimes have not been reform minded (Reed, 1988).

References


African American Politics in Constancy and Change

Erasing Racial Justice or How Liberals Became Black

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On August 11, 1965, the Watts area of Los Angeles exploded in the worst urban violence in nearly fifty years. Less than a week after the signing of the historic Voting Rights Act of 1965 the civil rights movement was dead. The nation’s attention shifted north where rioters rejected the soothing words of civil rights leaders and shouted “Burn, Baby Burn” and “Get Whitey.” The immediate consequences were 34 dead, 1,032 injured, 3,952 arrested and an estimated $40 million in property damage.

Watts was indeed a defining moment in the civil rights movement and its images have had a guiding influence on American politics for the last three decades. The image of the violent ghetto youth of the North helped shift public sentiment from one favoring the demands of Southern civil rights protesters to one decrying the nihilism and race consciousness of black power. Both media and scholars began to focus on the character of the protesters rather than the structure of the ghetto. The changing images assisted political leaders in shifting the goals of both the civil rights movement and the black power movement from racial justice to job-training and social services. The demands for “jobs and freedom” of the 1963 March on Washington were translated into “welfare” and “affirmative action.” In the long run, the “war on poverty” became a “war on welfare” with a major assist from a real war in Vietnam.

This work contests the view that civil rights advocates in general and King in particular saw affirmative action and welfare as primary goals of the civil rights movement or that the rise of black Power was primarily responsible for white backlash. It argues that King and other leaders offered a comprehensive alternative plan aimed at structural unemployment and purposefully designed to be racially inclusive rather than exclusive. The rejection of this plan, based on economic rights, represented a resurgence of white supremacy within the Democratic party epitomized by a new emphasis on white identity and a willingness to accept growing class disparity to thwart racial justice. In the post-civil rights era, when overt appeals to white supremacy were
no longer publicly acceptable, culture-of-poverty explanations for racial inequality assumed center stage. Foremost among these explanations was the creation of the concept of an “underclass” whose situation was self-perpetuating and immune to any government efforts at remelioration.

We now have a large and growing body of theory that helps explain the events of the last thirty-five years. Three specific literatures will be utilized in this analysis. First, the literature on social movements will provide a context for examining Martin Luther King’s attempt to transform the civil rights movement into an economic rights movement. The focus of our analysis will be on the issues of group identification, critical communities, and framing. Second, we will look at white backlash to King’s efforts drawing largely on the new literature on “Whiteness.” This literature, which views white supremacy as a vital and continuing component of American democracy, will be contrasted with popular political viewpoints which cite black power as the cause of white hostility to black demands. Finally, we look at the literature on the black underclass comparing and contrasting those who view underclass status as a product of changes in the structure of the economy with those who see such status as the product of cultural pathology.

The literature on social movement theory is generally divided into two broad categories. The first goes back to Aristotle in attributing the cause of political unrest to inequality in the distribution of wealth, status and political power. Karl Marx and his followers located this inequality in the structure of the capitalist system. While Marx located the conflict as one between opposing classes he provided no theory of mobilization. Lenin’s response to the failure of worker mobilization was his theory of the vanguard. While Marx focused on the causes of conflict and Lenin developed the organizations necessary to structure it, Antonio Gramsci sought to create a working-class culture that would counter the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

Sidney Tarrow contends that the theories of Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci all have strong parallels in recent theorizing about collective action and social movements. From the early collective behavior theorists of the fifties through Ted Robert Gurr’s work in the seventies, this theory linked collective behavior to a functional view of society in which societal dysfunctions produced different forms of collective behavior. However, because the assumed collective behavior was abnormal, few of them specified its relationship to the political.4

The inability of theories of collective behavior to predict or explain the unrest of the 1960s revitalized the study of social movements in both Europe and the United States. In his 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson posed the problem of the “free rider” which dominated post-sixties theorizing. Olson contended that movements sought to involve as many individuals as possible in pursuit of its collective good, however, the larger the group the more people will prefer to “free-ride” on the efforts of the individuals who have the most to gain from the movement. The answer to this dilemma came in the form of resource mobilization theory. Sociologists John McCarthy and Mayer Zald suggested that expanded personal resources, professionalization, and external financial support available to movements provided a solution—professional movement organizations.5 Yet the continuing growth of grassroots movements on the one hand, and special interest
group organizations on the other, led to increasing dissatisfaction with a resource mobilization approach.

Many recent writers have shifted the focus of research on social movements from structural factors to the "framing" of collective action. In moving toward issues of group identification and solidarity, these modern theorists owe much to the work of Gramsci, as well as E. P. Thompson, Clifford Geertz, Erving Goffman, William Gamson, Michel Foucault and Benedict Anderson.6 In the social sciences those whose works link the political process to collective identity include Doug McAdam, Charles Tilly, Amitai Etzioni, and Tarrow.7

Tarrow's *Power in Movement* attempts to synthesize these recent trends. He defines social movements as "collective challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities."8 Tarrow notes that these social solidarities more often rest on appeals to nationalism, ethnicity or religion rather than social class. The success of a movement in inspiring people to action depends on how grievances are shaped into broader more resonant claims. Framing not only generalizes the grievance but also defines the "us" and "them" in a movement's conflict structure. Much of the "work" of framing is cognitive and evaluative as the movement identifies grievances and translates them into broader claims against significant others.9

Tarrow highlights the role of social networks or critical communities in moving from group solidarity to a politicized group identity. These networks help answer Olson's "free-rider" problem in that collective action may arise only among the best-endowed or most courageous members of these groups, but the connections between them create a ripple effect that incites others. Tarrow calls these links "connective structures."10

While this ripple effect triggers collective action it unleashes forces it cannot control or sustain. Internally, powerful movements incite action from individuals who were previously passive. Yet it does not necessarily have the resources to internalize its support base thus creating opportunities for factionalism, defection, competition, and repression. Externally, the ripple effect works in both positive and negative directions motivating competing or hostile interests to move to action.11

It is our contention that Martin Luther King's efforts to "reframe" the civil rights movement as an economic rights movement were unsuccessful due to three primary factors. First, race, the primary basis of aggregation in the civil rights movement was replaced by class—a much less compelling basis of social aggregation in the American context. Second, the social network or critical community that had coalesced around the early civil rights movement began to fragment even within King's own organization. Third, the civil rights movement created a ripple effect that produced a "master frame"12 embraced by both complementary and hostile political groups demanding their "rights" and generating a cycle of protest.

**Framing Economic Rights**

Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as the other leaders of the civil rights movement were shocked by the rage, the violence and the loss of life in Watts. In
the two years between the March on Washington and Watts, King had seen his "dream turn into a nightmare." The dream of a "beloved community" based on interracial brotherhood was "shattered when the riots developed in Watts," said King.13

After Watts, King believed the civil rights movement had entered a new phase. It expanded its focus from one region—the South—to the entire nation. Moreover, it expanded its scope from civil rights to a more inclusive human rights. Shortly after Watts, while speaking to a meeting of the Illinois AFL-CIO, King stated that

It is a constitutional right for a man to be able to vote but the human right to a decent house is as categorically imperative and morally absolute as was that constitutional right. It is not a constitutional right that men have jobs, but it is a human right.14

King's promotion of economic rights was not new but it now assumed center stage.
As early as 1960, King had used a version of the "dream" metaphor that included economic rights. The dream encompassed "equality of opportunity, of privilege and prosperity widely distributed; a dream of a land where men will not take necessities from the many to give luxuries to the few..."15 Indeed, the slogan of the 1963 March on Washington was "jobs and freedom." After Watts, King was saying freedom was not free, and was meaningless without the economic means to pursue it or concretely, the right to eat a hamburger at a lunch counter was empty without the means to pay for it. In the early sixties, King's economic strategy largely revolved around increased welfare services and increased job opportunities primarily directed toward the black community. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) launched its major economic thrust—Operation Breadbasket—in Atlanta in 1962. The idea behind Operation Breadbasket, which would reach its full potential in Chicago under Reverend Jesse Jackson, was to use "selective patronage" to force retailers to stock products manufactured by black businesses and to hire black employees in ghetto stores. Reverend Leon Sullivan of Philadelphia was the inspiration for the program and he came to Atlanta for its inauguration. King said it was the next step for desegregation in Atlanta.16
In mid-1963, the Urban League's Whitney Young proposed "an immediate, dramatic and tangible domestic Marshall Plan "that would enable blacks to begin the social race at the same starting line. Carefully distinguishing between his call for "a special effort" and "special privileges," he called for massive compensatory action over ten years by government business, and foundations to generate employment, to improve education, housing and health, and to "reverse economic and social deterioration of urban families and communities." 17

While King supported Young's proposal, his colleague, Professor L. D. Reddick directly challenged the race-based nature of the program. Moreover, foreshadowing the debate over affirmative action, Reddick cautioned that Young's slogan a "Marshall Plan for the Negro" should be discarded completely because it fed the growing conviction that blacks "expect 'preferential' treatment for jobs." Reddick suggested using the "maximum" rather than "preferential" when referring to jobs.18
For Reddick the use of the term "preferential" was both politically unsound and violated the movement's principle of equality. In *Why We Can't Wait*, King cites Reddick's opposition to the Indian government's special treatment of untouchables. King disagreed with Reddick and argued that compensatory measures were necessary and had been used to benefit other groups. However, when King announced his own program for economic and social advancement that same year, he was careful to call it a "Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged." Putting a price tag of $50 billion over ten years on his proposal, King called for the development of a federal program of public works, retraining and jobs for all—"so that none, white or black, will have cause to feel threatened." Stressing that his principal goal was jobs, not relief, King was careful to point out that economic insecurity caused by automation was a problem for whites as well as blacks and challenged President Johnson's rosy economic forecasts.

Neither Young's "Marshall Plan" nor King's "Bill of Rights" received serious legislative or media attention. It seemed clear that King and Johnson were moving in different directions with King looking for economic programs that would empower the poor while Johnson promoted welfare policies that would keep them quiet. Watts proved they could not be kept quiet.

When King visited Watts and asked riot participants what they had gained, he was struck by the answer that "they paid attention to us." King decided that the need was real even if the form in which it was expressed was counterproductive. After visiting several northern cities and over the objection of Bayard Rustin and the SCLC staff he decided to focus his efforts on Chicago.

The story of King's lack of success in Chicago is well-known. In fact, King admitted that many of the problems he demanded Mayor Daley solve would take at least ten years to make a good start. In addition, he oversimplified the primary issue as economic exploitation in order to avoid confronting Daley politically. However, the experience in Chicago was profoundly instructive for several reasons. First, actually living in a Chicago tenement and dealing with the daily frustrations of ghetto residents deepened his identification with the urban poor. He learned that if he were to truly speak for the poor, as well as gang members, his voice must be more urgent, more demanding and less utopian. Second, the refusal of the Chicago democratic machine, the national Democratic party and the unions to concretely support the goals of his Chicago campaign drove a wedge between King and his former allies that would never be overcome. White union members had participated in the mobs attacking King in Chicago neighborhoods and Cicero. He began to identify less with this liberal coalition and more directly with the poor. Third, Daley's use of black middle-class leaders in Chicago to blunt King's attacks led King to challenge black middle class leadership itself: "the fact is that the civil rights movement has too often been middle-class oriented, and that it has not moved to the grass-roots levels of our communities." Finally, King realized that the massive problems faced by Chicago's poor could not be solved in Chicago alone. The battle must be expanded to include the entire country and in particular the nation's capital.

By 1966, King had moved from a conception of poverty as something caused by the deficiencies of the poor that the broader community could compensate or provide for to a conception of poverty as the inevitable outcome of steps taken by the privileged classes to sustain their privileges. In his new
rhetoric he urged the public to see poverty as systemic rather than personal. The piecemeal approach to poverty that offered welfare and job training had to be replaced by a comprehensive and redistributive policy of full employment and guaranteed income adjusted for inflation and at more than subsistence levels. The very definition of work needed a "radical redefinition" to include such services as health care and child-rearing. Most importantly, King joined Kenneth Clark and Michael Harrington in arguing for the democratic participation of the poor in devising solutions to the problems that faced them. King no doubt recalled the words of the president of the Woodlawn Association (TWO) who testified before a Congressional Committee that everyone in Chicago benefited from the war on poverty except the poor. It had become another source of patronage for the Daley machine which the TWO president called the "maximum feasible participation of the rich." Privately, King criticized capitalism and its materialism.27

King's conception took concrete form in the 1966 "Freedom Budget for All Americans" put forth by Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph. The Freedom Budget grew out of a June 1966 White House Conference28 called by Johnson to address increasing urban unrest and racial hostility. Randolph and Rustin called for outlays of $185 billion over ten years including guaranteed jobs and income. The 84-page proposal followed the precedent set by the Full Employment Bill of 1946 and was in part Randolph's response to the self-help programs advocated by black nationalists. He believed it would make possible the unity of the white and black working classes because it left "no room for discrimination in any form (and) because its programs are addressed to all who need more opportunity and improved incomes and living standards—not just to some of them."28 The Freedom Budget itself was drawn up by a team of black and white economists and intellectuals, including Leon Keyserling, Vivian Henderson, Tom Kahn, Nathaniel Goldfinger, and Michael Harrington. "No matter what you think of the war, whether you favor or oppose the administration's policies," said Randolph in his Senate testimony, "if the war goes on, and if the country makes the Black and White poor pay for it, this will have the most disastrous consequences on our democratic way of life."29 Johnson never seriously considered the "Freedom Budget" which emerged from his own White House conference and when Randolph and other civil rights leaders attacked him for budget cuts in the war on poverty he told aides to call "and tell them to cut this stuff out."30

King, too, had become increasingly concerned about the war in Vietnam and about Johnson's decreasing concern with the war on poverty. He had called for protests around a guaranteed income in northern cities, including Washington, DC, as early as October 1966. However, it wasn't until a conversation with Mississippi NAACP-1 DP director Marian Wright (later Wright) that he decided on a "poor people's" march on Washington. Wright had testified before the Senate Labor Committee's Subcommittee on Poverty in March 1967. Following her testimony, Senator Robert Kennedy, who sat on the subcommittee, accompanied her to Cleveland, Mississippi, where he personally saw the huge proportion of the poor paid for their efforts to register voters. Kennedy told her to bring the poor to Washington in part of "rock and roll push" and she agreed. And so in June 1968, when Wright and the Poor People's Campaign organizers
as if I was an emissary of grace. . . . Out of that, the Poor People’s Campaign was born.”

Wright’s initial suggestion that King and other religious leaders join her and a few dispossessed Mississippi Delta farmers was transformed into a massive, long-range campaign of civil disobedience comparable to the “Bonus army” of World War II. King was responding to something even more urgent than the plight of rural blacks in Mississippi and that was the violence sweeping across the nation’s urban centers in 1966 and 1967. Testifying before the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) in October of 1967, King said the real cause of the uprising was “the greater crimes of white society”—the White backlash, heavy black unemployment, racial discrimination, and the effects of the Vietnam war whose funding had decimated federal spending on urban areas. Speaking to reporters after his testimony, he said SCLC planned on “escalating non-violence to the level of civil disobedience” by bringing thousands of needy citizens to Washington to “just camp here and stay” to await meaningful federal action. “The city will not function,” he warned, until Congress approved “a massive program on the part of the federal government that will make jobs or income a reality for every American citizen.”39 The Kerner Commission eventually endorsed a jobs program and a guaranteed income in its report.

Already depressed about the growing violence at home and in Vietnam and the greatly increased hostility of the Johnson administration since his public attacks on the president’s Vietnam policy, King grew nearly despondent as his staff and friends tried to shoot-down the proposed campaign. Almost no one on his staff thought poverty was the best issue around which to carry the struggle forward and many thought the civil disobedience campaign would doom the organization if not the movement. Ironically, two of King’s most radical mentors and allies led the charge.

Bayard Rustin, who with Randolph had pushed economic programs while King was a school boy, preferred a program that used the new Voting Rights Act to put Democrats in Congress. While he was eventually brought around to supporting the goals of the campaign, he was categorically opposed to any disruptive civil disobedience. He and Michael Harrington urged King to formulate goals that were achievable in order to reverse the demoralization of the movement. When King refused to moderate his plans, Rustin stunned King by going public with his opposition.40

At least Rustin had agreed with King that the movement had entered a new “revolutionary” phase which in Rustin’s words required a “qualitative transformation of fundamental institutions” in order to realize “full employment, the abolition of slums, the reconstruction of our educational system and new definitions of work and leisure.” Stanley Levison, King’s close friend and an ex-Communist, strongly disagreed with the radical emphasis. In opposing the Alabama boycott King had called for after Selma, Levison contested that the civil rights coalition of liberals was “militant only against shocking violence” and gross injustice and that in the North the movement could only aspire to reform not revolution:

The American people are not inclined to change their society in order to free the Negro. They are ready to undertake some, and perhaps major reforms but not to
make a revolution. It is unwise to put that question in that alternative form particularly when it may well be wrong.31

Old-timers like Rustin and Levison were not the only ones to oppose the Poor People's Campaign (PPC).

James Bevel and Jesse Jackson each strongly opposed the project for different reasons. Bevel had quickly become absorbed in efforts to end the Vietnam war and thought the PPC detracted from that effort. Jackson, on the other hand, wanted to stay in Chicago with Operation Breadbasket which King thought was too limited in its approach to bring about structural change. According to Andy Young, King was quite rough on Jesse because he believed jobs would finally have to be provided by the public sector, and that Breadbasket was essentially a private sector program.32

Of course, King was assassinated before the PPC sunk in the mud, internal violence, bad press and external repression of Resurrection City. King accepted Reverend James Lawson's appeal to come to Memphis to speak precisely because the strike of sanitation workers emphasized the very goals of the PPC. The low wages and lack of health care of the sanitation workers highlighted the class issues in the anti-poverty struggle. At the same time the 1,000 plus sanitation workers were all-black and fighting for union recognition from an all-white city government. Moreover, the youthful violence that marred King's visit and brought him back for one tragic last effort was symbolic of the forces King was trying to harness in the late sixties and direct toward positive change.

It seems uncertain at best, that King—had he lived—could have forced the federal government to pass the economic Bill of Rights his campaign demanded.33 King cited a 1967 Harris poll that showed "a clear majority in America are asking for the very things which we will demand in Washington."34 Yet less than a year later, a Harris and Gallup poll would reveal only 3 percent of Americans would list "poverty" as a key issue before the nation. While much of this fall from the national agenda is attributed to white backlash against increasing urban violence, it should be noted that the drop in public support for government action pre-dates the worst urban violence. The American National Election Study, which polled Americans on the question of government responsibility from 1952 through 1986 reported a dramatic 28 percentage point drop among respondents who believe it is government's responsibility to ensure a job and a good standard of living in 1964.35 The drop comes at the peak of the civil rights movement but coincides with beginnings of racial polarization between the two major political parties driven by Barry Goldwater's "Southern Strategy."36

Framing "Whiteness"

In his Culture Moves, Thomas Rochon contends that evaluating movement impacts by their influence on cultural values avoids the problems of estimating policy impacts. Four difficulties arise in using policy reforms as a measure of movement influence according to Rochon. First, a movement organization may choose to focus its efforts, at least initially, on the social arena rather than public policy. Second, it may be difficult to distinguish between
policy reforms that result from movement activity from those of other forces. Third, as movement demands move through the policy process the resulting legislation may or may not meet the approval of movement activists. Finally, the existence of cycles of protest means that current movement influence may rest, at least partially, on the success of previous movements. Changing cultural values are easier to document, says Rochon, than policy impacts.

Cultural change can be mapped by examining changes in discourse. It involves the introduction of contention into how events should be viewed. An important new discourse in the post-civil rights era is the emerging literature on “Whiteness.” In contrast to mainstream political science literature, the new work on “Whiteness” sees white supremacy as an integral part of American democracy rather than an anomaly or exception. Alexander Saxton delineates three assumptions generally shared by these writers. First, a theory of white racial superiority originated from rationalizations and justifications of the slave trade, slavery and the expropriation of land from non-whites. Second, this theory continued to hold a central place in various syntheses of ideas legitimizing power because it continued to meet justificatory needs of dominant groups in changing class coalitions that have ruled the nation. Third, these legitimizing syntheses, including specific constructions within them remained in flux through ongoing processes of modification and readjustment.

Using Rochon’s wider cultural perspective and informed by the assumptions of scholars on white domination, we can expect that the social and policy reforms initiated by the civil rights movement took directions that the movement could not control. We could also predict that white supremacy would attempt to thwart the policy results of the civil rights movements, especially the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The real shift in the direction of American politics occurs in 1964, not 1965—the year of Watts. It is in the presidential election of that year that the Republican party, whose record on civil rights had been at least comparable to that of the Democratic party, firmly identified itself as anti-civil rights in the person of its presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater. Goldwater pioneered a “Southern strategy” which worked against a national consensus on civil rights and gave comfort to those opposed to the new civil rights legislation. According to Robert Novak, Policy A was to “soft-pedal civil rights. While stopping short of actually endorsing racial segregation, forget all the sentimental tradition of the party of Lincoln.”

The 1964 campaign demonstrated: (1) that conservatism provided an ideological mechanism for the Republican party to appeal to whites opposed to racial integration, without the liability of being labeled racist; and (2) that race could be used to break the economic class base of the New Deal Coalition among white voters, forcing an ideological shift to the right among a group once deeply committed to the redistributive and progressive economic agenda of the New Deal. By 1968, concepts and language that were seen as unfit by the Goldwater camp in 1964 were publicly embraced in 1968 and the pro-civil rights, northeastern wing of the party was excised.

Liberals who attempted to embrace the concept of affirmative action in the mid-sixties were put on the defensive because it conflicted with their vision
of an individualistic, merit-based, color-blind society. When attempting to implement race-based remedies like affirmative action that recognized previous discrimination against blacks, government officials were targeted by white politicians like George Wallace. Leading one of the most successful third party efforts in the twentieth century, Wallace attacked “big government” and high taxes as the enemy. Wallace’s attack provided a modicum of support for those who would deny racism yet opposed efforts to redress discrimination and its effects. Hubert Humphrey’s narrow defeat marked the end of the New Deal coalition and the rise of white supremacy in the form of Richard Nixon and a new “Southern strategy.”

If, in fact, race permitted the ideological takeover of the Republican party by conservatives and laid the basis for the defection of white Democrats, then white supremacy is not a flaw in American democracy but rather an integral part of it. As recent work by Alexander Saxton, Noel Ignatiev and others has shown, Jacksonian democracy in the nineteenth century depended on the existence of slavery to unite whites of different races and ethnic backgrounds. As the race revolution of the twentieth century expanded into a rights revolution for politically marginalized groups, the white working class saw its status eroding and sought to shore it up through a return to whiteness. However, the rights revolution had so challenged the universality of the dominant culture as to prohibit a simple return to whiteness of the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries.

The mainstream reaction to the black power movement was not fear of black domination so much as a fear of the disintegration of the reigning ideology. Black power specifically and the rights revolution in general interrogated the understanding of the distribution of power and privilege in the United States. “It would be hard to overestimate,” states sociologist and former Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) leader Todd Gitlin, “the impact of black rage and estrangement on white radical rage and estrangement in the later 1960s.” Yet an ideological interpretation of what was happening did not fit harmoniously with either the consensus or progressive varieties of American national consciousness because it stemmed from a class analysis of historical change. Thus while white supremacists threatened by competition from blacks in previously protected areas of life like jobs retreated to the conservative banner of Republicanism, white liberal supporters of integration had no conceptual category with which to comprehend African Americans as a separate national group. They fell back on piece-meal solutions such as affirmative action and welfare rather than providing the material means for improving the housing, schools, cultural life, and economy of black neighborhoods.

As late as the fall of 1965, Nathan Glazer was writing: “For the moment, ethnic self-assertiveness is in eclipse and even in bad odor.” Even five years later, few survey questionnaires contained questions about ethnicity. But by 1972, Michael Novak was writing in his manifesto The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics, “I want to have a history.” Poles, Italians, Greeks, Slavs, and others had learned about the importance of cultural identity from blacks. Multiculturalism was born as Americans of all colors began to celebrate differences instead of insisting everyone had to be the same. Many whites felt a marginality that was hardly grasped by the label “White.” Whiteness was an
empty cultural category and they wanted to belong to more distinct, better-defined and better-defended tribes. "Ethnicity," says Gitlin, "offered pride and victimization, assertion without the need for defensiveness." White ethnicity was preferable to white racial identity because it helped sublimate widespread white resentment at being blamed for the racial oppression of blacks.

Historian Matthew Frye Jacobson calls such identifications "ideological sleight of hand" that uncouples "ethnic" history from its most salient structural features. Jacobson states that

it is at once the brilliance and the damning limitation of Unmeltable Ethnic (like the ethnic revival in general) that the psychological dimension of identity politics and struggle—Novak's "inner conflict between one's felt personal power and one's ascribed public power"—takes precedence over structural features of the political landscape like legal codes, housing covenants, or Jim Crow practices.47

In short, writers like Michael Novak and Michael Lerner now disavow any participation in twentieth-century white privilege on the spurious basis of their grandparents' racial oppression ignoring, says Jacobson, that they owe not just their economic success but also their now stabilized and broadly recognized whiteness itself in part to these non-white groups.48

Other whites, however, had no problem embracing their white racial identity. Beginning around 1970, a number of racist and reactionary groups surfaced including anti-federalists, anti-Semites, racists, survivalists, and Christian fundamentalists. Although ideologically related to the Ku Klux Klan and older American Nazi groups, these new organizations were also violently opposed to any government beyond the county level and militantly anti-abortionist. They include the Aryan Nations, The Order, Bruder Schweigen Strike Force II, Posse Comitatus, the Arizona Patriots, the White Patriotic Party, and the Convenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord.49 The remarkable rise of David Duke from founder of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in 1975 to serious Republican gubernatorial candidate (one-half million votes) in Louisiana in 1991, is a testament to the shift right in American politics.

The defining moment for the Democratic party in 1964 came in Atlantic City when credentials officials at the presidential nominating convention—at the direction of Lyndon Johnson—refused to seat the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party (MFDP) preferring the segregationist, all-white male composition of the regular Democratic party. The two token seats "compromise" offered by Johnson and reluctantly supported by King and mainstream civil rights leaders but rejected by the MFDP, was a lesson in the futility of moral power over political power for many young civil rights activists. Stokely Carmichael stated,

The lesson, in fact, was clear at Atlantic City. The major moral of that experience was not merely that the national conscience was generally unreliable but that, very specifically, black people in Mississippi and throughout this country could not rely on their so-called allies. many labor, liberal and civil rights leaders deserted the MFDP because of closer ties to the national Democratic party. To seat the MFDP over the "regulars" would have meant a displacement of power, and it became crystal clear that in order to combat power, one needed power.50
Carmichael and the other young activists of SNCC had learned that there was no neutral, objective, fair arbiter of power relationships either inside or outside the system.

In reality, the lesson of political power over moral power had been presented a decade earlier in the Brown decision which for many inaugurated the civil rights era. While the Supreme Court struck a mighty blow for a color-blind Constitution in Brown I, it wilted in the face of implementation in Brown II. Just as Johnson retreated from providing immediate relief to black voters in Mississippi, the Court refused to grant traditional relief in the form of court orders to stop racial discrimination. Brown II was a conservative decision that denied Linda Brown her individual relief, but would buy time for gradual enforcement by local federal judges who would be provided no clear judicial guidelines or deadlines. It is remarkable that the Supreme Court justices after having overturned a policy of federally sanctioned segregation would assume that school integration would be carried out in a neutral, impartial, and meritorious way divorced from the economy of social power.

Instead of demanding a radical transformation of social practices, they left in place the same white administrators of the formal program of American apartheid. Those that had gained their jobs illegitimately were now charged with making merit-based, color-blind decisions in education and employment.

Brown, in many ways, foreshadowed affirmative action and to a lesser extent welfare. Black demands for jobs and an end to employment discrimination were met with a vague affirmative action and “job training”—often for jobs that did not exist. Quotas and racially identified jobs were nothing new. For example, early in this century the job of shoveling coal into engines was hot, dirty, “Negro work.” As diesel engines made the fireman’s job more attractive, whites began to displace black firemen. They achieved this by first excluding new union members who were “unpromotable,” a euphemism for Negro, then by making quota agreements with rail carriers that would get around the seniority of black firemen by placing a two-thirds limit on jobs for “nonpromotable” firemen. Even this scheme was not enough for the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen who worked out an explicit quota limit on Negro firemen with twenty-one Southeastern railroads. In industry after industry, blacks were confined to the lowest paying, dirtiest and dangerous jobs—unless, of course, the jobs became more desirable. The New Deal’s minimum wage legislation excluded the two largest categories of black labor, agricultural workers and domestics.

Like the Supreme Court in Brown, Congress and the Executive Branch chose not to offer direct relief to the millions of black workers who had suffered employment discrimination. Would major league baseball, for example, throw out all baseball records prior to 1947 because the records were not merit-based? Instead government officials of both parties acquiesced to the conservative solution of affirmative action. As it initially emerged in President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925, it was ambiguous and contradictory. On the one hand, it seemed to imply some racially specific positive obligation to more aggressively recruit and train minorities to broaden the pool for subsequent merit selection. The 4500-word decree mentions positive measures twice and affirmative steps once. On the other hand, there was a negative commandment of nondiscrimination requiring that citizens were treated with-
out regard to race, color, or creed. In some cases the ambiguity was contained in the same sentence. For example, “[t]he contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” While little attention was paid to Kennedy’s executive order, it would anticipate a government policy that granted little in the way of direct relief against discrimination as witnessed in the huge backlog of discrimination cases that would develop in agencies like the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). At the same time equality of opportunity was denied on the practical level, equality of results was philosophically attacked as “un-American.” Thus, whites who had benefited from decades of “unequal opportunity” could keep their gains and even protect future gains by opposing race specific-remedies.

With the Republicans uniting big business with white workers against big government and the Democrats moving away from domestic reform, the country was moving in two rapidly diverging directions in 1968 as the Kerner Commission so aptly pointed out. One direction suggested by the NAACP, Urban League, Rustin, Levison, and to a lesser extent Jackson was an “insider” strategy. That is, the civil rights movement should capitalize on its successes by building an electoral base and working for incorporation in a dominant coalition with white liberals and trade unions in the Democratic party. The alternative “outsider” strategy ranged from the separate land base programs of black nationalists to the revolutionary goals of the Black Panther party which endorsed full employment in its ten point platform. As was his custom, King sought a synthesis among these contending forces. From the failure of the War on Poverty and the destruction of urban violence, he saw a way forward through empowering the poor in a “rainbow” coalition. Ironically, Congress honored him after his death in 1968 by passing not an economic bill of rights but rather open housing legislation.

King’s death created a vacuum in national black leadership. With none of the leaders of the major civil rights organizations even remotely approaching King’s popularity or credibility, the vacuum was quickly filled by the very insiders Rustin and others had promoted. In 1970, the Congressional Black Caucus was established and its members quickly assumed a leading role as spokespersons for the “national” black interest. For much of the 1970s their major legislative effort would be directed toward the type of economic rights envisioned by King—specifically a full employment bill.

Economic Rights Revisited

For over twenty years, the realization of human rights through the concept of full employment disappeared almost entirely from the American scene. After the passage of the Employment Act of 1946, the post-war boom in the economy pushed memories of the Great Depression and its effects to the bottom of the national conscience. As the economy cooled and then stalled in the late sixties and early seventies, the idea of full employment re-emerged through the efforts of Frank Riessman, Alan Gartner and Russell Nixon and their supporters. As editors of Social Policy magazine, Riessman and Gartner helped initiate two immensely creative programs that went far beyond the
“manpower” left-overs of the by then defunct “war on poverty”—“paraprofessionalism” and “new careers.” These efforts were supported by some small funds provided through national legislation sponsored by Representative James Scheuer of Brooklyn. Each led logically to the need for new and better job opportunities through what was called “public service employment.” The National Conference on Public Service Employment was organized to support national legislation based on the idea that an expansion of public services was needed for America’s adjustment to an economy in which fewer and fewer people would be needed for the production of goods. Two California liberals, Rep. Augustus Hawkins and Senator Alan Cranston, sponsored this legislation, making it clear that the poor could best be helped by large-scale action designed to meet the country’s needs for more and better human services in the fields of education, training health, recreation, and other social services.

But there was a hitch. How could large-scale action—as distinguished from a scattering of welfare and “manpower” programs—be financed? One answer was to trim the sails and ask for only what was deemed feasible. This was done in the public service employment legislation presented to President Nixon in 1970 and promptly vetoed. In 1971 the effort was repeated. This time, with the 1972 elections in the offing, Nixon signed an Emergency Employment Act allocating $2.25 billion for the creation of 150,000 public service jobs. While this was far more than his Democratic predecessor had provided for civilian job creation, it was still a drop in the bucket—not even enough to provide jobs for the employable millions receiving public assistance. Besides, the idea of public service underwent a momentous change from public employment in the larger sense, which includes the federal and state civil service, to a lesser number of lower wage, temporary and sub-civil service jobs that would often be used to displace regular civil service employees.

In 1973, Representative Hawkins—with the backing of the Congressional Black Caucus—led a long effort to pick up the fallen flag of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s right to a useful and remunerative job. “An authentic full employment policy,” Hawkins declared upon introducing a Hawkins-Reuss bill in 1974, “rejects the narrow statistical idea of full employment measured in terms of some tolerable level of unemployment—the percentage game—and adopts the more human and socially meaningful concept of personal rights to an opportunity for useful employment at fair rates of compensation.” But rather than merely dusting off the older right to a job, Hawkins and Reuss provided for enforcement through new governmental machinery. The bill created a Job Guarantee Office to which every jobless person could turn in his or her own neighborhood, a Standby Job Corps to provide useful work when no other opportunities were available, local planning groups to develop reservoirs of useful public works and services, and a readily available procedure for administrative appeals. A new “last resort” guarantee of a job by government was added. Rejecting the older idea that the right was merely a moral commitment, Hawkins and Reuss made it “justiciable” by providing that any person who was able and willing to work but not given a suitable job opportunity could seek redress through the federal courts. Although George Meany and most of the craft unions opposed this idea, a legal memorandum by the United Automobile Workers supported it on the basis of long
experience with suits under state unemployment compensation statutes and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some of these provisions were regarded as "legislative ballast," that is, provisions that could be tossed overboard during stormy combat without sacrificing the major cargo. Other provisions subordinated the work of the House Budget committees to the goals of full employment, inhibited fiscal and monetary policies that would promote unemployment, provided for anti-inflation programs, set interim quantitative goals for the reduction of officially measured unemployment and broadened the labor force concept to include the total supply of available labor. Much of the thinking behind the legislation was set forth in the 1975 publication, Planning for Full Employment. As a contributor to this volume and the primary co-sponsor in the Senate, Hubert Humphrey roused up an impressive group of supporting Senators. These included not only Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Gary Hart of Colorado and Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio but also two Republican liberals—Jacob Javits of New York and Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. With this impressive list of co-sponsors, Humphrey then came before a meeting of the Congressional Black Caucus and pledged to "back up Gus Hawkins all the way."

On this basis, Frank Riessman once again took the initiative. To replace the National Conference on Public Service Employment, he sparked the organization of the National Committee for Full Employment, co-chaired by Coretta Scott King and Murray Finley of the textile workers' union. While this group concerned itself with the intellectual side of the subject, a parallel group—the Full Employment Action Committee—prepared itself for whatever might happen in the coming legislative and political combat.

The struggle over this new proposal lasted over four years, a much longer period than the earlier struggle over the Employment Act of 1946 recorded by Steven Bailey in Congress Makes a Law. With the growth of U.S.-based transnational corporations, the economy had changed enormously. For one thing, the old idea that prices fell during economic downturns no longer applied. Under pressure from the OPEC oil cartel and from less conspicuous price leadership practices by U.S. companies, prices rose sharply and, to the dismay of neo-classical economists, continued to rise during the 1974-75 recession. With their basic theories overturned by facts, neo-classical economists attained a media-recognized position as gurus by fondly embracing the prevailing conservative ideology of superiority on the part of the private sector (meaning profit-seeking business, but apparently excluding non-profit enterprises, cooperatives, labor unions and community and religious organizations) and inefficiency in any form of public sector employment. The latter point was publicized through a vigorous business-led campaign attacking the special employment programs set up under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (C.E.T.A.). Both economists and congressional liberals started to bow before the ideal of annual budget balancing, an ideal enshrined in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Under these conditions, labor unions were put on the defensive, as were also organizations representing minorities, women, older people and C.E.T.A. workers. Many of them were more interested in immediate struggles to defend small entitlements than in the larger and more difficult effort to establish the larger entitlement to opportunities for useful paid employment.
After his election, President Carter proved even more adamant than George Meany. With the support of Charles Schultze, whom he appointed chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, he insisted that the provisions for last resort to publicly financed jobs for the jobless be held in abeyance for at least two years and that if any such jobs were created, they should be at wage levels so low as not to compete with the lowest wage scales in private enterprise. After a year and a half of protracted negotiations, he forced the sponsors to accept the extraction of other teeth as well. He also went very far toward making budget-balancing and anti-inflation action more important than promoting full employment. When the bill finally became law, the only sharp tooth left was a mandate for presidential goals to bring officially measured unemployment down to an interim level of 4 percent in five years. In addition, the new law (1) restored the term “full employment” and reformulated the ideal of employment as a human right; (2) required the Federal Reserve Board to report regularly on its economic policy goals to the Joint Economic Committee; and (3) mandated inclusion in the Economic Report of the President of “employment objectives for certain significant groups of the labor force, including youth, women, minorities, handicapped persons, veterans, and middle-aged and older persons.” But by this time the strongest supporters of the bill had lost interest.

After signing the measure into law in 1978, President Carter promptly violated the mandate on reducing unemployment by using “anti-inflationary” monetary policies that increased official unemployment from 6.1 percent in 1978 to 7.1 percent in 1980. Voicing the views of Representative Hawkins and other supporters of the weakened law, Leon Keyserling charged that President Carter was “flagrantly avoiding the law.” In protest, Representative John Conyers, one of the strongest supporters of the original 1974 bill, indignantly walked out of a White House meeting.

But the protesters were not backed up by the Congressional Black Caucus. Many Caucus members wanted favors from the White House. Coretta Scott King, seeking federal funds for her new Martin Luther King Center in Atlanta, gave Carter an honorary award at the very moment of the Hawkins-Keyserling-Conyers attack. The Full Employment Action Council went into a prolonged period of inaction just when its work was needed. State and local full employment coalitions, which had often been organized with little encouragement from the Council, went out of business.

The case histories of these black-initiated economic reform efforts of the sixties and seventies indicate that contrary to the views of William Wilson and others, black leaders did not abandon universal programs and class-based reform in the interest of race-specific, interest group politics. That their efforts met with so little success is seen by some scholars as foreordained. Margaret Weir, for example, has argued that the United States marginalized macro-economic management solutions tied to public spending in both the 1930s and 1960s. This marginalization is due first to the difficulty of constructing coalitions of social and economic interests potentially supportive of diverse employment policies in the context of the American party system. The second obstacle to such proposals is the failure to change the national administrative structure to increase government’s capacity to administer complex employment policies. Thus Democratic administrations have preferred
to assume unemployment was not a structural problem and would gradually disappear with sufficient stimulation. Government efforts shifted from a focus on unemployment (universal) to a focus on poverty (less universal) and the "disadvantaged" (race-specific). These race-specific programs made it difficult to build broad-based support and also created a clientele of black leaders and program administrators dependent on them. The failure of these fragmented, targeted programs tended to further undermine the credibility of the structural approach.  

Ira Katznelson believes that the failure to achieve the social democratic potential of the New Deal was compromised not in the 1960s but in the 1940s. Any proposal that extended the planning capacity of the central state was seen, not without reason says Katznelson, as a direct challenge to the white supremacist arrangements of the South. The collapse of the labor movement as signified by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the adoption of a modified Keynesianism, shifted the political system from a politics of class to a politics of pluralism, from political economy to economics, and from the omission to the inclusion of race on the national political agenda. With this historical background, it was easy for Great Society strategists to see poverty not as a matter of class relations but principally as a matter of race. The Democratic party, then, embraced interest group pluralism as the only coherent strategy available and found itself vulnerable to charges that it was nothing more than a holding company for special interests.  

It should be emphasized here that the omission of race from the national political agenda prior to the civil rights movement was not a sign of racial neutrality—it was a sign of racial domination. Scholars like Kevin Phillips and Thomas Edsall who blame the break-up of the New Deal coalition on militant African Americans and white reformers are essentially acquiescing to white democratic domination.

The Urban Underclass

This failure of liberal and labor forces led a decrease in national black electoral activity and the rise of black neo-conservatism. Black neoconservatives accepted the civil rights movement as both a necessary and final corrective to the problem of racial discrimination. With civil rights laws now firmly in place, black neoconservatives argued that it was not the structure of the economy but rather the culture of African Americans themselves that prevented progress. The "culture of poverty" model of the sixties was replaced with an urban underclass model that compared black Americans unfavorably with Asian Americans and West Indian immigrants. The most prolific of the black neoconservatives, Thomas Sowell, stated that it was "completely misleading...to label particular occupations 'dead-end jobs' or particular wage levels as 'subsistence.'  

According to the Hoover Institute economist, "[a]ttitudes and work habits are often more crucial—and take longer to acquire—than do specific skills." In Sowell’s universe, "free markets" would solve the problem of unemployment much more efficiently and effectively than government intervention. The problem for Sowell and other black neoconservatives was not the structure of the economy but the character of the unemployed.

Another assumption emerged from the writings of such black neoconser-
natives as Stephen Carter, Shelby Steele, and Stanley Crouch. Like Stan
Levison they simply did not believe American society was ready to under-
take the massive social and economic reforms necessary to provide equal par-
ticipation in all areas of this society. In *The Content of Our Character*, Steele
explicitly states,

> But my deepest feeling is that in a society of increasingly limited resources there
will never be enough programs to meet the need. What I really believe is that we
Black Americans will never be saved or even assisted terribly much by others,
ever be repaid for our suffering, and never find that symmetrical, historical jus-
tice that we cannot help but long for. *63*

Steele's deep feelings parallel those of the black nationalist movement which
has historically staked its claim for reparations while at the same time deny-
ing that the larger society has the moral will to deliver justice. The result has
been a series of leaders and organizations that call for either a tactical or com-
plete withdrawal from the dominant white society.

Following a period of quiescence in the seventies when even black nation-
alisits like Amiri Baraka and the Black Panther Party pursued the "insider
strategy" of electoral politics locally in Newark and Oakland, respectively,
and nationally in the National Black Political Assembly, the movement re-
surfaced in the face of the conservative onslaught of the Reagan-Bush era.
Strangely, the most prominent manifestation of black nationalism, Afrocentrism, avoided the pressing issue of economics. Proponents of
Afrocentrism focused on issues of education and the construction of a value
system based on the principles of Ancient Egypt (Kemet). While arguing that
education is political and must be socially relevant, they offered no specific
program or policy to bridge the growing economic gap between blacks and
whites. To their credit, however, Afrocentrists provided a sharp critique of
the universalist tendencies of Eurocentric culture. Its proponents claimed that
the values they promoted were central to the African experience but no bet-
ter or worse than the values other races might claim as their own. In short,
Afrocentrism argued that race consciousness could serve positive as well as
negative purposes. From this perspective, groups like the Nation of Islam
were clearly distinct from white supremacist groups like the Klan and Aryan
nations.

A second manifestation of contemporary black nationalism involved the
media-centered racial confrontations of Al Sharpton, Vernon Mason, Alton
Maddox, Jr. and especially Louis Farrakhan. None of these racial spokes-
persons put forward an economic program and Sharpton and Farrakhan moved
in the direction of electoral politics. Sharpton actually ran for a New York
Senate seat while Farrakhan rose to national prominence in his defense of
black presidential candidate Jesse Jackson in 1984. With his 1995 Million Man
March (MMM) Farrakhan challenged Jackson for the fictional title of presi-
dent of the "Black Nation." Yet nowhere in his two and one-half hour march
address did Farrakhan put forth a economic program. What seemed at first
glance to be the mounting of a protest against the status quo was turned in-
ward, with a fundamental responsibility placed upon African American men
to get their own house in order—black and white neoconservatives alike must
have been delighted. In the words of Farrakhan biographer Authur Magida,
behind the claim of being an apostle of God, Elijah Muhammad was another sort of apostle: a disciple of capitalism, a kinsman of John Stuart Mill and Horatio Alger, a black counterpart to the Commerce Department and the Small Business Administration.” It seems appropriate then that the mission statement of the MMM limit itself to a call for “corporate responsibility” and expanded corporate partnerships with black business. Farrakhan, himself, had launched an unsuccessful line of “P.O.W.E.R.” cosmetics in the 1980s. When Henry Louis Gates asked Farrakhan what the country would look like if, by magic, he could turn his hopes into reality he gave a long and meandering answer that “centered on things like revamping the educational system” to make it less Eurocentric. Of course, Farrakhan’s popularity despite his lack of a concrete economic program may be traced in larger part to the failure of Jesse Jackson to get significant economic commitments from the Democratic party in 1984 and 1988 and Bill Clinton’s success in moving the party significantly to the right in 1992 and 1996. To his credit Jackson put forth “A Workers’ Bill of Rights” in his 1988 presidential campaign that included the right to a job. However, his budget projections did not include funding that would guarantee that right. For example, his four-year projection for “economic adjustment and diversification” totaled only $16 billion. In both 1984 and 1988, Jackson succeeded only in gaining procedural reforms within the Democratic party for all of his effort in mobilizing the black vote. At least in part, his lack of clout must be attributed to his refusal to seriously consider an independent bid for the presidency. Sociologist William J. Wilson, who is rumored to have direct access to President Clinton, has been equally unsuccessful in gaining greater economic resources for public sector employment. In his provocative 1978 book, The Declining Significance of Race, Wilson charged that black leaders and intellectuals in the sixties and early seventies abandoned universal type New Deal programs in favor of divisive, race-based programs like affirmative action. No where is there a discussion of such major efforts as the “Freedom Budget,” the Poor People’s Campaign or the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. An analysis of the fate of those programs would have demonstrated that race had become increasingly important in public policy and the public’s perception of such policy. In his latest book, Wilson chooses “not (to) advance proposals that seem acceptable or “realistic” given the current political climate.” “Rather,” says Wilson. “I have chosen to talk about what ought to be done to address the problems of social inequality (emphasis his), including record levels of joblessness in the inner-city ghetto, that threaten the very fabric of our society.” From this high moral ground Wilson endorses three recent employment proposals—“One calls for the creation of public-sector infrastructure maintenance jobs, the second for public service jobs for less-skilled workers, and the third, . . . for WPA-style jobs of the kind created during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.” Wilson’s empirical research documenting the concentration of poverty among poor blacks does not match his subsequent call for universal rather than targeted programs. Theda Skocpol says this creates a paradox: “if vivid facts about severe social problems were all that mattered in shaping policy prescriptions, Wilson’s focus on the truly disadvantaged would constitute a call for more finely targeted public policies” rather
than the opposite. Unlike Wilson, fellow Harvard "dream team" member Cornell West rejects the idea that structures are primarily economic and political creatures. Yet he differs from black neoconservatives in recognizing the very negative effects that the large cultural forces of consumerism and hedonism have in black cultural institutions. Focusing primarily on the effects of this culture West merely acknowledges in passing that "the only feasible alternative to the welfare state is to create more jobs for poor people—something the private sector is simply uninterested in doing for it is not in its economic interests to do so..." However, even effective jobs programs says West, "do not fully address the cultural decay and moral disintegration of poor black communities." West, in short, accepts the notion of an underclass.

Both West and Wilson, as well as Sowell and Steele, represent a new, post civil rights category that has been labeled "public intellectual." Historically, there have been any number of black scholars who made efforts to disseminate their views and research widely, Early this century intellectuals like W.E.B. DuBois, Anna Julia Cooper, and Carter G. Woodson had audiences that extended beyond the academy. These individuals were also attached to institutions that served the black community. Today's public intellectuals, both liberal and conservative, are based in predominantly white institutions and their function is primarily to interpret black behavior for a white—generally elite—audience. In interpreting for a white audience they have usually accepted the cultural parameters of that audience. West and Wilson, for example, although acknowledging the problems the structure of the economy imposes on blacks, also suggest that culturally dysfunctional behavior exists apart from that structure. Kenneth Tollett, a black professor of education at Howard University, says "the stereotype is not a stereotype any more. The behavior pattern [in the underclass] is not stereotypical in the pejorative sense, but it is a statement of fact." In short, even liberal black scholars do not contest the notion of the underclass itself. Nor do they contest the dominant discourse that sees merit as an objective rather than a culturally laden concept.

Two phenomena are generally associated with underclass status—poverty and deviant social behavior. Yet those scholars who study the underclass have failed to consistently define the relationship of poverty to underclass status. If all persistently poor individuals (individuals poor for eight of the last ten years) who are not disabled or aged are defined as part of the underclass, then 23.5 percent of the poor, or 7–8 million persons, belong to the underclass. If we limit our definition to all poor blacks and Latinos living in the nation's largest cities, then less than 16 percent of the poor population, or 5.2 million persons, fit the definition. If we further limit the underclass to those with a high incidence of joblessness, high school dropouts, welfare dependents and female-headed families, then only 5 percent of the poor population, or 1.6 million Americans, are in the underclass. Using the latter criteria Isabel Sawhill and Erol Ricketts found that 40 percent of underclass census tract are not in areas of extreme poverty and that 72 percent of the census tracts with high poverty rates are not underclass tracts by behavioral definition.

If it is not poverty per se but deviant social behavior that defines the underclass, what behaviors are we talking about? Ken Auletta's work, which helped to popularize the term underclass, divides them into four distinct categories: (a) the passive poor, usually long-term welfare recipients; (b) the hos-
tile street criminals who terrorize most cities, and who are often school drop-outs and drug addicts; (c) the hustlers who earn their living in an underground economy but rarely commit violent crimes; and (d) the traumatized drunks, drifters, homeless shopping-bag ladies and released patients. Auletta's categories of the underclass contain groupings with very divergent characteristics. In what sense are the passive poor on welfare similar to the very active street hustlers who Bayard Rustin and others have argued are among the brightest minds and best capitalists of the inner city? What values do the homeless share with drug dealers who often exhibit lavish lifestyles? In fact, about the only thing linking these disparate categories together is the public perception that the inhabitants of these constructs are overwhelmingly black.

While every effort from urban renewal to walled residential communities has been made to physically separate and isolate the underclass from "normal society," it in fact is more linked than ever. The ghettos of this nation have been wired into the white-dominated electronic fantasy world of sex, violent action, and consumption since the late 1950s. By age eighteen, the average American who views television 25 hours per week has seen 200,000 acts of televised violence and 40,000 murders. The body count in the most popular action films of a generation ago seldom exceeded single digits. Now it has grown to over sixty in today's popular films. Inner-city African Americans, who have fewer entertainment options, watch 47 percent more television than whites and attend significantly more movies than average.

While low income and deviant social behavior are highly correlated, they are not the same. In his *Unheavenly City*, Edward Banfield distinguished between the middle classes who were able to defer immediate gratification for long-term gain and the lower classes who were not. Given the standard behavior of corporate executives in the United States in looking for short-term profits at the expense of long-term development and the typical behavior of the middle-class credit card holder, Banfield's distinction begins to fade. Jeremy Rifkin has called the metamorphosis of consumption from vice to virtue one of the most important and yet least studied phenomena of the twentieth century. It is as if the whole nation has adopted Charles Kettering's mid-century motto "the key to economic prosperity is the organized creation of dissatisfaction." Our social status is now determined by what we buy rather than what we produce. The point is not to deny the extremely harmful violent and dysfunctional behavior that is reported in the daily newspapers in every American big city. The point is that we have created a mass culture of violence, consumption and instant gratification and at the same time denied large numbers of inner-city residents the legitimate means to fulfill often artificially induced needs. This so-called underclass is no more disorganized than any other class. However, it is organized differently to accommodate the different environment daily facing residents of the ghetto. Levels of family disruption and illegitimacy among whites three decades into the sexual revolution are almost exactly where they were for black families when Moynihan sounded his controversial alarm in 1965.

The underclass is not a term of science or even social science. It is an ideological construct used to explain the failure of many blacks to progress in a post-Civil Rights, "color-blind" era. Loic Wacquant states that "underclass
status' is established wholly from the outside and forced upon its putative 'members' by specialists in symbolic production." 81 These journalists, politicians, academics, and governmental experts don't have the slightest concern for the self-understanding of those who are arbitrarily lumped into this analytical fiction, says Wacquant, and only want to control and discipline its members. Moreover, Wacquant believes that the very notion of the \textit{ghetto} has been diluted to simply "designate an urban area of widespread and intense poverty, which obfuscates the racial basis and character of this poverty and divests the term of both historical meaning and sociological content." 82

At the same time popular television programs like the Cosby show demonstrated that blacks with the proper values and behavior patterns could be very successful in American society. In TV land, everyone with an ounce of merit is making it. 83 Additionally, it enables increasingly economically insecure whites to feel superior to blacks even as they accept growing class disparities. Listen to Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg after the 1984 election:

These white Democratic defectors express a profound distaste for blacks, a sentiment that pervades almost everything they think about government and politics. ... Blacks constitute the explanation for their [white defectors'] vulnerability and for almost everything that has gone wrong in their lives; not being black is what constitutes being middle class; not living with blacks is what makes a neighborhood a decent place to live. These sentiments have important implications for the Democrats, as virtually all progressive symbols and themes have been redefined in racial and pejorative terms. 84

The Edsalls add that "the underclass serves to reinforce the most damaging racial preconceptions about black America." 85 What the Edsalls do not add is that the concept serves to remove responsibility for Democratic defeats from the shoulders of those Democratic centrists who supported the Vietnam war and ignored King's, Young's and Randolph's calls for serious economic reform.

Obviously, liberal defenders of the underclass have become black themselves in the eyes of these voters. For the Edsalls, the underclass is an Achilles' heel for the Democratic party because they are identified with a set of non-traditional or "insurgent" values. "For the national Democrats," contend the Edsalls, "it is the 'values barrier' that has proven to be most insurmountable." 86 What are these traditional values that have been challenged? According to the Edsalls they revolve around commitment to a larger (if exclusive) community—"to the family, to parental responsibility, to country, to the work ethic, to sexual restraint, to self-control, to rules, duty, authority, and to a stable social order." 87 The insurgent or competing values "that have been the focus of the rights revolution and of the civil rights movement" include freedom from confinement, from hierarchy, from authority, from stricture, from repression, from rigid rule making, and from the status quo. 88

Two elements stand out in this confrontation between "traditional" and "insurgent" values. First, the principle demands of the civil rights movement are lumped together with a host of other demands stemming from the white-led counter-culture and anti-war movements of the late sixties. From this perspective, all those involved in the "rights revolution" from gay rights to
planned parenthood have become black. Second, a more accurate listing of the values surrounding civil rights demands would include liberty, freedom from discrimination, individualism, faith in the Constitution, one person—one vote, democracy, and equality. Would not the "founding fathers" regard these as traditional values?

Rochon would argue that this crude framing of the rights revolution confuses several separate processes. "Value conversion," says Rochon, replaces existing cultural values with new ideas on the same topic about what is important, equitable or legitimate. The Supreme Court’s reversal of the separate but equal doctrine of its 1896 Plessy decision in the 1954 Brown decision is an example of such a conversion. According to Rochon, "value creation" is a second process involving the development of new ideas or concepts, or categories of analysis that apply to situations that had not previously been the subject of explicit cultural values. "Affirmative action," for example, had historically been applied to whites in a variety of setting but did not become a cultural battleground until applied to women and minorities. A final process, "value connection" develops a conceptual link between phenomena previously thought to be unconnected or connected in a different way. The creation of the term underclass and its connection to culture is a prime example of such a process.99

The underclass concept is damaging to black progress precisely because it is linked to an identity that is in turn linked to a set of values that is seen by both blacks and whites as "nontraditional," "irrational," and "irresponsible." But the real danger of the underclass concept is that it is seen by its proponents as immune to outside intervention, as self-perpetuating. In the words of Stuart Hall by essentializing difference we see "difference as ‘their traditions versus ours,’ not in a positional way, but in a mutually exclusive, autonomous, and self-sufficient one."99 By essentializing black in this way, we move from its socially constructed and historical character back to the rigidity of biological and genetic notions of race.

Conclusion

In the current debate over affirmative action, both sides have invoked the words of Dr. King to support their side. King, in fact, did call for a color-blind society. But that vision of a color-blind society rested on a foundation of racial justice. King’s call for love was always balanced with a call for power to implement that love. A color-blind society without shared power and racial justice would have been as meaningless for King as the right to eat a hamburger at a lunch counter with no money to pay for it.

King also supported affirmative action. He argued that a people that had so much done against them for so many years needed some preferential treatment to catch up. He cited the GI Bill of Rights as a preferential treatment plan that had enjoyed wide popular support. Yet King also realized that affirmative action was a band-aid approach at best. It antagonized whites and only reached those blacks who had jobs. King sought to build a mass-based, militant grassroots movement that would pressure the government to enact radical economic reforms.

This essay has attempted to show that affirmative action and welfare were
used as substitutes for radical economic reform. These policies defused King’s
campaign and made it dependent on the state itself. A new dominant eco-
nomic and political elite used fear of the “underclass” to promote the new
priorities of “modernizing the economy” and “protecting family values.”
Equality was no longer seen as linked to past group oppression and disad-
vantage. It was now simply a case of guaranteeing individual choice under
the conditions of a “free market.”

Finally, others were able to refocus the civil rights movement, in part, be-
cause King was not successful in transforming it from a civil rights struggle
to an economic rights struggle. The critical community that had formed
around the issues of desegregation and voting divided sharply over the is-
suit of economic rights. King’s attempt to construct a class-based movement
around the issue of poverty lacked the natural or inherited identifications to
create solidarity. In fact, efforts to revive the New Deal coalition for full em-
ployment in the mid-seventies collapsed as it was seen as a race-based issue.
The failure of both King’s “outsider” strategy and the Congressional Black
Caucus’s “insider” strategy to produce significant economic reform led to a
further fragmentation of the group solidarity among African Americans. Per-
haps the three most prominent manifestations of this fractured identity—the
media-centered black politics of the 1980s, the religious movement led by
Minister Louis Farrakhan and the development of Afrocentrism had little to
say about economic rights.

One recent article on the relative lack of ethnic violence in the United States
suggests that the focus on economics rather than race works to prevent the
mass political uprising feared by the Kerner Commission. “Instead,” says
Dipak Gupta, “what we see and will continue to see, is the escalation of so-
ociopathic or psychopathic violence born out of individual frustration and
hopelessness.” The massive and growing internal security mechanisms in
the United States, both public and private, would seem to indicate that the
problem is systemic. The spread of school violence to the suburbs along with
a rise in high profile hate crimes may create the context for a reframing of
economic rights that will embrace King’s vision. The dream of a comprehen-
sive and redistributive public policy revolving around jobs and income and
involving the democratic participation of the poor. Such a policy would
challenge the under consumption of the poor and the over consumption of a cul-
ture of military Keynesianism. Political elites would have to accept that the
abolition of poverty was possible and the masses would have to see that pov-
erty was systemic rather than personal. Work must be radically redefined to
include many “third sector” activities and civil rights must embrace economic
and social rights.

In short, the current race discourse must not only embrace racial justice again but also human justice. But it also must move beyond dis-
course and organize for power.

Notes

1. This article benefited from the assistance of the late Bertram Gross whose pio-
neering work in the field of economic rights will be sorely missed.

2. John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, From Slavery to Freedom (New York:
12. A “master frame” is a successful collective action frame that is adopted by other groups. See Tarrow, *Power*, p. 118.
24. King was marginalized at this conference due to his opposition to Johnson’s Vietnam policy.
29. Garrow, Bearing, p. 579.
30. Garrow, Bearing, p. 599.
33. The PPC Declaration of 1968 demanded the following: (1) A meaningful job at a living wage for every employable citizen; (2) A secure and adequate income for all who cannot find jobs or for whom employment is inappropriate; (3) Access to land as a means to income and livelihood; (4) Access to capital as a means of full participation in the economic life of America; and (5) Recognition by law of the right of people affected by government programs to play a truly significant role in determining how they are designed and carried out. Jackson, Recasting, p. 444.
34. Jackson, Recasting, p. 500.
37. Rochon, Culture Moves, p. 50.
40. Edsall, Chan, p. 40.
41. Edsall, Chan, p. 39.
42. The Edsall's report that Survey Research Center data show poor southern whites converted from economic liberalism to economic conservatism over the race issue. Edsall, Chain, p. 41.
43. See, for example, Alexander Saxton, The Rise and Fall of the White Republic (London: Verso, 1996), passim; and Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995), passim.
46. Gitlin, Twilight, p. 139.
52. Graham, Civil, p. 102.
53. Graham, Civil, p. 28.
70. Wilson, Work, p. 226.
73. West, Race, pp. 57-58.
74. Edsall, Chain, p. 236.
84. Edsall, *Chain*, p. 182.
86. Edsall, *Chain*, p. 262.
88. Edsall, *Chain*, p. 263. Daniel Yankelovich, the pollster, calls the rights revolution stage two of the affluence effect which begins in the U.S. after World War II. During this stage, the quest for self-expression and self-fulfillment grows less inhibited as people relish their new freedom to choose careers and life-styles in accord with their individual bent. See Yankelovich in Henry J. Aaron, et. al., eds., *Values and Public Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1994), pp. 18–19.
89. The definitions are Rochon’s while the examples are the author’s. Rochon, *Culture Moves*, p. 54.
The Micro-World of the Black Activist: An Examination During the Ebb Tide of a Social Movement

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Introduction

Aldon Morris, one of the foremost contributors to the study of social movements, has indicated that scholars do a good job of describing and explaining social movements, but where more work needs to be done is in explaining why and how they arise (Morris, 1997).

Morris suggests that social movements are likely to have periods of growth or dynamism, and down periods, or dormant phases. Yet it is during those down-times that the conditions are created which give rise to the dynamic phases. While this conceptualization is familiar as the description of a dialectical process, it is nonetheless persuasive.

We know from a number of specific studies: Morrison, Morris, Payne, McAdam (Morrison, 1987; Morris, 1984; Payne, 1995; McAdam, 1982) and from the summaries and analyses of Tarrow (1989) that social movements don’t exist in some kind of amorphous, undifferentiated public. Rather the contrary, they arise from, and as parts of, dense infrastructures: many organizations, many networks, often overlapping, often linked to one another, sometimes even at odds with one another, but filled with experiences which inform, develop skills, perspectives, and styles of behavior. They are constituted by people who develop specific capabilities and worldviews associated with the complicated social networks in which they are enmeshed.

Morris says we know some kind of significant infrastructure is necessary to produce and sustain a social movement. He says we need to understand how that infrastructure operates. We need to know what its constituent members are doing before the social movement fully materializes.

Despite Morris’s lament about the absence of information on the hiatuses between the celebrated periods of a social movement, James Scott’s work
(Scott, 1985) has provided a valuable empirical basis for such understandings. Scott’s work is informative primarily about the populations among which social movements originate. His work is less edifying about the instigators and leaders of such movements. Many scholars, e.g., Payne, Morrison, Morris, discuss political involvement by principal participants in social movements, even local ones, which are precursors to full-fledged social movements. These are, however, primarily reconstructions rather than contemporary observations, and they tend to focus on the character of political and public involvement, as opposed to settings where such activity took place and the messages people were exposed to and expressed in those settings. Scott is almost alone in describing and analyzing pre-movement settings in real time and in concentrating on the physical and cognitive circumstances of those settings.

This study is an attempt to contribute to our understandings of social movements by examining the lacunae Morris identifies and by looking at a population outside the scope of Scott’s work. Scott does not concentrate on activists in a social movement because the population he examines is, specifically, pre-movement. The other scholars look at activists, but not in real time and not with the same emphasis as this study. This study examines the physical and mental terrain occupied by a collection of Black activists. I refer to the physical terrain as spaces, and the mental terrain as narrative and as social memory. The intention is to map out the connections between the activists’ individual lives, the organizations to which they belong, and the dynamic potential of social movements.

This study is rooted in the three conceptions noted above which are found in the social movement literature: spaces, narratives, and social memory.

Spaces

A concept of spaces is central to the meaning of this whole discussion. I am using spaces to refer, specifically, to social spaces, places where human beings interact, places where they interact and where they communicate. These places are physical. They don’t require that the people simultaneously occupy physical spaces, while that does happen with some social spaces such as meetings, concerts, speeches, conversations, it does not happen with many others, such as books, fliers, the worldwide Web, television programs, radio programs. While it may be a stretch to call a radio program listened to by many people at the same time a shared physical place, it is nevertheless a place, a mental place, where their consciousnesses are simultaneously engaged with the same subjects. There is, in a sense, a shared space, even if it is only within each of their heads.

For purposes of this study, a social space is a common ground where people can engage in social intercourse—where they can be present in the words or ideas or physical aspects of other humans.

The literature distinguishes free spaces from other kinds of spaces (Evans, 1986). By “free spaces” most scholars mean spaces where the participants in a social movement are free to express and hear their own points of view, points of view which are likely to be oppositional to the hegemonic ideology, because most social movements are oppositional. They oppose or con-
tradic the hegemonic ideology. Strictly speaking, even hegemonic spaces, however, may have some neutral messages transmitted in them, or even anti-hegemonic messages. It is more that within hegemonic spaces the dominant messages (as opposed to all the messages) re-enforce the hegemonic perspective. Similarly, the messages in free spaces can be mixed, oppositional, tangential, neutral, even some supportive of the dominant view. There are simply more agonal messages in these venues than there are viewpoints which parrot the prevailing line.

Moreover, many non-hegemonic spaces are not specifically movement spaces. They are, instead, spaces “free” from control or direction by the established order even though they may not be specifically associated with a social movement. They may be spaces, however, where movement views can be articulated much more consistently than in mainstream places.

Nor is it that most spaces, either hegemonic or free, consciously associate themselves with the dominant or with the oppositional point of view. It is more that they simply are characterized by one viewpoint or the other as expressions of the perspectives of people who habituate those spaces. And, as I said, there are some spaces which are characterized by neither point of view, but where one may hear a variety of messages or narratives.

One intention of this study is to identify and characterize the spaces frequented by the activists who are the subjects of the study—whatever those spaces might be.

Some spaces do exist where suppressed groups can articulate their own critiques and visions of society. In social movements free spaces for suppressed groups are important for leaders to articulate the vision of the social movement, for cadres to be trained, and for participants in the movement to have their consciousneses raised.

As Tarrow has indicated, however, free spaces can be found in almost every setting, no matter how oppressive and circumscribed—even in prisons and concentration camps. As Morris tells us, what is necessary for space to be transformed into social movement organizations (SMOs) is a certain level of infrastructure. In other words, some space is formally organized. Spaces with set meetings and charters and rules and named positions become organizations. This is not to say, however, that SMOs and space are sequential. “Free space” does not give way to organizations. Free space exists subsequent to and independently of the formation of organizations. Indeed, a characteristic of social movements (as indicated by Tarrow) is the rich intermixture of space, organizations, and the people attracted to both who eventually constitute the mass basis for a social movement. For social movement organizations to be able to develop into a social movement (SM) a certain (unknown) critical mass is necessary.

Because I am interested in a downphase, an ebb-tide, as I put it, of the black liberation movement, I am particularly interested in the extent to which the activists I interviewed participate in black spaces during such a historical period. By black spaces I mean spaces which are controlled and dominated by black people, and spaces wherein most participants are black. This does not mean they express any particular view—hegemonic, oppositional, or neutral. They may, but that is not among the criteria I am using for identifying a space as black. Again, by black spaces, I mean only that the spaces are dominated
or controlled by black people and that most of the participants in those spaces are black. But since I want to identify all the spaces black activists in the study frequent, my interest is not restricted to black spaces. I also want to identify non-black spaces they visit. By non-black spaces I mean spaces which are dominated and controlled by people who are not black. They are also spaces where most of the participants are not black. Again, I do not make any inferences about the characteristics of the viewpoints expressed in those spaces. Hence, I sort the many varieties of spaces attended by these respondents into two categories: black and non-black. I do assume, however, because black people are not dominant in U.S. society that black spaces are free spaces. They are spaces where one is free to hear narratives which differ substantially from the dominant narrative. The non-black spaces may also be free spaces. At the very least, some of them may be free spaces. This study has no way of differentiating between non-black spaces that are free, and non-black spaces that are not free. As a result, for this paper, I simply distinguish between black and non-black spaces as a way of making at least one major distinction between the kinds of spaces frequented by these respondents.

Narratives

Narratives consist of the substantive communications within spaces. They take many forms, such as conversations, discussions, debates, speeches, slogans, lyrics, popular documents, written statements, musical compositions, works of art. There are some forms which might be labeled symbolic narrative (Covin, 1998). Such symbolic expressions might include food, clothing, hairstyle. They are statements people make about their identity with their conduct, their appearance, their lives. Even accents, syntax, pronunciations of words, can be symbolic narrative, witness *ebonics*.

Within "free" spaces narratives constitute the means by which an ideology counter to the hegemonic ideology is developed and sustained.

Narratives are what people tell each other in spaces. They are what people listen to, or attend to, in spaces. For the most part, what people tell each other, listen to, and attend to are different in hegemonic spaces than they are in free spaces. There may be overlapping messages, but for the most part, people attend separate kinds of spaces, specifically, to participate in different kinds of narratives. That is true even for those spaces that are characterized neither by the hegemonic nor by a social movement narrative.

Narrative is what space is about—in much the same sense that food is what meals are about: sustenance. They constitute the energy source: the motive power.

Social Memory

Narratives combine in memory, as reconstructed understandings, to constitute social memory (Couto, 1993). For participants in social movement organizations and social movements, the reconstructed memories serve as a collective memory which sustains and directs the actions of participants. Social memory is a collective recognition of the importance and significance of specific events, activities, experiences, leaders, antagonists, and traditions.
The hegemonic social memory is likely to be considerably different from the social memory of social movement participants. While, for example, in the United States, the dominant social memory is of George Washington as a national hero, in the black power movement he not only was not a movement hero, he was touched with infamy because as the first president of the country he was a slave owner. And while the general population of the country has no knowledge of Marcus Garvey, within the black power movement he is not only a well-known figure, but also recognized as a movement icon. While the Johnson administration's war on poverty can be viewed through the dominant perspective as the failure of attempts to throw money at problems, it can be viewed through an alternative perspective as an excess of rhetoric not matched by deeds. In each instance, the same events or persons are present in collective memory, but with entirely different meanings as determined by the social memory of the population.

**Social Movement Organizations and Social Movements**

While the literature makes a distinction between SMs and SMOs (Tarrow, 1989), both are ways of conceptualizing human interactions. The two conceptual categories speak to the recognition of a difference between highly organized, tightly focused populations (SMOs); and more loosely structured populations (SMs) connected to social causes. SMOs, of course, are organizations. They are ordered and structured groups. Their members, effectively, constitute the hard core, the cadres, of a social movement. The SMs include the groups, but they also contain supporters, followers, who do not belong to any organized groups, but who are generally in favor of the same aims articulated by the SMOs, or who respond favorably to SMO leaders. Such persons are the masses which furnish the movement to the cause. Without them the activism of the SMO cadres would persist, but its power, its momentum, would be minimal. That can only be supplied by mass adherents to their cause and leadership.

One of the problems of understanding social movement organizations and social movements is related to the condition that in most societies there are always some social movement organizations. Yet they are not accompanied by corresponding social movements or mass movements. I maintain that SMOs persist because there are always people who have such social, such political interests. They are activists, cadres. They are among the political elites—a small segment of the political elites, but a segment nonetheless. But activists are atypical of the species. Their absolute numbers and their proportions of the population are always small.

The movement, particularly the mass movement, appears only when significant numbers of the rest of the population can be drawn to the cause of the activists. That, I submit, requires two additional criteria: an event or series of events serving as a catalyst, the wild-card factor (McCormick and Jones, 1993), and a charismatic leader or leaders.

Then the SMOs are empowered and can serve as mobilization agents for the population at large. Absent those criteria SMOs serve only to occupy the small segments of the population that have political affinities.
The Focus of the Study

The subjects of this study are all members of SMOs. Yet they are also participants in an SM, loosely labeled the black liberation movement. The study attempts to show and interpret some of the specifics, interactions, and complexities involved in their linkages to such associations (SMOs and SMs). It attempts to portray and analyze these linkages as they are realized in spaces where narratives and social memories are actualized, or come into being. Such descriptions and interpretations may identify how leaders of separate organizations can develop similar perceptions, values, and motivations which may constitute the potential for a social movement. They also provide evidence that suggests how such potential may at times be realized, how the activists can hook up with each other, and/or virtually simultaneously contribute to mobilizing significant numbers of people.

One of the most salient characteristics of social movements is that they tend to be oppositional. They oppose the status quo. They arise in a context dominated by those outside of the social movement—others—in many ways opposed to the members of the social movement. A critical question is: In a context dominated by others, how do those who challenge the status quo flourish? An antecedent question is: In a context dominated by certain interests, how do oppositional interests arise, become self-conscious, and coalesce? This is really the question which Morris says remains unanswered and which this study is intended to address (albeit in whatever preliminary fashion).

One of the most consistent findings of this study is the extreme complexity, density, and richness of the worlds occupied by the respondents. They are remarkable people whose lives speak to the extraordinary multidimensionality of the human condition. To attempt to understand social movements and their origins is to attempt to come to grips with the astounding number and contradictory expressions of the human animal. In them indeed we see Vishnu, whose manifestations are without number.

The Conduct of the Study

Subjects

The subjects were all chosen because they are active in public life in Sacramento, California. All of them are active at the local level, some are active at state, national, and international levels as well. They represent a significant component of the city’s more race-conscious black activists. They are not, however, meant to be a representative sample. They are examined for the information their lives can yield about how leaders in SMOs operate during a down cycle of a social movement. What are they doing when there is little of public note happening on questions that are supposed to be their areas of activism? Does their activity in these periods shed any light on how it is possible for leadership formations to initiate social movements?

There are thirteen respondents. Nine of them belong to organizations which by program are either nationalist or Pan Africanist. Interestingly enough, however, most of the respondents do not identify themselves according to
such labels. The other four subjects include one elected official, a school board member; one member of more mainstream militant integrationist organizations; and two musician activists. All of the respondents belong to some organizations to which no other members of the group belong.

In some respects, this group of respondents is representative of most local elites in the U.S. They are educated. They are all high school graduates. Eleven of the thirteen have college degrees, eight have advanced degrees. They are all employed, except one, who is retired. Their age range is from early thirties to sixty-plus. Four are women, nine are men. All have been active participants in black collective life for some time. The youngest has been an activist for the shortest period, four years. Most of the others have been active for considerably longer periods of time, ranging from ten years to more than thirty.

They engage in much more political activity than the general public. Keep in mind that while less than 50 percent of the eligible population participated in the minimal political act, voting, during the last peak political event in the country prior to the study, the presidential election, these respondents all engaged in political acts considerably beyond the minimum—even though some are alienated from mainstream politics and do not see voting under current circumstances as particularly productive. The smallest number of system-oriented activities engaged in beyond voting by any respondent was four, by a man who classifies himself as apathetic. Apathetic or not, he had written a letter to an editor, phoned a media outlet about a story or editorial, written a political representative, and produced a political work of art. Nine of the respondents had engaged in at least seven of such kinds of activities.

All of the respondents have been intensely involved in SMOs. All of them had participated in no less than seven kinds of activities associated with an SMO, such as holding office in an organization, taking part in a march, participating in a demonstration. Eight respondents had engaged in no less than nine such kinds of activities.

I'm interested in the textures of their lives. How many organizations do they belong to? What are they? What activities do these respondents participate in? Where do they go? Who do they talk to? What do they talk about? Do they read? What? We know in Montgomery before the boycott and the formation of the MLA, there was a core of extant organizations; there was an infrastructure. We know some of how those organizations were operating, and what some of the people in them were doing in general, but we have little information about what they were doing day-to-day, and the details about how these people interacted with various features of the terrain they inhabited. Before the Civil Rights movement entered its heyday, CORE already existed, the NAACP already existed, the Urban League already existed. How did the people in them become part of a national social movement? How did they interact with each other and with the environment at large before they got swept up into the whirlwind of massive social change? By looking at these thirteen leaders, we can answer these questions about one set of change agents.
Setting

All of these interviews were conducted at political gatherings—either public or organizational. This reality confirms the observation that just because an SM is in a down-phase does not mean that nothing is going on. Indeed, frequently, a great deal is going on. We just don’t have enough information about what that is to understand it.

One set of these interviews was conducted at an organizational retreat. Another took place at a public forum, a third set was conducted at a rally in a park, another at a march commemorating Dr. King’s birthday, and a final set at a mass rally commemorating the Million Man March. As a participant observer I was able to see that all of these respondents were intensely engaged with social questions of utmost importance to them. This was true even though for most local residents and even informed consumers of the local media these were non-events. Most of the events did not make the mainstream news. Those that did received scant treatment and were mostly trivialized. Most were covered, however, in the local black press.

Questions

The respondents answered thirty-seven questions, both open-ended and closed. They were given great leeway in their responses as the intention was to learn what they really did.

The major objective of the questionnaire was threefold: (1) to elicit an understanding of the major black spaces and non-black spaces frequented by each respondent, (2) to identify the character of black narrative to which the respondents were exposed and in which they participated and to identify where such narratives took place, and (3) to identify the character of social memory operating among the respondents. While the respondents were asked no direct questions about social memory, the character of some elements of respondents’ social memories can be inferred from both the social spaces in which they function and the narrative operative in those spaces. The All African People’s Revolutionary Party, for example, promotes a social memory which is African-centered, which points to the exploitative role of capitalism and imperialism, and which links African people throughout the world. The 100 Black Men promotes a social memory which emphasizes the traditions and responsibilities of black men.

The questions were designed to find out with respect to any activity identified, whether the respondent participated only in black spaces, only in non-black spaces, or in both. Most respondents indicated that in some activities they participated in black spaces, in other activities they participated in non-black spaces, in still other kinds of activities they participated in both black and non-black spaces.

There were some questions which called on respondents to indicate the race of the majority of people with whom they engaged in a particular activity. On those questions, respondents often said they could not make such a designation. They might say, for example, that in the category of cultural organizations, they belonged to several organizations. In one, the majority of participants were black; in another, white; in a third, Latino. As a result, their
answers might indicate three races as the “majority” of people with whom they engaged in cultural organizations.

Findings

In this section I report my findings. I found a total of sixty-nine spaces which the respondents identified as frequenting, thirty-five black spaces and thirty-four non-black spaces. I identify dominant non-black spaces, which I also refer to as mainstream spaces. My use of the term, “mainstream spaces,” in this instance does not mean that I have determined that the narratives are those of the hegemonic ideology. In this work these are mainstream spaces simply because they are dominated by those people who constitute the great majority, the mainstream, of the population. These are non-black spaces which these respondents attend more frequently than the corresponding black spaces. I identify all the spaces in which the respondents participate, whether dominant non-black, dominant black; non-dominant mainstream, non-dominant black. On the basis of total numbers of spaces in which each correspondent participates, I compare numbers of black and non-black spaces in which the subjects participate. I identify dominant black spaces frequented by the respondents. These numbers are depicted on bar graphs. I also discuss the narratives in which the subjects participate. I particularly focus on black narrative. I assume it is most likely to reflect the substance of their race-conscious political activity. I also assume it is closest to the line they develop in their political work. It is that work which potentially could give rise to a flood-tide phase of the black liberation struggle.

Total Number of Spaces

The sixty-nine spaces which the respondents report frequenting include thirty-four spaces in which there are some respondents who attend a black space and some respondents who attend its non-black counterpart. One example of such space consists of reading professional journals. There are two sets of this space: reading non-black professional journals is one. Reading black professional journals is the other. Five respondents read black professional journals and nine read non-black professional journals. Among the nine who read non-black professional journals, three also read black professional journals. In effect, for professional journals three people attend both black and non-black spaces. For every space reported on in the study, except one, respondents attend both black and non-black spaces. The one exception is family, where all the respondents reported that a majority of their family members are black.

Mainstream Spaces

These respondents live and operate in a world which is not dominated by black perspectives and values. A number of findings make that point eminently clear. (See figure 1)

While two respondents read black newspapers regularly, twelve read mainstream papers regularly. The two who read black newspapers also read main-
Figure 1
Respondents' Comparative Exposures to Black and Mainstream Spaces

This chart measures the number of respondents who were exposed to Black spaces and to mainstream spaces in ten categories: newspapers, television programs, television subjects, conversations with colleagues, lectures or conferences, political position, journals or professional publications, articles, radio programs, and radio stations.

Newspapers – 2 respondents exposed to Black newspapers, 12 to Mainstream.
TV programs – 3 Black, 12 Mainstream.
TV subjects – 5 Black, 11 Mainstream.
Conversations with Colleagues – 4 Black, 13 Mainstream.
Lectures or Conferences – 6 Black, 11 Mainstream.
Political Position – 3 Black, 10 Mainstream.
Journals or Professional Publications – 5 Black, 9 Mainstream.
Articles – 8 Black, 13 Mainstream.
Radio Programs – 6 Black, 8 Mainstream.
Radio Stations – 6 Black, 8 Mainstream.

stream newspapers regularly. Only one respondent reads no newspapers regularly. Thus, twelve of the thirteen attend non-black spaces for their regular newspaper reading. Ten of those who attend non-black spaces for their newspaper fare, do not regularly attend black spaces for such information. Clearly, non-black spaces dominate the newspaper reading habits of this group. Moreover, it is of further significance that the black newspaper the respondents identify is a weekly, while the mainstream newspapers are all dailies. The influence of regular black newspaper reading pales almost to insignificance.
In this instance, newspaper reading, two of the respondents are double-counted because they read both black and mainstream newspapers. Each total contains those two respondents. This pattern of double-counting appears in every data set because there are some subjects in each measure except one who attend both black and non-black spaces. Hence, while the (n) for television program responses is 15, that n reflects the total of 13 respondents. One watches no television programs regularly, nine watch only mainstream television programs regularly, and three watch both black and non-black television programs regularly. Thus, the count of 9 + 3 +3 = 15, is a count of 12 respondents, those who watch some television regularly. The overwhelming influence of mainstream television as opposed to black television is unmistakable. Twelve watch mainstream television regularly. Three watch black television regularly, those three are among the twelve who watch mainstream TV regularly. This pattern extends to specific subjects featured on television. Five are likely to watch television programs featuring black subjects, and eleven are likely to watch those dealing with other subjects. Again, it is important to keep in mind that some subjects are being double counted for this and every other measure. For every measure but one there are respondents who attend both black and non-black spaces.

In a society dominated by non-black media these patterns are perhaps not surprising. These respondents, however, all have choices about whether to watch television at all. No one forces them to watch it. They have at least three alternative choices: (1) They could choose not to watch television; (2) It would be entirely possible for them to choose to watch only black programs, or (3) programs which have black people as subjects. Only one of the thirteen makes either of those choices.

Nor is the work place a particularly felicitous arena for a preponderance of black subjects. Four of this group are likely to talk with their colleagues about black people, but all thirteen are likely to talk with their colleagues about other subjects. This may be more a function of the composition of the work force than it is the proclivities of the respondents. However that may be, these subjects spend very little time talking about black people in the settings where they spend most of their conscious time.

These are race-conscious black activists, yet among them, six go to lectures or conferences dealing with black people and eleven go to conferences or lectures with other subjects as their principal focus. Only three label their political positions as Nationalist or Pan Africanist. The ten others use labels more prominent among the wider public. It is the popular vocabulary which they choose to locate their politics rather than the more esoteric one of academics and ideologues. Here, in their world, it is, in the broadest sense of the term, the popular expression that they have at hand, which they use.

Even outside the newspapers it is not the black publication that is their most frequent reading fare. Five read black journals or professional publications. Nine read such publications on other topics. Eight are likely to read articles about black people. All thirteen are likely to read articles on other subjects.

Radio fares little better. Six listen to black radio programs. Nine listen to other kinds of programs. Six listen to black radio stations. Nine listen to news radio stations.
In ten specific categories of spaces in which these respondents participate, more participate in mainstream spaces than in black spaces, and in most cases, far more participate in mainstream spaces. Some, of course, participate in both black and non-black spaces. In those cases respondents are not exposed solely to dominant spaces. But in these ten categories while some respondents are exposed only to non-black spaces, none are exposed only to black spaces.

There is no doubt that for the collectivity, non-black spaces are the prevailing venue.

The next graph (see figure 2) compares the numbers of kinds of black and non-black spaces to which the respondents are exposed. For this graph all the spaces in which each respondent participated were counted. The number of non-black spaces each respondent attended were compared with the number of black spaces attended by each respondent.

These are people who are well-exposed to the dominant messages of society. While only three indicate attending more kinds of spaces that are specifically black than are non-black, nine report more kinds of spaces that are non-black than are black. One reports the same number of each. These data, however, do not indicate the amount of time spent at each space. Nor can they compare time spent at black spaces with time spent at non-black spaces, or the intensity of respondent involvement in specific spaces.

The respondents also differ more widely in their exposures to kinds of black spaces than in their exposures to kinds of non-black spaces. The respondent attending the most kinds of black spaces (A) identifies twenty-seven types, while the respondent with the lowest (J), cites only eleven types. Yet with non-black spaces the person citing the highest number of kinds (J) names twenty-four, while the person with the lowest (K) names seventeen. Moreover, for non-black experiences both the modal and mean number of types is twenty. But only three respondents identify twenty or more black types.

In short, when we look at all spaces, not just those in which mainstream spaces are dominant, most of these activists are more frequently exposed to the dominant messages of society than they are to black ones. They do not live isolated lives, divorced from the mainstream and society in general. Their perceptions, beliefs, and values cannot help being influenced by such a pervasive immersion.

For these findings to be significant, one has to assume significant differences between black and non-black spaces (some of which might be justified because these are not just any black people at random, they are race-conscious black people who are involved in SMOs and much more likely to frequent black spaces containing race-conscious narrative than the black population at large).

Black Spaces

What, then, are those venues, those spaces, where they might receive and disseminate alternative messages? There are ten that stand out.

These are black spaces in which at least a majority of the respondents participate. In some instances, these are clearly dominant black spaces in that all respondents participate in them and do not participate in an equal number of the corresponding non-black spaces. Three spaces fit this description. In
There are 13 respondents. Each is designated by an alphabetical letter, A through M.

Two activities are measured for each respondent: 1) the number of Black activities to which the respondent was exposed, and 2) the number of non-Black activities to which the respondent was exposed.

A was exposed to 27 Black activities and 20 non-Black.
B was exposed to 14 Black activities and 20 non-Black.
C = 19 Black and 19 non-Black.
D = 14 Black and 21 non-Black.
E = 23 Black and 21 non-Black.
F = 18 Black and 20 non-Black.
G = 19 Black and 22 non-Black.
H = 13 Black and 19 non-Black.
I = 14 Black and 20 non-Black.
J = 11 Black and 24 non-Black.
K = 26 Black and 17 non-Black.
L = 12 Black and 18 non-Black.
M = 15 Black and 19 non-Black.
others, twelve and eleven respondents participate, clearly marking these as black spaces which dominate their non-black counterparts. At a minimum, in each of the black spaces I have labeled dominant, a majority of the respondents participates.

Space number one (1) represents the majority of the family members as black. All thirteen subjects share this space. They also all share spaces (2), majority of friends are black, and (3) listen to black music.

Measure (4), belong to black political organization, is shared by twelve subjects. Measures (5) and (6) are both shared by eleven subjects. Five is: belonging to organization other than a political one, the majority of whose members are black. Six is: read black magazines.

Measures (7) and (8) each include nine respondents. They are (7), read books on black subjects, and (8), attend black theatrical productions.

The other two measures, (9) and (10), each claim eight respondents. Nine is: seek out articles—in newspapers, magazines, journals—on black subjects. Ten is: go to black movies.

In these ten activities reside a collection of black spaces filled with black narrative, contributing to a social memory with specific black components.

There are other spaces, while not as dominant for the whole pool of respondents, which also serve as significant sources of black narrative and social memory.

Six listen to black radio programs and black radio stations, belong to black religious organizations, attend lectures and conferences featuring black themes, and attend black nightclubs.

Five belong to black cultural organizations.

Four belong to black email lists and four also belong to black social organizations.

Three watch BET regularly.

For most of these people who attend black churches, listen to black radio stations, belong to black social organizations, and attend black conferences, these spaces and the narratives prevailing in them, augment those present in the ten dominant black spaces. These additional exposures deepen and strengthen their social memories of the black experience. One might more clearly appreciate the significance of such attendance by comparing these activists vis-à-vis such black spaces to a similar collection of non-black activists. I can say, unequivocally, that few non-black activists regularly attend any of these spaces where attendance is observable.

All of the respondents are members of primarily black friendship networks and families. All identify a form of black music as their favorite. All except one belong to black political organizations. All except two read black magazines regularly and belong to black organizations other than political ones.

In addition, most of the respondents also read black books, attend black theatrical productions, watch black movies, and seek out black articles in all publications.

Some of them listen to black radio stations, black radio programs, attend black lectures and conferences. A few even belong to black email lists and regularly watch BET.

These spaces together constitute a significant source of black narrative for the respondents collectively and for each one individually.
One is unlikely to find such an intense exposure to black spaces among activists from non-black segments of the population.

**Black Narrative**

In examining black narrative, the substantive communication within black spaces, I utilized three categories: symbolic black narrative, implicit black narrative, and explicit black narrative. These categories arose out of the information the subjects supplied. I discuss each category and principal considerations associated with each one below.

**Symbolic.** As indicated earlier, there are some narrative forms we might label symbolic narrative. In this study they consist of food, dress, and hairstyle. Ten profess to favor "soul food" in various manifestations. One wears "Afrocentric" clothing as professional apparel. Seven designate their hairstyles as "Afro" or "natural." Two more include a reference to afros or naturals as parts of the descriptions of their hair styles. These "symbolic" representations are statements. People make about their identity with their conduct, their appearance, their lives. In this case, these symbolic statements specify their racial identity.

**Implicit.** It is important not to overlook black spaces where black narrative might take place. Where we cannot categorically assert the presence of black narrative substance, but where a rational examination would support the assumption of the presence of black narrative, I label such a condition, implicit black narrative. In this regard I focus our attention on the categories of friends and family.

All thirteen activists said that a majority of their friends were black. Six also said that they talked with their friends about black subjects. But what about the nine who said they talked with their friends about politics? When black people talk with each other about politics isn’t it likely that some of that conversation is about black politics, about how black people are affected by and effect politics? What about the five who said they talked with friends about social problems? Is it likely that some of that conversation centered on black social problems? Given the people involved in these conversations—all or mostly black—it is very likely that these spaces created by friendship primarily among black people are also filled with narratives about black people.

With families the case is quite interesting. Only two respondents said they talked with family members about black subjects. Ten said they talked with family members about family. The most frequent subject of conversation among family members is other family members. But given that all thirteen respondents said a majority of their family members were black, aren’t most of these conversations about family members about black people? They may not have race as subject matter, but they do have black people as subject matter. They are not talking about any family in general. They are talking about specific families. These would seem to be black narratives in black spaces. They would contribute to the social memory of black families.

While these latter two examples with friends and family might be narratives about black people in black spaces, they are not specifically and self-consciously focused on race. They are race-based narratives which are not
intentionally race-based. They are race-based by default, race-based because of the inescapability of race as a defining condition in this society, i.e., where as a matter of circumstance and not of choice, friends and family members will most likely be members of the same race. Michael Dawson, *Behind the Mule* (1994), Katherine Tate (1993), and Dianne Pinderhughes (1987) all comment on this set of circumstances.

Explicit. For those narratives which are intentionally, self-consciously race-based, what is their substance? What is their subject matter? We get the most explicit designation of such matters from the reading lists. They include among other works of similar substance: *Rosa Lee*; a biography of Harold Washington; *My American Journey*, by Colin Powell; *We Have No Leaders*; Kweisi Mfume’s autobiography; *Solomon’s Song*; Andrew Young’s *An Easy Burden*; *Black Betty: The Autobiography of Frederick Douglass*; *Two Nations*, by Andrew Hatcher; several books by bell hooks; *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey: Raisin in the Sun*; a collection of Maya Angelou’s poems. In short, these are substantive works, complex, multifaceted, books which deal with race in the U.S. in no superficial fashion. This is informative, analytical, high quality narrative.

Keep in mind that the respondents choose to read these books, as opposed to choosing not to read books at all. Secondly, these are not light, escapist works. They are not comedy, celebrity biography, romance novels. They deal with central race figures in serious ways, with Nobel prize-level fiction, with Pulitzer prize-level poetry, with the most serious kinds of political and racial ideas. In these books the panel of activists engage a deep narrative, a narrative which encourages them to think deeply. It is narrative addressed to the deepest racial problems afoot in this country. It brings the respondents into a profound engagement with the subject of race.

For magazines, the highest number of readers, five each, were those reading *Emerge, Black Enterprise*, and *Ebony*. The magazine with the next highest number of regular readers, four, was *Essence*. The respondents also read *Jet, Ebony Man, Black Schools*, and *Black Issues in Higher Education*. Again, this is not lightweight reading. While *Ebony, Black Enterprise*, and *Essence* are black mainstream publications, they do not parrot the white mainstream, and they tend to be more than fluff.

The black movies they go to differ in seriousness, as do the non-black ones. Some of the more serious ones are *Get on the Bus* and *The Preacher’s Wife*. On the other end of the spectrum are *The Nutty Professor* and *Set it Off*. The theatrical productions include serious fare: *Jar the Floor, Raisin in the Sun*, *The Colored Museum*. One unanswered mystery is how to count *Othello*.

We are not privy to specific conversations that went on between these respondents and others in black spaces. Nor do we know the substance of the discussions at all the meetings they attended. But from what we do know, from the books and magazines, from the movies and plays they attended, from the marches, demonstrations, rallies, and forums they participated in, and from selected organizational meetings, there are a number of salient observations we can make about the content of the narrative to which we have access.

That narrative includes the recognition of a specific racial identity. It develops racial consciousness. It emphasizes a positive image of people of Af-
African descent. It stresses the need for struggle to improve the condition of black people. It encourages cooperation between black people. It emphasizes the accomplishments and achievements of people of African descent. It stresses the importance of resolving conflicts between African peoples, including those centered around class and gender. It includes cultural expressions which re-enforce specific racial identity. It stresses both politics and economics as means of maximizing black power.

While there is a good deal of scholarship that speaks to the existence of this kind of consciousness, see especially Michael Dawson (1994) and Smith and Seltzer (1992), these respondents are indubitably race-conscious in their own right, irrespective of observations of others. They self-consciously participate in race organizations, read race publications, attend race-based performances, and participate in race-inspired politics. They say that they talk about race to others. It is important to them. It is at the forefronts of their minds and it informs their actions. The narratives in which they participate, both as recipients and as presenters are race-conscious and often race-based.

Additionally, those narratives encompass whatever questions are current among members of the black population (which may or may not concur with those present in the population at large), e.g., affirmative action, ebonics, the Million Man March, Kwanzaa, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Geronimo Pratt, Juneteenth, Welfare reform, employment opportunities, economic empowerment, the African diaspora.

It is apparent that these activists experience a world of information, analysis, and dialogue outside the mainstream, a world which is re-enforced in many different venues.

It is equally clear, however, that this world has no monolithic vision. These activists belong to different organizations with different perspectives. They read different books and articles, go to different movies and plays. They have differing levels of exposure to both black and mainstream spaces. Perhaps most importantly, they are individuals, each with her or his own take on the world. In one organization to which several respondents belong, a close-knit, harmonious organization, two of the respondents actively opposed the Million Man March. Two others, members of the same organization, not only supported the march, they attended it. There is no uniformity in this collection of people.

There are, however, perspectives, streams of information, lines of analysis they are privy to which fall outside those of mainstream USA, and which enable them to develop effective critiques of and alternatives to the mainstream, critiques and analyses which have common elements.

They are also, in a way, hooked up with each other. They are reading books, magazines, and articles tuned to the same sets of concerns. They go to movies and plays centered around the same issues. They share a common music and the sensibilities associated with it. They belong to organizations focused on the same populations. Those populations also constitute the bulk of their friends and family members. They go to similar marches, rallies, forums, and demonstrations. They are very active politically. They are likely to see one another. They often know each other by sight.

While they are certainly well-exposed to the hegemonic worldview, they are in a better position to take issue with it than is the population at large.
Social Memory

My comments on social memory are derived more from the literature and from general observations based on the study than on specific measures of social memory.

The social memory forged in these respondents has complex origins and is itself multidimensional. It is constructed from sources both mainstream and particular. While the most widespread particular sources are those associated with African ancestry, there are others which have been specially influential on some individuals: socialist, Marxist, Christian, feminist. They contribute to the variation in social memory held by these activists. There is no doubt, however, that very powerful social forces which are almost entirely rooted in the black population had the most widespread effects in this group—family, friendship, the messages and cultural sensibilities of black music. The social memory of this pool has also been heavily influenced by politics in that twelve of the thirteen belong to political organizations and all thirteen are much more politically active than members of the population at large. Many of them—whether currently members or not—have been heavily influenced by the black church and they are all fluent in the language of the black church.

Their social memory leaves them quite conscious of black-owned businesses or institutions: publications, book stores, radio stations, BET, nightclubs—and also predisposes them to patronize such establishments.

As a group, as is particularly evident in their reading, they are much informed by the lives of black leaders. We noted, specifically, biographies and autobiographies on Harold Washington, Colin Powell, Kweisi Mfume, Andrew Young, Frederick Douglass, and the works of Marcus Garvey. They are also informed by black writers—Toni Morrison, bell hooks, Maya Angelou.

The social memory of these respondents incorporates specific aspects of black narrative which have been identified above. They share a consciousness of a common racial identity and history. They have an awareness of a collective racial oppression and the imperative to struggle against it. They have a belief in the efficacy of politics and economics as means of struggle. They have a positive conception of African peoples. They believe in black cooperation.

Their social memory leads them to identify with each other, and with other black people. It drives them to join the organizations they do and to avail themselves of the informational sources they use. Those sorts of organizations and information sources, in turn, serve to re-enforce the social memory. Hence, the processes of narrative and social memory are mutually re-enforcing. Together they place these activists in the position of engaging in struggle, leading struggle, and utilizing opportunities to expand struggle.

To them, the events they witness on a daily basis—either in person or in the news—run-down schools, high black unemployment rates, high black infant mortality rates, the O. J. Simpson trial—are not isolated, abstracted events. They are woof and warp of life in this society, deeply embedded in a social and historical context they believe they know.
Two Profiles

The full complexity represented by these respondents may perhaps best be appreciated by looking at two of their lives in the detail afforded by the questionnaire. The pair I have chosen for this closer look, virtually at random, are a man (C) and a woman (F). The man is in his early sixties, retired. The woman is in her early forties, in the full flush of her career.

Respondent C

The most recent book C has read is *An Easy Burden* by Andrew Young. He reads *Black Enterprise* and *Ebony* regularly. He also regularly reads the local mainstream newspaper, the *Sacramento Bee*. When he reads the newspaper he is most likely to read articles that are about the community, as well as the Metro and Front Page sections.

On the radio he listens to “All Things Considered,” on NPR, and he listens to a local black-owned station, 104.3, called “The Breeze.” It plays jazz (mostly vocals), and easy listening black music. It also features community events, ads for black restaurants and clubs, social events, and it has some documentaries and interviews that tend to focus on black personalities or black music genres. He also listens to the local public broadcasting jazz station.

On television he watches “Cosby,” “New York Undercover,” and the Arts and Entertainment Channel, as well as “Tony Brown’s Journal,” cable programs on the black community, and Jessie Jackson’s show on CNN.

The most recent movie he saw was *The Preacher’s Wife*.

His favorite kind of music is jazz.

He belongs to the NAACP, the Urban League, the 100 Black Men, the Sacramento City Children’s Coalition, and the Oak Park Community Arts Group.

His most frequent subjects of conversation with colleagues are family values, brotherhood, the black community, and black organizations. He talks about the same subjects with his friends, with the addition of conversations on what needs to be done. With his family he talks about family unity and harmony.

His favorite recreation is skiing and he belongs to a black ski club in Sacramento.

The majority of his colleagues, friends, and family members are black.

The race of the majority in the organizations he belongs to varies with the organization. In some the majority is white; in others it is black. In still others, such as the Oak Park Community Arts Group, composed of members of many different races, no race is in the majority.

He attends lectures, conferences, and seminars. The subjects tend to be anti-violence, race relations, male-female relationships, and family values. He also attends the theatre. The last play he saw was entitled, *God’s Trying to Tell You Something*.

He seldom goes to nightclubs. The last one he went to was a black club in Oakland. His favorite kind of food is “soul food,” almost any kind. Before he retired, he dressed for work in suits and ties. He describes his hairstyle as a short cut. Of ten possible mainstream political activities, he has engaged in
five. He's also made contributions to a political or community organization other than religious ones. He's attended community or political events with children and he's also participated in children's activities such as clubs, camps, and sports. He participates in family activities such as family reunions.

He characterizes his political position as moderate. He has engaged in seven of the ten possible SMO oriented activities.

Respondent F

The most recent books F has read are Welfare and Racism, Brothers and Sisters, and My American Journey, by Colin Powell. She regularly reads Essence, Black Enterprise, Emerge, and California Journal. She also regularly reads Black Scholar and the Black Quarterly Review of Books. Newspapers she reads regularly are the California Job Journal, and the Sacramento Bee.

When she reads publications she is most likely to read editorials, as well as articles on social and political issues.

She regularly listens to The Breeze and to NPR. While she doesn't watch television regularly, programs she is most likely to watch are "Star Trek," "ER," and "The X-Files." She has email but she doesn't use it regularly although she belongs to a Mumia Abu-Jamal email list.

The most recent movie she saw was Verna Rack.

Her favorite kind of music is Reggae and her favorite song is, "any song by Bob Marley."

Organizations she belongs to are the Sacramento Area Black Caucus, Africa's Daughters Rising, NOW, the Women's Civic Improvement Club, Sister Friends, Friends of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Library, and the Sacramento Valley Black United Fund.

With colleagues she is most likely to talk about women's and children's issues and public policy. With friends she talks about social and political issues—how they effect black people, about public policy, and about community empowerment. With family members she talks about health care of the elderly and political issues such as affirmative action and welfare reform. She also talks with them about daily black life.

Her favorite recreations are collecting teapots and sleeping.

The majority of her colleagues are of European ancestry. The majority of her friends and family members are of African descent. In organizations she belongs to the majority of members in professional organizations are of European descent. In social and political organizations the majority are either of African descent or Latinos.

She attends lectures, seminars, and conferences. Their subject tends to be empowerment of people of color.

She attends theatrical productions regularly. The most recent ones were by the Sacramento Repertory Theatre (a black theatre company), and the Berkeley Repertory Theatre (also a black theatre group).

She attends night clubs. The last two she went to were a jazz club and a Black club.

Her favorite foods are fruit salads and gumbo.

She dresses for work in a professional business wardrobe. She calls her hairstyle, "easy." It is a natural, worn medium-length.
Out of ten possible mainstream political activities she has participated in eight. In addition, she’s made contributions to political or community organizations other than religious ones. She’s attended a political fundraiser. She attends community or political events with children. She’s participated in children’s activities such as clubs, youth groups, rites of passage. She participates in family activities such as reunions.

She says her political position is, “radical to left, feminist.”

Of ten possible SMO activities, she’s engaged in ten.

Assessment

These are both extraordinary people. From the scope of F’s activities, it’s clear why one of her favorite forms of recreation is sleeping.

C, interestingly enough, calls himself a moderate, It is unlikely that on any of the national polls he would be placed in that category. He would be considerably left of center. But it is important to recognize who C is comparing himself with. He considers himself a moderate. He is a member of the NAACP, the Urban League, the 100 Black Men. Within the black population he is a moderate. That is the perspective from which his definition of his political position arises. Indeed, most of the other respondents in this study would probably agree with that definition of C’s position. It is because their collective social memory ascribes his set of views a moderate designation. It is not a designation derived from a mainstream perspective.

The sketches show the respondents’ deep interaction with the wider world: the Sacramento Bee, “All Things Considered,” NY Undercover, Arts and Entertainment, the Sacramento County Children’s Coalition, the Oak Park Community Arts Group, NOW, Friends of the Library, California Journal, California Job Journal, “Star-Trek,” “ER,” “The X-Files.”

These two attend some of the same spaces: Black Enterprise, the Sacramento Bee, The Breeze, NPR. Yet while organizationally each attends a variety of spaces, they are in each instance different spaces. This is true, too, of all the specifically black organizations to which they belong. There is no overlap in them. The only black spaces they share, aside from marches and rallies, are in the media.

It is likely, however, that the narratives they hear and participate in within separate black spaces, and that the social memory prevalent within these separate black spaces have many elements in common. It is likely, for example, that they both knew about the Million Man March long before the general public did. It is likely that they are much more conversant with the plights of Geronimo Pratt and Mumia Abu-Jamal than the public at large. Frances Cress Welsing and Dr. Anna Julia Cooper are much more likely to be part of their mental terrain than that of most people.

While one characterizes himself as a moderate and the other as a radical to the left, feminist, there is likely a core of perspectives and values that they share which is significantly different from—and to the left of—the mainstream.
Conclusions

What do these interviews tell us about Aldon Morris’s down-phase in social movements? They tell us that even in down-phases there are activists—and that they are very active. They tell us that there are plenty of spaces in which they participate where a narrative other than the hegemonic one is dominant. They tell us that some elements of a-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic narratives span these alternative spaces. The interviews also tell us that these activists are widely exposed to the hegemonic points of view, that they are not isolated from the population at large and detached from reality.

The interviews also clearly reveal the presence of the infrastructure Morris says is necessary to mount and sustain a social movement.

Indeed, this panel of activists is representative of the people who day-in, day-out constitute the substance of that infrastructure. They are political junkies, policy-wonks, activists, a rare human species. They will be organizationally involved, politically involved, social movement or not, because that’s what they’re interested in. That’s what they like to do. This kind of activity will always be important in their lives. To engage in it they will create and inhabit spaces where they can engage in narrative which is important to them. In these spaces, by means of such narratives, they will imbibe and perpetuate a social memory particular to their consciousnesses.

Looking at these respondents’ lives it is easy to understand the consistent gaps on almost every major issue, in poll after poll, year after year, between the black and white populations. It is easy to understand the differences in racial group reactions to the Rodney King and O. J. Simpson verdicts. It is easy to understand how 1,000,000 black men could have gathered at the National Mall in Washington, DC as a result of a call to arms barely heard by the general public until the zero hour and how a similar number of black women could have assembled with even less mainstream fanfare in Philadelphia. It is easy to understand how black people get exercised over church bombings, hate crimes, police brutalities, and racial insults which barely touch the national consciousness.

In this country black people, and black activists in particular, inhabit two terrains. One is that shared by the national population at large. The other consists of renegade, guerrilla spaces, where the tales told, the values learned, and the memories perpetuated are woven from an entirely different cloth than that found in the national garment. These activists are of a different mind from the population at large, and while it is a multifaceted mind, there are important components of it that the activists hold in common.

In this light, it is easy to understand how, in Mao’s words, “a single spark can light a prairie-fire,” how a Supreme Court decision, or a bus boycott, or a lunch-counter sit-in, can launch a movement of awe-invoking power and unprecedented durability. Each of these “sparks” has its incendiary potential because in each instance there is an a-hegemonic or anti-hegemonic leadership present, which is associated with an organizational infrastructure, both of which are disposed to be motivated by such occurrences. If enough of those leaders and infrastructure organizations react to an event or set of circumstances virtually simultaneously, the potential exists to mobilize the whole set of the population with which they are cross-connected—friends, families, political organizations, and other kinds of organizations.
By the same token, it is quite clear that people who are outside the loop, who are not "hocked up" as these people are—regardless of their complexions or ancestry—will be much more influenced by the narrative afoot in mainstream public spaces, and that the social memory they draw on to guide them, the perceptions which constitute their basis of reality, will be different-in-kind from those of the people who constitute the seed-ground for the emergence or re-emergence of a full-blown social movement.

References

Rating Black Leaders

Robert C. Smith

San Francisco State University

The study of African American leadership has long been a subject of importance to historians and social scientists (see Walters and Johnson, 1999 for a recent bibliography, and Walters and Smith, 1999). A lacuna in the extensive historical and social science scholarship is that there has never been an attempt to systematically compare and rank black leaders in terms of the individuals impact on the black freedom struggle. In 1982 and 1988 the historians August Meier, Leon Litwack, and John Hope Franklin edited two volumes of essays on important black leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see Table 1). But, they did not seek to rank the individuals in terms of their significance or “greatness,” and the criteria of selection for both volumes was idiosyncratic depending on the importance and significance of the individual but also on the availability of contributors to write the papers. (Franklin and Meier, 1982; Litwack and Meier, 1988). Thus, there were some obvious omissions, for example, Franklin and Meier mention Walter White, Paul Robeson, William Monroe Trotter, Mordicai Johnson, and Father Divine as important twentieth-century leaders not included. And from Litwack and Meier’s list of seventeen nineteenth-century leaders the most obvious omissions are David Walker, whose Appeal was enormously influential at the time it was published in 1831 (its publication may have led to his murder) and subsequently, and Maria B. Stewart, the feminist and abolitionist writer and lecturer.

Thus, a systematic effort by social scientists and historians to evaluate empirically and rate or rank black leaders seems a useful contribution. Although the “rating game” as it has been used in evaluating the American presidents has been dismissed as subjective and impressionistic by some presidential scholars, these studies in the half century they have been conducted have yielded some interesting and useful insights into the nature of leadership in the presidency. Employing this methodology in studying black leadership I think will also provide insights that are interesting and that contribute, however modestly, to the scholarship on the subject.
### Table 1
#### Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century African American Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19th Century</th>
<th>20th Century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Allen (1760-1831)</td>
<td>Booker T. Washington (1856-1915)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat Turner (1800-1831)</td>
<td>T. Thomas Fortune (1856-1928)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick Douglass (1817-1895)</td>
<td>Ida B. Wells-Barnett (1862-1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Ann Shadd (1823-1893)*</td>
<td>W.E.B. DuBois (1868-1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Mercer Langston (1829-1897)</td>
<td>James Weldon Johnson (1871-1938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Highland Garnett (1815-1882)</td>
<td>Marcus Garvey (1887-1940)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin R. Delany (1812-1885)</td>
<td>A. Phillip Randolph (1889-1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Humphries Clark (1829)*</td>
<td>Charles C. Spaulding (1900-1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanche K. Bruce (1841-1896)</td>
<td>Mary McLeod Bethune (1875-1955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Brown Elliot (1842-1884)*</td>
<td>Charles Houston (1895-1935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland Thompson (1840-1887)*</td>
<td>Mabel K. Staupers (1890- )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Crummell (1819-1898)</td>
<td>Adam Clayton Powell (1908-1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry M. Turner (1834-1915)</td>
<td>Martin L. King, Jr. (1929-1968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Henry Steward (1847-1935)*</td>
<td>Malcolm X (1925-1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaiah Montgomery (Not available)*</td>
<td>Whitney Young (1921-1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Church Terrell (1863-1954)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*All of the twentieth century leaders should be familiar to students of African American history, with the exception of Mabel Staupers the head of the National Association of Negro Nurses in the 1950s and Charles Spaulding, the principal founder of the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company. Several of the nineteenth century leaders, however, are relatively obscure including Mary Ann Shadd, educator, reformer and the first black woman to edit a newspaper; Peter Humphries Clark, an activist educator in Cincinnati; John Mercer Langston, the first black elected to office in the United States (town clerk in Oberlin, Ohio), member of Congress and perhaps second only to Douglass in importance during the Reconstruction era; Robert Elliot, a Reconstruction era Congressman; William Steward, educator, leading layman in Baptist church affairs and YMCA activist; Holland Thompson, a Georgia State legislator; and Isaiah Montgomery, founder of the all-black town, Mound Bayou, Mississippi.

Sources: Leon Litwack and August Meier (eds.), *Black Leaders of the Nineteenth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), and John Hope Franklin and August Meier (eds.), *Black Leaders of the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).
Rating the Presidents: Schlesingers' Model

In 1948 and again in 1962 Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. asked a panel of historians and political scientists to rate the American presidents by placing them (in rank order) in one of the five following categories: Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average and Failure. Both studies generated a lot of interest and controversy among scholarly and lay observers of the presidency. In 1996 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. replicated his father’s earlier polls. As indicated earlier, the Schlesinger polls were frequently criticized as subjective and impressionistic.

In 1948 the senior Schlesinger selected forty-eight historians to participate on his panel and in 1962 seventy-four. In 1996 Schlesinger, Jr. selected thirty-three panelists. In neither of the three studies are objective, replicable criteria provided for the process of selection or for the final number of panelists. We are only told that the individuals selected were “eminent” or “distinguished.” Given the well-known liberal ideological inclinations of the Schlesingers, this inevitably led to controversy and allegations of bias. For example, Schlesinger, Jr’s 1996 panel included (for no apparent reason and without explanation) former New York governor Mario Cuomo and former Illinois senator Paul Simon, two well-known liberal politicians without academic credentials (Schlesinger’s panel included one African American, David Levering Lewis of Rutgers).²

Apart from the subjectivity in panel selection, participants were given no criteria and little guidance in evaluating presidential leadership. Schlesinger, Sr. wrote “Each participant applied his own measuring rod in accordance with the relative importance he attached to the complex of factors that helped make or break a president” (1962, 1980:380). Schlesinger, Jr. wrote “As to how presidential performance was to be judged, the scholars were left to decide for themselves. It was assumed that historians would recognize greatness—or failure—when they saw it, as Justice Potter Stewart once proposed to recognize pornography” (1997:179).

In defense of their methodology, the Schlesingers note that their panels agreed with little dissent on the great and near great and on the failures, with the principal differences involving those regarded as average; however, even in the average cases it was noted that the “preponderance of evidence was conclusive” (1962, 1980:381).

Also Schlesinger, Jr. observes that when political scientists have employed more objective, scientific methodologies (what he refers to as “more pretentious methodologies”), including random samples of several hundred political scientists and historians, and stated criteria of evaluation (with typologies and numerical scores) the results have been essentially the same (see Ridings, Jr. and McIver, 1997 for a recent example of such a study). Schlesinger, Jr. writes (1997:182),

However simple or complex the method, the final ratings turned out to be much the same. There have been nine Great and Near Great in nearly all scholarly reckonings. Lincoln, Washington and F. D. Roosevelt are always at the top, followed always, though in varying order, by Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Theodore Roosevelt,
Wilson and Truman. . . . The failures have always been Grant, and Harding, with Buchanan, Pierce, Fillmore, Taylor and Coolidge always near the bottom.¹

It would appear, therefore, that the Schlesingers' method while not meeting the normal standards of scientific objectivity and rigor, nevertheless produces reliable and to an important extent valid results.

Rating Black Leaders: A Modification of the Schlesinger Model

In this study of the greatest black leaders I attempted to modify the Schlesingers' model so as to increase its transparency, validity, and reliability. This is done first through clear specification of the panel selection process, and second by using a simple, clearly stated, common criteria for leadership selection. Selection of great leaders, like the choice of great books or baseball players, is inevitably personal and subjective. But, my slight modifications of the Schlesingers' method improves its usefulness for this project.

Regarding selection of the panel, the forty-six respondents were selected randomly from the 1998–99 mailing list of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), the thirty-year-old professional organization of scholars of African American politics. Although not racially or professionally exclusive, most of the members of NCOBPS are black and most are academic political scientists at colleges and universities.

My original research design included in addition to NCOBPS members a sample of members of the Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History (ASALH), the oldest organization devoted to the scholarly study of the black experience in the United States. However, its membership list was not available. I also considered use of a sample of historians specializing in African American history drawn from the membership of the American Historical Association (AHA), the oldest and largest organization of American historians. AHA, however, does not classify its membership by area of specialization. Use of the ASALH and AHA lists would have added disciplinary and racial diversity to the panel, as well as a larger number. This would have likely enhanced validity and reliability. But I would guess the final list of the top ten would be about the same although in varying order.

The NCOBPS panel is based on a mail questionnaire administered to sixty individuals selected randomly from the group's most recent mailing list. The questionnaire was mailed in September 1999 and responses were recorded and tabulated through December 1999. (See the appendices for the questionnaire and the list of panelists.)²

The central problem in a project such as this is the criteria for selection. That is, although ultimately selections are personal and subjective respondents should be given more guidance than Schlesinger, Jr's not so cute reference to Justice Stewart and pornography. But, the problem of how leadership is defined and measured has long been a subject of dispute in the social science literature (Paige, 1977). And in the extensive literature on black leadership in the United States there is no consensus among scholars as to how it is properly defined and evaluated (Walters and Smith, 1999:7–8, 35–36).

Does a black leader need to head an organization? Organize a movement?
Can an individual lead on the basis of ideas and intellect alone? Is leadership effectiveness or greatness measured by influence inside the black community? By influencing the behavior of whites? By laws passed or cases won? Is leadership greatness best assessed in historical perspective or is it possible to make useful assessments of contemporary leaders?  

Finally, is "great" leadership to be judged by "good" leadership? That is, can an individual be a great leader if it is thought his leadership was bad for the country? For the race? Or, is leadership to be evaluated solely on the basis of the individual's impact on society, for good or ill (can an individual be great—as Nation of Islam Minister Louis Farrakhan described Hitler—but as he said "wickedly great")? Ratings of great presidents appear to have a bias toward "greatness as goodness," selecting as great or near great presidents those individuals whose presidencies left a lasting, positive legacy (generally progressive, reform presidents). It is for this reason that Reagan—whose presidency had a major and at this point continuing impact on American politics and society—is judged in the Schlesinger poll only an average president. Schlesinger writes (1997:134), many panelists viewed "...his priorities—his attack on government as the root of all evil and his tax reductions that increased disparities between rich and poor white tripling the national debt a disaster for the republic."

Questions about the nature and evaluation of leadership can be asked but not answered in a study of this sort (because in the end each panelist will make his selections applying his own standards), however, I did wish to avoid the greatness as goodness bias. Thus, in the cover letter and on the questionnaire panelists were asked to use the following criteria: Please list below in rank order the five African Americans who, in your historical judgment, have had the greatest impact, for good or ill, on the well-being and destinies of the African people in the United States.

This criteria—for good or ill—was included specifically with Booker T. Washington in mind. Knowing that many scholars of the African American experience think that Washington had a major but largely negative impact on black well-being, I wanted the criteria to explicitly leave open the opportunity for his inclusion. Of Washington Harlan writes (1982:2), "It is ironic that Booker T. Washington, the most powerful black American of his time, and perhaps of all time, should be the black leader whose claim to that title is most often dismissed. ... Washington was a genuine leader, with a substantial black following and with virtually the same long range goals for Afro-Americans as his rivals."

The panel was asked to select and rank five persons. Five is obviously an arbitrary number. It was selected (rather than ten) because I thought it would require panelist to engage in more critical thought and discernment.

**Rating Black Leaders: The NCOBPS List**

Table 2 lists the ten greatest leaders as selected by the panel, including data on the frequency of mentions, the number of times the individual was ranked first (and fifth), and each individual's mean scores. Dr. King and Dr. DuBois, not surprisingly to this writer, are the unambiguous selections as the two in-
TABLE 2
The NCOBPS' Panel: Ten Greatest African American Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Rank By #1</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Martin Luther King, Jr.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21(3/5)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>W.E.B. DuBois</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7(2/5)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Malcolm X</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3(1/5)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Frederick Douglass</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3(5/5)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Booker T. Washington</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2(5/5)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Marcus Garvey</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2(1/5)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Thurgood Marshall</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2(1/5)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jesse Jackson</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0(4/5)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ida B. Wells-Barnett</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0(1/5)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mary McLeod Bethune</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0(4/5)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fannie Lou Hamer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1(0)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Adam Clayton Powell</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0(4/5)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Frequency represents the number of times the individual was mentioned by panelists. The fifth and tenth persons were mentioned by the same number of panelists. Thus, the list includes twelve rather than ten persons.
b. Rank by #1 represents the number of times the individual was ranked first. The figures in parenthesis represent the number of times the individual was ranked fifth.
c. Mean score calculated by summing the rankings of the individual (1-5) and dividing by the number of mentions.

individuals who have had the greatest impact on the destinies of black people in the United States.  

Professor William Daniels of the Rochester Institute of Technology in his response wrote, "The 'rank order' aspect of this assignment is perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the project. This is so because history is continuous and events flow from other events and changing conditions provide contexts for others. Thus, it is difficult for me to rank a Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. higher than a Justice Thurgood Marshall because the efforts and successes of Marshall paved the way for King and even assisted King while he was making his presence felt."

Professor Daniels' point is well taken with respect to King and the civil rights movement specifically, but also with respect to the general idea of leadership as an individual phenomenon. To rank Marshall (#6) behind King elides different contexts, conditions and roles that go into making any particular individual a leader. It is perhaps not accidental that the Montgomery bus boycott that propelled King eventually to leadership greatness occurred one year after the historic victory of Marshall and his colleagues in Brown vs. Board of Education.

Yet, Marshall is on the select list of ten. Ella Baker is not, although she was mentioned by three panelists. Yet Ms. Baker played a major—some scholars
say near indispensable—role in the success of the movement King led in the 1950s and 1960s. Sekou Franklin of Howard University writes,

Ella Baker, perhaps more so than anyone else was responsible for rescuing the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from organizational collapse in the late 1950s. She also gave the NAACP legitimacy in the South in the late 1940s; was responsible for organizing poor people from rural areas where most of the black middle class leadership (including preachers) were fearful of going. Remarkably, Baker did this shortly after and during a time when the South was being gutted (sic) out. . . . Baker was also responsible for the founding of the Fellowship for Reconciliation with Stanley Levison and Bayard Rustin. She was a critical organizer with the Highlander Folk School and the Young Negro Cooperative League in Harlem during the Depression. Thus, she played major roles in at least three major organizations (SNCC at its founding; in leadership and leadership development; SCLC . . . and the NAACP in the southern region of the United States during the World War II years. . . . Perhaps, even more important was the fact that Baker challenged the status of black leadership, openly and personally confronting King and the black preachers, as well as NAACP leadership for being too bureaucratic, conservative, non-confrontational and hierarchical.

Similarly with Malcolm X who ranks three on the list ahead of Garvey (5). Yet Malcolm was literally the son of Garveyites and Elijah Muhammad built the Nation of Islam on foundations developed by Garvey. Yet Muhammad is not among the select ten, although clearly without Muhammad there is no Malcolm (a point several panelists noted in selecting Malcolm) or for that matter Louis Farrakhan. Other examples could undoubtedly be cited, for example, Martin Delany who is often referred to as the “father of Black Nationalism.” The point is that leadership is hardly ever a discrete category of social relations existing in a historical vacuum.

Having said this, King and DuBois undoubtedly richly deserve their preeminent ranking as singularly important individuals who through the force of their personalities, intellects, character, and courage exerted an enormous impact on the destiny of the race. Of King panelists wrote such things as “he transformed American society”; “unequal in his capacity to mobilize blacks”; “the decisive force in breaking the back of the southern racial caste system”; “A major voice in challenging the Vietnam war and American imperialism.” Although he ranked King number two after DuBois Professor Lorenzo Morris of Howard nicely summarize the sentiments of the panel:

Martin Luther King should almost certainly be first on anyone’s list of the most influential figures in the African American experience. His crucial role in focusing and directing the American civil rights experience is beyond question. The civil rights experience, itself, also unquestionably marks one of the great transformations in American history preceded only by the civil and revolutionary wars. In this regard, King is probably the most influential person in 20th century American history. While this is a rather arbitrary distinction, his influence over blacks does not seem to have directed the civil rights movement away from the path toward which it was otherwise inclined. Non-violent direct action, for example, was not unique to King although he was its best apostle.

DuBois himself acknowledged his debts to the “Great Douglass” and the “Great Crummell” but his magnificent contribution is sui generis. Most pan-
elists referred to DuBois' intellectual leadership, an "iffy proposition in American life." Professor William Banks observed, but DuBois was more than the "intellectual linchpin of the black movement" or "one of two or three major American intellectuals of the twentieth century." Through his leadership role in organizing the Niagara Conference; in founding the NAACP; in editing The Crisis; in encouraging "manly protest"; and in organizing several Pan African conferences he is the "model for the engaged Scholar—Statesman—Activist." Professor Morris' remarks again nicely capture the sentiments of the panel:

William E. B. DuBois is a unique combination of scholar, social analyst and political organizer. His exceptional role in structuring the conditions for the development of the NAACP and the intellectual direction he gave it through his work on The Crisis substantially defined the conceptual issues around which the organization struggled and grew. Similarly, DuBois played a dominant role in defining the principles and political themes around which Pan Africanism developed here and internationally through much of this century. As a consequence, he has a singularly crucial role in defining the conceptual parameters of the national—integrationist debate that dominates the history of African American politics. At the same time, his sociological creative research on urban life and on the black church, coupled with his groundbreaking historical research helped to set the highest standards for research on black issues. As a consequence, scholarship in black higher education today probably owes more to him than any other group of scholars.

Although it was not surprising that Malcolm X would appear on a list of ten great black leaders, I was surprised that he would rank so high—number 3—ahead of Douglass (although not by much, and note that Douglass' mean score is somewhat higher than Malcolm's), Garvey or Washington. Thurgood Marshall near the end of his life was scornful of the adoration (especially among the young) accorded Malcolm twenty-five years after his death, arguing that he was a rabble rouser who accomplished little (Williams, 1997:304). The NCOBPS panel apparently shares the view of Bruce Perry, author of the most thorough study of Malcolm's life. Perry writes "Malcolm X fathered no legislation. He engineered no stunning Supreme Court victories or political campaigns. He scored no major electoral triumphs. Yet, because of the way he articulated his followers' grievances and anger, the impact he had on the body politics was enormous" (1991:380).

Panelists tended to view Malcolm's significance as a leader along three dimensions. First, as the "quintessential charismatic leader," who was also the "intellectual leader of twentieth century black nationalism." Thus, his was a leadership of ideas. But not ideas in the refined sense of a Crummell or DuBois. Rather, as Perry notes it was not just his ideas but the powerful way he expressed them. Of this second dimension, panelists noted that Malcolm "expressed the anger that lay deep within the souls of the African American people" and "gave voice to the voiceless in the face of overwhelming racist oppression." In doing so in a militant and forceful way a panelist said he "kept America on edge." The third area of Malcolm's importance as a leader, according to the panel, was his role in fostering a Pan Africanist consciousness and his efforts to establish practical, concrete linkages between leaders of the African and African American liberation movements in the context of
an international human rights movement.

Like Malcolm, Garvey’s significance as a leader is rooted in his effective espousal of the philosophy of black nationalism, with a powerful Pan African consciousness. But unlike Malcolm, Garvey’s influence goes beyond intellec and charisma because he created the first mass movement of blacks. As Professor William Banks put it, “he was the leader of the largest mass organization in history—says it all.”

Frederick Douglass’ standing as a leader in rank behind Malcolm but ahead of Garvey is based on his “transcending his enslaved status to become effective the first nationally recognized black leader in United States history.” As a leader of the abolitionist movement Douglass, the panel noted, gave crucial guidance to the emancipation struggle and set the “conceptual parameters” for the twentieth century’s militant integrationist protest movement.

Booker Washington was the second black to achieve the status of nationally recognized race leader. Although he ranks five on the list (tied with Garvey, although Washington’s mean score is a bit higher), he is, as anticipated, the most controversial choice. Indeed, of the seven panelists who provided comments on their choice of Washington five were ambivalent or negative. One simply wrote “villain.” While another wrote “negative impact.” Washington’s stress on education and entrepreneurship is noted as a positive contribution, but in the end the tendency is to view his powerful leadership as doing more harm than good because as Professor Mack Jones of Clark-Atlanta observes, “His leadership was instrumental in allowing the southern planter class to reimpose its domination after Reconstruction with minimal cost to it.” However Washington’s leadership role is evaluated, he was a powerful presence in black life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Professor Banks of Berkeley concludes, “He was wrong about many things but who can question that for many years he was ‘The man’ in Afro-American life.”

The panel described Thurgood Marshall as the “greatest jurist of the twentieth century” and “one of the great lawyers of the twentieth century “who” spearheaded the creation of the legal foundations of the civil rights movement.”

In somewhat of a surprise Jesse Jackson is ranked number seven, the only living person included on the list. Surprising because Jackson, as he has said, is still a man becoming, and it is always difficult to provide historical perspective on a leader before the consequences of his leadership are measured by time. That is, the ultimate significance or consequence of Jackson’s impact on the well-being of the black community is perhaps too early to assess.

But, the panel disagrees. Jackson’s leadership is viewed as historically significant because of his role in the “transition from protest to politics “that has characterized post civil rights era black politics. Jackson, one panelist wrote, “whatever one thinks of him, is singularly responsible for bringing millions of blacks into the electoral process.” Another writes, “he made an extraordinary transition from race conscious civil rights organizing to national party politics.” Wellesley’s Wilbur Rich summarizes Jackson’s historical significance in the following way: “he has transcended his origins in the civil rights movement and made himself a modern politician. He has also fought to create a
coalition of whites, blacks and others. History will be very kind to him.”
Yet the panel was not unanimous in a positive assessment of Jackson’s sig-
nificance as a leader. Professor Willie Legett of South Carolina State Univer-

sity wrote,

Rev. Jesse Jackson would be ranked third in having an impact, for ill, on the well
being of black people. Rev. Jackson has perfected the ability to use politics for self
advancement. Rev. Jackson has used black people for his personal gain for over
thirty years. Moreover, Jackson has the unusual ability to articulate a right-wing
agenda, such as his Wall Street Project, while maintaining the support of the left.

One respondent—a woman—declined to participate in the poll, contend-
ing that there was no rational way to make the selections and that the re-
results would likely be a “bunch of men,” which would send the wrong mes-
sage. Three women, however, appear on the list, Mary McLeod Bethune, Ida
B., Wells-Barnett, and Fannie Lou Hamer. Bethune was cited for her role as
a leader in the black women’s movement; for her role in advising Eleanor
and Franklin Roosevelt and serving as informal leader of Roosevelt’s “black
cabinet”; and for her leadership on education issues.
Wells-Barnett’s significance derives from her courageous leadership of the
campaign against lynching. From the 1890s through the 1930s, Wells-Barnett
was an activist in the militant, protest wing of the civil rights movement and
a panelist wrote, “At great personal risk . . . more than any other person she
made lynching a national issue.”
Fannie Lou Hamer is described as a “true grassroots leader,” who with
remarkable courage provided a moral light, a moral standard for the civil
rights movement.

Adam Clayton Powell is the only elected politician on the list. The panel
noted his militant advocacy of black rights in the House; his persistent push-
ing of the “Powell Amendment” (requiring the cutoff of federal funds to in-
stitutions practicing racial discrimination) which became Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act; his Chairmanship of the House’s Education and Labor Com-
mittee; and in general his “forcing the idea of black liberation on the agenda
of national politics.” Professor Robert Holmes, also a member of the Georgia
Legislature, offers a broader perspective on Powell’s historical significance:

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell actually initiated mass marches and boycotts
in Harlem more than a decade before Martin Luther King, Jr. As Chair of the Edu-
cation and Labor Committee of the U.S. House he was responsible for passage of
the war on poverty legislation, minimum wage, fair labor standards, antidiscrimi-
nation in employment and various other laws benefiting African Americans, poor
people, students and women.

Conclusion

Of the twelve individuals on the NCOBPS list of the greatest black leaders
in history all except two—Douglass and Washington—are twentieth-century
leaders, although Washington’s leadership carries over into the twentieth cen-
tury. Comparing the NCOBPS list with Franklin and Meier’s twentieth-cen-
tury list in Table 1, seven of the individuals are on both lists. Three women are on both lists and eleven of the fourteen persons on the Meier and Franklin list were college educated (including five with advanced degrees) and thirteen of the fourteen were married. Eight of the twelve on the NCOBPS list were college educated (including four with advanced degrees) and all were married. Three clergymen are on the Franklin and Meier list, four on the NCOBPS list; three civil rights leaders and one civil rights litigator are among Franklin and Meier’s selections; four civil rights leaders and a litigator are on the NCOBPS list; and four on both lists edited important journals or newspapers (Douglass, DuBois, Garvey, and Wells-Barnett). Two black nationalists are on both lists. The Franklin and Meier list also includes a businessman and a labor leader while the NCOBPS list does not (no business person was mentioned by the NCOBPS panel, but Phillip Randolph was mentioned twice). And there is one elected and appointed official on each list, although arguably Marshall achieved his leadership greatness prior to his appointment to the Court.

Several generalizations, consistent with the historical and social science scholarship on black leadership, are suggested by the results of this inquiry. First, blacks appear to have made their greatest, to use Dr. King’s phrase, “strides toward freedom” in the twenty-first century—the late twentieth century. Second, the leadership has been drawn disproportionately from DuBois’ “talented tenth” of the college-educated, cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. Third, clergymen, educators, and orators have played major roles in the struggle; politicians near inconsequential ones. Finally, although often overlooked, women have played important leadership roles.

Throughout the history of the Afro-American freedom movement there has been a continuous struggle for hegemony between nationalists and integrationists, whether between Douglass and Delaney and Washington and Bishop Henry Turner in the nineteenth century, or DuBois and Garvey and Malcolm and King in the twentieth.

Finally, it is worth noting in concluding that the only living person on the list—Jesse Jackson—is noted for his significance as an agent in the transition in black politics from militancy and protests to politics and elections. I will refrain from speculating on what this means for twenty-first century black leadership and politics.

Notes

1. For the volume on twentieth-century leaders Franklin and Meier also included as a criterion that the individual not be alive, although they made an exception for the ninety-year-old Mabel K. Staupers, the long-time president of the National Association of Negro Graduate Nurses, who led a long crusade to employ and integrate nurses into the armed services.

2. Policy Review, a conservative journal, criticized Schlesinger’s results as biased in large part because Reagan was ranked 25 while Clinton was rated 20. Its editors subsequently selected their own panel, which included well-known conservatives like William Buckley, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Henry Kissinger. Predictably, Reagan was ranked much higher by this group (Fetzenberg, 1997).

3. Walton and Smith (2000:200–10) in their recent textbook rank the presidents in terms of their racial attitudes and policies. Of the forty-one presidents, twenty-
three were white supremacist; eighteen were racist in terms of policy, fourteen exhibited ambivalence or neutrality on race policies and nine proposed or pursued anti-racist policies. (These nine include Lincoln, Grant, Benjamin Harrison, Truman, Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Clinton). Of the ten greatest presidents according to the most recent Schlesinger poll—Lincoln, Washington, Franklin, Roosevelt, Jefferson, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Truman, Polk, and Eisenhower—six pursued racist policies, two were racially neutral or ambivalent in their racial policies, eight were white supremacist and only two—Lincoln and Truman—pursued anti-racist policies. Ranking the presidents by their racial policies, for good or ill on black people, the five greatest were (in order) Lyndon Johnson, Lincoln, Kennedy, Truman, and Benjamin Harrison. The failures were Andrew Johnson, Reagan, Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Andrew Jackson.

4. The response rate was 76 percent. For mail surveys Babbie (1973:165) writes that 60 percent is considered “good” and 70 percent “very good.” In addition to the NCOBPS list, two other scholars were invited to participate, Robert Allen, editor of The Black Scholar, the leading journal of research in Black Studies, and William Banks of the University of California, Berkeley. Professor Banks is preparing a major anthology of African American social and political thought.

5. Several colleagues suggested that in this project living persons be excluded. A suggestion I am pleased I rejected given the ranking of Rev. Jackson.

6. My choices—determined prior to receiving the panel results—are DuBois, King, Booker Washington, Frederick Douglass, and Richard Allen.

7. In addition to Baker, the following individuals were mentioned by at least one panelist: Harriet Taubman (4), Elijah Muhammad (3), Louis Farrakhan (3), Duke Ellington (2), Denmark Vesey (2), Ralph Bunche (2), A. Phillip Randolph (2), Nat Turner (2) Rosa parks (2), and Sojourner Truth (2). The following persons were mentioned once: Huey Newton, James Baldwin, Carter Woodson, Walter White, Whitney Young, Colin Powell, Jackie Robinson, Stokeley Carmichael, Maxine Waters, Paul Robeson, and Ward Connerly.

8. The seven female members of the panel selected nine women. One female respondent selected three women among her five leaders, and one woman ranked Fannie Lou Hamer number one. The thirty-six male panelists selected eighteen women, three included two women among the top five, and one man ranked Harriet Taubman first.
Appendix

Rating Black Leaders

Please list below in rank order the five African Americans who, in your historical judgment, have had the greatest impact, for good or ill, on the well-being and destinies of the African people in the United States. In the space provided, a brief comment about the individual’s significance is also invited.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Please feel free to include queries, comments and suggestions about the project.
References


The NCOBPS Panel

Robert Allen, *The Black Scholar*
William Banks, University of California, Berkeley
Claude Barnes, North Carolina A & T University
Timuel Black, Chicago, Illinois
William Boone, Clark-Atlanta University
Ronald Brown, Wayne State University
Rufus Browning, San Francisco State University
Mary Coleman, Jackson State University
David Covin, California State University, Sacramento
William Daniels, Rochester Institute of Technology
Don Davis, Howard University
Sekou Franklin, Howard University
Lawrence Hanks, Indiana University
Kwasi Harris, San Jose State University
Floyd Fayes, Purdue University
Lenneal Henderson, University of Baltimore
Charles Henry, University of California, Berkeley
Matthew Holden, Jr., University of Virginia
Ricky Hill, South Carolina State University
Robert Holmes, Georgia General Assembly
Charles Jones, Georgia State University
Mack Jones, Clark-Atlanta University
Nolan Jones, National Governors Association
Ollie Johnson, University of Maryland, College Park
Willie Legett, South Carolina State University
Mamie Locke, Hampton University
Paula McClain, Duke University
Cheryl Miller, University of Maryland, Baltimore
Lorenzo Morris, Howard University
William Nelson, The Ohio State University
Marion Orr, Brown University
Georgia Persons, Georgia Institute of Technology
Michael Preston, University of Southern California
Adolph Reed, Sr., University of Arkansas
Mitchell Rice, Texas A & M University
Wilber Rich, Wellesley College
Daryl Roberts, Tuskegee University
J. Owens Smith, California State University, Fullerton
James Steele, North Carolina A & T University
Robert Starks, Northeastern University
Katherine Tate, University of California, Irvine
Ronald Walters, University of Maryland, College Park
Hanes Walton, Jr., University of Michigan
Eddie Williams, Joint Center For Political and Economic Studies
Linda Williams, University of Maryland, College Park
Harold Wingfield, Kennesaw State University
African American Voting Behavior, President Clinton’s Scandal, and the 1998 Election: The Search for New Variables

Hanes Walton, Jr.
Kenneth Jordan
Lester Spence
Maxie Foster
Thomas N. Walton

University of Michigan
Savannah State University
Washington University at St. Louis
Louisiana State University at Shreveport
Atlanta Public Schools

The failure of the intellectual imagination is crippling! It is also sad and tragic because it is so misleading. It permits existing explanatory theories, hegemonic models and empirically derived concepts to become entrenched and institutionalized. Then cognitive inertia sets in and paradigms cannot shift. In such an intellectual context and environment “habits of the mind” start to govern scientific beliefs and these habits become cognitive barriers to new ideas, new stimuli, the old conceptual difficulties in the dominant paradigms and “novel or disputed phenomena.” Things merely stand still. The future is foreclosed and in the words of philosopher Abraham Kaplan, the “conduct of inquiry” comes to a screeching halt. Perhaps nowhere is this more prevalent than in the once creative field of voting behavior.

Over time, in the subfield of electoral behavior, a triumvirate of theoretical approaches and variables have emerged. It is this trilogy of variables—partisanship, candidates and issues—that has beaten, and continues to beat the explanatory opposition; and it does so on a number of grounds . . . “it has achieved virtually the status of a world religion.” Why? “Part of the substan-
tive success . . . [of these variables] . . . is (their) . . . parsimonious . . . (role) . . . and . . . (their) unduly vigorous . . . production of voting ‘facts’." Yet, the unasked, unexplored, and unexamined question is whether this trilogy explains African American voting behavior. More importantly, has the hegemonic influence of these variables foreclosed the exploration of other influential variables in African American voting behavior? This is an exploratory analysis for other potential variables in current African American voting behavior.

The African American Electorate and the Political Context

Kaplan again. He writes: "not all explanation consists in fitting something into a pattern already given. . . . The task of explanation is often to find or create a suitable pattern. . . . The scientific achievement. . . . often exists in discovery. . . . (or) . . . making manifest a new pattern." In the 1980s and 1990s, the political context of the African American electorate underwent a profound and critical change. In this altered political context, the partisanship of the African American electorate came under massive attack and sustained pressure. Both major parties, the Republicans and the Democrats leveled a relentless assault and critique against African American partisans. The crime of the African American partisan, as the major parties perceived it, was their use of the party system and process to obtain citizenship rights. The Republican party assault was unabashedly direct, while the Democratic party’s strategy was directed against Rev. Jesse Jackson and indirectly against the African American electorate.

Goldwater launched the assault in 1964 and Ronald Reagan lifted it to the pinnacle with the Republican Revolution that emerged in the 1980 presidential campaign. Lois Moreland wrote, "while Governor Reagan may not himself be a racist, in the words of Rev. Joseph Lowery, Chairman of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the black community perceives that racist forces have gravitated toward him." The most prominent example of this occurred at the start of Reagan’s 1980 campaign. Governor Reagan took an overt and clear-cut stance towards race, and Civil Rights. Here is how Professor Moreland described the event that defined Reagan and civil rights for the 1980 campaign: "Governor Reagan, himself had not seemed to be as much of an issue as the Republican party until he went to Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three Civil Rights workers had been killed, and announced his support of states rights." After his election, he continued this definition by opposing all the major civil rights achievements of the sixties and seventies. In the words of Michael Dawson, "Reagan demonized African Americans." President Bush continued the process but in a less involved manner.

Enter Democratic President William J. Clinton. Clinton, beginning with the 1992 presidential primaries and nearly continually throughout his second term, distanced the party, first from Rev. Jesse Jackson, and then the needs and hopes of the African American community. With President Clinton at the helm, the Democratic party, except for a few symbolic acts, put down the African American community and its civil rights leadership. In the words of his sundry analysts, he did only safe things for African Americans.

Caught up in this type of political context, what happens to the partisanship inside the African American community? Does it continue at the same
level of support and affiliation as before? With both parties pushing the African American voter from them, what is the response? And perhaps most importantly, do the same variables continue to shape African American voting behavior? However, despite an altered partisanship context, one group of African American political scientists tells the same old story. They say: "Black satisfaction with Bill Clinton's performance and their desire to maintain their representation in the executive branch of government also help explain why black Democrats were no longer at odds with their party. Clinton's support among blacks remained consistently strong."14 This is not really the case. African American voting support for the Democratic party peaked in 1984, and began a decline in 1988 that has continued throughout the 1996 elections. Electoral analysts who focus only upon turnout tend to miss this decline because turnout fails to reveal that the actual numbers of those voting for the Democratic party have significantly dropped off.15 The real situation is high support among those that actually turn out but a declining turnout overall. Thus, reporting the high support of those few who are turning out without the necessary qualifications creates an illusion. It fosters the same old story that despite party abandonment and a hands-off policy African Americans still provide the party with the same level of support. This is sheer nonsense and nothing could be further from the truth.

Long ago, Michael Preston, in not only a pioneering study of African American voting behavior but in one of the most creative and innovative pieces of research, revealed after analyzing the 1983 mayoral election in Chicago, declared: "in 1983 none of the trends or theories held up.... The traditional theories of voter participation do not explain the sudden mobilization of the general populace that overcame the historical apathy of the black community."16 Few people picked up on Preston's truly imaginative and path-breaking work on African American voting behavior. They should have.

Data and Methodology

To facilitate this empirical exploratory analysis and get beyond knee-jerk answers about which variables affect change in African American voting behavior, this study will undertake a precinct analysis of Atlanta, Georgia. Previous precinct analysis of this city's electorate has been quite insightful and revealing about new factors influencing African American voting behavior. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler did a cross-sectional precinct analysis of the city's African American electorate in the 1962 congressional election and discovered how moderation shaped the vote.17 Charles Rooks did a similar cross-sectional precinct analysis of the 1969 mayoral vote in the city and discerned that issues instead of race shaped the vote.18 Collectively, these single election studies brought out new and different variables influencing the collective dimensions of African American voting behavior. In fact, precinct analyses have been central to understand group voting behavior since the pioneering work of Harold Gosnell's Machine Politics in 1937.19 Today, Gary King's recent work with its use of precinct data from the 1992 and 1994 elections in Fulton County (Atlanta) continues this long and rich intellectual tradition.20

Having settled on a precinct analysis approach, the next question is which election do we analyze? Since the 1998 election is a midterm election, the 1994
midterm election data will be used for comparative analysis.\textsuperscript{21} Election returns from the 1994 and 1998 midterm general elections will be used from three statewide offices: (1) Governor, (2) Attorney General, and, (3) Commissioner of Labor. And, what of the total number of precincts to be used? For this study, the N=45 precincts in both elections and using those same precincts permits us to employ the 1994 precinct vote as an independent variable and therefore measure the influence of partisanship upon the African American 1998 vote. This will then provide the opportunity to explore for other variables because survey data tends to provide a rather standard list of attributes as variables. This makes it difficult to seek out newer ones.

Now, what makes a precinct study analysis? First, the precinct, instead of the individual becomes the unit of analysis. Secondly, for this study, we chose only those Atlanta precincts where African American registered voters make up 90 percent or more of the registered voters in the precincts. Table 1.1 shows the parameters for the 45 precincts in the 1994 and 1998 midterm elections. Here we can see that the mean African American registration in those precincts in both years is nearly equal at 97 percent. The median is the same, 98 percent, the mode is 99 percent. The lowest African American voter registration in these precincts is 93 and 91 percentages, respectively. The maximum registration is equal to 100 percent.

Thirdly, this precinct study will permit us to see the percentage of the vote in these units for the three statewide offices as African American votes for these candidates. Fourthly, this precinct analysis will provide one with enough cases (N=45) to make a statistical analysis possible and reliable.

Understanding now precinct analysis, the next question deals with the type of statistical technique for an analysis of this election return data. For our study, a bivariate regression analysis has been selected.\textsuperscript{22} This methodological procedure permits one to analyze the relationship of the 1994 vote to the 1998 vote with a correlation measurement. Next, a scatterplot of the correla-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The % Parameters of the 1994 Precincts</th>
<th>The % Parameters of the 1998 Precincts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Value</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Value</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Percent</td>
<td>4,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,378</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from "1994 Fulton County Voter Registration System: Precinct Locator and Summary Total" and "1989 Fulton County Voter Registration System: Precinct Locator and Summary Total." Calculations by authors.
Table 1.2
The Voting Districts Inside Atlanta and the 45 Precincts in the 1994 and 1998 Elections: A Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Voting Districts Inside Atlanta Total Votes</th>
<th>The 45 Precincts Total Votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Governor</td>
<td>60,366</td>
<td>19,854</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Attorney General</td>
<td>39,939</td>
<td>13,657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Commissioner of Labor</td>
<td>54,579</td>
<td>17,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154,884</td>
<td>51,371</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Governor</td>
<td>87,598</td>
<td>26,678</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Attorney General</td>
<td>85,468</td>
<td>26,506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Commissioner of Labor</td>
<td>87,220</td>
<td>26,882</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260,286</td>
<td>80,066</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...tion provides one with the nature of linearity in the relationship as well as identifying any outliers or deviant cases from the scatterplot that could further our understudy of voting behavior.

Overall, this bivariate regression procedure is easier to interpret and it starts at the basic level, the influence of a single independent variable, the 1994 vote. Thus, the resultant interpretation is simple and devoid of the necessary qualifications which evolve from multivariate procedures.

Therefore, the data for this study is the election return data from 45 precincts in Atlanta in 1994 and 1998 and the statistical method is that of the bivariate regression technique.

Finally, how representative are these 45 precincts of the Atlanta voting districts? Table 1.2 compares the total voting districts to the 45 precincts and in so doing provides a sense of the total picture which these 45 precincts form. In 1994, the 45 precincts provided about 33 percent of the total vote cast in the Atlanta voting districts, while in 1998 the 45 precincts provided a little less as it gives us a view of 31 percent of the total vote cast in the Atlanta precincts. In short, the 45 precincts used in this study give at least a third of the voting behavior of the African American electorate in the city.
Table 1.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Mean Turnout</th>
<th>Governor D %</th>
<th>Governor R %</th>
<th>Attorney General D %</th>
<th>Attorney General R %</th>
<th>Commissioner of Labor D %</th>
<th>Commissioner of Labor R %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>19,854 (89%)</td>
<td>2,531 (11%)</td>
<td>13,657 (71%)</td>
<td>5,670 (29%)</td>
<td>17,860 (92%)</td>
<td>1,564 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998*</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>26,678 (94%)</td>
<td>1,376 (5%)</td>
<td>26,506 (95%)</td>
<td>753 (3%)</td>
<td>26,882 (98%)</td>
<td>669 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>6,824 (36%)</td>
<td>-1,155 (46%)</td>
<td>12,849 (49%)</td>
<td>-4,917 (87%)</td>
<td>9,022 (34%)</td>
<td>-895 (57%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* In 1998, a new third party, Reform Party, ran a candidate for Governor and Attorney General but no candidate for office in the other statewide elections. Although the vote for this gubernatorial candidate was 322 votes in the 45 precincts, and 524 votes for the Attorney General candidate. They have been omitted from the table but not the calculations. Calculations prepared by the authors.
African American Voting Behavior in the 1998 Elections: The Atlanta Data

At a glance, one can see African American voting behavior in Atlanta in two midterm elections and compare them by looking at the differences in Table 1.3. In the initial column one can see the mean percentage turnout. The next column gives the actual vote and percentage for the Democratic and Republican candidate for Governor. This is followed by similar data for the party candidates for the Attorney General and Commissioner of Labor posts. In 1984, the Governor got the largest vote total followed by votes for the Commissioner of Labor and the Attorney General. It is the reverse in 1998. Moreover, in 1998, the vote for each post is not only much higher, they are nearly the same. Each party got at least 26,000 votes. Finally, in terms of the differences between the two midterm elections, the Democratic vote increased and the Republican vote decreased across the board. In sum, more African Americans in 1998 voted for the Democratic party and fewer voted for the Republicans.

Table 1.4 presents this reality in a more dramatic fashion. When the data is rank-ordered, African Americans increased their vote for the Attorney General candidate by 49 percent, the Commissioner of Labor by 39 percent and for the Governor by 26 percent. Likewise they decreased the vote for the Republican candidates by substantial margins. In the 1998 election, African American candidates captured the Attorney General and Commissioner of Labor positions for the very first time in the history of the state. From Table 1.4 it is unmistakable what the African American electorate did in 1998.

The 1998 African American Vote, the Scandal and New Potential Variables: An Interpretation

The univariate analysis in Tables 1.3 and Table 1.4 reveals that in 1998 the key variables influencing African American voting behavior were (1) partisanship, i.e., the high Democratic vote, (2) African American empowerment, i.e., high support for African American candidates, (3) binacialism, i.e., high support for the white Democratic governor, (4) values, i.e., justice, as expressed in the huge increase (49 percent) in their vote for the Attorney General candidate and economic needs, i.e., employment, as expressed in the great increase for the Commissioner of Labor vote. Rooks in his 1969 analysis, found the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Democratic Vote and %</th>
<th>Republican Vote and %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
<td>+12,849</td>
<td>-4,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner of Labor</td>
<td>+ 9,022</td>
<td>- 895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>+ 6,024</td>
<td>-1,155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Table 1.3. Calculations by authors
Table 1.5
\( r^2 \) = The Percentage of the 1998 African American Vote Shaped by Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of Vote for Office</th>
<th>( r )</th>
<th>( r^2 )</th>
<th>% of Partisanship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994–1998</td>
<td>% of Gubernatorial Vote</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1998</td>
<td>% of Attorney General Vote</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1998</td>
<td>% of Commissioner of Labor Vote</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


third (3) variable to be present at that time.\(^2\) Jennings and Zeigler found the fourth (4) variable when they uncovered high African American support for moderate white southern candidates.\(^3\) But what we want to explore here are potential new variables arising in the 1998 election amidst a presidential scandal and a changed partisanship context. Hence, let’s turn to our bivariate regression technique to determine the strength of partisanship in the 1998 African American vote.

Election analysts, beginning with Professor Gosnell, have shown that at the collective dimension level, the past partisan vote is the best predictor of the partisan vote in subsequent or future elections. Table 1.5 indicates that partisanship was the highest in the African American vote for the Commissioner of Labor candidate. But here only one-third (33 percent) of that vote was shaped by partisanship. Two-thirds or 67 percent of the African American vote was determined by other variables. In the African American vote for the Attorney General, some 80 percent of that vote was determined by other variables besides partisanship. Here only 20 percent of that vote was shaped by partisanship. And, in the African American vote for the candidate for Governor, where the degree of association is almost nil, partisanship was not a real force in the vote. Therefore, with these wide variations in the role that partisanship played in the 1998 African American vote, what then are the other possible variables? The bivariate regression does not confirm these new variables, it simply tells us that they are there. Yet, there are suggestive clues. One of these clues is that a potential new variable is in the value area.

Several scholars have posited that the African American community in many ways possesses the traits that are most called for in a republican democracy—a heroic pragmatism coupled with the ability to uphold the universal principles of equality and justice. Albert Murray, contemporary of Ralph Ellison and renowned cultural critic in his own right notes,

It is the political behavior of black activists, not that of norm-calibrated Americans, that best represents the spirit of such constitutional norm-ideals as freedom,
justice, equality, fair representation, and democratic processes. Black Americans, not Americans devoted to whiteness, exemplify the open disposition toward change, diversity, unsettled situations, new structures and experience, that are prerequisite to the highest level of citizenship. It is the non-conforming Negro who now acts like the true descendent of the founding Fathers—who cries, "Give me liberty or give me death," and who regards taxation without representation as tyranny.26

Murray notes that if social scientists were to create a survey based on the most important documents of this country (the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence), the African American would be revealed as the most American of all citizens. Although further research is needed in this area, this offers a range of potential variables wrapped up in the desire to both preserve and uplift the very democratic principles this country purports to be founded upon.

The voting behavior of African Americans in this context becomes more than an instrument to restoring their own dignity lost in the negative partisanship environment. Our position is much richer. The voting behavior of African Americans in this context becomes an instrument to restore the dignity and majesty of the democratic process. This cannot be overstated. The literature in the social sciences and humanities is rife with examples of African American deviance and subjugation. Their actions in such accounts are never divorced from their status as subjugated victims. However, it is important to realize that though undoubtedly victimized, and subjugated, African Americans are not victims. As part of the grand human tale, they have the potential not only to assert their own humanity, but in many ways to fight for the humanity of the country as a whole as well.

One of the contextual factors that undoubtedly aided this was the realization from the Democratic party that more must be done to address the African American community. For the first time in recent memory, a strong push was made to contact African Americans through various media agencies such as Black Entertainment Television (BET), as well as various black newspapers and radio stations. The Democratic strategists realized that the turnout was the key, rather than simply the vote. However, it is important to realize that the mobilization argument only deals with half of the picture. Mobilization does not work unless the mobilized population is indeed interested in the course they are being mobilized for. This is where the "standard bear" argument that we make comes in. The Democratic party made an attempt to mobilize African Americans, and this attempt was successful for at least two reasons. The African American population realized first that they had a stake in the upcoming election, particularly given the Republican stances on crime and welfare. Furthermore, they recognized that they had a duty to assert democratic principles and to right what was set wrong. The scandal provided the moment in which these new variables could be expressed.

In analysis of the election, several pundits caught this. Glen Bolger notes the following:

In late October, we noted in our tracking memo for the RNC that African-American interest in the election is higher (46 percent "10's") than White interest (37 percent "10's"). [Also telling] is the percent of the electorate made up of African-
Americans. It increased significantly from 1994. For example, African-American turnout in Georgia increased from 16 percent of the electorate in 1994 to 29 percent in 1998. In Maryland, it went from 12 percent of the voter pool to 21 percent. These turned close gubernatorial contests into blow-outs.27

Bolger noted that the most important issue of this election was honesty/integrity in government. He did not quite make the connection between support for honesty and integrity, and the large African American turnout. However, this factoid indicates further support for our hypothesis. Honesty and integrity are crucial in order to preserve and enhance the democratic project. The fact that the African American population not only turned out, but it was more interested in the proceedings than their white counterparts speaks volumes.

Caught between the demonization of the Republican party and the distancing of the Clinton-led "New Democrats," African American voters can literally plot their own independent course. Hence, the severe decline in their Republican vote suggests a drastic dislike for the party's demonization strategy, while the greater support for the statewide African American candidates who are lower on the state ticket over the gubernatorial candidate at the top28 but with still one-fourth (26 percent) increase for this position indicates that traditional party partisanship and allegiances have not been the type of responses that the community expects and deserves. Thus, the African American vote here is not only a protest vote but is also one of self-reliance and self-determination as well. Therefore, amidst the scandal environment, one does not see a "rally-around-the-President's" party's response but a more sophisticated one where potential new variables come to light. Caught in this vortex, the African American voter demonstrated a new voting behavior and posture. They did not do the expected!

As astute political scientists, we cannot practice the principle "Cover what you Discover" because it results in us contributing to this stalemate wherein activity of the mind as earlier stated "comes to a screeching halt."

Conclusion

From this exploratory analysis, it was discerned that when the partisanship context changes to a negative one with a poor set of voting options and the president because of his scandal mobilizes this electorate to minimize the scandal's impact on the party, the African American voter, where the political context permits, i.e., supports new possibilities, similarly and differently simultaneously. Therefore, we suggest as testable propositions two new potential variables appeared, dignity and respect. Kaplan is correct. From the Atlanta data, new voting patterns did emerge.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 212.

5. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


15. See Table 1.3, and notice the turnout and the actual vote for 1993.


19. Harold Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), pp. 91–125. This study did not include the African American precincts.


25. Jennings & Zeigler, pp. 128, 130, 131, and Table 4 on page 133 and 136. They wrote: "Evidently, Welmer's moderate stand for civil rights struck a much more responsive chord as the proportion Negro increased," p. 128.


28. Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," American Political Science Review Vol. 59 (March 1965). Using election return data shows that as voters move from the candidates at the top of the ticket like the governor to candidate at the middle and bottom of the ticket, there is a steady drop-off in voting. Few and fewer people vote for the candidate below the top. This did not happened here as Table 1.4 reveals.
Black No More: 
Race Construction and the 2000 Census

Clarence Lusane

American University

Once I was a Negro... black as night... devoid of any rights...
Once I was a Negro... but no more... I'm about to join de whites
"Black No More" (Jones, 1995: 45)

Race is Fiction. Racism is Real.
War Against Racism slogan

Introduction

In 1776, coincidentally the year that the Declaration of Independence was written, German scientist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach published On the Natural Variety of Mankind, his treatise on racial classifications that prophetically divided the peoples of the world into five groups. The groups that he defined were the Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, (native) Americans, and Malays. Although his mentor Carolus Linnaeus had constructed a taxonomy of four racial groups based on geographic determinants as early as 1758, it would be Blumenbach who would go down in history as the father of the Enlightenment's racial classifications schematic (Gould, 1994). His geometry of race would forever remap how the world viewed itself, and govern the ongoing debates over race. Blumenbach is also (in)famous for the creation of the label "Caucasian," named after the Caucasus mountain cluster, which lies between Russia and Georgia, because it "produces the most beautiful race of men" (Gould, 1994: 65).

For his time, Blumenbach was considered racially tolerant and enlightened. For instance, he did not think that racial boundaries were impenetrable. Yet, neither did he demonstrate a scientific understanding of the fallacy of race. His arbitrary and ultimately racist grouping of peoples into boxes and creation of an aesthetic hierarchy laid the groundwork for political, scientific, and academic rationalizations for two centuries of global white supremacy. It
would be irrelevant to future scholars of racist dogma that Blumenbach did
not hold to the notion that intellectual or moral capacities were significantly
differentiated or immutable between phenotypically distinct groups of people.
These theories of Eugenics emerged in the age of imperialist expansion and
the racial boundaries that Blumenbach contrived provided the justification
for decades of slavery, colonialism, and mass genocide.

Fast forward 200 years and, unsurprisingly, similar battles are still being
waged over racial categorization and identity. From Canada and Australia
to Brazil and England and beyond, national authorities are attempting to col-
lect population data related to race and ethnicity that rarely or consistently
correspond with popular views and practices, and, in some cases, may be an-
tagonistic. For most nations, the national census is at the center of state and
popular discourses regarding race and ethnicity. While most policy-makers
and scholars agree that the national census is an appropriate and necessary
instrument for such data collection, the census process itself plays a critical
role in the evolution and development of the ever-changing nature of racial
and ethnic categories. As one international conference, whose theme was
should rethink ethnicity in order to come to grips with its intrinsic mallea-
bility, particularly during periods of rapid social change such as the present.”
(“Challenges of Measuring an Ethnic World,” 1992: 4) While greater appreci-
ation of the fluid nature of race and ethnicity is certainly needed, it is ne-
necessary to recognize and acknowledge the constitutive function of the census
in the construction and defining of racial and ethnic categories themselves.

The U.S. Census and Politics of Race

The U.S. 2000 Census has the potential to be the most pivotal ever for de-
defining what constitutes black America. Bloodletting over the method of enu-
meration and groundbreaking changes in the meaning of the racial catego-
ries used by the census portend that, at least officially, what we have histori-
cally thought of as racially "black" may be no more. These changes at the
policy and administrative levels reflect, and perhaps project, racial identifi-
cation changes occurring at the popular level. Driven by large waves of im-
migration, sizable and growing interracial couplings, popularization of mul-
tiracial individuals, post-Cold War reification of individualism, and a vigor-
ous multiracial grassroots movement, racial redefinition is shaping the dis-
course on race as the nation segues into the twenty-first century. President
Clinton’s “One America” racial reconciliation effort, in many ways, is suc-
cumbing to a view of “260 Million Americas.” Changes and challenges at the
popular level can be read as complex and contradictory counter-discourses
to the dominant racial arrangements. As described below, rejection of offi-
cial efforts at racial categorization do not necessarily reflect an overthrow of
deply rooted essentialized conceptions of race and may paradoxically reify
such notions.

It bears emphasizing that the census is the most important document—
the epicenter of official national population data—for a range of political, eco-
nomic, social, and even cultural determinants. The results of the census de-
cide how federal, state and local political and school districts are apportioned
and how the political pie is sliced. Given the recent attacks on majority-minority voting districts by conservatives, an accurate census is vital to the political battles ahead by African Americans and minority legislators and political activists. Additionally, funding, enforcement, and determination eligibility for countless federal programs are determined by census information including the Voting Rights Act, bilingual education, equal employment opportunity, energy assistance, lending practices, child assistance, aid to the elderly and handicapped, transportation projects, low-cost housing, and many other programs (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1988). Elected officials, political parties, business executives, marketers, scholars, researchers, and thousands of non-governmental organizations all employ the census in carrying out their work. The census is indispensable for individuals who wish to do genealogical and family tree research.

Due to insufficient funding, incompetent enumeration, low prioritization, poor outreach, and distrust of census-takers, the black community and other marginalized population clusters have suffered from regular undercounts in the decennial census. This undercount has resulted in less funding for social programs and perhaps unfair construction of political districts. For these reasons alone, African Americans and other minority populations dependent upon an accurate count and consistency in official collection of racial data can ignore the 2000 census only at their own peril.

A more important point to emphasize, however, is that state definitions of race and ethnicity are profoundly influential in shaping academic and popular discourses (and self-identifications) around these identities. Through its juggernaut and official role as an arbitrator of scholarly and popular debates regarding race, the census creates, defines, and establishes boundaries around, and even erases racial categories with an almost invisible and unacknowledged power. While the census may often follow popular convention—as in the case of adopting the appellation “African American”—it also reifies and gives legitimacy to racial categories and labels. It is not the imprimatur of accuracy that is conveyed by the Census for, after all, socially constructed racial groups by definition are fluid and undefinable in any real sense, but rather the census is given an official stamp of approval and contributes to the reinforcement of socially conceived practices and popular belief about races. Given its role as a determinant of federal largesse, the census also conveys, seductively, that it pays literally to lay claim to a particular census-sanctioned racial or ethnic identity whether one actually lives that identity or not. It becomes prudent to lay claim to ancestral ties to a Native American or Hispanic identity, for instance, and it matters little whether one actually conforms to a lifestyle consistent with contemporary cultural or social norms and praxis reflecting that identity.

The relationship between state-determined racial identity and popular perspectives is a dynamic and contested one although the bend is toward the hegemonic power of the former. As noted by law professor Ian F. Haney Lopez (1996), the courts have been a critical and decisive force in drawing the legal line between whites and non-whites. Yet, the pivotal role that law plays in the construction of racial identity has been given inadequate attention although that appears to be changing somewhat with the emergence of theoretical movements such as Critical Race Theory (Crenshaw, et al., 1995).
In a similar way, with a few notable exceptions, the role of the census as an axis of race construction—rather than just a source of contentious battles over inclusion and exclusion—has been largely ignored by most scholars (Lee, 1993: 75–95). This omission in the literature appears at first somewhat surprising given what appears to be an obviously critical manner in which the census reflects, perpetuates, and articulates the instability of race categories. However, it is the normative function of the census itself that conceals its position in manufacturing race. While the elastic quality of race is manifest in the contested relationship between popular culture and official culture, the foundational paradigm of racial existences remains unchallenged. The clash between the popular and the official has resulted in reconstituting but never overthrowing the idea of race. At the same time, the limited categories of race that appear on the census also establish boundaries that, for instance, transform Jamaicans and Nigerians into black Americans, and Chinese and Koreans into Asian Americans.

Popular struggles have led to nomenclature changes that occur regularly on the census although the nomenclature problematic remains permanent. Naming difference has historically been a site of vigorous debate. In the United States, how communities, including whites, have labeled themselves or been labeled by bodies of authority has never been settled for long. This nomenclature problematic has especially affected “minority” groups in the United States. The terms as popularly employed are fluid and imprecise. For the social group currently referred to as African Americans, a number of labels have been used since the pre-colonial period including “African,” “Colored,” “Negro,” “Afro-American,” “Black,” as well as “African American.” In a similar vein, “Hispanic,” “Latino,” and “Chicano,” among others have been used to conflate a wide group of nationalities whose primary basis of unity is the Spanish language and, in some instances, a common history of Spanish colonialism. Even more troubling, the terms “Indian” and “Asian-American,” seek to bring together widely different communities of people whose unity, to the degree it exists at all, is externally generated by the dominant culture. All of these labels embody not only contests over identity, but reflect the deeper core of issues that arise in the effort by oppressed racial and ethnic groups to liberate themselves both internally and externally. This identity yearning has consistently been thwarted by the reality of powerlessness. As Grant and Orr (1996: 148) note, “The frustrating search by blacks for a group designation reflects their continued subordination within the American political and economic system.” This frustration (and search) can be applied to other groups in a similar state of subordination.

It is argued here that state-conceived and state-defined categories of race, in this instance mediated through the census process, play a vital role in the construction and (in)stability of racial identity. Contestation over the census is, therefore, a critical race referent. Across the social, political, and ideological spectrums, the census serves as a frame of reference in the legitimization of dominant racial narratives. In lieu of discredited theories of racial essentialism, The Bell Curve notwithstanding, the census is cited as an undisputed source of scholarly racial and ethnic truths with little resistance to the underlying assumptions that inform the structure and content of its categories, and its function in creating and transforming how we process our ideas about
race. It is the underlying and normative assumptions that give the census its ideological power, a power to erect perspectives, ideas, and even emotions on a range of social concerns including that of race.

A few notes of caution before proceeding further along these lines of analysis. While it is argued here that the census is a generally unacknowledged critical actor in the nation’s racialization process, race construction occurs from many social vectors and one must to be careful never to be overly determinate toward one particular site. Popular culture, historical experiences, institutional socialization, and many other variables, operating at different levels of intensity and influence, contribute to the process. In addition, race construction as a social process develops unevenly and unpredictably. It is not a given that the role of the census is by definition negative or positive and it may oscillate frequently between being a defender and a destabilizer of racial categorization. Finally, the census and other state-controlled procedures and systems, which are simultaneously coercive and ideological in nature, are also consistently contested by the constituencies at which they are targeted.

Racial Identity and the Census

The census has always been a site for racial contestation. In nearly every census since 1790, race has been defined differently, and the inclusion or exclusion of any specific racial group has been contingent on the confluence of the political imperatives of the moment and the balance of power between various social actors. Although it was not until after the Civil War that African Americans were individually counted in the U.S. census, the roots of racial discourse regarding the census are rooted in Article 1, Section 2c of the U.S. Constitution that designated blacks as “three-fifths” of a person for the purpose of determining the number of Representatives that each southern state would be apportioned in the U.S. House of Representatives. (Native Americans were included in the census count but were not part of the calculation for apportionment purposes.) This passage, of course, was the compromise made between northern industrialists and financiers and southern slaveholders over exactly how slaves would be calculated in such a way that did not favor either side. Needless to say, neither slaves nor free blacks were consulted. Then again, neither were most whites. The decision to fashion the nation, in part via the census, as “white” was an elite one, albeit supported by a (white) popular consensus. Political and racial imperatives thus informed the first census and the way it addressed race.

The census and the census process are reflections of the manner in which U.S. racial paradigms and discourse are produced. No instance of census-taking is devoid of the ideological, political, and social issues engulfing the racial politics of the nation. Necessarily, the debate over the census from the beginning was a struggle over racial identity, racial status, and racial power. U.S. nation-building was configured in critical and often decisive ways around the debates regarding slavery, the race issue, and the distribution of economic power. State intervention into these discourses, including the political (and racial) use of the census, was conscious and deliberate.

It was not only a question, as F. James Davis (1991) wrote, of “who is
black?” but also a question, as noted by Ian Haney Lopez (1996), of “who is white?” The “one-drop” rule has functioned to generally define anyone in the United States who has any African heritage—no matter how miniscule—as “black.” This definition had decisive importance for census-takers operating in a monoracial system of racial classifications. The “black” classification has never fully captured all those who are popularly perceived to be black. The “white” classification on the census has also been fluid. Citizens whose phenotype is not “black,” but also not traditionally “white” have often been placed in the “white” box out of expediency. U.S. citizens from the Arab world and the Middle East, for instance, estimated to be about 2.5 million, have been racially categorized by the census as white (Fisher, 1998). What Lopez (1996: 161–162) terms the “constituent assumptions of physicality” have historically determined much of what the census-takers have defined as the racial population. Lopez (161) insightfully argues that the census has treated race as heredity, innate, exclusive, and universal.

It was during the Nixon administration that the modern categories began to form. Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Casper Weinberger ordered the Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE) to develop new standards for classifying race and ethnicity. In 1977, after several years of haggling, the FICE recommendations were adopted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and became known as Statistical Directive 15 (SD15) (Spencer, 1997: 2–3). This rule mandated that all official government documents, including the 1980 Census, would recognize four racial groups: black, white, Asian and Pacific Islander, and American Indian and Alaskan Native. Everyone counted by the Census Bureau or otherwise federally documented would fall into one of these groups. Importantly, Hispanics were to be considered an ethnic group so in addition to being designated ethnically, say, Cuban or Dominican, these individuals were also to be racially classified (Vobeda, 1997). In 1980, many Hispanics did not choose a racial designation.

In 1990, the category “other” was added to the census and was selected by about 10 million people. According to the General Accounting Office, 98 percent of those who choose “other” were Hispanics who concluded that they were neither black nor white (Rodriguez and Gonzales, 1996). Yet, resistance to racial categorization was limited as the majority of Hispanics selected the white box. Only 1.7 million selected black (Edmonson, 1996). For roughly 20 years, with minor tinkers here and there, SD15 was the law of the land.

Background to the 2000 Census

On October 30, 1997, OMB revised the guidelines and standards for the categories to be used in collecting racial and ethnic data. These changes were the result of four years of hearings, recommendations, research, and the establishment of a federal body to manage the whole process: the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards (ICRRES). Thirty federal agencies had representation in ICRRES (O’Hare, 1998). While the decisions to restructure data collection affected all federal entities, perhaps the task most critically affected is the 2000 Census process. OMB will no longer refer to their racial categories directive as “OMB Statistical Policy.
Directives 15. The new policy is now called “Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.”

Given the minimum attention to the census by most black leaders and activists, Wade Henderson, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, is prescient in calling the 2000 Census the “sleeper civil rights issue” (Merida, 1997: 22). Embedded in the distribution and allocation of $108 billion in federal spending are civil rights enforcement mechanisms. While the black community, as a whole, has been slow to weigh in on the debates around the 2000 Census, plenty of other players have entered the game. Beyond the usual issues that surround the census, two controversial concerns arose regarding the 2000 Census that mobilized activists both left and right: the Clinton administration’s proposal to use statistical sampling to address the undercount issue, and changes in the content of the racial categories and recipient-selection options.

Who To Count On

Population undercount has always plagued the census. (See Table 1.) This has resulted in an inaccurate enumeration of the population, as well as costing those undercounted communities—disproportionately the poor, children, and people of color—millions of dollars in federal aid. Criticisms by affected communities and improved methods led to a steady drop in the number of those missed from 1940 to 1980. In 1990, however, this trend saw a reversal.

The 1990 Census produced the largest undercount in recent history. According to the Census Bureau, 5.0 percent of Hispanics of all races, 4.4 percent of African Americans, 3.1 percent of Asian Pacific Islanders, 12.2 percent of Native Americans on reservations, and only 0.7 percent of non-Hispanic whites, were missed in the count (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997: 4). Children, disproportionately poor and of color, were more than half of those not counted (52 percent). The homeless and rural renters were also undercounted. Many prisoners, especially African American, were miscounted. Black prisoners are disproportionately located in rural areas (where most prisons are placed) and counted in those populations rather than counted as part of urban enclaves where they usually reside when not incarcerated. According to one estimate, there were 26 million errors in the 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers (in millions)</th>
<th>Numbers (in percent)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>7.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Census that contributed to the undercount. An estimated four million people were double counted in addition to the 8–9 million that were missed (Cummings, 1998: A5). According to the Census Bureau (1998: 2) itself, "For the first time since the Census Bureau began conducting post-census evaluations in 1940, the decennial census was less accurate than its predecessor. In spite of unprecedented efforts to count everyone, accuracy in the 1990 Census fell short of the accuracy achieved in the 1980 Census" (emphasis in the original).

New York, like many states and urban areas that recognized that it was losing federal funds due to the census undercount, sued the Commerce Department to force it to adjust its figures according to its own determination that it had missed thousands of state residents, particularly in New York City. Despite the confessed irregularities and problems, in 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Department of Commerce vs. New York that the Secretary of Commerce did not have to adjust figures from the 1990 Census. That decision meant that many communities across the nation did not and would not receive their fair share of federal resources.

Exacerbating the potential black undercount for 2000 are important demographic and social changes. For example, dislocation from public housing—through evictions, demolition, or under-use—is creating a nomadic cohort of African Americans that few researchers have shown any will or capacity to track (Burgess, 1998: 3). The Census Bureau vowed that it would do everything possible to ensure an accurate and full count for 2000.

Clinton, Congress, and the Census

In 1996, the Clinton administration proposed that a more innovative and efficacious method be employed in the 2000 Census. On February 28, 1996, the Census Bureau submitted "The Plan for Census 2000," which called for statistical sampling procedures to be employed in the 2000 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997). The plan proposed reaching 90 percent of the population through traditional enumeration efforts and then doing a statistical calculation on the remaining 10 percent. An additional 750,000 households would later be sampled directly as a check on the accuracy of the statistical sampling. It was argued that not only would these methods generate a more accurate count, but they would also be more cost-effective. Conducting the census is expensive. In 1990, it cost $2.6 billion. If the same methods were to be used in the 2000 Census, the projected costs would be $7.2 billion. Congress, however, only allocated $4 billion. The administration argued that the only way to reduce the cost down to $4 billion and get a more accurate count was to use advanced statistical methods, the same ones that are used to calculate the nation's employment rate and the GNP (Cummings, 1998: A5).

The sampling issue quickly polarized, and the debate in Congress became especially sharp. Both sides recognized that the Democrats would be the likely beneficiaries of a more accurate census count. Black Congressmembers, in particular, spoke out for sampling. Those for sampling, beyond the administration and Democrats, included the NAACP, Leadership Council on Civil Rights, National Association of Elementary School Principals, Black Leadership Forum, and many other groups representing constituencies that had been
undercounted in previous censuses. In opposition was the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee ("Sampling in the 2000 Census," 1997) that referred to the proposal as "the highly uncertain process of statistical sampling." Also, on the other side were conservative individuals and institutions such as columnist George Will, anti-tax movement leader Grover Norquist, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, American Conservative Movement, Americans for Tax Reform, the Eagle Forum, Small Business Survival Committee, Law Enforcement Alliance of America (which was founded with financial aid from the National Rifle Association) and the Latham and Watkins law firm (which filed suit on behalf of Newt Gingrich) among others (Vobejda, 1998a).

Conservatives complained that the Democrats could not be trusted not to misuse the numbers that came from sampling. George Will attempted to link Clinton and sampling with other issues heralded by the right. He wrote (1998), "This is a White House that had no scruples about getting the Immigration and Naturalization Service to drop criminal checks on applicants for citizenship so that more Democrats could be naturalized in time for the 1996 election: why would it suddenly develop scruples about adjusting census numbers for political purposes?"

In addition to implying that the Clinton administration can not be trusted to not use sampling for partisan purposes, conservative opposition has also focused on the constitutionality of the procedure. Sampling foes contend that "actual enumeration," as stated in Article 1, Section 2c of the Constitution, means that the population must be counted one-by-one, and anything different from that is a constitutional violation ("Sampling in the 2000 Census," 1997). This assertion was a gross and opportunistic misinterpretation of the Constitution which, in fact, does not (obviously) detail how the census enumeration is to occur. In any case, the United States has grown considerably and it has become impractical, if not impossible, to attempt to count the population "one-by-one."

Carping by the conservatives also conflicts with the opinions of experts. A panel of scholars and researchers established by the National Academy of Sciences argued that not only should sampling occur, but that without it, the 2000 Census will be less accurate than the 1990 one. The panel concluded, "It is fruitless to continue trying to count every last person with traditional census methods of physical enumeration. Simply providing additional funds to enable the Census Bureau to carry out the 2000 Census using traditional methods, as it has in previous censuses, will not lead to improved coverage or data quality" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1997: 7). Simply put, statistical sampling will reduce costs, limit the harm of non-responsiveness, and increase accuracy, particularly in the area of minority undercount. Indeed, none of these things will happen without a radical change in how enumeration is carried out. Without sampling, the number of minority citizens enumerated in the 2000 Census will fall far short of the actual size of the population.

On August 24, 1998, a three-judge panel, two of whom were appointed by President Reagan (Royce C. Lamberth and Douglas H. Ginsburg) and one who was appointed by President Clinton (Ricardo M. Urbina), decided unanimously that statistical sampling for the 2000 Census would be illegal (Vobejda, 1998b). Although the suit, filed by congressional Republicans, sought to ar-
gue that sampling was unconstitutional, the judges contended that the suit violated the Census Act which governs how the Census Bureau carries out the census process. The constitutionality of sampling was not addressed in the lower court decision. On September 9, 1998, three weeks later, the Supreme Court announced that it would take up the issue in its 1998–1999 session (Carelli, 1998).

In January 1999, the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, ruled that the Census Bureau could not use sampling or other statistical methods to conduct the 2000 Census, almost certainly delivering a death blow to obtaining a more accurate census than in 1990. The ruling was based on statutory rather than constitutional grounds giving supporters of statistical sampling a small opening for legislative relief. However, given the Republican dominance in Congress, there was little doubt that the Court’s decision would stand. The narrowness of the ruling left open the possibility of using statistical methods in the construction of legislative districts within states, and in determining population counts for the purpose of distribution of federal funds. All of which has led to the likelihood that two sets of numbers will emerge from Census 2000 (Vobejda, 1999).

Race in Transition

Historically, a dizzyingly range of racial options have appeared on the U.S. Census. (See Table 2.) For example, between 1870 and 1910, following the Civil War, the categories “mulatto,” “octoroon,” and other labels were occasionally used on the census to identify those of mixed racial heritage. This enumeration occurred during a time when interracial marriage was illegal in many states including virtually all southern states. While some mixed-raced children were born of voluntary unions, many were the result of rapes and unwarranted sexual liaisons, particularly in the South. Despite the census designation, being mixed had little social capital. Although the division between black and black-white mixed-raced individuals may have carried some social weight within the African-derived community, particularly regarding class distinctions, the practical reality was that whites popularly viewed anyone who was not white as black or “other.” The “one-drop” rule operated on a popular as well as legal scale (Davis, 1991).

Yet, the census was an important element in the legal and official discourses of race. Many of those who have held the power to decide how citizens would be counted and with what methods have often held repugnant racial views. In 1911, Walter Francis Wilcox, at one time the Census Bureau’s chief statistician, wrote, “Mentally the Negro is inferior to the white... the mental constitution of the Negro is very similar to that of a child, normally good-natured and cheerful, but subject to sudden fits of emotion and passion during which he is capable of performing acts of singular atrocity, impressionable, vain, but often exhibiting in the capacity of servant a dog-like fidelity which has stood the supreme test.” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995: 430–439) Wilcox’s views were consistent with many decades of racial myopia that informed the census process.

Following the 1920 Census, the last one to include the “mulatto” category, the Census Bureau gave very explicit instructions to census-takers regard-
Table 2
Historic Overview of Changing Racial Classifications on the U.S. Census Form
1870–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Classifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>White, Black, Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>White, Black, Indian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>White, Black, Mulatto, Quadroon, Octoroon, Indian, Chinese, Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>White, Black, Indian, Chinese, Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>White, Black, Mulatto, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>White, Black, Mulatto, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>White, Negro, Mexican, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>White, Negro, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>White, Negro, American Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>White, Negro, American Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Aleut, Eskimo, Other, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>White, Negro or Black, Indian (American), Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>White, Black or Negro, Indian (American), Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, Hawaiian, Guamanian, Samoan, Eskimo, Aleut, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>White, Black or Negro, Indian (American), Eskimo, Aleut, Asian or Pacific Islander, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, Samoan, Guamanian, Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>White, Black, African American or Negro, American Indian or Alaska, Native, Asian Indian, Japanese, Native Hawaiian, Chinese, Korean, Guamanian or Chamorro, Filipino, Vietnamese, Samoan, Other Asian, Other Pacific Islander</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ing how to racially classify mixed-race citizens. According to its Enumerator's Reference Manual, "Report 'Negro' for Negroes and for persons of mixed white and Negro parentage... A person of mixed Indian and Negro blood should be returned as a Negro, unless the Indian blood definitely predominates... Mixtures of non-white races should be reported according to the race of the father" (Kennedy, 1990: 47–48). There are several interesting points to note about these instructions. First, census-takers were imbued with tremendous, indeed, determinant power in defining the nation's racial landscape. The phrase "unless the Indian blood definitely predominates" meant that it was essentially left to the determination of the census-taker with the implication that self-identification carried little weight. In fact, the Manual states explicitly, "The race question is answered by the enumerator from observation" (Kennedy, 1990: 48). Second, the category "white" is to be protected at all
costs. Virtually no combination of mixture transports one into the white race. Thus the ideological thrust of the census becomes apparent along these lines. Third, strict definitions employed by the Census highlight the contested nature of the categories.

Prior to the 1960s, the existence of multiracial individuals animated major inconsistencies in the definition of who was in what racial category for the purposes of census enumeration, the enforcement of segregation laws, and anti-miscegenation ordinances. State constitutions defined race in ways quite distinct from federal codes. (See Table 3.) In Alabama, the state argued that Negro included mulatto. Colorado and Delaware made a distinction between Negroes and mulattos. In Arkansas, it was stated that “persons in whom there is a visible and distinct admixture of African blood shall be deemed to belong to the African race; all others shall be deemed to belong to the white race.” Georgia went in the other direction and attempted to define white by stating “The term ‘white person’ shall include only persons of the white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in their veins.” Louisiana had perhaps the most complex and convoluted definition of race. It had five categories of non-whites: Negro (three-fourths or more Negro blood); Griffe (half-Negro, half-mulatto); Mulatto (half-Negro, half-white); Quadroon (one-fourth Negro, three-fourths white); and Octofoon (one-eighth Negro, seven-eighths white) (Kennedy, 48–50).

A Middle Passage?

These tortured ways of defining race served the purpose of never completely erasing a middle-race strata in the United States. While not functioning exactly the same as Latin America’s well-known “mulatto escape hatch,” some mixed-race, Latino, or black individuals, whose skin was light enough, could and did simply pass into whiteness, abandoning their non-white heritage and lifestyle for the opportunities and security that were perceived to be held by whites. This was a form of what Fanon (1967: 111) termed “denigrification” where it would be “possible for the miserable Negro to whiten himself and thus to throw off the burden of that corporeal malediction.”

Many mixed-race individuals sought, on their own volition, to mobilize and organize themselves into a social force. In the North, multiracial people and interracial couples sought to codify their identity and there were several waves of multiracial organizing, particularly, the “club” movement. As has been the case in a number of periods, black soldiers came home from war with non-black wives. According to researcher Jon Michael Spencer, a number of support organizations were created over time to help with the adjustment process faced by returning veterans and their new brides. This included the Manassa Society (1890), Penguin Club (1936), Club Internationale (1947), Club Miscangement (circa 1950), and Club of Tomorrow (circa 1950) (Spencer, 1997: 17). While it is unclear to what degree feministic ideology was a factor in these endeavors, given the time periods and configuration of black male/non-black immigrant female, these efforts demonstrate the resistance to monoracial categorization throughout U.S. history.
Table 3
State Definitions of Black Prior to 1960s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>one drop of Negro blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>one drop of Negro blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ascertainable non-white blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Appreciable admixture of Black ancestry and one-sixteenth of Negro blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>Appreciable admixture of Negro blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>a person of Negro descent to the third generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Appreciable amount of Negro blood and one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>all persons of African descent/white race shall include all other persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>one-fourth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>one-eighth of Negro blood/heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Mulattos, mestizo and their descendants, having any blood of the African race in their veins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>all persons of mixed blood descended from Negro ancestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Mulattos, quadroons, or octoroons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Ascertainable any Negro blood with not more than one-sixteenth Native American ancestry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Recently, the growth in the number of multiracial individuals and families has sprouted a movement of social, cultural, and political dimensions. Multiracial coupling in the United States has increased significantly since 1970 when there were an estimated 310,000 interracial marriages. By 1990, the number had grown to 1.2 million, a growth of 365 percent (Piana, 1995: 11). Six years later, there were “1.3 million married couples in which the race of the husband was different from that of the wife [and] 1.5 million couples where a Hispanic was married to someone not of Hispanic origin.” (O’Hare, 1998) At the same time, there were 2.6 million children who lived in married-couple houses where the parents were of different races or where a Latino was married to a non-Latino (1998). While this growth has been substantial, it is important to put the numbers in perspective. Relative to the instances of mar-
riage overall, interracial marriages make up less than 3 percent of all U.S. married couples (Spiegler, 1994).

Cultural manifestations of multiraciality abound. Autobiographies, WEB sites, videos and films, magazines, novels, and dating services are only a few of the culturally expressed multiracialisms that flourish in the 1990s. Much of the literature emerging in this field evince highly personal experiences and perspectives. Recent works, such as Black, Jewish and Interracial: It's Not the Color of Your Skin, but the Race of Your Kin (Azoulay, 1997); Of Many Colors: Portraits of Multiracial Families (Kaesar, Gillespie, and Valentine, 1997); Half and Half Writers Growing Up Biracial and Bicultural (O'Hearn, 1998); As We Are Now: Mixblood Essays on Race and Identity (Penn, 1998); Notes of a White Black Woman: Race, Color, and Community (Scales-Trent, 1995), and other books, explicate the angst and anguish visited upon individuals and families who find themselves betwixt and between the spaces separating races in the United States. This state of liminality creates a social burden of racial displacement that the multiracial movement attempts to address (Turner, 1984: 19–41).

The multiracial movement took contemporary political form, beginning in the 1980s, when it began to lobby for a new “multiracial” category to be put on the census and other government documents that would allow respondents to choose that designation rather than one of the official monoracial four. Groups, such as Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally), Association of MultiEthnic Americans, and many conservative activists, contended that choosing the “other” category, which was included on the 1990 Census, was a dehumanizing insult and a denial of people’s multiracial heritage. For some on the right, as Crenshaw (1997) has noted, support for a multiracial category is part of a larger agenda to implement a conservative “color-blindness” that eliminates racial categories without addressing racism. As House Speaker Newt Gingrich (1997) declared in June 1997, “We must break down rigid racial classifications. A first step could be to add a ‘multiracial’ category to the census and other government forms to begin to phase out the outdated, divisive, and rigid classification of Americans as ‘blacks’ or ‘whites’ or other single races. Ultimately, our goal is to have one classification—‘American.’” This subversive tactic on the part of Gingrich and others is consistent with the conservative ideology of individual rights being privileged over group rights, and using the rhetoric of colorblindness to turn back the clock on civil rights. By happenstance (perhaps), Project RACE’s headquarters is located in Gingrich’s district.

Project RACE, the most active group around the issue, has members in forty-two states and in four countries (Project RACE, 1998). The group has had some success at the state level and received support from a number of governors including Governors Lawton Chiles (R-FL), Jim Edgar (R-IL), John Engler (R-MI), Parris Glendenning (D-MA), James Hunt (D-NC), Zell Miller (D-GA), and George Voinovich (R-OH). Governor Glendenning, for instance, signed House Bill 253 into law, effective July 1, 1998, that allows respondents to choose more than one racial category and includes instructions that multiracial respondents may select all applicable categories (Project RACE, 1998).

The relationship between Project RACE and the civil rights movement, which has vigorously opposed adding the multiracial category, has been
wholly antagonistic. Project RACE's executive director and president Susan Graham (Project RACE, 1998) equates the NAACP with the Ku Klux Klan, both of whom are viewed as using and engaging in "racially regressive words and actions [that] threaten our basic right to self-identification." Graham, who is white, is married to a black man.

Whites and mixed-raced individuals are not the only ones who support changes in racial classification. Some black scholars continue to advocate that racial categories should be eliminated completely from the census. Sociologist Orlando Patterson (1997: 173) argues that the term and category of "race," in any usage, "should be banished from the census questionnaire immediately." The growth of black Caribbean and African immigrants will ensure that the debate within the "black" community will continue to evolve and be multiplexed.

As to be expected, civil rights groups and black elected officials vehemently oppose the creation or addition of any other categories because they believe that such a move dilutes black political and demographic power as many blacks would potentially choose the "multiracial" category without an appreciation or grasp of the significance of keeping the number of blacks or other minority groups relatively high. NAACP president Kweisi Mfume (1998) criticized the movement to create a multiracial category as an effort to make a personal statement. He asked, "Is the Census form the correct place to make such personal (and sometimes political) statement about one's racial makeup?" His fear was that, with the possibility of perhaps 70 percent or more of African Americans having some mixed heritage, a mixed-raced category would seriously diminish the black count and affect negatively everything from electoral representation to federal urban assistance.

Resistances to multiracial identity among African Americans is also rooted in a history of interracial rape against black women. The present generation of multiracial activists disconnect from this past and the memories that echo through thousands of black families. They fail to recognize the critical role that remembrances play in social identity construction. While many African Americans acknowledge a mixed heritage, they do not necessarily embrace it. In part, this is due to the fact that most African Americans do not live a mixed-race existence or are not viewed as such by either themselves or the larger society. From Louis Farrakhan to Colin Powell, and millions more, skin hue is a heritage marker and racial mixture is obvious. At the same time, history and the social praxis of race eliminate space, except in limited and generally class-determined ways, for a functional mixed-race existence.

Opposition to a multiracial category has also come from quarters other than the black community. Among the non-black civil rights groups who are critical of the multiracial category are the Chinese for Affirmative Action, La Raza, and MECHA (Movimiento Estudiantil de Chicanos en Aztlán). These communities also see the danger of diminishing numbers.

Advocates for a multiracial category have a point in criticizing the uselessness of the "other" category that was employed for the 1990 Census. It contributed little useful information and was, in a sense, a dumping ground for those who could not be effectively categorized within the U.S. racial typography. The "other" category simply created another racial group—"other"—
without clarifying the exact racial character of the multiple others. The term does not indicate how people are multiracial, that is, what combinations of racial mix are actually happening. In a similar way, to add the multiracial category creates perhaps a more digestible label, but reproduces the same problems as “other.” A newly fabricated multiracial race category would maintain no social currency, and only has the potential to further muddy already muddied waters. The term “multiracial” generates more confusion than clarity according to field research done by the Census Bureau. Tests demonstrated that the term “multiracial” was puzzling to many respondents while yielding no useful information. If the term “multiracial” had been used on the 1990 Census, according to the Census Bureau, it is likely that a very small number of individuals, perhaps less than 2 percent based on the 1990 data collection, would have actually selected it (Fisher, 1998).

Groups who oppose the “multiracial” category acknowledge the theoretical and philosophical contradictions that are inherent in their position. In effect, they are supporting the use of race in the long battle to end race as a determinant factor in social life. However, they correctly contend that it is not the labels and language of race that determines racism, but the reverse. To provide an opportunity for further racial entanglement, particularly for a category with little historic aggrievement or claim to reparations, does more harm than good. The degree to which multiracial individuals are oppressed has to do with the degree to which they are perceived to be non-white, not multiracial. According to Brandeis University professor Ibrahim K. Sundiata (1995: 14), “The manipulation of the ‘Coloured’ (mixed race) category by South Africa’s former apartheid regime should stand as a caveat to those who would advocate its introduction here.”

The decision to allow respondents to the 2000 Census to “select all that apply” will also destabilize racial categories as we know them. The new guidelines created five categories: (1) American Indian or Native Alaskan; (2) Black or African American; (3) Asian; (4) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; and (5) white. Latino designation falls under a separate category, “Hispanic or not Hispanic.” Respondents can choose Black, White, and Asian (ala Tiger Woods) if they so desire. The Census Bureau plans to use sophisticated computer techniques for eventually disaggregating the number of people who fall into particular racial groups for the purposes of funding and other legislative and policy requirements. Critically, the Hispanic question will appear before the race question in an effort to reduce the number of Latinos who neglected to respond to the race category because they believed that Hispanic is viewed as a race rather than an ethnic designation. For the 1990 Census, many Hispanic wrote-in “Hispanic” or “Latino” under “other” in the race category. As Yzaguirre and Perez (1995: 7) observed, “[M]any Hispanics, especially those who are not U.S.-mainland born, have difficulty classifying themselves by race.”

Under the old guidelines with four racial categories plus other, there were five possible choices. With the option to choose as many racial categories as one feels necessary, there are sixty-four possible combinations. When the Hispanic and non-Hispanic category is added to the mix, there are 128 possible combinations of racial and ethnic constructions.

While the new system allows for more data to be collected, it initiates a
range of complications in tabulations, counting, and making final decisions on who is exactly in what race. Virtually any tabulation process will either overcount or undercount racial groups. If only those who solely select black (or white, etc.) are counted, respondents who choose, for instance, black and Native American will be missed resulting in a "black" undercount. On the other hand, if the decision to choose everyone who selects any category into the count for each racial group, the numbers will add up to well over 100 percent because many will be doubly or triply counted. This is only the beginning of the problem.

It also became nearly impossible to do comparative analysis because the baseline shifts dramatically between the 2000 Census and all the previous censuses. Pre-testing demonstrated that many African Americans and probably not a few whites will change their selection choices from the 1990 Census. Predictions about the growth of particular racial groups are predicated on the racial categories that existed for the 1990 Census. It is likely that racial groups will shrink as many who chose a single category in 1990 will select several in 2000. There is some indication that there may not be a big crossover. According to a 1996 Census Bureau test run, fewer than 2 percent stated that they would select more than one racial category for the upcoming census (Stoneman, 1998). Even 2 percent, however, would be a significant number of individuals. It is also difficult to predict the state of race relations at the moment that the 2000 Census is delivered creating another variable that could influence racial self-identification. In an official sense, if someone who was "solely" black (or white, Asian, or Native American) on the 1990 Census, selects more than one race on the 2000 Census, they will, in effect, be black no more.

Conclusion

Though perhaps not obvious, the enumeration of races is a critical factor in shaping racial identity and the national discourse on race. First, racial groups exist in relation to each other and, therefore, size matters. To the degree groups see themselves as "minorities" or "majority" influences a sense of racial status and racial power. This is why African Americans and Latinos bristle at being called minorities, a term felt to be negative. Second, to be undercounted limits and diminishes a group's real capacity to influence public policy and political systems. Third, an accurate count (or at least the perception of accuracy) assists in the formation of community consciousness. Fourth, to reduce the numbers of a racially oppressed group, without reducing racism, helps to rationalize the elimination of racially structured remedial programs that are critical not only to material sustenance, but also to social worth and self-worth.

As the panic of an epic undercount looms, the Census Bureau and others search for strategies. The Bureau plans to spend about $100 million in advertisement for the 2000 Census (Cummings, 1998). The NAACP and other groups are also planning massive outreach efforts to convince African Americans and other traditionally undercounted constituencies to return their census forms and cooperate with census-takers. Opponents of the census' racial categories are advocating that respondents sabotage the process by either re-
fusing to select any racial designation, selecting all that are available, check anything but black, or do not return the census forms at all (Bryd, 1998: 12–13). The motivation behind this call is the recognition of the boundary problematic inherent in the fabrications that we call racial groups. Regardless of which side is most effective, the 2000 Census, as in the past, has become a battleground for the nation’s unresolved racial neurosis.

This view elides, however, the social reality of racism in its individual, institutional, internal, social, and cultural forms. U.S. society continues to revolve around broad racial disparities that will not evaporate simply by retiring the use of racial categories. Shadow becomes form through the prism of inequities. The fiction of race is buttressed by the reality of racism; eradication of the latter is the necessary condition for the elimination of the former. That the census, as a state-mediated fulcrum of racial negotiation, contributes to our notions and definitions of race seems obvious. That this process, like our irrational notion of race, is contested turf is not. The ultimate erosion of racial categories will pivot on the overthrow of racism. In summing up the endurance of racial categories and the struggles they generate, to echo the words of Marc Anthony, the fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves.

References


WEB Sites


Presidential Advocacy of Welfare Reform: From Roosevelt to Clinton

Cheryl M. Miller

University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Introduction

The call for “welfare reform” is as close to being a mantra in policy and political discourse as any term coined this century. Although its meaning is variable and unclear, like much political language, its currency has ranged from the mouths of disgruntled citizens to the campaign rhetoric and speeches of institutional elites like presidents. In bemoaning the failure of America’s traditional welfare programs, Presidents Ronald Reagan and William Clinton coined two of the most evocative phrases in the welfare reform lexicon. Reagan’s “welfare queen” metaphor and Clinton’s “end welfare as we know it” pledge captured and reflected public sentiment. These words depict the gradual erosion of political and public support for traditional welfare programs. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (P.L. 104–193) is the manifestation of this disillusionment.

By traditional welfare we refer to the means-tested public assistance programs like Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, and Food Stamps. The AFDC program has perhaps been the most frequent target of reform rhetoric.\(^1\) Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), a federal grant-in-aid for cash assistance to poor families, replaced fairly restrictive state-run widowed mothers’ pensions (Handler, 1995:22–25). Only twenty-states operated such pensions at that time (Bussiere, 1997:64). In the early 1960s ADC was expanded and had a name change to AFDC (Skocpol, 1995:137). According to Joel Handler, “although there are many assistance programs for the poor, when people say ‘welfare,’ they mean Aid to Families with Dependent Children” (1995:1). Likewise, others have noted “the narrowing of the debate over the welfare state to AFDC” (Block et al., 1987:48). When AFDC was enacted in 1935, mothers receiving aid for their children were primarily white widows (Bussiere, 1997:74–76).
The objection to the later AFDC program was that most of the mothers were “able-bodied” and could work. Also, as AFDC’s composition changed to include more never-married and minority females, public and political opposition to welfare increased (Gilens, 1996:594).

This article examines presidential rhetoric and advocacy in calls for welfare reform. Use of the presidential office to promote policy goals is a function taken on by presidents even before Theodore Roosevelt used the “bully pulpit” in his push for economic democracy (Smith, 1994:33–38). Going public, in an age of mass media, is one of a president’s most potent informal powers (Kernell, 1986; Campbell and Jamison, 1990; Gelderman, 1997). Through the use of direct public appeals a president can seek to direct, not just facilitate change (Edwards, 1997:327). Presidential speeches are a primary mechanism of making public appeals. While a number of case studies document the role of specific presidents in proposing and initiating welfare reform (Burke, 1974; Anderson, 1978, ch. 8; Lynn, 1981; Ellwood, 1996; O’Connor, 1998), there is little empirical research that explores or substantiates the extent to which this institutional elite has exerted executive leadership in welfare reform.

Presidential scholars have noted the potential of chief executives to garner support for their policy preferences through persuasive public communications and rhetoric (Mervin, 1995; Edwards, 1997; Gelderman, 1997). In numerous instances presidents have used the bully pulpit to pursue policy initiatives. These include the following examples: Franklin Roosevelt’s selling of the New Deal in his radio speeches to the American public (Rozell, 1997:90–91), Lyndon Johnson’s advocacy of a War on Poverty in his State of the Union addresses, and Ronald Reagan’s evil empire speeches to gain increased defense and Strategic Defense Initiative funding (Tulis, 1987:197–203). Clearly, presidents are not always able to marshal favorable public opinion. Recent examples from the Clinton administration support this observation.2

A president’s bully pulpit is used at its maximum advantage when:

1. It addresses a topic of transcendent moral significance,
2. It has an audience appeal beyond short-term self-interest,
3. The president is willing to use his energies and eloquence for a cause in which he may fail. (Smith, 1994:46).

Welfare reform, as a policy issue, has shown both moral consequence and continuing appeal. But, to what extent have presidents gone public in their views on this issue? We hypothesize that presidents, given their national constituency, are likely to have articulated their views and policy preferences in the enduring public debate about welfare and welfare reform. How attractive has welfare reform been as a policy issue? We ask with what frequency, in what vein, and to what extent have presidents used the “rhetorical presidency” in this regard since the ushering in of the limited American welfare state in 1935?3
Data and Methods

As the raw material to answer these questions we use the two most formal speeches of presidents—inaugural and state of the union addresses. There are very few domestic policy issues about which presidents go directly to the public. Or, have a guaranteed national audience in doing so. Therefore, we chose these speeches as a good starting point to examine the frequency and content of presidential rhetoric about welfare. This assessment will provide insight into the importance presidents have placed on welfare policy as an issue to take to the public and an issue to be addressed by institutional elites. Although both speeches serve symbolic and ceremonial functions, typically inaugural addresses lay down the principles which will guide a new administration and state of the union addresses describe how these principles will be reflected in legislative initiatives (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990:73–74). Though the principal audience of inaugural addresses is the American people and Congress is the principal audience of state of the union addresses, both speeches are regularized rituals in which a president has the opportunity to inform, influence, and persuade a national audience.

Since George Washington, presidents have delivered an inaugural address after taking the oath of office. Typically this speech is used to lay out a political philosophy, challenge the country to pursue certain goals, and promote unity. That presidents give a State of the Union address before Congress “from time to time...and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” is constitutionally mandated in Article II, Section 3. This address is thus one of the best opportunities for a president to advance his policy preferences and “compared to most presidential discourse, the State of the Union address is a carefully constructed, conscious statement of true presidential priorities” (Moen, 1988:116). By tradition, these speeches have been annual, delivered in person since Franklin Roosevelt, and covered by the electronic media since Harry Truman (Congressional Quarterly, 1989:575).

The variation in these two addresses ranges from those focused on a few legislative initiatives to speeches which are disjointed laundry lists (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990:53; Tulis, 1987:143). Given their extensive coverage in the electronic and print media, the two addresses are effective ways for a president to apprise and appease national interest in his plans and goals. While these addresses do not constitute the universe of public messages, addresses, statements, and speeches a president has at his disposal to appeal to and influence citizens and Congress, they are certainly among the most proactive, visible, and influential.

We conducted a keyword search of inaugural (N=16) and state of the union addresses (N=62) from 1935 to 1997 for all occurrences of the term welfare or the related terms public assistance, AFDC, food stamps, and poverty. 4 In addition, all of Franklin Roosevelt’s addresses and state of the union addresses beginning with Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 were read in their entirety to control for cases where the keywords might not capture relevant substantive content. This process yielded four inaugural and thirty-four state of the union addresses where welfare, or a related term, occurred at least once and was related to domestic welfare policy. These “welfare” passages, which in most
cases constituted a small portion of the address, were then analyzed for frequency and substantive content.

The Presidency and Welfare Reform: Empirical Results

Frequency of Welfare Rhetoric

Have welfare policy and welfare reform been themes in formal presidential addresses? Figure 1 shows that state of the union speeches were significantly utilized by presidents to speak to the public about welfare policy. Only one-quarter of the inaugural addresses contained remarks about welfare. Given the epideicitic and contemplative nature of inaugural addresses, compared to the more deliberative function of state of the union speeches, we might expect fewer comments in inaugural addresses. Conversely, more than half of the state of the union speeches contained welfare policy remarks. Granted the tendency of presidents to use state of the union addresses to speak to persistent national problems, like unemployment, inflation, war, and civil rights, it is not surprising that welfare received more attention in these speeches (Campbell and Janieson, 1990:55–60).

Figure 1
Percent of Addresses since 1935 with Welfare Remarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inaugural Addresses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without Welfare Remarks 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Welfare Remarks 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of the Union Addresses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without Welfare Remarks 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Welfare Remarks 55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Figure 2 reveals, presidential comments on welfare are more of a post-1970 phenomenon. If we take as a landmark the 1960s explosion of social welfare programs ushered in by Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society, we might expect to see more presidential attention to welfare policy in post-1970 speeches. Indeed, two-thirds of the state of the union welfare remarks occurred after 1970, and more than one-third post-1980. This trend is consistent with the rising perception of welfare as a problem reflected in public opinion polling since 1970 (Anderson, 1978: ch. 3). Similarly, with the exception of Franklin Roosevelt's 1937 address, all other inaugural address occurrences were after 1970.

Table 1 lists the thirty-eight formal addresses with welfare remarks by president and prominent themes. Eleven presidents have used their bully pulpit in this way. An analysis of Table 1 shows that most of the pre-Richard Nixon welfare comments relate to program justification and expansion. The progression ranges from Franklin Roosevelt's 1935 State of the Union remarks on the need for temporary relief for the poor and unemployed, through Johnson's poverty eradication theme, found in his 1964, 1967, 1968, and 1969 State of the Union addresses. In these early addresses, only Dwight

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**Figure 2**

**Distribution of Addresses with Welfare Reform Remarks, by Decade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Inaugural Addresses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of State of the Union Addresses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=4

N=34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President (Party)</th>
<th>Year and Type of Address</th>
<th>Welfare Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt (D)</td>
<td>1935 SOU</td>
<td>set-up relief program, warning that relief should be temporary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt (D)</td>
<td>1936 SOU</td>
<td>continued need for relief for the needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt (D)</td>
<td>1937 IA</td>
<td>provide for those who have too little</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Roosevelt (D)</td>
<td>1944 SOU</td>
<td>need for economic security for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Truman (D)</td>
<td>1947 SOU</td>
<td>administrative changes, establish a “well integrated department of welfare”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Truman (D)</td>
<td>1952 SOU</td>
<td>help states increase public assistance payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight Eisenhower (R)</td>
<td>1954 SOU</td>
<td>simplification of grant-in-aid programs, self-responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight Eisenhower (R)</td>
<td>1956 SOU</td>
<td>expansion of AFDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwight Eisenhower (R)</td>
<td>1961 SOU</td>
<td>accomplishments of federal grants to the needy, including AFDC recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John F. Kennedy (D)</td>
<td>1962 SOU</td>
<td>decrease dependency through services, training and rehabilitation instead of cash support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (D)</td>
<td>1964 SOU</td>
<td>begin a War on Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (D)</td>
<td>1967 SOU</td>
<td>expand War on Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (D)</td>
<td>1968 SOU</td>
<td>increase funding for War on Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndon B. Johnson (D)</td>
<td>1969 SOU</td>
<td>expand War on Poverty, work, increase funding for job training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1970 SOU</td>
<td>support of H.R. I/Family Assistance Plan, reform the welfare system, work incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1971 SOU</td>
<td>support of H.R. I, “welfare reform”, “abolish” the present system, work, self-responsibility, administrative changes, work-incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1972 SOU</td>
<td>support of H.R. I, work, “welfare reform”, “workfare”, increasing costs, dependence, fraud, community service employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1973 IA</td>
<td>work, self-responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Quote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Fraud, waste, work, expand job training, change the system to reward work, accomplishment, &quot;welfare mess&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Fraud, work, self-responsibility, simplify the system against waste, AFDC growth slowed, SSI begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>decrease funding, especially food stamps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>cut fraud, cut program, &quot;tighten eligibility and benefits rules&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>&quot;reform&quot;, work, increase funding for services instead of cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Notes 1979 welfare reform accomplishments, including &quot;welfare reform demonstration projects&quot;, self-sufficiency through work, self-responsibility, fraud, move to states, &quot;compassionate reform&quot;, waste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>cost, devolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>cut fraud and waste, help truly needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>move people to work, dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>web of dependency, &quot;welfare culture,“ welfare “emancipation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>dependency of welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>cost, dependency, work, poverty trap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>dependency, “welfare enslavement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>dependency, self-responsibility, work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>&quot;end welfare as we know it”, work, dependency, child support, &quot;empowerment”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>&quot;reward work over welfare&quot;, self-responsibility, dependency, “revolutionize” welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>work, self-responsibility, dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>welfare to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>work, dependency, self-responsibility, jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>more job creation, work, notes declining welfare rolls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beginning with Nixon, the themes and rhetoric change. The first use of the term “welfare reform” in these speeches is in Nixon’s 1970 State of the Union address. Nixon calls for “a total reform of our welfare system.” In the same vein, in his 1971 State of the Union address he says:

the most important is welfare reform. The present system has become a monstrous, consuming outrage. . . particularly against the children it is supposed to help. . . . We may honestly disagree, as we do, on what to do about it. But we can all agree that we must meet the challenge, not by pouring more money into a bad program, but by abolishing the present welfare system and adopting a new one. (Public Papers of the President, 1970)

The frequency and substance of Nixon’s welfare remarks is consistent with his focus on welfare reform as his top domestic agenda item (Light, 1991:70). Although Eisenhower was the first president to seek reductions in the public assistance caseload (Jeter, 1997:H7), starting with Nixon, this policy issue became a staple of presidential rhetoric, if not action. The remainder of this article focuses on post-1970 addresses, using Nixon’s 1970 language on wel-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President (Party)</th>
<th>Number of Addresses with Welfare Reform Remarks</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inaugural Address</td>
<td>State of the Union Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Ford (R)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Carter (D)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush (R)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>2(D) 4(R)</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
fare reform as a watershed for the shift in focus from establishment and expansion of welfare to one of serious reform. Also, after 1970 the frequency and amount of position-taking in presidential rhetoric increased.

Inasmuch as state of the union speeches are characterized by the three processes of: (1) meditation on values, (2) assessment of problems, and (3) policy recommendations, welfare reform received the full treatment in post-1970 speeches (Campbell and Jamieson, 1990:54). Table 1 reveals presidential lamentation over dependency replacing self-responsibility among welfare recipients. Evidence of problem diagnoses includes comments about enslavement, fraud, waste, and high cost as features of welfare programs. Lastly, policy proposals abound in remarks by these presidents advocating work-incentives, workfare, job training, job creation, decreased funding, and devolution.

Table 2 lists the six presidents and twenty-four post-1970 addresses that contain welfare reform remarks. Republican presidents and two-term presidents have more frequently used these speeches to push welfare reform. Sixteen of the twenty-four speeches were by Republicans. This finding may reflect a post-Nixon era tendency for welfare policy to be a more constant focus of Republican Party rhetoric and reform. And, four of the last six presidents have been Republicans. Three of these contemporary presidents frequently and consistently used the bully pulpit to advance their welfare reform views. Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and William Clinton made three-quarters of the speeches with welfare reform remarks. All three presidents were two-term presidents having longer tenures to comment on the use of political capital in advocating change. Another similarity among the three is that they all operated in a divided government for most or all of their tenure. Nixon commented on welfare in all five state of the union addresses, as did Clinton from 1993 through 1997. Reagan made welfare remarks in six of his addresses. Even though Gerald Ford, James Carter, and George Bush were one-term presidents, unlike the other presidents in Table 2, and did not have welfare reform as a top domestic priority (Light, 1991:70–71), each touched on welfare reform in two addresses.

These empirical findings are consistent with those of others about presidential involvement in social welfare policy. Le Loup and Shull (1991) found that fully 36 percent of presidential proposals made to Congress from 1953 to 1975 were social welfare initiatives. Indeed, they found that 31 percent of Nixon’s 980 legislative proposals were social welfare initiatives (1991:43). More generally, social welfare policy appears to be a focus of both presidential rhetoric and action. Research on Reagan’s seven state of the union addresses found that 44 percent of the words of these addresses dealt with domestic economic affairs. Fully 21 percent of his words in this category focused on spending (i.e., welfare, entitlements, Superfund, education) issues (Moen, 1988).

**Substantive Themes**

How have recent presidents used the bully pulpit in advancing welfare reform? Although the policy content of what constitutes welfare reform has been variable and subject to ideological dissensus, presidential comments about welfare have manifested similar themes. As Table 3 reveals, the remarks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President (Party)</th>
<th>Year and Type of Address</th>
<th>Cutting Costs and Fraud</th>
<th>Encouraging Work</th>
<th>Reducing Dependency/ Self-Responsibility</th>
<th>Administrative Changes</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1970 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1971 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1972 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1973 IA</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
<td>1973 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Nixon (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>James Carter (D)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Carter (D)</td>
<td>1981 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
<td>1982 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>Ronald Reagan (R)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush (R)</td>
<td>1989 IA</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bush (R)</td>
<td>1992 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1993 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1994 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1995 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1996 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1997 IA</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D)</td>
<td>1997 SOU</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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of post-1970 presidents emphasize five major themes: cutting costs and fraud, encouraging work, reducing dependency/self-responsibility, administrative changes, and devolution. From Table 3 it is clear that the first three themes have been enunciated far more than the latter two. The literature is mixed in the linkage between presidential rhetoric and public opinion. Some scholars assert that persuasive rhetoric can boost presidential approval ratings and shift citizen policy preferences (DiClerico, 1995:139–140; Ragsdale, 1984). Others find no relationship between the two or only an “at the margins” effect (Page and Shapiro, 1985:28; Edwards, 1997). Although we cannot draw a causal link between presidential utterances on welfare and public opinion, at the least, presidential remarks have reflected the dissatisfaction of the polity about what was wrong with welfare. The recurrent assessment found in these presidential remarks is of a worsening social condition inconsistent with
American values. Below we use their own words to illustrate how presidents articulated these themes.

Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan explicitly express concerns about cost, usually in the sense of cutting fraud and waste, and funding services rather than cash support. Nixon tells the public in his 1974 state of the union address that “recent studies have shown that fully 40 percent of the AFDC benefits being paid are either going to ineligible persons or are incorrect in amount.” Ford asserts in 1976 that “we are wasting badly needed resources without reaching many of the truly needy.” However, Reagan best expresses the cost concern in his 1988 address when he laments “today, the federal government has 59 major welfare programs and spends more than $100 billion a year on them. What has all this money done?”

Even though these presidents voiced concerns about costs, consistent with much of the political discourse, traditional welfare is one of the smallest strains on the federal budget among entitlement programs. Table 4 shows the relative cost of these welfare programs contrasted with the costs of the two largest social insurance programs. Looking at five-year intervals from 1965 to 1995, even when the AFDC, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps public assistance programs are combined, expenditures are typically less than 4 percent of the federal budget. Seemingly, cost has been just one of the issues driving the welfare reform debate and the rhetorical contributions of these presidents to it.

These other concerns largely relate to work incentives and dependency. These are prominent themes in the remarks of the six presidents, with the exception of Ford, whose comments centered on cost and fraud. Long before Nixon began to sound the welfare reform refrain, Franklin Roosevelt warned in his 1935 State of the Union address that “to dole out relief in this way is to

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDC,</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>Security Income,</td>
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<td>and Food Stamps</td>
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administer a narcotic, ... It is a violation of the traditions of America. Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute workers.” His warning was a harbinger of post-1970 welfare reform rhetoric.

The importance of political language and symbols in problem definition is well documented (Stone, 1997). Much of the concern communicated by these presidents about welfare robbing recipients of their work ethic and fostering dependency is consistent with public attitudes that welfare programs have become symbols of an irresponsible lifestyle and moral decay (Anderson, 1978; Lehman and Danziger, 1995; Jeter, 1997). Illustrative examples of this theme abound. Nixon speaks about “workfare” and “moving people from welfare rolls to payrolls” in his 1972 State of the Union address. In his 1973 Inaugural address he reminds Americans that the country was built “not by welfare, but by work; not by shirking responsibility, but by seeking responsibility.” Likewise, in his 1973 State of the Union address he bemoans “the welfare mess.”

This reducing dependency theme is continued by Carter in 1978 when he explains to the country that his proposed “Better Jobs and Income Act ... would fundamentally reform current programs to assist the poor” and in his 1981 entreaty to “increase self-sufficiency through work rather than welfare.” Similarly, in 1985 Reagan speaks about the need “to encourage opportunity and jobs rather than dependency and welfare.” More stridently, in 1986 Reagan urges “lasting emancipation” from “the welfare culture” and “spider’s web of dependency.” Lastly, Reagan states government welfare programs have created a massive social problem and a “a poverty trap” in his 1988 State of the Union address.

In the same vein, Bush criticizes “welfare enslavement” in his 1989 Inaugural address. And, in 1992 he reminds the country that “welfare was never meant to be a lifestyle.” Finally, Democratic President Clinton used these addresses as frequently as Presidents Nixon and Reagan, the other two-term presidents, to advance his welfare reform views. Clinton’s addresses, like Nixon’s and Reagan’s, are laced with numerous remarks about welfare to work. In 1993 Clinton pledges to “end welfare as we know it.” In 1994 he exhorts “work over welfare,” and in 1996 asks for “welfare reform that will really move people from welfare to work.” Finally, in his 1997 State of the Union address (after the enactment of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act) Clinton challenges states to “turn those welfare checks into private sector paychecks.” He also hopes to see “two million more people off the welfare rolls by the year 2000.”

Less common topics of presidential remarks are those dealing with administrative changes and devolution to the states. In recognition that his proposed Family Assistance Plan (H.R.1) was a doomed effort, Nixon recounts in his 1973 State of the Union address that he has “directed that vigorous steps be taken to strengthen the management of AFDC through administrative measures and legislative proposals.” Ford pledges in his 1976 address to use his “presidential authority to tighten up the rules for eligibility and benefits.” Surprisingly, given its currency in policy debates, Reagan is the only president to focus on devolution to the states in welfare reform remarks.
Table 5
Major Presidential Welfare Initiatives, Post-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President (Party) (Divided Government)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proposed Legislation</th>
<th>Addresses with Reference to Legislation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Carter (D) (No)</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Program for Better Jobs and Income Act*</td>
<td>1978 SOU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald Reagan (R) (Yes)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>signs bipartisan Family Support Act</td>
<td>1987 SOU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clinton (D) (Yes)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>signs Republican-sponsored Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act</td>
<td>1997 SOU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Congress did not enact the proposal.

Legislative Initiatives and Action

Our findings are that contemporary presidents, regardless of party, advanced welfare reform in two of their most scrutinized and important formal speeches. This is especially true of state of the union addresses and of two-term presidents. However, such rhetorical leadership may be symbolic and not accompanied by policy leadership. To gauge whether these comments were examples of talk, but no action, we investigated which of the six presidents since 1970 advanced bills consistent with the substance of their welfare reform remarks. This information is displayed in Table 5.

Utilizing the center-stage position tradition and the media afforded them with these two addresses, some presidents have sought public support and appealed for legislative action—two of the typical functions of these speeches.
Table 5 shows that the three presidents who commented most in their speeches on welfare reform also attempted legislative initiatives. Neither Ford nor Bush pushed welfare reform legislation, despite the concerns about costs (Ford) and dependency (Bush) voiced in their addresses. We note above, however, that Ford did administratively attempt to tighten eligibility rules. However, Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton each took legislative action previous to or subsequent to their remarks. All used these speeches as a way to garner public support for proposals to Congress.

Nixon made the most mentions of current or forthcoming legislation in his addresses. His proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP), to replace AFDC with a minimum income guarantee for the poor and work incentives, was a three-year legislative priority. The FAP was, by far, the most radical reform welfare proposal to that date and one for which a president used tremendous political capital in pushing (Burke, 1974; Light, 1991:75-76). The Family Assistance Plan was introduced in 1969 as H.R.1. In his 1970, 1971, and 1972 State of the Union addresses, Nixon attempted to sell H.R.1 to Congress and the nation. Even after final defeat of H.R.1 in 1973, Nixon pressed for welfare reform in his 1973 Inaugural address and his last two state of the union addresses.

Jimmy Carter’s 1978 State of the Union welfare remarks were in follow-up to his 1977 Program for Better Jobs and Income legislative initiative, a reform proposal considered by many to be as radical and costly as FAP (Lynn, 1981; Anderson, 1978: ch. 8). The Program for Better Jobs and Income Act would have consolidated AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamps into one cash support program with a national uniform benefit and established a public jobs program. It was not enacted. The same fate awaited two other legislative initiatives. Carter recounts in his 1981 State of the Union address that neither of his 1979 proposals, the Work and Training Opportunities Act nor the Social Welfare Reform Amendments Act, was passed.

In his 1982 State of the Union address Reagan presents the ill-fated Great Swap. He recommends that in return for the federal government taking over the full cost of Medicaid and Medicare "as part of a financially equal swap, the states will simultaneously take full responsibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children and food stamps." Reagan, without a doubt the most ideological president in his promotion of welfare reform, did not continue to push his devolution proposal, which he strongly believed in, once it was rejected by Congress in 1983 (Moen, 1988:782). Light (1991:240-243) notes that Reagan was not a president to use his political capital in repeated requests for legislation.

Reagan did, however, have considerable success in other welfare reform proposals. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) contained numerous Reagan administration welfare initiatives. Its enactment began a period of welfare retrenchment, even amidst a recession. Among the other social welfare cuts embodied in OBRA, AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid outlays were reduced from a pre-Reagan baseline by 14.3 percent, 13.8 percent, and 2.8 percent respectively (O’Connor, 1998:40-41). The act also imposed a federally mandated gross income ceiling for AFDC eligibility, reduced
allowable assets, and lowered the age of child eligibility from 21 to 18 (O'Connor, 1998:42). About 700,000 families were either deleted from the welfare rolls or lost benefits as a result of OBRA (Jeter, 1997:H7). Last, state demonstration programs, which were expanded during Reagan’s tenure, laid the foundation for the bipartisan Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA). With its emphasis on child support, job training, and work, FSA extended AFDC changes the Reagan administration initiated in OBRA (Handler, 1995:62).

One of the persons who helped write the 1988 FSA enacted under Reagan was William Clinton. Clinton brings this fact to the attention of the American public when he comments in his 1995 State of the Union address that “as Governor I had the honor of working with the Reagan administration to write the last welfare reform bill in 1988.” Thus, Clinton brought a background of welfare reform advocacy to the White House, as had Reagan who advanced this issue as governor of California. The state of affairs Clinton faced upon taking office, however, was that after the 1980s leveling of AFDC rates, there was a sharp increase in caseloads from 1989 to 1992 (O'Connor, 1998:51). Consistent with his “end welfare as we know it” pledge, Clinton appointed a Welfare Reform Task Force which crafted the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994. In his 1994 State of the Union address he says, “This spring I will send you a comprehensive welfare reform bill that builds on the Family Support Act of 1988 and restores the basic values of responsibility.” This bill, which was not enacted, proposed a two-year time limit on AFDC and stricter work requirements (Lehman and Danziger, 1995:10–12). A Democratic-majority Congress failed to enact the bill.

In 1995 a Republican-majority took leadership of Congress and welfare reform. Clinton twice vetoed the Republican-drafted Personal Responsibility Act of 1995. Both it and the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) went much further than Clinton’s 1994 proposal. The 1996 act not only ended the AFDC entitlement, but had stricter age and tenure restrictions, child caps, and stringent work requirements. Although he ultimately signed the legislation and claimed credit, Clinton was unhappy with many of its provisions (Clinton, 1995). Interestingly, PRWORA embraces the turn back to the states approach of Reagan’s earlier devolution proposal. Perhaps a softening period, initiated by Reagan’s rhetoric and actions occurred to make this approach saleable. Almost two decades after an advocacy begun by Nixon, with the rhetorical and policy leadership of Reagan and Clinton, welfare was “reformed.”

Conclusion

Consistent with how center stage and persistent the welfare policy issue has been in American political discourse and public debate, presidents have used their office to comment. Our analysis of inaugural and state of the union addresses from 1935 through 1997 reveals there has been considerable rhetoric. Also, in the case of those presidents most frequently commenting on welfare in their state of the union addresses, action has followed. Despite the variance in political contexts, as hypothesized, presidents have used two of their most ballyhooed formal addresses in this regard. This is particularly true in
regard to state of the union addresses. Further, beginning with Richard Nixon in 1970, all contemporary presidents, to some extent, used these speeches to urge welfare reform.

The three presidents most assertive in advocating welfare reform were Republicans Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, as well as Democrat William Clinton. Finally, the welfare reform remarks of these presidents echo salient themes of cutting costs and fraud, preventing work disincentives, and reducing dependency. It may go too far to say that some presidents have provided political and moral leadership on this issue, based on the frequency and substance of their comments. But, they have consistently brought welfare policy issues before the public.

These findings are not to suggest that just presidents who deemed welfare policy important enough to focus on it as part of their inaugural or state of the union addresses were the only ones who promoted changes. Presidents who did not use these addresses to advance welfare reform had other formal and informal speeches in which to do so. Nor can we assume that these presidents pushed for legislative reform merely because they commented on the issue. However, we did find a high correspondence between the speech and actions of post-1970 presidents. Four (Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton) of the six contemporary presidents who used these addresses to advocate welfare reform also attempted to get legislation enacted.

The latest round of welfare reform is over. A new era of "workfare," "work first," and "wedfare" has begun. However, it will be some time before the evidence is in on whether the reforms of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act will quell the calls for welfare reform sounded so frequently over the last three decades. More likely, if the past is prologue, presidents will continue to use their bully pulpit in pursuit of further reform. We found no reluctance to or ineptitude by numerous presidents in using two of the office's most renowned rhetorical instruments in this regard. This controversial policy issue was certainly not avoided by presidents in these speeches. To the extent presidents are not particularly successful in moving from rhetoric to policy leadership, this may be more a reflection of the enduring but illusive nature of the welfare policy issue than inadequacy on their part.

Notes

1. This entitlement program has been replaced with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant under the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Recipients are permanently limited to two years of aid without work and a five-year life-time eligibility.

2. A recent example of this phenomenon is President Clinton's failed attempt at using the bully pulpit in a speech at the University of California at San Diego in May 1997 to urge the country to engage in a dialogue about race. His appeals to Americans to engage in racial reconciliation and establishment the following month of The President's Initiative on Race Commission were almost unanimously criticized by the media and ignored by the public. Other issues for which President Clinton has used his bully pulpit include teen-age smoking, and getting the private sector to hire welfare recipients (Solomon, 1997).

3. On presidential rhetoric and strategies of direct popular appeal, see Tulis (1987):
According to Theda Skocpol (1995: chs. 4 and 7), the Social Security Act’s establishment of public assistance and social insurance programs add up to an “incomplete version of a modern ‘welfare state’” compared to European countries (p. 228). Also see Block, et al. (1987: xi-xiii) on this point.

This procedure was followed for the sixteen inaugural and thirty-six state of the union addresses that were available from Internet web sites. The other twenty-six state of the union addresses secured in hard copy were read in their entirety for keywords. We should note in 1993 President Clinton did not give a State of the Union address in January. Instead, on February 13, 1993 he gave a “New Direction Address before a Joint Session of Congress” that received the same media attention of a state of the union address. We chose to include that address as one of the state of the union addresses for the period of this analysis.

See note on content analysis above.

Although only one (1935 Franklin Roosevelt State of the Union) of the Roosevelt and Johnson speeches listed in this analysis contain explicit mentions of the term welfare or AFDC, they are included because of their emphasis on alleviating poverty. These remarks may be inclusive of more than the Aid to Dependent Children (under Roosevelt) and AFDC (under Johnson) populations, but certainly included them. As Skocpol notes: “by the 1960s, AFDC became the visible embodiment of welfare understood in contrast to social security, and Great Society Programs targeting the poor tended to be incorporated into the welfare rubric” (1995:212).

President Kennedy also sought to reduce the public assistance caseload—with the 1962 Public Welfare Amendments (Jeter, 1997:H7).

Our post-Nixon analysis is not meant to suggest that no prior president focused on welfare reform. A case in point is Lyndon Johnson. Although a content analysis of his state of the union and inaugural addresses does not reveal it, Johnson was responsible for initiating the first major thrust toward work incentives. His $50 monthly earnings disregard proposal for welfare mothers who worked formed the basis for the work incentive provisions of the Welfare Amendments of 1967 (Burton, 1974:24–30).

We should note that Nixon used these speeches as often as Reagan and Clinton, despite not serving the last two years of his term—due to Watergate.

The third function is to urge citizens to contact their representatives (Lewis, 1997:382).

The Family Assistance Plan (H.R.1) was defeated by both liberals and conservatives. Conservatives thought the work incentives features were too weak and that people who were employable should not be guaranteed an income. Liberals, on the other hand, thought the benefit level too low and disliked the punitive nature of the work requirement (Burke, 1974: ch.8; Mead, 1986: ch.5; Handler, 1995:5)

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Miller


Crime Fighting and the Exclusionary Rule: Bama Talk on Giving the Police More Leeway to Gather Evidence in Criminal Cases

D'Linell Finley

University of Alabama

This paper begins with the premise that crime and the accompanying fear of crime undermine the safety and security of our society. Alabama has a history of conservatism, symbolized by its politics of rage in the form of former Governor George C. Wallace (Carter, 1995). Implicit in Alabama conservatism, fear of crime and ways of crime fighting appear to be lightning rods for political debate. "Law and order" are often code words for toughness on crime. The Alabama Legislature has often responded to constituency concerns with such initiatives as habitual offender legislation which allows life sentences for those persons with at least three prior felony convictions. Youthful status may be waived for capital offenses. The death penalty has been expanded to cover additional crimes such as drive-by killings, drug crimes involving murder, and gang-related killings. While there are many constitutional issues that have been raised in crime fighting, i.e., right to counsel, right to remain silent, equal protection, etc., the focus of this paper is on the Fourth Amendment issue of search and seizure. If there is a perception that police need more leeway to fight crime, one would expect a significant level of support for changes even if those changes weaken some of the protections via the Exclusionary Rule enumerated in Mapp v. Ohio (Kairys, 1993: 167–179).

The writer expresses appreciation to the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of Alabama for allowing questions to be included in its Omnibus Survey. Special thanks to Debra Moehle McCallum, director, and Darwin Morgan, research assistant, for timely advice on the table, graphs and statistical findings.
In order to determine if there is support for giving the police more leeway to gather more evidence in a Fourth Amendment search, this paper reports the results of a study designed to examine the following questions: (1) Do you favor or oppose police officers being given more leeway to obtain evidence for use in criminal trials? (2) Do you favor or oppose doing away with the exclusionary rule to more effectively fight crime? (3) Do you favor or oppose the use of an anonymous tip to the police, as sufficient probable cause for police to obtain a warrant to search your home? (4) Do you favor or oppose sobriety checkpoints in an effort to curtail drunk driving? (5) Do you favor or oppose the current Supreme Court's apparent pro law enforcement stance rolling back rights in search and seizure upheld during the Chief Justice Warren Supreme Court years, and (6) Do you favor or oppose Supreme Court decisions that favor the rights of society over the individual in order to balance the rights of society against those of the individual?

The 1994 election featured gubernatorial candidates touting strong law and order credentials. The election of Fob James, a conservative Republican re-affirmed the state's image as a conservative law and order State. Jeff Sessions, an equally conservative law and order candidate, was elected Alabama Attorney General. Both men were strongly supported by former Republican state party chair Emory Folmar, mayor of Montgomery, Alabama, and 1982 Republican gubernatorial nominee. All three men are well known for their strong law and order campaigns. The three men have been critical of past United States Supreme Court rulings that appear to give an edge to criminals, especially in the area of search and seizure. The fact that these men hold prominent electoral positions would suggest support for changing the search and seizure laws so as to give the police more leeway in gathering evidence to fight crime. The "law and order" stance, so common among many Alabama officials makes this study worthwhile.

The Judicial Environment

The Supreme Court has been significantly impacted through judicial appointments by Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush (Kairys, 1993: 1–11). Since 1984, the conservative judicial appointees have produced a significantly more conservative United States Supreme Court particularly in search and seizure cases, symbolized by the 1984 Supreme Court decision United States v. Leon (468 U.S. 897, 1984). This case has created a perception of an apparent strong pro-law enforcement stance by the United States Supreme Court. Because of this perception, this 1994 case provides an opportunity to determine whether Alabamians when given personal choices are willing to sacrifice some of their Fourth Amendment protections in order to fight crime.

Although there has been substantial criticism of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts for the apparent roll—back of individual rights, there is some support for expanding search and seizure powers of law enforcement. Charles Brandt (1990) places considerable blame on the more liberal Warren Court decisions for hampering the police in crime fighting efforts. According to Brandt not only did Mapp bring about substantial changes in the attainment of evidence and arrests, the case also had an impact on the prosecution of the accused. Brandt a former deputy attorney general for Delaware, argued
that the application of the exclusionary rule has had its most devastating impact on drug arrests. The 1994 case, *United States v. Leon* provides a basis for assessing the extent to which the United States Supreme Court has strayed from the 1961 case *Mapp v. Ohio* with regards to Fourth Amendment rights in criminal cases. The *Mapp v. Ohio* case (1961) required police to obtain search warrants before searching one's property, otherwise the evidence obtained would be excluded in criminal cases (367 U.S. 643, 1961). If rights have not regressed, then one has to determine what is happening in a societal attitude of toughness toward crime (Bradley, 1985).

Bradley further suggests that part of the blame for the confusion that the police and the courts have experienced concerning the Fourth Amendment is due to the exclusionary rule. Bradley also places a heavy share of the blame on the Burger Court's good-faith exception established in *United States v. Leon* (1984). Prior to the good-faith exception, the function of the rule was very clear: Illegally obtained evidence was always inadmissible at trial. The only difficulty in the application of the exclusionary rule was in determining if the evidence was constitutionally obtained (Bradley, 1985: 1470).

Bradley concludes that if Fourth Amendment law is to be effective in limiting unnecessary intrusion on behalf of the police and in providing effective law enforcement, then the law must be simple and clear so the police can clearly understand it. The *Leon* case involved the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified to allow a good-faith exception. Some of the facts surrounding the *Leon* case are as follows: After receiving information from a confidential informant the California Police Department initiated an investigation into Leon's and others' alleged drug trafficking. After conducting surveillance of the defendant's activities and on the basis of an affidavit summarizing the officer's observations, Officer Rombach prepared his application for a warrant to search Leon's and others' private residences and the defendants' automobiles for an extensive list of items. Several deputy district attorneys reviewed the application and issued a facially valid search warrant. As a result of the searches, large quantities of drugs and narcotics were found. After being indicted on federal drug charges, Leon and the other defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence. At an evidentiary hearing, a federal district court granted the motions in part on the grounds that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Even though Officer Rombach acted in good-faith, the district court rejected the government's contention that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied where evidence was seized in 'good-faith reliance upon a search warrant' (Rossum & Taff, 1991: 518). A federal appeals court affirmed this decision and the government sought certiorari limited to the issue of whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized.

Justice White delivered the opinion of the court which dealt with the question of "whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause" (468 U.S. 897). In writing the opinion, White asserted that
the Fourth Amendment contains no provision "expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands" (468 U.S. 1025). The question the Court was presented to the Court involved the balance between preventing the use in the prosecution's case of evidence obtained via a warrant issued in good-faith and a neutral magistrate which issued was turned out to be a detective's warrant.

Justice White noted the social costs that had been exacted because of the use of the exclusionary rule to preserve Fourth Amendment rights. Prior to the warrant, there had been no form of a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. The Burger Court was of the opinion that the time had arrived for a provision to be made to allow for such a good-faith exception. As part of his argument for a good-faith exception, White focused on three points. First, the exclusionary rule was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second, White asserted that there was no existing evidence to suggest that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment by being unfettered by the requirement that they act under oath. Third, and according to White, most importantly, the Court discerned no basis and was offered none for believing that the exclusion of evidence that was seized pursuant to a warrant would have a significant effect on the issuing magistrate or judge.

In his closing remarks, White argued the following:

In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Under these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate. (468 U.S. 897)

The Leom case marked a crucial point in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the exclusionary rule and how it should be applied. The case provided for the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which created an exception to this rule and held that previously illegally seized evidence may be used in the prosecution's case if the police officers obtained the evidence in an "objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant" (Misner, 1986: 506). Misner points out that one of the major purposes of the substantive criminal law is to "induce external conformity to rules" (Misner, 1986: 509). The criminal law usually has refused to elevate specific deterrence of the individual above its "goal of general deterrence and general education," (p. 509), as a result criminal law has usually rejected that mistake of law excuses misconduct. Misner and others suggest that the exclusionary rule is intended to serve a similar purpose. Prior to Leom, the Supreme Court ruled that the main function of the exclusionary rule should be to deter misconduct on the part of the police (p. 509).

In his conclusions, Misner maintains that Leom is a very questionable decision because it assumes that police officers need encouragement beyond the constitutional requirement of the Fourth Amendment, to seek a judicial opinion that a search is indeed proper. If the Supreme Court continues with the
decision in the Leon case, then it must be limited to "judicially warranted searches" (p. 543). In regard to deterrence analysis, the Leon exception "should not be expanded in reliance upon specific deterrence of the individual officer' (p. 544). Misner feels strongly that in Leon-type situations, the community should feel equally comfortable in relying upon a 'general theory of deterrence for the exclusionary rule, since the remedy of the exclusion of evidence is a remedy directed against the population as a whole as represented by the prosecuting arm of the state' (Misner, 1989: 544–545). Some critics believe the Exclusionary Rule has lowered arrests that should have been made. (Brandt 1990: 80).

Utilizing statistics from the Bureau of Justice in Crime and Public Policy, Brandt concludes the Mapp decision derailed 45,000 to 55,000 serious criminal cases in 1977–78 alone. The study did not include that never happened because while police officers felt certain that drugs were being dealt, they did not have enough evidence to secure search warrants (p. 80–81). Brandt, concedes that in the 1960s police misconduct was rampant especially in terms of actions against civil rights demonstrators. As a result of these and other police violations, the police came under close scrutiny from the public and the courts. However, with the current drug problem Brandt maintains that it is no longer the police who pose a threat to the neighborhood, but the drug dealers carrying rifles (p. 81). To counter criminal elements Brandt applauds the Supreme Court for the Leon decision, but believes the Court did not go far enough in this decision. Brandt is not advocating that we abandon our constitutional rights, however, he does not see a problem with relaxing the exclusionary rule since, in his view, the exclusionary rule is a judge—made right and not a constitutional right. In essence, Brandt sees the full impact of the exclusionary rule as applied through Mapp v Ohio as an example of the Court's nit-picking technicalities and does not see how police can be expected to perform their duties if the exclusionary rule remains intact (p. 81). Brandt's position is the most explicit position calling for direct and decisive action to combat crime. His writing would certainly lead one to conclude there has been an excessive hampering of the police.

Survey Findings

The survey used in this paper gathered data from a random sample of four hundred and sixty adults, eighteen years or older, from households across the state of Alabama in the Omnibus Capstone Survey. Specifically, this part of the Omnibus Capstone Survey included the questions identified in the introduction of this paper. Respondents were given choices of agree, strongly agree, disagree, strongly disagree. In order to simplify the responses agree and strongly agree were combined into one answer, agree. Respondents were asked to state their party identification, political ideology, race, and gender. This paper examines the level of support for each of the stated questions as a whole which is labeled "total percent agree." The paper then looks at the level of support by each of the categories, party identification, political ideology, race, and gender in order to determine if the level of support correlates to membership in either of the above.
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* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001

Numbers show percentage of respondents answering each question with agree or strongly agree out of those respondents who chose to answer each question (Total N=425). Captstone Poll, Institute for Social Research, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, December, 1998
The Politics of the Black "Nation"

Figure 1
Total Percent Agree

Figure 2
Total Percent Agree by Party Identification
Figure 3
Total Percent Agree by Political Ideology

Figure 4
Total Percent Agree by Race
The level of support as measured by respondent's answers yielded the following:

- Support for Sobriety Checkpoints: 78%
- Support for Giving Police More Leeway: 58%
- Support for Anonymous Tip: 42%
- Support to Do Away With Exclusionary Rule: 37%
- Support for Balancing Individual Rights Versus Society: 34%
- Support for Rolling Back Rights in Search and Seizure: 30%

The answers from respondents suggest there is a level of support for some measures such as sobriety checkpoints. However, the level of support drops when more pointed questions concerning Fourth Amendment Rights are addressed. The survey also produced some findings that are statistically significant when factors such as gender, ideology, and party are considered. Females are more likely (63%) to favor giving police more leeway to get evidence than males (53%) (P=.0002). Females are more likely (46%) to favor the use of an anonymous tip as being sufficient for a warrant than males (36%) (P=.04950). Females are more likely (82%) to favor sobriety checkpoints than males (74%) (P=.01742). Republicans are more likely (44%) to favor doing away with the exclusionary rule. Thirty-seven percent (37%) of Independents and thirty-three percent (33%) of respondents identified as Other favor doing away with the exclusionary rule (P=.00682). Conservatives are more likely (44%) to favor doing away with the exclusionary rule. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of respondents identified as Middle of the Road favor this idea. Twenty-nine percent (29%) of respondents identified as Don't Think in Those Terms
favor this idea. Only twenty-five percent (25%) of liberals favor doing away with the exclusionary rule (P=.03257). Republicans are more likely (87%) to favor sobriety checkpoints. Respondents identified as Other and Democrats expressed (75%) support for sobriety checkpoints. Seventy-three percent (73%) of Independents favor sobriety checkpoints (P=.04713). Respondents identified as Other and Democrats are likely to favor rolling back rights in search and seizure with forty percent (40%) and thirty-eight percent (38%) of each group respectively favoring this idea. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of Republicans favor rolling back these rights. Only twenty percent (20%) of Independents favor such a proposal (P=.00554). Again, it is significant to draw attention to the overall findings. Aside from the general idea of giving police more leeway to get evidence (58%) and sobriety checkpoints (78%) there was no majority support for specific proposals. Only thirty-seven percent (37%) of respondents favor doing away with the exclusionary rule. Forty-two percent (42%) favor anonymous tip as efficient for search warrant. Only thirty percent (30%) favor rolling back rights in search and seizure. Finally, only thirty-four percent (34%) favor the court balancing individual rights versus society in order to fight crime. When responses that are statistically significant, (p<.05), are discussed alongside those whereby respondents regardless of party, ideology, race, and gender expressed preferences, there are some patterns worthy of notice.

Respondents by a clear majority supported the general proposal of giving police more leeway to get evidence. There were significant differences in the level of support by party, ideology, race and gender. Sixty-six percent of Republicans versus fifty-six percent of Democrats expressed support for more leeway to get evidence. Sixty-five percent of the respondents identified as others supported such leeway while fifty-three percent of respondents identified as Independents supported giving police more leeway to get evidence (Table 1).

Ideologically, conservatives were most likely to support the general proposal of giving police more leeway to get evidence. Sixty-seven percent of respondents identified as conservatives supported more leeway while respondents identified as liberals at forty-one percent were least likely to support giving police more leeway. Respondents identified as Middle of the Road and Don't Think in Those Terms by a majority of fifty-four and fifty-seven percent, respectively, supported more leeway.

Along racial lines whites were more likely to support giving police more leeway to get evidence. Sixty-one percent of respondents identified as white versus forty-nine percent of respondents identified as African Americans supported more leeway (Table 1). Along gender lines female respondent expressed sixty-three percent support for giving police more leeway to get evidence while only fifty-three percent of the males supported more leeway to get evidence (Table 1).

Alabama respondents did not express support for balancing the rights of society against those of the individual (Table 1). However, party, ideology, and race did provide significant differences in levels of acceptance. Forty-four percent of the Republicans versus only thirty percent of the Democrats favored abolishing the exclusionary rule. Thirty-seven percent and thirty-three percent, respectively, of respondents identified as Independents and Other
supported abolition (Table 1). Along ideological lines conservatives were more likely to support such abolition. Forty-four percent of the conservatives and thirty-nine percent of respondents identified as Middle of the Road favored abolition versus twenty-five percent and twenty-nine percent respectively for liberals and respondents who did not think in ideological terms (Table 1). The issue of race reflected some disparity in support for abolition of the exclusionary rule. Only twenty-seven percent of African American respondents versus thirty-nine percent of white respondents supported such abolition. Again, it is important to note that only thirty-seven percent of all respondents favored abolition, reaffirming that Alabama citizens want to do something about crime, but are reluctant to surrender specific Fourth Amendment rights in the name of crime fighting.

When faced with a real proposal to give police more leeway such as using anonymous tips, only forty-one percent of respondents favored such course. The survey did note that African Americans and female respondents were more likely to favor anonymous tips (Table 1). Their support level was forty-nine and forty-five percent, respectively. Respondents identified as Don’t Think in Those Terms gave a support level of forty-seven percent. While the writer was unable to ascribe any rationale for respondents identified as Don’t Think in Those Terms, one can consider the perceived vulnerability of African Americans and females as a possible rationale for favoring anonymity when confronting the police.

Respondents by a wide majority did favor sobriety checkpoints. This was the only question other than giving police more leeway to get evidence to receive an absolute majority of support from respondents. As previously stated, the support for sobriety checkpoints was seventy-eight percent. There were major differences based on party, race, and gender. Eighty-seven percent of Republicans versus seventy-five percent of respondents identified as Democrats expressed support for sobriety checkpoints. Respondents identified as Independents and Other expressed support of seventy-three and seventy-five percent, respectively.

Whites were more likely to support sobriety checkpoints than African Americans. Though African Americans support sobriety checkpoints, their lower level of support compared to whites very likely reflect some concern and suspicion for the police. The expressed level of support for respondents identified as white was eighty percent versus seventy percent for respondents identified as African Americans. Females were also more likely than males to support sobriety checkpoints. Females expressed support of eighty-two percent versus seventy-four percent for males.

Respondents were least likely to favor rolling back rights in search and seizures upheld during the Chief Justice Warren Supreme Court years. The overall level of support was thirty percent. Respondents identified as Republicans were least likely to support proposals rolling back rights in search and seizure. Twenty-eight percent of Republicans support such roll backs. Thirty-eight percent of respondents (Table 1) identified as Democrats expressed support for rolling back rights in search and seizure. The ten percent difference does suggest Democrats and Republicans have different positions on rolling back search and seizure rights in order to fight crime. The higher level of support by Democrats came as a surprise since Republicans are usually more con-
servative and more likely to be projected as tough on crime. Respondents identified as Independents and Other expressed support of twenty and forty percent, respectively (Table 1). Ideologically, there is little difference between respondents identified liberal and conservative. The level of support was twenty-seven and thirty percent, respectively. Respondents identified as Middle of the Road and Don’t Think in Those Terms expressed support of twenty-nine and thirty-five percent, respectively (Table 1).

On the question whether respondents were willing to surrender rights that would allow for balancing the rights of the individuals against the rights of society in order to fight crime the level of support was thirty-one percent. Ideology and gender did have some impact on the level of support for more leeway for law enforcement officials. Ideologically, thirty-nine percent of respondents identified as liberals versus thirty-one percent of respondents identified as conservatives expressed support balancing the rights of individuals versus society, a difference of seven percent. Respondents identified as Middle of the Road and Don’t Think in Those Terms expressed support of thirty-four and thirty-three percent, respectively.

Along gender lines males more than females expressed support for the courts balancing individual rights versus society. The level of support was thirty-eight percent for males and thirty-one percent for females.

Conclusion and Implications

When given the opportunity to express support for individual choices, Alabamians do not favor abolishing the exclusionary rule, using anonymous tips for police to obtain a warrant to search one’s home, rolling back rights in search and seizure, and favoring the rights of society over the individual in order to fight crime. The frequent criticism as symbolized by Brandt of the liberal leaning of the Supreme Court particularly during the Warren years, would also suggest that the public is satisfied that the yoke of liberalism has been cast aside as exemplified in Leon. On the contrary the Alabama findings in this research suggest that while support varies according to party, ideology, race and sex, none of these areas gave majority support to any of the proposals aside from sobriety checkpoints and the catch-all statement, give police more leeway to get evidence. The findings suggest that as long as respondents can be tough on crime in the abstract there is widespread support. However, when confronted with the possibility of losing privacy in a Fourth Amendment search, there is little support for giving the police expanded powers to search for incriminating evidence.

The broader implications derived from this research though somewhat regional and parochial suggest difficulty in gaining specific support to relax Fourth Amendment protections via Mapp v. Ohio and the accompanying exclusionary rules. While the Leon case has provided some judicial bases for relaxing some of the protections guaranteed in a more stringently interpreted Mapp v. Ohio, it has not abolished Fourth Amendment protections. Further, the generally low support for nearly all of the specific proposals to relax the exclusionary rule suggests that widespread perceived law and order attitudes significantly decline when people know there is a likelihood of police search of their homes.
References


Appendix A
Questions Distributed by the Capstone Poll Institute for Social Science Research, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1995

These next questions concern individual versus state or federal rights. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, please tell me whether you favor or oppose police officers being given more leeway to obtain evidence for use in criminal trials. Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1. STRONGLY OPPOSE
2.
3.
4.
5. STRONGLY FAVOR
6. DK/NA
7. R COULD NOT USE SCALE

The United States is the only country which uses the exclusionary rule which throws out court evidence obtained in an illegal manner. Using a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, do you favor or oppose doing away with the exclusionary rule to more effectively fight crime? Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1. STRONGLY OPPOSE
2.
3.
4.
5. STRONGLY FAVOR
6. DK/NA
7. R COULD NOT USE SCALE

Using a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, please tell me if you favor or oppose the use of an anonymous tip to the police, as sufficient probable cause for police to obtain a warrant to search your home. Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1. STRONGLY OPPOSE
2.
3.
4.
5. STRONGLY FAVOR
6. DK/NA
7. R COULD NOT USE SCALE
In an effort to curtail drunk driving, the US. Supreme Court has ruled that sobriety checkpoints are constitutional and are not a random search. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, do you favor or oppose this decision? Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1       STRONGLY OPPOSE
2
3
4
5       STRONGLY FAVOR
6       DK/NA
7       R COULD NOT USE SCALE

The current U.S. Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in an apparent pro-law enforcement stance is rolling back rights in search and seizure upheld during the Chief Justice Warren Supreme Court years. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, do you favor or oppose this court stance? Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1       STRONGLY OPPOSE
2
3
4
5       STRONGLY FAVOR
6       DK/NA
7       R COULD NOT USE SCALE

The current U.S. Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Rehnquist, through its decisions in search and seizure cases, is attempting to balance the rights of the individual against the rights of society. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly oppose and 5 is strongly favor, do you favor or oppose decisions that favor the rights of society over the individual. Remember, you may use any number between 1 and 5.

1       STRONGLY OPPOSE
2
3
4
5       STRONGLY FAVOR
6       DK/NA
7       R COULD NOT USE SCALE
Black Organizational Development and the Black Student Leadership Network

Sekou Franklin

Howard University

Over the last decade, black activists, intellectuals, and political leaders have searched for new methods, strategies, and mechanisms for revitalizing insurgent level activism among national black organizations and leadership. Attempts in the last thirty years at developing unified black fronts, some of which have brought together organizational leaders across the ideological terrain, have all but failed (Smith, 1996), while the agendas of many traditional civil rights organizations have increasingly become institutionalized and absorbed under pragmatic, symbolic party platforms. Simultaneously, the character and function of black organizations at the local levels, have been somewhat ignored and significantly under-utilized by national black organizations.

By the 1980s and 1990s, much of the insurgent-level organizational activities directed towards solving the new crises that emerged over the last decade were exercised by small-scale, local-level black organizations. This is nothing new within the black organizing tradition, as a number of civil rights scholars inform us (Branch, 1988; Morris, 1984; Dittmer, 1995; Fairclough, 1995; and Payne, 1995). However, with the decline of wide-scale black insurgency and the increasing pragmatic stance of national civil rights organizations, the potential militancy of local-level organizations has increasingly become important. Even many local chapters of the NAACP have embraced more militant postures than their national organization.

This study draws partly from Debra C. Minkoff’s description of institutional ecology (1995) to examine the character, functions, and roles of local-level black organizations as they relate to the dilemmas facing modern, post-civil rights era black politics. Institutional ecology insists that social movement and voluntary organizations serve as the foundation for larger movement activities because they provide density, leadership development and technical training to activists and because they link local-level struggles with nationally coordinated efforts (Minkoff, 1995). One such organization that
combined its efforts with local-level organizations was the Black Student Leadership Network (BSLN)—an organization that operated from 1991 to 1996 under the umbrella of the Black Community Crusade for Children (BCCC). Through its Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute, the BSLN trained hundreds of young black adults between the ages of 18 and 30 in political and community organizing tactics, teaching methodology, child advocacy, and community service (Rhodes, 1995: v; White, Sullivan, and Countryman, 1992–93). During its tenure, BSLN serviced the needs of approximately 2,000 black children every year through its Summer Freedom School Program. More importantly, it mobilized black youth around a national advocacy campaign designed to alter public policy issues of critical importance to black communities (Wiley, 1995: 1–2). By relying upon archival data, the second half of this investigation concentrates on the activities and local-level organizing efforts of the BSLN.

Black Organizational Consistency, Legitimacy, and Density

Black organizations serve as the starting point for analyzing black political participation, voting behavior, political mobilization, campaign activities, and movement-style protest efforts. Previous studies have situated black organizational insurgency within the frameworks of collective action, social movements, and pressure groups. Resource mobilization theory points to the different political motivations and intentional, rational responses of social movement actors, as well as to that which external actors and resources play in developing social movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Jenkins and Parrow, 1977). Under the political process/political opportunity model, black organizational insurgency occurs during cycles of protests or whenever political activists take advantage of shifts in political opportunities which come about as a result of changes in political and social processes such as industrialization, wars, demographic changes, and international political alignments (McAdam, 1982: 36–59; Tarrow, 1994). Other research highlighting the barriers to insurgent demands of black organizations and the activism of black social organizations have examined black organizations in the post-civil rights era (Smith, 1996; Pinderhughes, 1990; and Pinderhughes, 1992).

For this discussion, I utilize Debra C. Minkoff’s conception of institutional ecology to examine the organizational efficacy of black organizations in the post-civil rights era. Though her approach focuses primarily on national social movement and voluntary organizations, it provides a relevant model for analyzing the interaction between national social movement organizations and advocacy groups and similar organizations at the local levels. Minkoff states the following:

[In the American public and political domains formal organizations, not abstract collectivities, are given a voice. Huddled underneath the umbrella, then are interest groups, social movement organizations, and a range of less politicized voluntary organizations. Therefore, if we understand which organizations are supported by—or shut out of—the institutional arena, we should be in a better position to understand how constituencies themselves gain entry as well. (1995: 2)
She believes that insurgent responses by social movement and voluntary organizations are influenced by political and social contexts; changes and challenges from political institutions; national public policy initiatives; institutional racism; and favorable or harmful pieces of legislation (9–17). Also, she believes that these organizations are “often linked to such objectives as providing constituents with skills and resources to promote participation in the political and social arena (e.g., citizenship education), empowering the group through local community development projects, or enhancing cultural awareness and pride” (120).

Minkoff contends that “as the number of voluntary groups and social movement organizations increases, mobilization efforts become less vulnerable to variations in political and social conditions. Thus, individual organizations may come and go, but the group structure as a whole remains a viable aspect of the social and political scene” (3). She suggests that an increase in organizations provides legitimacy, longevity, and consistency to the overall social movement that has defined the organization, especially since “organizational legitimacy is constructed by political and legal events at the national level as well as by organizational density dependence both within and across institutional boundaries” (120).

In fact, many of these organizations, especially at the local levels, provided the infrastructure for recruiting and influencing black participation at one historic, modern event—the October 1997 Million Woman March (MWM). When asked the question, “In which, if any, of the following types of organizations are you an active member?” a significant portion of the respondents at the MWM claimed to have organizational membership in a number of organizations. As Table 1 points out, almost 44 percent of the respondents claimed to be members of neighborhood organizations and close to 62 percent pointed to membership in church-oriented organizations.

An institutional ecological approach for studying black organizations is useful because it seeks to identify those organizations, even at the local levels, that are committed to the ideological demands of the movement goals, rather than relying solely on cycles of protests as explanations for black insurgency. These organizations provide consistency and longevity to these demands even in the absence of mass-level insurgency and represent the totality of the overall social movement community (Staggenborg, 1998: 181–185). This approach also allows us to identify the local chapters of national organizations, such as the local NAACP chapters and the local mosques of the Nation of Islam, which may exert more militancy than their national organizations, as a result of their political surroundings, the relationship that they have with other organizations in its community, and its leadership.

Minkoff’s study also sheds light on the need to systematically measure and account for the plethora of black organizations that have been engaged in community-based, protest, and political activities in the post-civil rights era. Several episodic events over the last twenty years have allowed for systematic measurements of black organizations at the local level, including the 1983 March on Washington, the Million Man and Million Woman Marches; and Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns, particularly since black leaders actively recruited and engaged local-level leaders in different communities around the country for these events. A systematic measurement of black or-
Table 1
Organizational Membership Among Survey Respondents at the Million Woman March (MWM)

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<td>Neighborhood Organization</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA or Parent's Group</td>
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<td>Union</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
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<tr>
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organizations is necessary in order to determine the limitations and potential for modern political and social movement activities within the black community.

Political Orientation and Local-Level Organizations

An investigation of the evolution of black organizational insurgency over the last twenty years must consider how local-level organizations orient or introduce young black activists to different forms of conventional political activities and community mobilization efforts, as well as to movement-style political activities (McAdam, 1982: 51). This orientation involves the psychological process, the cognitive attributes, or the “transformation of consciousness” that are influenced by different political and economic conditions and that provide necessary steps to collective action (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 1992; McAdam, 1982: 51), as well as the political motivations behind one’s engagement in political activities.

Traditionally, one’s orientation to political and community activism has come through local-level organizations or community and social institutions even though many of these organizations did not concentrate solely on political and electoral mobilization efforts. Civil rights activist, Ella Baker, utilized non-political local-level organizations and strategies as intermediaries for introducing and orienting poor blacks to the political process and to protest activities, particular those that were “uncomfortable being identified with the more militant aspects of the struggle” (Payne, 1995: 95). Shortly before leaving the SCLC, Baker sent a letter to its Committee on Administration suggesting that the SCLC coordinate a literacy project not only to teach local
people how to read, but to use this project as an instrument for organizing women's groups, church groups, sororities, and local people around civil rights issues (Payne, 1995: 94-95).

The orientation of black activists to insurgent activism in the modern, post-civil rights era is much different than the orientation of those black activists who fought nobly against entrenched racism and segregation. It is different from those black activists who came through the Black Panther Party or the Republic of New Africa. Part of the differences can be attributed to an increase in the myriad of non-traditional civil rights problems which to some extent have had a similarly negative impact upon the black community as entrenched segregation did forty and fifty years ago (Sullivan, 1996; Harris, 1998). These problems involve the wide range of issues such as black on black violence, crime, and school drop-outs. In particular, gun violence contributed to the dramatic rise in deaths among black men between 15 and 24 and black women ages 25 to 44 (McClain, 1995: 643).

With the intensification of non-traditional civil rights issues, many local-level organizations that would have mobilized around desegregation policies forty years ago, are now forced to mobilize citizens around finding solutions to combating these problems. A young activist who during the 1950s and 1960s may have been a member of the local NAACP youth council or SNCC may now be involved in a local-level organization whose goals are directed towards confronting those non-traditional civil rights issues that are most acutely felt by the particular community in which they are situated. These organizations may represent the only linkage for black residents to any forms of political and community activities. They may also become increasingly important given the disconnect between those blacks living in the poorest communities with social organizations and community institutions (Cohen and Dawson, 1993: 290–291). In fact, as one travels to various cities and towns where such organizations exist, one may find the leadership of local-level organizations dually engaged in internal community development activities and efforts to deal with non-traditional civil rights issues, while at the same time participating in public policy efforts and political empowerment issues.

Dilemmas Facing Black Organizations

One of the difficulties in measuring black organizational insurgency and black political participation is understanding its relevance within a proper sociopolitical context (Walton, 1997: 7). Black insurgency was defined by the lobbying and protest activities of black organizations from the early twentieth century to the 1960s, yet redefined through electoral politics and political movements during the 1970s. Although traditional civil rights and movement-style organizations were responsible for most of the insurgent-level activities by formal organizations throughout the civil rights movement, for the most part, this began to change towards the end of the 1960s. By 1970, the NAACP, CORE, the SCLC, and SNCC had experienced a dramatic decline in initiating insurgent, formal organizational activities despite their dominating influence during the early 1960s (McAdam, 1982: 183).

The decline of black organizational insurgency occurred simultaneously with the increase of black elected officials. Hence, much of the resources of
black organizations are now directed towards gaining entry or access to institutional or conventional political processes. Professor Adolph Reed contends that in the post-civil rights era, black leaders of nongovernmental organizations have aspired for an "insider-negotiator" status, similar to black politicians (1995: 185). Though his description is probably most closely associated with national, nongovernmental black organizational leaders, it also points to some problematic dilemmas facing black organizations operating at the local level.

An important question for this discussion is: Can local-level black organizations effectively combat state-level conservative public policies, economic and political repression, and structural factors that continue to exacerbate racial inequalities? Reed insists that they are somewhat incapable, partly because of the intensity and location of the conservative regime's public policy initiatives. He writes that

it is absurd to present neighborhood and church initiatives as appropriate responses to the effects of government-supported disinvestment, labor market segmentation, widespread and well-documented patterns of discrimination in employment and housing as well as in the trajectory of direct and indirect public spending, and an all-out corporate assault on the social wage. (1995: 189)

He insists that local-level black organizations which "organize programs that compensate for inadequate school funding, public safety, or trash pickup, simultaneously concedes the point that black citizens cannot legitimately pursue those benefits through government" (188).

Although Reed's criticisms are valid and useful, they underestimate the potential impact of these organizations in dealing with both the external attacks on the black community and the internal dilemmas. Dating as far back as the eighteenth century, loosely knit black organizations in the form of mutual aid (benefit) societies, such as the Brown Fellowship Society and the Free Dark Men, organized black residents around cooperative economic initiatives. Though many of these associations suffered from their own prejudices over skin color differences, many of them formed in order to protect their members from economic destitution and economic repression and they contributed to the development of black insurance companies (Greenbaum, 1995).

Additionally, local-level black organizations have become even more important to those black communities that are isolated from larger, national black political agendas and organizations. In his discussion of the local social movement by the Gullah people, John Smith writes that "From the 1890s to the late 1960s, the coastal Sea Islands were isolated from the mainstream black movement" (1995: 289). Thus, the local social movement was carried out by local-level organizations such as the Penn Center of the Sea Islands which mobilized residents around issues involving land-ownership. Organizations such as the Penn Center also produced community leaders that bridged the concerns of "local people" with national black political organizations (Robnett, 1996).

Another task performed by local-level black organizations is their ability to form coalitions on a broad range of issues that are at best tenuous among national-level political actors and organizations. In the 1960s, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) brought together local-level black and white orga-
nizations in various cities throughout the country under its Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP). In Chicago, Louisville, Oakland, Philadelphia, as well as Chester, Pennsylvania, and Hoboken, New Jersey, the SDS through its ERAP project developed local movement centers of its own through the creation of community-based organizations called JOIN ("Jobs or Income Now"). JOIN had a two-pronged strategy, the first of which was to develop a “cross-racial” coalition of blacks and whites from different neighborhoods or organizations around economic justice, community policing, and improved race relations. Their second strategy was to develop an interracial welfare rights group that primarily consisted of women (Gitlin, 1997).

Furthermore, local-level organizations may develop in response to a specific incident or event, similar to Aldon Morris’s description of the different local movement centers, such as the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), the Inter Civic Council (ICC) of Tallahassee, and the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), that mobilized southern blacks during the 1950s around social and political issues (1984: 40–41). A contemporary illustration of an organization that paralleled the movement centers of the 1950s was the National African American Leadership Summit (NAALS) organization whose success was dependent upon the local operative efficacy of its organizing committees and chapters. An examination of the local NAALS chapter in the San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco and Oakland) exhibits the function of this organization. Comprised of activists from various advocacy, religious, and voluntary organizations in the Bay Area, the local organizing committee of NAALS evolved after the Million Man March in order to confront some internal problems within the black community and to push forth some public policy initiatives on behalf of black residents in the Bay Area. The Bay Area chapter of NAALS became a major pressure group in San Francisco’s 1995 mayoral election, lobbying mayoral candidate Willie Brown to adopt certain policies that were beneficial to the black community.

To some extent, local-level organizations such as the Brown Fellowship Society, the Penn Center of the Sea Islands, the JOIN organization, and the Bay Area chapter of NAALS represent the large number of organizations that continue to find ways to improve the life conditions of blacks all over the country. Though these organizations are to some extent invisible because they remain overshadowed by national black organizations and black electoral and campaign activities, they provide the stability and the foundation for not only larger political and social movements, but also national black organizations.

Black Student Leadership Network

The 1980s and early 1990s were critical periods for emerging new black activists and activist organizations. The conservative retrenchment of the Reagan-Bush Administration and its attacks on social welfare and race-consciousness public policies combined with internal dilemmas which plagued many black communities, such as gang violence, juvenile homicide, and crime, seriously raised concerns among black activists. Black political and community activists in different communities were forced to confront issues that were different than the previous generation of activists (Countryman and Sullivan, 1993: 29). Some organizations and activists emerged to provide tac-
tical solutions to the external attacks from the right and to effectively deal with the internal dilemmas within poor black communities. For example, political scientist James Jennings points to the emergence of the “new Black political activist” in the 1980s which entails those conventional black leaders that utilize militant and nationalist appeals or movement-style mobilization tactics to build local power bases and organizations that challenge the major political and economic arrangements (1992: 15–20).

One important black activist organization that emerged in the post-civil rights era was the Black Student Leadership Network (BSLN). The formation of the BSLN began in 1990 when Lisa Sullivan, a community and political activist in New Haven and a consultant to the New Haven NAACP youth council, urged prominent civil rights activists and academics to assist her and other black student and youth activists in the development of a mass-based, black student and youth activist organization. In 1991, Sullivan helped to organize a black student leadership summit at Howard University that attracted a number of student and youth activists from around the country. After much deliberation, the summit attendees officially founded the BSLN (Wiley, 1995: viii). For the next six years until its collapse in 1996, the BSLN linked a nationally coordinated advocacy campaign with local-level political and community initiatives and organizations in an effort to combat both the conservative political and economic retrenchment of the Bush administration and the internal dilemmas (i.e., crime, violence, school-drop outs, etc.) which plagued various black communities.

The formalization and maturation of the BSLN took place amidst the economic recession of the early 1990s and the 1992 Los Angeles riot. Many of the initial members of BSLN were former activists in Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns and were also involved in college campus mobilization efforts in the South Africa divestment movement in the 1980s. Others were drawn from the ranks of student activists involved in anti-racism campaigns across American college campuses during the 1980s. Still most of the initial members of the BSLN, as well as the hundreds of black student activists that passed through the organization were particularly concerned with finding solutions to combating the internal dilemmas which had long been ignored by national black organizations and leadership and had become intensified with the proliferation of crack cocaine.

Beginning on April 4, 1994, the BSLN and local community activists launched its National Day of Action Against Violence in many communities throughout the country in conjunction with the observance of Dr. King’s assassination. It wanted to inform the country that non-violence is still a relevant issue in determining the black predicament. Yet, unlike the movement-style activists who ardently pushed for non-violence as a tactic and strategy of civil disobedience during the civil rights movement, the BSLN emphasized that present non-violent movements should be exerted towards stopping gun and urban violence in black and Latino communities.

The anti-violence initiatives also provided an oppositional response to the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1994 (National Crime Bill) and its push for mandatory sentences (Hoy, 1996). Several BSLN activists coordinated forums in Boston consisting of youth representatives who discussed the impact of urban violence and proposed different violence prevention programs. In Washingt-
ton, DC, BSLN activists and supporters organized a teach-in of young adults discussing the benefits and detriments of the national crime bill, as well as to discuss ways for developing a young black adult lobby network (Hoy, 1994: 2–3). In sum total, BSLN activists participated in at least sixteen local-level activities around the country on April 4, 1994. At the same time, this day of observance became a catalyst which allowed local activists to mobilize community residents on other important local issues, such as housing rehabilitation, police brutality, and educational advocacy. Interestingly, it was not until 1997 that the NAACP launched a similar type of national anti-violence campaign.

The BSLN was situated under the structured framework of the Black Community Crusade for Children (BCCC), which was initiated and coordinated by former civil rights activist Marian Wright Edelman. Since the early 1970s, Edelman’s tenure as president of the Children’s Defense Fund, a Washington-based children’s lobby group, had earned her the status of a Washington insider (Kaus, 1993: 21–22). In December 1990, she utilized her insider status and contacts to pull together influential black academics and activists, which led to the formation of the BCCC. With initial backing from such notable figures as historian John Hope Franklin and National Council of Negro Women president Dorothy Height, the BCCC became a national advocacy organization for black children and families mostly situated in poor communities. The BCCC served as the parent organization of the Black Student Leadership Network which in turn became the black student and youth activist wing of the BCCC.

Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute and the Freedom Schools

As noted in Table 2, the BSLN initiated and coordinated a number of activities during its tenure including anti-violence and childhood hunger campaigns, as well as voter education and social policy issues. Much of BSLN’s energies were directed towards training young black activists in mobilization tactics, leadership development, and child advocacy. This took place through its Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute which became a modern day “halfway house” for training black students in political and community activism (see Table 2). The Institute drew on the expertise and resources from former civil rights activists, social and educational policy experts, grassroots leaders of local-level black organizations, and conflict resolution specialists. Its training sessions usually lasted for two weeks and it included a number of educational activities. BSLN activists were also trained in direct-action organizing strategies that were borrowed from the USSA Midwest Academy, “a training institute for community organizers founded in 1973 and inspired by movements of the 1960s” (Wiley, 1995: 19).

Initially, the Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute sponsored two regional training sessions in North Carolina and California. In 1994, as BSLN expanded its efforts, the institute brought together hundreds of black student activists from all over the country to the Knoxville, Tennessee area for nationally coordinated training sessions at Knoxville College and the Alex Haley Farm in Clinton, Tennessee. After the students went through the rigorous
### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs and Projects</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Day of Action Against Violence</td>
<td>Publicized the anti-violence and violence prevention work of local communities and engaged local communities in policy debates around juvenile issues and anti-crime legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Schools</td>
<td>Developed educational programs for black children in low-income rural and urban communities; coordinated child advocacy campaigns and voter registration drives with local level black organizations, churches, and public officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Party</td>
<td>Organized informal gatherings of young blacks on college campuses, at residences, and at neighborhood centers to discuss pertinent social and political issues; organized letter-writing campaigns, youth speak outs and public forms, and child watch visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childhood Hunger Campaign</td>
<td>Coordinated childhood hunger campaigns with the Food Action Research Council, the North Carolina Hunger Network, and other statewide hunger networks to pressure Congress to re-authorize the Summer Food Service Program of the US Department of Agriculture and to raise the nutritional value and quality of meals served through the program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Education and Social Policy</td>
<td>Through BSLN’s Advanced Service and Advocacy workshops, it developed training sessions in voter education and social policy issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute</td>
<td>Coordinated leadership development and training in direct action organizing, teaching methodology, and child advocacy for hundreds of young black activists.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted, *BSLN History Project*, 1996, BSLN Archives, Washington, DC.

Two-week training session, they were dispersed to work in different Freedom Schools for the rest of the summer.

BSLN’s Summer Freedom Schools operated as its major linkage for connecting its efforts with the projects of local-level black organizations and community and political activists. They were “run by Black college students in a number of sites combining child feeding programs with academic and cultural enrichment, recreation, and child advocacy” (Black Community Cru-
sade for Children, 1993: xiv) and they taught "basic reading, writing, and math and provided cultural and recreational activities for children and youth" (Rhodes, 1995: v). During its tenure, BSLN activists "staffed Freedom Schools in dozens of low-income communities across the United States, serving thousands of children. Local community organizations and schools provided sites, and the interns taught the children Black history and helped improve their basic academic skills" (Edelman, 1995: v). The Freedom Schools also served as a medium for implementing and pushing forth national advocacy projects of the BSLN. These schools were located in urban and rural areas throughout the country including Marlboro County and Bennettsville, South Carolina; Raleigh and Charlotte, North Carolina; Detroit, Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Norfolk, New York, Hartford, Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Washington, DC, and Kansas City.

The locations of the Freedom Schools were dependent upon the support and sponsorship of various host organizations, agencies, and churches in the different communities that requested freedom school sites. For instance, in Oakland, the Freedom Schools were sponsored by the Urban Strategies Council, a non-profit community-based agency and in Raleigh, North Carolina, the Southeast Raleigh Community Development Corporation (SRDCD) functioned as the host agency for the Freedom School. The host organization recruited workers, primarily students, for the Freedom Schools, as well as assisted in raising the necessary funds to coordinate training activities for its participants. Also, each of the Freedom Schools within the different jurisdictions were given latitude to develop and implement individual advocacy pieces that were particularly helpful to those communities which the Freedom School operated.

The concept of BSLN's Summer Freedom School Program was borrowed from SNCC's 1964 Freedom Summer Project in Mississippi. Although the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) was responsible for directing and planning the Freedom Summer Project, SNCC was the principle guiding force for the project since it provided the majority of the staff at the state's headquarters and the funds for the project (McAdam, 1988: 28–29). With SNCC's Freedom Summer Project, staffers chose to bring in a number of white volunteers from Northern and West Coast college campuses, primarily in order to attract attention to the Southern civil rights struggle and to capitalize on their labor resource pool. This did not occur without serious debate, as those who were opposed were concerned that white Northern college students would endanger the need to create indigenous black leadership in Mississippi (Lauter and Perlstein, 1991: 2; McAdam, 1988: 37–38).

Despite the controversy over bringing in white volunteers, SNCC's Freedom Schools occurred simultaneously with its political maturation and attempts to develop a political consciousness among the children and adults that were a part of the schools, as well as aspirations to organize the Freedom School youth into a larger politically empowered "student force" that would challenge the entrenched racism in the state of Mississippi (Cobb, 1964) 1991: 36). For many of its participants and their families, it was their first orientation to either a politically or group consciousness raising activity (Fusco, 1964) 1991: 40).

The impact of the 1964 Summer Freedom Schools had far-reaching effects.
Historian Clayborne Carson writes that it "represented one of the first attempts by SNCC to replace existing institutions with alternative ones" (Carson, 1981: 121). In fact, they were a precursor to many of the Afrocentric-based schools and black independent institutions that many local-level black organizations have developed in recent years. Furthermore, it became a model for the BSLN's Freedom Schools program. However, the major difference was that the BSLN intentionally chose to recruit and maintain a black membership base, rather than recruit white volunteers.

By 1996, the BSLN was in its last phase as an organization. Despite its success with advocacy, lobbying, and political education activities at the national and local levels and its efforts in combating the internal community dilemmas, many BSLN members began to question the ideological thrust of the organization. Many rank and file members were bothered because the organization was still under the jurisdiction of the Marian Wright Edelman and had not yet declared total independence from all mainstream political and lobby organizations. This was especially important since the Republican congressional takeover in 1994 and its solidification in 1996 seemed to have negative consequences on the Children's Defense Fund's resources and lobbying efforts. This affected the BSLN since it was partially coordinated by Marian Wright Edelman who as president of CDF utilized her position to legitimize BSLN programs with patrons, older civil rights activists, political activists, and Democratic party officials. Still another conflict which particularly bother ed many BSLN members was that a few whites began to surface as interns in the Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute and the Summer Freedom School Program.

Interestingly, the BSLN never did exhibit the radicalism that was displayed by the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee during its latter years. Between 1965 and 1969—after the attempts by the older civil rights' leadership to curtail SNCC's militancy at the 1963 March on Washington; its rejection by the Democratic Party at the 1964 Democratic National Convention; and the contradictions in the Vietnam War—SNCC experienced a radical upsurge within its organization. Not only did SNCC officials offer an adamant critique of capitalism, but through its department of international affairs, they established international relations with those engaged in liberation struggles and independence movements in several African, Asian, and Latin American countries (Forman, 1985: 475-522). Also, unlike SNCC with its establishment of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the BSLN organization never made a full effort to organize a third party or a third "force" within the two-party system. Given Edelman's ties to the Democratic Party and her insider status in Washington, it is highly unlikely that she would have allowed the BSLN to move towards a more radical posture or towards third party politics.

Ultimately, the organization collapsed as a result of internal conflicts among the BSLN leadership and staff. Many of the staff members and leaders that were responsible for maintaining organizational consistency left as a result of their disappointments with the Children's Defense Fund and the Black Community Crusade for Children and their disagreements with the direction of the BSLN. Others left in order to pursue personal goals and other opportunities.
Although, the organization collapsed in 1996, it was replaced by the Student Leadership Network for Children (SLNC) which now carries out some of the former operations of the BSLN, including the Freedom Schools and the training sessions at the Alex Haley Farm that was previously conducted under the BCCC and the Ella Baker Child Policy Training Institute. Yet, the SLNC lacked the movement-oriented focus that existed with the BSLN. Summer 1997 was the first year that the SLNC began its work and although it too boasts a predominantly black membership base, many more white students were drawn into the organization. Many of the interns working in the SLNC coordinated Freedom Schools were formerly involved in the BSLN.

Conclusion

This study examined black organizational legitimacy and consistency at a point in which insurgent activities from national black organizations have declined and their influence has all but disappeared and been replaced by electoral activities. Also, this study examined whether local-level black organizations and local chapters of national organizations constitute viable alternatives to national black organizations, particularly in dealing with non-traditional civil rights issues that are specific to the post-civil rights era. One of the concerns for future studies of black politics revolves around the impact that these issues and other internal dilemmas will have upon black political behavior and political participation. The important question left for further research is: How do organizations mobilize young blacks in the most alienated and isolated communities and what organizations have been successful in doing this?

During its tenure, the BSLN was engaged in a number of activities ranging from anti-violence initiatives and numerous advocacy campaigns that addressed various social, economic, and political issues at the national and local levels. Its formation was part of the larger outgrowth of young activists who were seeking to initiate a larger mass movement that would effectively deal with the problems facing modern, post-civil rights era black politics. For many activists, their participation in the BSLN represented a process of engagement to participate in what they believed to be a renewed insurgency in the black community. It also gave them an opportunity to combat the common misconception that black students and young adults tended to be disinterested in political and community mobilization efforts.

References


Franklin


Reflections

African American Public Opinion and the Pre-Scientific Polls: The Literary Digest Magazine’s Straw-Vote Presidential Polls, 1916–1936

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Weeping, wailing and the gnashing of intellectual teeth appear even in the so-called empirical studies.¹ Sociologist Doug McAdam, in a curious study of African American politics, cries about the period between 1876 to 1930:

Unfortunately, the period in question predates the development of modern survey techniques. Thus, we must rely on sketchy impressionistic accounts of the “mood” of the black population rather than any systematic attitudinal data drawn from surveys of blacks.²

Measurements of public opinion in America, however crude, began in the formative years of the Republic and have continued ever since. Practitioners of these early acquisition and measuring instruments called them “straw vote polls,” while modern public opinion specialists refer to them as “pre-scientific” polls. Despite their labels, the critical question is whether these polling instruments, and their less than accurate data, can speak to the academic and scholarly communities about times past. In 1981, The American Political Science Review³ published an article that used such data and Paul Allen Beck praised it for the innovative insights and conceptual richness it brought to modern day voting studies.⁴ In 1994, the American Sociological Review⁵ published a uniquely creative article using straw vote polling data. Finally, one

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can find book-length manuscripts on the subject. Hence, cries and whispers are neither essential nor necessary. Empirical studies appraise mournful sounds as a lack of methodological imagination and the failure to be conversant with the literature on the subject matter under analysis.

Simply put, this is an exploratory study of the theoretical and empirical dimensions inherent in the historical antecedents of African American public opinion. In addition, it is an analysis of the methodological implementation of these polls in order to gather further insights into the very nature of these "pre-scientific" measurements of public opinion and race.

Introduction

On the eve of the twenty-first century, African American public opinion is both underexplored and underexamined. This is as true of contemporary and current expression as it is of the historical antecedents. Rarely have the antecedents of this opinion been subjected to critical analysis, despite the fact that polling in this country predates the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, was featured in a newspaper article on the 1824 election, and was depicted as a major concern to farmers in an October 10, 1855 survey. Launched in the formative days of the Republic, this evolutionary polling procedure has matured and improved over time. By the mid-thirties, polls had attained scientific status. One student of public opinion writes, "Although straw (polls) conducted by common citizens were extremely popular from the mid-nineteenth century through the first two decades of the twentieth, they no longer appeared after the 1930s." Yet it was these "pre-scientific polls" that tapped public opinion before the mid-thirties and have provided researchers with insights into some of the antecedents of current and contemporary public opinion.

Gunnar Myrdal, in his seminal work, titled *An American Dilemma*, did not use either the longer and extensive "pre-scientific" polling data or the rising scientific polling data on African Americans, because he concluded that African American public opinion was a secondary reaction to white public opinion. As he saw it: "The Negro's entire life, and consequently, also his opinions, are, in the main, to be considered as secondary reactions to more primary pressures from the side of the dominant white majority." An observer of this part of Myrdal's work says, "Myrdal believed that these secondary attitudes, being largely defensive responses to white attitudes and actions, were relatively superficial responses, not deeply rooted in the individual psyche or in cultural memory, and could easily be altered if white attitudes changed." For Myrdal, African Americans had no public opinion, neither in terms of historical antecedents, nor in terms of contemporary and/or current manifestations. Hence, there was no linkage between the past and the present, nor could it be; for, if whites did not form and express opinions, African Americans would never have any opinion of their own. Thus, the search for historical antecedents never really begun. At the close of the twentieth century, the search for antecedents is still not on the horizon. Although it should not be.

The "pre-scientific" straw vote polls are opinion surveys, "conducted orally
and with pen and paper [and] ... are used to determine the popularity of a particular candidate or policy."13 The leading scholar on straw-vote polls, Claude Robinson, says: "While straw polls have been used, for the most part, in gauging popular sentiment towards candidates standing for governmental office, they have also been employed as unofficial referenda to determine the position of the voters on important public questions."14 Thus, straw-vote polls fall into two categories: (1) candidate polls, and (2) issue polls.

However, "the most famous straw polls in American history, though, were the ones conducted by the Literary Digest in the 1920s and 1930s."15 Robinson concurs. He notes: "The Literary Digest, whose name is almost synonymous with straw polls, commenced ... in 1916."16 And for the next two decades, it would conduct a series of both candidate and issues polls until 1936. Then an unanticipated event occurred which led to the demise of the Literary Digest. "The Digest accurately predicted both the winners and vote differentials for the presidential elections of 1920, 1924, 1928, and 1932, but failed to anticipate Roosevelt's defeat of Landon in 1936."17 In the next year, the Digest ceased publication and, with it, the "pre-scientific" straw-vote polls slowly disappeared. The massive failure of the Literary Digest's last major poll would forever stigmatize these polls and the opinion information which they contained. Such polls and their polling data fell into disrepute.

However, the recent resurrection of their data and current use, have once again signalled their potential. Thus, in this exploratory analysis, our working hypothesis is that the Literary Digest presidential straw-vote polls can tell us something about: (1) pre-scientific polls and race, and (2) African American public opinion in the first three decades of the twentieth century.

The Data and Methodology

All of the straw-vote polls taken from the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention through 1936 have been dubbed "pre-scientific" because their sampling procedures, methods of data analysis, and sponsors were neither scientific nor professional. Writing in 1932, in the midst of the heyday of the straw-vote polls, Robinson found that eight factors caused them to be inaccurate. There were four types of biases that affected the outcome: (1) geographical, (2) class, (3) selection, and, (4) participation. Also, there was manipulation by the sponsors, and/or multiple voting practices by the participants. Additionally, there could be shifts in voting preferences. But even with these limiting factors, the results of the Digest's polls, as well as the predictions of others, had been fairly accurate until 1936. What then caused the failure?

Initially, analysts claimed: (1) response bias, i.e., the overrepresentation of members of the Republican party and rich people, (2) sampling methodology, i.e., sampling methods were not random, and/or, (3) elements of both. Recent research, using a 1937 Gallup poll that asked about participation in the 1936 Literary Digest polls, "concludes from this evidence that a low response rate together with a nonresponse bias contributed greatly to the failure of the Literary Digest poll to correctly call the winner."18 Here is how they explain the Digest's forecast of a landslide victory for Alfred Landon over the incumbent President Franklin D. Roosevelt. "The magazine's final count be-
fore the election gave Landon 1,293,669 votes (55 percent), Roosevelt 972,897 (41 percent), and Lemke 83,610 (4 percent). The actual results on election day gave the president 61 percent of the vote and his Republican challenger only 37%.

Hence, the Digest poll was substantially off in both categories.

Thus, the study says: "Those who reported receiving straw vote ballots were supporters of the President. But a slight majority of those who claimed to have returned their ballot favored Landon." Therefore, both the analysis of that day as well as those of today, identify both a sampling problem as well as a low response rate. The Digest distributed ten (10) million ballots and had over two million three hundred thousand (2.3 million) returned and counted. Hence, the reason for the failure cannot be attributed to the size of the sample, but rather the procedure and the technique. Such methodological flaws made the Digest and similar such "pre-scientific" polls questionable and any user of these types of polls must be forewarned about their limitations and weaknesses.

With this caveat in mind, we now turn to the database inherent in the six presidential straw-vote polls. Table 1.1 provides the necessary information on these polls. The initial poll in 1916 sampled three groups: (1) labor leaders, (2) five states, and, (3) 3,000 communities. The poll results of five hundred (500) labor leaders accurately predicted incumbent President Woodrow Wilson as the winner while the other two larger polls forecasted Hughes as the winner. This poll was half-right.

By the time of the 1920 presidential election, the Literary Digest had expanded its sampling to cover six states that could play a pivotal role in the outcome of the election. On this occasion, they distributed 600,000 ballots and, with a 26 percent participation rate, they were able to accurately predict the outcome. Emboldened by their success, the Digest would poll nationally and in the urban areas for the next four elections and would substantially increase the number of postcard ballots that they sent out. As Table 1.1 indicates, they polled a sizeable number of Americans. Moreover, each of the nationwide polls enabled the pollster to increase the number of installments that they could write about in upcoming presidential elections. This peaked in 1932, when they had eleven articles in the magazine on the outcome of the election.

Since the poll turned out to be accurate in eighty percent (80 %) of their efforts, they resisted all criticism or opposition and noted, with increasing fervor, how accurate they had become over time. Yet, there were always continuing questions about the sampling procedures from their partisan critics. When the poll predicted a Republican victory, the Democrats would be the challengers and when the poll predicted a Democratic victory, the Republicans would challenge the sampling method. Finally on the eve of the 1936 election, the Digest made a major statement about their sampling technique and even gave it a name. Here is how they put the matter:

The poll represents thirty years' constant evolution and perfection. Based on the "commercial sampling" methods used for more than a century by publishing houses to push book sales, the present mailing list is drawn from every telephone book in the United States, from the rosters of clubs and associations, from city directories, list of registered voters, classified mail-order and occupational data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group/Areas Polled</th>
<th>No. of Cities</th>
<th>No. of States</th>
<th>No. of Ballots Sent Out</th>
<th>No. of Ballots Returned</th>
<th>% Returned</th>
<th>No. of Magazine Installments</th>
<th>Predicted Presidential Winners</th>
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<td>1916</td>
<td>Labor Leaders</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>457*</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wilson (D) Hughes (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five Big Doubtful</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hughes (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>States**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communities***</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Six Pivotal States****</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>153,237</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Harding (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48*</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>2,386,052</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Coolidge (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
<td>2,767,263</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hoover (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>3,064,497</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Roosevelt (D) Roosevelt (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Cities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>2,376,523</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Landon (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Digest gives two different numbers of returned ballots, 457 in the initial article, and 422 in a later one.
** Five Big Doubtful States are: (1) New York, (2) New Jersey, (3) Ohio, (4) Indiana, and (5) Illinois.
*** There is no listing of the communities where the polls were conducted.
**** Six Pivotal States are: (1) New York, (2) New Jersey, (3) Ohio, (4) Indiana, (5) Illinois, and (6) California.
***** The Polls covered all 48 states, plus the District of Columbia and included an additional category labeled "State Unknown" for the ballots that didn't indicate one.
With these words, the *Digest* argued that its poll was characterized by “three distinctions”: (1) impartiality, (2) accuracy, and (3) exclusiveness. It was as if the magazine saw itself in a class of its own in straw-vote polling. It is believed that what made it so “uncommonly accurate,” was its system. Here is its explanation:

The “system” is both simple and complex. The master-list represents every vocation, every voting age, every religion and every nationality extraction in the country. It is constantly revolving, so that a certain percentage of names change with each poll.

The *Digest* said all of this on the eve of the 1936 election. It is in this flow of words, about the nature and scope of their sample, that brief remarks about racial participation in their “commercial sampling” technique emerge. It was in the installment report on their 1916 sample of 500 labor leaders around the country that they reported:

In Baton Rouge, LA, we are informed that there are ten white unions with a membership of approximately 700, and fully 98 percent of these voters favor the reelection of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Marshall. In the colored unions, of which there are five, with a membership of about 900, many of whom have no vote in the state, fully 75 percent are said to favor the Democratic candidate.

Elsewhere, in the 1932 election installment, the *Digest* tells us that: “The District of Columbia has no voice in a national election, but it has in a *Literary Digest* poll. That’s only fair—a slight compensation for the disfranchisement that goes with permanent residence in the National Capital.” In 1932, the District of Columbia had a large African American population. Hence, with several such comments scattered throughout the magazine and its installments, along with the magazine’s claim that its polls were a true cross-section of America, maybe there was participation among African Americans in the poll. At least, it is worthy of a preliminary exploratory analysis.

But before we begin this exploratory analysis, there are two other sources that can give us clues as to African American participation in straw-vote polls in general and the *Literary Digest*’s presidential polls in particular. These clues come from the “commercial sampling” procedure of these polls. Said polls relied upon mail questionnaires and ballots to collect their public opinion information. This meant that the sampling frame or technique relied solely upon readily available and accessible mail lists, i.e., lists with fixed addresses. In this period, 1916–1936, published lists were essentially the telephone directories, automobile registration lists, utility users, subscriber’s lists, a few voter registration lists, and some very specialized lists of doctors, lawyers, clergy, and educators. The *Digest* relied primarily upon the telephone directories and later automobile lists. Thus, at this point, our question is simple: were African Americans on these lists?

A secret and confidential memo from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s statistician and pollster, Emil Hurja, provides an answer! To determine what socioeconomic group had telephones, Hurja quietly solicited the statistical department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. And after an investigation AT&T reported back on the number of farmers, rural people
and lower income people that had telephones. They also gave information on race. Here is how Hurja's memo revealed what they told him about African Americans:

The poll from the southern states is likely to show even a greater percentage in favor of Roosevelt than is indicated in the poll, to the extent of three to five percent, for the reason that about that percentage of the total telephones listed in the southern states are in the names of Negroes, who while voting in the post card poll, will likely not cast their ballots in November.28

Here is the smoking gun that reveals the percentage of African Americans on the phone list as well as the observation that they voted in this straw-vote poll. But there is one more clue and it comes from pollster, George Gallup.

In his analysis of why the 1936 Digest poll failed, Gallup offered the following explanation:

Public-opinion polls can fall short of accuracy, then, by excluding groups which later participate in the actual elections. The inclusion of Southern Negroes in the sample of some polls introduced still another biasing factor in their final returns, since such groups were effectively disfranchised in many Southern states and did not participate in the election.29

As Gallup saw it, the Digest's failure was due in part to the organization's lack of "precaution to control the composition of the cross-section" of the sample and the lack of adjustment for non-voting African Americans who participated in the straw-vote polls.30 This second clue speaks to the first one but in a different manner. Nevertheless, here are two clues, and both from pollsters that African Americans were participating in these pre-scientific polls. Now we can proceed.

These clues, must be tempered by realism. Despite the Digest's continuing comments and assertions, the mail-out postcard ballot of the Digest did not collect data on the basis of race. Figure 1.1, which reproduces four of the six different ballots, confirms that they never requested or obtained the race of the voter. Moreover, it does not show up on the two missing ballots. This "pre-scientific" poll only inquired about the voting intentions of the ballot markers. Thus, the question immediately arises as to how we can discern potential African American participation and its public sentiment from these ballots? This question therefore takes us away from the huge data set and to the matter of methodology.

To explore African American participation and then infer from that participation some testable propositions about African American opinions and attitudes, we will employ a plural methodology. First, we will turn to historical evidence, where available, to establish African American electoral participation in these six presidential elections. Secondly, we will turn to statistical measures of association to see if a relationship between African Americans and the Literary Digest vote exists, and if such a relationship is found, to determine, with appropriate measures of association, the predictability of that relationship from the previous election.

Two measurement models have been established. One will explore this relationship using the African American population. This is a rather standard
### Figure 1.1
The Facsimiles of the Mail-Out Postcard Ballots of the *Literary Digest* Magazine for Its Straw-Vote Polls in 1916, 1920, 1932, and 1936

#### The 1916 Ballot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please mark an &quot;X&quot; before the name of the candidate you voted for in 1912 and the candidate you will vote for in 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFT – Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILSON – Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOSEVELT – Progressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAFIN – Prohibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBS – Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUGHES – Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILSON – Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANLY – Prohibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENSON – Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_FACSIMILE OF THE POST-CARD ON WHICH 15,000 REPLIES WERE RECEIVED IN ANSWER TO THE LETTER OF INQUIRY TO READERS IN THE DODGERS_ STATES

#### The 1920 Ballot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE: INDIANA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please mark an &quot;X&quot; before the name of the candidate you voted for in 1916 and the candidate you will vote for in 1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUGHES – Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILSON – Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HANLY – Prohibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENSON – Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBS – Socialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARDING – Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COOK – Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WATKINS – Prohibition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTENSON – Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_What the Ballot Looked Like_

These were sent to 100,000 voters in each of the six states polled.

#### The 1932 Ballot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE THIS Secret Ballot For PRESIDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Signature-No Condition-No Obligation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Mark Your Choice-Mail At Once</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Last Presidential Election (This is to show your vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To vote for a candidate who is not listed, put an &quot;X&quot; in box above him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACOBSON-COREY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.E. FORD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRED S. T. DAVIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To assist in tabulation by State, please write the name of your State here:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_What the Ballot Looks Like_

The real one is larger than this and is printed in red and black. Remember that the above is not a ballot.

#### The 1936 Ballot

_What the Ballot Looked Like_

Source: Taken from the *Literary Digest Magazine: 1916, 1920, 1932 & 1936*

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procedure in political science, set into motion with V. O. Key’s work on *Southern Politics* in the late 1940s. The second model will explore this relationship between the African American voting age population and the party vote in each state. Creation of these two measured segments of the African American community evolved from the epistemological need to determine intragroup opinions and to move beyond the black-white comparison syndrome that delimits current literature because the focus here is upon group differences and race relations matters. The focus of this study is upon African Americans.

Finally, there is the matter of the “pre-scientific” polls themselves. Beyond the potential of primary insights and testable propositions about antecedents of African American public opinion, these six presidential election straw-vote
polls will be further analyzed for their insights into these types of polls. We now know from the "scientific" polls that (1) African Americans make up an extremely small and meager number of participants, (2) that such polls tend to ask about race relationship issues, (3) societal crises that are race-based generate a lot of interest in attitudes and opinions in the community, and (4) that on such crisis occasions, these polls tend to over-sample the African American community. Put simply, one must ask what one can learn about the nature, characteristics, and scope of such polls and the poll makers. To acquire such insights, it will be essential that a content analysis be conducted on all of the installments of the Digest polls for racial matters and the questionnaire itself as they evolved over time.

It is appropriate at this juncture to add more discussion to the limitations of the Literary Digest data. Although all polls have errors rates, several tests of reliability have been developed to deal with the level of error. The consensus test for the "pre-scientific" polls was the checking of their results with the actual election return data and a measure of their closeness or parallelism; in a word, corroboration. Using extant African American voting return data from the cities of New York and Chicago, in the same time period and overlapping their data for the Democratic party, we found a greater closeness and parallelism. A check of the data with spotty national voting return data from the African American community also revealed an association. It was these tests of corroboration that assisted us in accepting, to a degree, the usefulness of this straw-vote data. In fact, without the empirical results of the voting return data, we would not have undertaken this exploratory analysis.

Therefore, it is hoped that our plural methodological approach will enable us to draw, from this Digest's data set, insights and testable propositions about both African American public opinion and the "pre-scientific" polling instruments and race. Chief among this methodology is a bivariate regression technique which permits us to assess the linearity of the predictive variable.

Race and the Literary Digest Polls

At this point, it is essential that we complete our portrait of how the Digest addressed and responded to the "issue" of race in these presidential campaigns, since it had developed a questionnaire that did not ask for the race of the respondent. To this point, we have discussed only two of the magazine's comments about race and racial participation. It was using the data from the 1916 polls, with the inclusion of Washington, D.C. from 1924 until 1936, when the poll went nationwide and included all 48 states and the District of Columbia.

After 1916, the Digest was criticized in the 1928 election about its sixty-three percent (63%) forecast rate for Hoover. A critic said that this prediction and/or forecast was too "sensational." "He considers the possibility that the poll ballot may have gone prevailingly to 'white-collar' groups, that Negro voters haven't received due representation..." As to the matter of Negro representation in the poll, the Digest simply said that "the list of Digest subscribers is not included as a unit..." in its sampling procedures. It neither confirmed nor denied African American inclusion.
Surprisingly on the same day that the Digest reported the final results of its 1928 poll, it ran an article entitled "The Race Issue in the Campaign" and reported in that article that forty-five leading white southerners signed a protest statement because of the "injection of the race issue into the presidential campaign" by both parties. One party circulated the story that "Mr. Hoover had danced with a Negro woman while engaged in Mississippi flood-relief work...[and provided]...a picture of Oliver Q. Morton, civil service commissioner of New York City, dictating to a white stenographer." 36

The other party placed in several southern newspapers a quote from an article written by W.E.B. DuBois that said: "in all Governor Smith's long career he sedulously avoided recognizing Negroes in any way," and that as far as Negroes are concerned, 'a vote for Al Smith is a vote for the Bourbon South." 37 Essentially, the one-page article merely reported the debate over the controversy and took a hands-off policy. The final report of results never mentioned race or racial representation. Moreover, reports of the controversy, after the polls results were in, suggest that the Digest had no intention of interfering in their forecast.

The next mention of race is in the final report of the 1932 election. Here the Digest quotes the national chairman of the Communist party, C. A. Hathaway, that on election day: "There is disfranchisement of the Negro in the South, but we are going to surprise people with our vote in Negro districts." 38 Then the Digest offered a further remark. It tells us that:

James W. Ford, the Alabama Negro graduate of Fisk University and grandson of a lynching victim, who is running for Vice-President, has also gone from coast to coast by train, speaking at about—ninety meetings...[and]...The police broke up Mr. Foster's and Mr. Ford's meeting in Los Angeles. 39

Again, these comments about the African American Communist vice presidential candidate and his speaking tour, comes after the ballot results are reported and no mention is made of him in the discussion of the results and outcome of the poll. In short, the initial African American presidential candidate received a late remark about this running, not about how he might impact the election.

Although Ford would repeat his role in the 1936 election, the Digest never mentioned him again, only the white presidential candidate Earl Browder. 40 However, after its fifth installment report, the Digest did run an article on those sharecroppers in the South and a meeting of the Arkansas Farm Tenancy Commission at Hot Springs, Arkansas. In that article, the Digest wrote, "There are roughly 3,000,000 farm tenants in the United States. In the South, nearly four-fifths of the Negro farm operators are tenants." 41 The Digest noted the large problem in Arkansas and indicated that the federal government brought an indictment "of an Arkansas planter on charges of violation of antislavery laws..." 42 Therefore, with this remark, and after its comments in the 1932 election, the Digest never again mentioned race, racial issues, racial candidates, or racial participation in the polls. And each time that it did make reference to race, other than in 1916, it was always after the final results were in. Seemingly this was an afterthought strategy. Thus, it can be said unequivocally, that race, race issues, and racial candidate never became even tangen-
tially important to the *Literary Digest* polling reports or discussion. Reference to race was only marginal at best.

**The African American Electorate: 1916–1936**

Extant historical election returns provide the empirical data that African Americans, though disenfranchised in the South, 1890–1901, continued to vote in both the North, South, Midwest, and West. It can be gleaned from this extant historical election data that the remaining African American voters had a strong partisan linkage with the Republican party. But this African American-Republican party alliance was coming under increasing pressure from both the North and the South by third parties like the Populist party in the South and Southwest and the Progressive party in the urban North, Midwest, and West. The data show that African American voters were systematically switching to these two third party efforts and to the Democrats.

Hence, just as the *Literary Digest* polls began in 1916, both the Northern and Southern African American electorate had begun, in 1912, to move into the Progressive party ranks. The conversion and mobilization of this electorate to the Progressive party ranks is well documented by two historians. In fact, of the five major northern cities in their analysis—Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh—the Progressive party carried two, Chicago and New York City, and the Democrats outpolled the Republicans in Boston, Chicago, and New York. These trends suggested that the 1912 African American-Republican coalition was coming apart. And while the Progressives did not make a serious effort in 1916, the budding African American Democratic coalition was evolving.

Despite these evolving coalitions and alliances and the fact that, at the state and local levels, African Americans, via political machine involvement, were winning seats in the California, Ohio, and New York state legislatures as well as in the Jacksonville City council as Democrats, the African American-Republican party alliance and coalition remained the dominant one among the African American electorate. This alliance and coalition, in tatters, disarray, and badly shaken, which had endured since the Civil War, nearly held until the coming of the New Deal. By the 1936 presidential election, this alliance and coalition would permanently collapse.

Two major factors pulled it apart. First, there is President Herbert Hoover's southern strategy of lily-whiteism. "In 1928, Herbert Hoover finally capitulated to lily-whiteism, after being elected, because the number of black voters in the South and the increasing race prejudice and discrimination in America dictated dropping the southern black Republican as expendable. White Republicans became the order of the day."

The second factor, beyond the rising tide of lily-whiteism, was due to acts of the first lady, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. The evolving African American and Democratic alliance "finally cemented" in the presidential election of 1936. Using election-return data from eleven major cities in the United States, Professor Robert Smith empirically demonstrated how this alliance transformed itself into a formidable force. Hence, during the last two years of existence of the *Literary Digest* Polls—there were numerous African American Democrats.
Before closing this historical overview, there is one other unique factor about the African American electorate in the time frame in which the *Literary Digest* polls operated. It took place in the Communist party during their 1932 and 1936 presidential efforts. "The party ran a black, James Ford, for the Vice Presidency in 1932, 1936, and 1940. Each year, the vote for the party dropped from the 1932 figure of 102,701 votes."\(^{52}\) Again, in the last two years during which polls were conducted by the *Literary Digest*, there were African American communist voters in the electorate.

Finally, there were some unique activities at the state level by the African American electorate that provides additional clues of their participation during the years of the *Digest*'s operations. The African American electorate, in 1920, placed their own gubernatorial candidate in the Arkansas election. The candidate captured more than 17,000 votes and finished third. In 1921, the African American electorate in Virginia placed their own candidate, John Mitchell, on the ballot as a gubernatorial candidate. He received more than 5,000 votes.\(^{53}\) Both of these candidates ran on Black and Tan Republican party tickets. It is this type of indigenous African American political activity which totally contradicts sociologist Doug McAdam's argument that the "structure of political opportunities" launched African American political "insurgency between 1930 and 1970."\(^{54}\) Moreover, it is this type of electoral activity that is not picked up by his political process model of mobilization. \(^{55}\) It is also the variety of activity which clearly defines for us the nature, scope, and parameters of African American political participation in the era in which the *Digest* polls were conducted. Finally, there is a significant meaning to be drawn from this historical analytical overview.

Conventional wisdom, advanced by *The American Voter*, is that the African American voter was a Republican up until the New Deal, where they switched to the Democratic party.\(^{56}\) Working on this commonsense assumption then our measurement model would seek to find the degree of association between the African American population, the African American voting-age population, and the state-level Republican vote in the *Digest* polls. Doing such would not, as the historical overview reveals, be consistent with the realities of the African American electorate. For this analysis, instead of using the commonsense wisdom, it is reasonable to seek the association between the Republican vote and the Democratic and Third Party vote, particularly the Communist party in 1932 and 1936, to get a more comprehensive and systematic picture.

Put differently, during the period of the *Digest*'s presidential polling operation—1916–1936—the African American voter, although curtailed by disenfranchisement, entered this polling era with a strong Republican attachment and coalition, but the coalition and alliance were in flux and in transition and eventuated, in the last two national polling years—1932 and 1936—into a strong Democratic alliance and coalition. Hence, the two measurements must take these historical realities into account, or make the necessary adjustments.
African American Public Opinion and the Literary Digest Polls: The Inferential Findings

All of the straw-vote polls in general and the Literary Digest polls in particular were pre-election polls designed to forecast or predict the outcome of presidential elections. These polls asked individuals their voting “intentions,” tabulated these and projected a particular winner and/or outcome. These were pre-election polls designed to pick up public sentiment about a candidate for public office.

The first two initial Digest polls mailed out their ballots to five and six states, respectively. Then from 1924 until 1936, the Digest polled nationwide and in selected urban areas. As these ballots were returned, the Digest announced their results in different installments of the magazine. Just prior to the November general election, the Digest would provide a “final results” table, where the total vote would be given and a winner would be projected.

In this “final results” table, the vote for each candidate in each of the states would be given as well as how these same voters had voted in the preceding election. In addition, in this “final results” table, one could ascertain the vote not only for the Democratic and Republican party presidential candidates but for the third party candidates as well. Thus, it is to this data that we now turn for our empirical analysis.

Using this pre-election polling data, our procedure was to convert the total vote for each candidate to total percentage for each of the major and minor parties. Then, we turned our attention to the African American population and voting age population in each state. Since only 1920 census data and the 1920 Digest poll coincide, it was necessary to conduct the interpolations to secure an estimate of both the African American population and voting age population for the 1916, 1924, 1928, 1932, and 1936 years. Once the estimates had been determined for both blacks and whites, these population totals and voting age totals were also reduced to percentages for each state and the District of Columbia.

Once the percentages were calculated, adjustments to the total number of states had to be made because the African American population was not then and is not now evenly distributed across the country. Other adjustments were made in terms of the years in which we would take the third party vote percentage into account (1924, 1932, and 1936). With this information in hand, the correlation analysis could begin.

Figure 1.2 demonstrates the degree of association between the African American population and the African American voting age population and the vote for the Democratic presidential candidate, 1924–1936. The relationship is nearly linear between these two variables, except for the 1928 election year, indicating a very strong positive relationship between these two variables. The strength of the relationship increased as the New Deal and the policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt impacted the African American community.

Figure 1.3 shows a similar pattern but an inverse relationship between the African American population and African American voting age population and the Literary Digest’s final reported vote percentages from the different Republican presidential candidates. Again the correlation is quite strong between these two variables and it decreases inversely in nearly a lin-
Figure 1.2
r = The Strength of the Relationship between the African American Population and the African American Voting Age Population and the Final DEMOCRATIC Vote in the Digest's Polls

Adapted from the Digest's Final Return Reports as noted in Table 1.1. Calculations prepared by authors

Figure 1.3
r = The Strength of the Relationship between the African American Population and the African American Voting Age Population and the Final REPUBLICAN Vote in the Digest's Polls

Adapted from the Digest's Final Return Reports as noted in Table 1.1. Calculations prepared by authors
Figure 1.4

The Predictive Percentages of Participation for the African American Population and the African American Voting Age Population in the Digest's Final Democratic Vote

Adapted from the Digest's Final Return Reports as noted in Table 1.1. Calculations prepared by authors.

ear fashion except for the year 1928. As the Depression, associated with Republican President Herbert Hoover deepens, the relationship between the party and the African American communities disintegrates. Finally, Figure 1.4 shows the predictive powers of the independent variables, population and voting age population, upon the dependent variable, the Democratic vote cast in the Digest's pre-election polls. Knowing the degree of association between African American population and voting age population permits one to predict a certain percentage of the Democratic vote. For instance, knowing that in 1924 there is a .64 and .76 degree of association permits one to predict that 41 and 58 percent of the votes, respectively, in the next elections can be expected for the Democratic party. However, given the limitations of the data, we used the empirical findings in a suggestive rather than a conclusive manner.

Given this guarded statistical optimism that is based on imperfect data, what clues about African American public opinion can we infer? Again acknowledging the vagaries of the data, we will offer some theoretical instead of empirical inferences.

First, the moderate to strong correlations found between different segments of the electorate in the African American community suggest that African Americans did participate in these pre-election polls. This agrees with the argument propounded by the sponsor of the polls that their "commercial sam-
pling procedure” did include all groups and segments of the American population.

Secondly, the moderate to strong association between the two different electoral segments and the polling results intimates that at the attitudinal levels African Americans were assuming a Democratic partisanship. We developed a sense that this was happening from the data analysis and African American participant remarks in the 1916 labor leaders poll.

Seemingly there is a trend toward an evolving African American Democratic alliance. Even though they could not always vote, they were willing to participate in these polls and cast a pre-election ballot for the Democratic presidential candidates. Moreover, as Figure 1.2 shows, this same community was, at the attitudinal level, withdrawing from the Republican party. At each pre-election poll, African Americans were distancing themselves mentally from the party of Lincoln and were willing to report this distance in their pre-election ballots. There was also found a negative association with the minor parties.

This brings us to the third point, i.e., that African Americans had an “interest in politics” in this period. Both Figures 1.1 and 1.2 point to that fact. In the states under analysis, it is revealed that African American voters found ways to express this political interest, although in many states they were disenfranchised. The Digest polls gave them a symbolic way to express this political interest and, in a unique way, to send a political protest to their former political ally, the Republican party. In the past, African Americans had used symbolic devices—like electing Negro mayors in Colonial New England, and in the 1920s and 1930s the election of mayors of Bonzeville (Chicago)—to indicate their interest in and concern about and for politics.58

Another theoretical inference from these two figures is that it is “not just” an interest in politics. The positive and negative correlations suggest some degrees of awareness, as well as a sense of differences, between the candidates and the parties. Other voters within the African American community were simply following the passing political parade and its issues. Another clue to confirm this inference was the fact that two segments of the African American community were chosen directly to speak to this matter. The African American population includes those unable to vote, while the African American voting age population includes at least those that are eligible and entitled to vote. In the 1924 election, the voting-age population showed more interest and possibly more awareness but as the depression deepens the two groups show similar degrees of association and there corroborates the fact that there was a growing consensus.

Finally, in Figure 1.3 one can project, though not in explicit and empirical terms, from the African American attitudes that their intentions were to form a growing realignment with the Democratic party. Implicit here is that a realignment from the Republican party was taking place. All of this was happening at the attitudinal level as the Digest’s data suggests. Extant voting data and the election of African Americans to several state legislature and city councils as Democrats offer additional empirical support to our theoretical clues and inferences. This transition and partisan realignment was well under way, as we learned from these polls, long before the second election of the New Deal.59
African American Public Opinion and the Pre-scientific Polls: The Questionnaire Instrument

This case study of the *Digest*’s presidential polls permits one to explore the survey instrumentation used by these “pre-scientific” mechanisms. The ballots shown in Figure 1.1 comprise the structure of the questionnaires. The early 1916 and 1920 ballots were basic. The questions asked pertained only to candidate and party voting. The last two ballots, 1932 and 1936, show that the question format changed and particularly in the last one referencing the questions about reasons for non-voting. For this question, new evidence can be gleaned on the actual participation in previous presidential elections. In this respect, the 1936 questionnaire was different from earlier ones.

An analysis of these survey instruments reveal that they did not gather the type of demographic data so commonly found in the “scientific” polls. These questions were aimed at party switching and previous voting intentions. Secondly, these questionnaires captured both the major and minor party support in current and past elections. But, what of race?

Without demographic data, race was not a concern in these “pre-scientific” polls. Therefore, knowledge of racial involvement has to be gathered from insights provided by the poll sponsors and statistical measures of association. Hence, race entered pre-election polls via its “commercial” sampling technique—not from a questionnaire-designed format.

There is one other caveat. The sponsor of the polls tells us that its 1916 labor leader polls included African American labor leaders and allowed some of them to speak in the write-up of the polling data. This suggests that in other “pre-scientific polls,” specifically focused polls may have included African American public opinion and demographic data.

Thus, on the matter of sampling methods and questionnaire design, both became important features in determining if the results cover matters of race and racial issues.

The Inferences from a Case Study: Testable Propositions

Professor James Scott, in his pioneering work on the weapons of the weak, clearly finds that suppressed minorities find ways to craft an unofficial story about their domination, and alongside the official story, there is one offered by the weak . . . but one must look.50 Hence, African American public opinion, even in the “Nadir,” as historian Rayford Logan called the era between the turn of the century and the “New Deal,” exemplifies more than “widespread feelings of pessimism, impotence, and fatalism.”62

From the *Digest* polling data, African American public opinion showed that African Americans had an interest and were aware of politics during this era. Based on these pre-election attitudes, there was a growing partisanship alignment taking place in the community. Although the data does not tell us, there was possibly a protest of the Republican party presidential candidates and their public policies. Clearly there was an anguish with the Republicans that grew out of a sense of betrayal. African American public opinion, during this era of intense suppression and domination, was not, as Myrdal would have us believe, i.e., that African American public opinion was only a secondary
reaction, or merely passive withdrawn responses. The Digest data shows that African American voters demonstrated political cognition, the ability to evaluate, assess as well as respond. It also says that these attitudes could be relied upon to forecast the future Democratic vote.63

This is what this "pre-scientific poll" shows us, though in less precise dimensions than one would want. But it also reveals that sampling procedure and questionnaire design are key issues in helping one to recapture the political thoughts of different segments of the population from the past. And in that past, African Americans were realigning from the Republican party and realigning with the Democratic one. These pre-election attitudes and opinions were clues to future African American voting behavior and party partisanship.

Republican President Warren G. Harding comments after the 1920 election that "the fundamental, eternal and inescapable differences between blacks and whites . . . [served] . . . as the basis underlying his pledge to stand uncompromisingly against every suggestion of social equality . . . racial amalgamation there cannot be."64 Of Republican President Harding and his successor, V. O. Key, Jr. says: "The years of Harding and Coolidge were not times to inspire high hopes in the future of the human race . . . "65 Racism, and its political manifestations formed African American partisan attitudes and opinions in this era. Such words in high places from high people served to highlight the existence and potential impact of African American public opinion.

Notes


13. Herbert, p. 69.
15. Hearst, p. 70.
17. Hearst, p. 70. The Digest 1916 poll was partially correct in its prediction.
19. Ibid., p. 127. See also “Landon, 1,293,669; Roosevelt, 972,897,” *Literary Digest* (October 31, 1936), pp. 9–10.
20. Ibid., p. 132.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 4.
26. In 1924, African American Population (26%), VAP (33%); 1928, AAP (27%); VAP (42%); 1932 AAP (27%); VAP (26%); 1936 AAP (28%), VAP (26%).
30. Ibid., p. 74.
34. Walton, *Black Politics*, p. 106, Figure 5; p. 110, Figure 6.
37. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
42. Ibid., Next to the article, the Digest ran a photograph of the 1936 parade of Southern Civil War Veterans.
44. Ibid., pp. 99–120.
46. Walton, Black Politics, p. 114, Figure 7.
47. Ibid., p. 103; See Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics, p. 154, Table 6.10.
50. Walton, Black Politics, p. 92.
51. Walton and Smith, p. 138, Table 9.3.
55. Ibid., pp. 36–59.
64. Quoted in ibid., p. 107.

* The Digest gives two different numbers of returned ballot, 457 in the initial article, and 422 in a later one.

** Five Big Doubtful States are: (1) New York, (2) New Jersey, (3) Ohio, (4) Indiana, and (5) Illinois

*** There is no listing of the communities where the polls were conducted

**** Six Pivotal States are: (1) New York, (2) New Jersey, (3) Ohio, (4) Indiana, (5) Illinois, and (6) California

***** The Polls covered all 48 states, plus the District of Columbia and included an additional category labelled: “State Unknown” for the ballots that didn’t indicate one.
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Review Essay

America as a "New World" Power: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

Peter Ronayne


The race for 2000 is on, with a multitude of presidential candidates lining up to show why they belong in the White House. Foreign policy played an essentially negligible role in the 1996 presidential election. For all the forward-looking talk about the twenty-first century, neither Bill Clinton nor Bob Dole made a serious and consistent effort to define their vision of American foreign policy in a post-containment era. That negligence was an unfortunate omission, because without a major, threatening adversary, the United States now enjoys the privileged position of having real choices to make about the nature of its role in world politics, the pursuit of order, the promotion of human rights and democracy, and the use of military force. If the present does in fact represent a "unipolar moment" (Krauthammer, 1992), a rare opportunity for the spread of a "Pax Americana," then the United States must address these central questions concerning the nature and legitimacy of American hegemony. Although foreign policy issues rarely play a decisive role in presidential politics, the crisis in Kosovo suggests that they might achieve a rare level of prominence and attention. The NATO war against the brutal Milosevic regime compels the public and policymakers (and hopefully candidates) to reflect on crucial issues of national interest, human rights, intervention, and America's role in the world. The formation of a relatively stable framework for the pursuit of American interests in the twenty-first century...
requires that the United States address these entangled issues and sort out its complex blend of isolationism, realism, and idealism.

Three fairly recent books seek to spark the thoughtful reflection and debate about post-Cold War American foreign policy, a debate too often lacking in domestic politics. All three volumes raise fundamental questions about U.S. foreign policy, past, present, and future, each in an attempt to define coherent parameters for the definition and pursuit of interests by a liberal democratic hegemon.

In *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*, Robert H. Johnson examines the past fifty years of American foreign policy as an exercise in historical reinterpretation and as a means for orienting present and future policy. Through the application of a psychological model to Cold War foreign affairs, he levels strong criticism throughout the book against American foreign policy for a misguided tendency to promote and embrace the exaggeration of external threats.

Conceptions of threat in the international system stem from "a sense of increased danger and a lack of confidence on the part of the persons or groups threatened in their capacity to control events" (emphasis in original, p. 11). From John Dewey’s argument that the "quest for certainty" is a dominant feature of human existence and Herbert Kaufman’s discussion of the "aversion to unpredictability" (p. 13) that characterizes organizational behavior, Johnson points to the United States’ tendency to exaggerate threats to national security when faced with unpredictability and a lack of control.

The Cold War environment epitomized for policymakers a climate of uncertainty and uncontrollability. The development of nuclear weapons, the emergence of the Soviet Union and its oppositional ideology of communism, and the growth and diversity of the Third World all raised high levels of uncertainty and anxiety in the minds of American statesmen. Furthermore, realism’s expansive view of threats due to “interest defined as power,” its emphasis on the use of military force, and its heavy reliance on balance of power concepts provided an inadequate framework for effectively understanding and acting within a more complex Cold War context.

The role of analogies and conceptual frameworks in convincing Americans of the need to fight communism has been demonstrated elsewhere (Khong, 1987). Johnson draws from this theme in his analysis of exaggeration. Uncertainties created by America’s former ally were reduced by comparing Stalin and his regime to Hitler’s Nazi Germany and by transforming appeasement into the domino theory. The United States also sought to reduce Cold War uncertainty by applying military-style solutions to more or less vague political threats. This strategy made ambiguous challenges to Western Europe or the Third World seem more concrete and easier to sell to a reluctant or dubious Congress. Finally, policymakers often relied on a “worst case scenario” (p. 29) approach in their assumptions and predictions about Soviet intentions and capabilities, which Johnson argues might be appropriate in a battlefield situation but is not conducive to prudent and moderate national policy.

*Improbable Dangers* portrays the United States as a polity ripe for this exaggeration of external threats. Exaggeration provides a tool for consensus building in a political system of diffused power. Thus, the Truman Doctrine and NSC 68 stand out as the clearest examples of stretching the truth to build
public and elite agreement on significant foreign policy issues and approaches. Following the advice of Senator Arthur Vandenburg, the Truman administration sought to "scare the hell out of the country" with its so-called "doctrine" in order to rally the nation to universal containment. Similarly, NSC 68 worked "to bludgeon the mass mind of the top government" (p. 33) into favoring a significant mobilization by the "city on a hill" against an aggressive, encroaching Soviet Union.

This potent combination of domestic rationales and revolutionary changes in the international environment merge to paint an often troubling portrait of American exaggeration of national security threats over the last fifty years. The account moves methodically through a fairly critical analysis of U.S. conceptions of threat during the Cold War in Europe, in the realm of nuclear weapons, and in the Third World. Johnson repeatedly and often effectively demonstrates that American policymakers too often saw threats where none existed and described in overblown fashion those that did merit attention. In Europe, the United States fell under the sway of an illusory threat of Soviet attack. In terms of nuclear weapons, once the foundation of mutual assured destruction had been established, policymakers nonetheless pursued an obsession with "overwhelming superiority" and "escalation dominance" (p. 96) that contributed to an upwardly spiraling and costly arms race. Third World regions of the world like Vietnam, Angola, and Afghanistan alarmed American statesmen with the specter of Marxist-Leninist advance in the aftermath of Western colonialism. Altogether, Johnson finds that many threats to minor interests were mistakenly calculated as adding up to a major threat.

After this carefully developed form of moderate and tempered Cold War revisionism, the final section of Improbable Dangers applies the approach and its lessons to American foreign policy in the 1990s and beyond. A post-Cold War world rife with ethnic conflict, the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, and humanitarian disasters means that prospects for control and order may become even slimmer than before. However, the anarchic nature of world politics does not drive Johnson to embrace a fatalistic isolationism.

With the lessons of Cold War threat exaggeration in mind, Johnson urges an American foreign policy more aware of the "intractability and complexity of the emerging disorder" and "the limited capacity of the United States to understand and deal with it" (p. 237). For this, he suggests some ten propositions key to an appropriate "rethinking of national security in an age of disorder" (p. 236) and which reflect a fairly proscribed view of the United States' material and moral interests in the world.

Robert H. Johnson has produced a readable and accessible, rigorously footnoted, and effective analysis in Improbable Dangers that covers significant theoretical and empirical ground. Still, like many solid and provocative pieces of analysis, it raises several important but unanswered questions.

Johnson states in no uneven terms that the reality of contemporary international turbulence means accepting a certain level of moral discomfort, and he sharply chastises Leslie Gelb for a "simplistic" New York Times column on the war in Bosnia that argued, "To countenance genocide, and that is what the Serbs are doing, is to say that evil does not matter, that nothing matters, and that therefore almost anything is acceptable" (p. 234). Johnson can legitimately disagree with Gelb's position, but he needs to provide a more de-
tailed explanation of how his moral calculus determines when the ethical line
must be drawn and where American interests in Europe and elsewhere end.

In addition, the application of his psychological approach to cases of pre-
Cold War foreign policy would strengthen the argument. Did the Cold War
monopolize exaggeration and fear, or did American fear of British encroach-
ment in Texas, Oregon, and California during the 1840s demonstrate the same
threat-fear-exaggeration dynamic? Similarly, can American diplomacy func-
tion and win public support without demonizing as the next Hitler antag-
onists like Milosevic, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein? These suggestions aside,
this book provides a useful framework for rethinking the imperatives of
American foreign policy and the need to meet legitimate threats in the fu-
ture without illegitimate exaggeration.

It would be no exaggeration to say that serious differences of opinion ex-
ist between Robert Johnson and Joshua Muravchik. Muravchik’s latest book,
The Imperative of American Leadership, represents a clarion call for an ambitious
and expansive American foreign policy. Muravchik, a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, argues forcefully for America as the world po-
lieanman, embracing an “engaged, proactive, interventionist, and expensive”
foreign policy (p. 1). Muravchik explains that “the main debate over U.S. for-
eign policy is between the Washingtonian and the Wilsonian outlooks” (p.
20). The invocation of the nation’s first president comes from his famous Fare-
well Address urging Americans to avoid entangling the nation in the quar-
rels of others. Wilsonians, of course, repeat Woodrow Wilson’s call for the
United States to actively shape a liberal-capitalistic world order.

This energetic tract falls clearly with the Wilsonian camp, applauding its
proactive approach and vigorous promotion of a world order conducive to
American values and interests. In this perspective, American “victory” in the
Cold War represents a “loud rebuke to the realist school of thought” (p. 34)
and its criticism of the legalistic-moralistic approach to foreign affairs as na-
ive. The spread of democracy, the end of the colonial era, the durability of
the Bretton Woods System, and the growth of international institutions dem-
onstrate the strength and resilience of supposedly “idealistic” American
statesmanship. Therefore, the United States should continue to be “wond-
rously effective pursuing a Wilsonian, or an intensely activist, engaged for-
eign policy—playing the role of world leader” (p. 35).

Muravchik argues that the United States must lead because no viable al-
ternatives exist. Europe’s dismal diplomatic record since 1914 and the pow-
erfully racial component of Chinese and Japanese exceptionalism remove
them from contention as preeminent world leaders. These blanket statements
ignore the United States’ failure even to join the League of Nations and turn
a blind eye to significant elements of “racial hierarchy” in American foreign
policy attitudes (Hunt, 1987). For Muravchik, hopes for a revitalized, post-
Cold War United Nations inevitably faded and dissipated because the insti-
tution remains a mere collection of states which constantly struggles to
achieve concerted, consistent, and forceful action, succeeding only when the
United States takes charge. Therefore, he bluntly proclaims that Europe, Asia,
and the United Nations cannot match the American record, which “in broad
sweep, is one of success and effective leadership, through two world wars
and the cold war” (p. 70).
In Muravchik’s view, the tragedy of Bosnia provides the ultimate example of world politics in the absence of vital, energetic, American leadership. Without U.S. guidance, the democracies of Western Europe wallowed in indecision that Serb aggressors proved more than willing to exploit. To his credit, Muravchik admits that the United States performed only "marginally better" (p. 123) than its European counterparts, as both George Bush and Bill Clinton failed to stop the Bosnian disaster. But in effect, that very failure supports his overall point. The United States deliberately chose not to take charge, instead ceding leadership to the European Union for a crisis in its own backyard. For Muravchik the verdict is clear: without American leadership, the world’s opposition to aggression “will be formless as a jellyfish—and as brave” (p. 131). Unfortunately, an essential question goes undiscussed and unanswered: when and why do foreign policy elites decide to lead?

Muravchik’s architecture for the continued exercise of America’s hegemonic leadership rests on four main pillars, including the maintenance of military supremacy, the use of force, and the promotion of free trade. Building on his previous work, Exporting Democracy, Muravchik places dramatic emphasis on the fourth pillar, the United States’ role in fostering the spread of democracy. The argument in Chapter 12 resonates with (but does not adequately cite) the still growing “democratic peace” literature. Here, the spin on that school of thought is simple and straightforward: democracies do not fight one another, and thus, the worldwide growth of democratic governments serves American interests and resonates with American values. In this book, the universality of democratic principles stands unquestioned and their expansion should surprise no one, because “all across the non-Western world, people cannot get enough of Western technology, Western economics, Western entertainment, Western consumer goods, Western fashion” (p. 177).

The chapter does address skeptics like Samuel Huntington who argued in The Third Wave (1991) against the supposed progress in the spread of democracy. Interesting sparks would fly at a Muravchik/Huntington debate given the latter’s argument in the controversial The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996a) which attempts to refute the so-called “Coca-colonization thesis.” In a related article in Foreign Affairs (1996b) Huntington states plainly that “the image of an emerging universally Western world is misguided, arrogant, false and dangerous.” Muravchik certainly could pay more attention to both the political realities and the potential consequences of an ambitious if not aggressive crusade to promote democracy, particularly in Asia, where significant American economic interests may collide with issues of regime type and human rights.

In terms of spirit and energy, few will likely match Muravchik’s heartfelt call to action. His feisty polemic does at times skirt the depth required by the issues he tackles and can be somewhat zealously overbearing in its uncritical acceptance of the benevolence of American power. However, his clear vision articulates an approach to American foreign policy that demands attention and loudly rebukes flirtations with neo-isolationism.

The essence and justification of even a benevolent hegemony draws the philosophical acuity of Lea Brilmayer in her discussion of morality and American foreign policy after the Cold War. American Hegemony: Political Mo-
rality in a One-Superpower World applies Brilmayer’s analytical skills to a series of difficult but crucial issues surrounding the just exercise of hegemony. For many Americans the term “hegemony” may too easily conjure notions of empire, domination, and corrupt realpolitik with the strong doing what they can and the weak doing what they must. Nonetheless, since 1945, the United States has actively assumed the role and appears to have no plans to abdicate. Brilmayer’s inquiry forces us to examine the very nature of hegemonic activity by a liberal state and the unique opportunity such an exercise of power provides.

The fundamental issue that first arises involves consent, particularly since the United States has neither the means nor the desire to impose by force its vision of order on the entire world. Instead, American hegemony requires some level of international consensus or support to provide it with adequate legitimacy. To investigate the issue, Brilmayer carefully winds her way through separate chapters each devoted to a unique form of consent, each weaker than the previous level, and each with significant flaws. The first and strongest, contemporaneous consent (chapter 4), occurs when states agree to specific actions by the hegemon. Chapter 5 develops the concept of ex ante consent, the level at which states agree in advance to certain norms which later function as sources of legitimacy for state action. Hypothetical consent (chapter 6) represents an even weaker form. In this form, consent emerges from the assumption that a state would have formally agreed to a norm in the past because the “arrangement” in question is substantively desirable. In addition, the hegemon assumes the lion’s share of the cost of the desired collective good which subordinate states seek but cannot secure on their own.

The final level, the legitimation or justification of hegemonic activity or intervention based on substantive morality, bears most significantly on the United States. The argument developed in chapter 7 is fairly straightforward: in certain situations (usually adequately horrendous, like genocide) morality alone permits intervention without consent. The United States may not seek out monsters to destroy, but it has displayed a penchant for the occasional moral crusade. Therefore, given this American missionary impulse, the notion of justifying interventions abroad through essentially an appeal to natural law seems particularly relevant to U.S. foreign policy.

However, the ultimate policymaking challenge comes in Brilmayer’s thoughtful follow up. To discuss justifications for intervention omits an equally important question: does there ever exist an obligation to intervene? As one observer has succinctly noted, “Every nation acts when its vital national interests are at stake—that is what nations are all about. But a superpower is defined by its readiness to act in some matters that do not imperil national survival” (Rieff, 1995). Brilmayer builds on this point and suggests that we hold any hegemon, particularly a powerful liberal democratic state, to a fairly stringent standard of consistency across interventions. Indeed, she firmly rejects the realist argument that in anarchy, moral arguments and imperatives are nothing more than moralistic naivete (pp. 33, 56). An evenhanded application of ethics in statecraft raises difficult questions made even more compelling and pressing by the so-called (and disputed) “CNN factor” (Stobel, 1997; Rotberg and Weiss, 1996). If Kosovo, why not Rwanda? If Somalia, why
not Sudan? If Haiti, why not Liberia? The discussion does provide room for objections to this demand for consistency and relates several reasonable rationales for non-intervention in a given case. Nonetheless, Brilmayer’s firm conclusion stresses the importance of great power accountability.

Brilmayer never shies away from the ultimate purpose of her analysis, which is unabashedly “to promote a moral American foreign policy” (p. 218). However, the book falls surprisingly short in terms of proposing mechanisms for the translation of her ideas and ideals into policy. A discussion of the evolving role of nongovernmental organizations in the American foreign policy process and their role in constructing a more moral system of global governance would help develop her overly short reference to the transforming ability of “people power” (p. 221).

Brilmayer makes clear that we cannot blindly and uncritically assume benevolence on the part of the United States in its exercise of post-Cold War hegemony. But, she adds that Americans should not shy away from the role of hegemon. Hegemonic activity does not inevitably corrupt but instead “creates the opportunity for political morality” (p. 224). American Hegemony itself provides an invaluable opportunity to discuss the moral challenges faced by a hegemon espousing the principles of liberalism in both internal and international contexts and seeking to transcend the logic of the Melian dialogue.

Charles William Maynes, former editor of Foreign Policy, has explained that “In no area of government can officials spend more money or end more lives than in the field of international affairs. So from the standpoint of giving citizens control of the issues that truly count, debate about foreign policy should be even more vigorous than that about domestic policy.” The books reviewed here bring to the forefront fundamental issues of American foreign policy that for too long have sat unaddressed. They highlight the difficult but necessary task of reconfiguring the foundation of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In the endeavor to spark a high-minded and engaging discussion and debate of critical issues in American foreign relations, The Imperative of American Leadership, Improbable Dangers, and American Hegemony make worthwhile contributions. One hopes that Campaign 2000 contributes to the debate as well.

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Ronayne


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Book Reviews


Michael Armacost’s informative and very readable account of his four years as United States Ambassador to Japan bears a title posing a false choice: are the Japanese our “friends” or are they our “rivals”? The question reflects what Armacost perceives to be growing pressure on the United States, in the years after the end of the cold war, to define more clearly where Japan stands in our Manichean view of the world. American diplomacy, reflecting American popular sentiment, has long tended to identify countries as either friend or foe. Now that the cold war is over and the Soviets are no longer able to serve as our Evil Empire, there has been a growing demand for a new target. During the years that Ambassador Armacost served in Japan, from 1989 to 1993, Japan seemed to be the leading candidate to accede to this role.

On the surface, Armacost seems to accept the idea that there has to be a choice. “The alliance could,” he tells us, “evolve into a more balanced and durable partnership. Alternatively, increasingly intense commercial competition could fuel renewed geo-political rivalry. . . . Things could go either way” (vii). His own bias, he then admits, is clearly toward the former option: Japan should be our friend. The stories he tells in the book, however, do not fit well with this insistence that there has to be a choice. Rather, the most likely future is one which resembles the situation Armacost writes about in this book where Japan is in fact simultaneously friend and rival.

Unlike the ambassadors who came before and after him (Mike Mansfield before and Walter Mondale and Tom Foley after), Armacost came to the job with extensive experience in the day-to-day work of America’s diplomatic relations with Asia. He had served as a special assistant to Ambassador Robert Ingersoll in Tokyo in the 1970s, had worked in an Asia-related position in the National Security Council, Pentagon, and State Department, and had already completed a tour as ambassador to the Philippines in 1982–84. He therefore brought to the job much deeper knowledge of the issues with which he would be dealing as ambassador than most others who had served in this role.

He found himself in that job, furthermore, at a particularly critical juncture in the two nations’ relations: the cold war was clearly winding down and pressure was building, es-
especially in the U.S Congress, for the administration to get much tougher with the Japanese in demanding trade concessions and a more equitable sharing of the defense burden. On the economic side of the relationship, this pressure manifested itself in what was argued as the most far-reaching attempt of the United States thus far to pressure Japan into changing its way of doing business: the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). The U.S. would no longer be content, the Bush administration insisted, with sector by sector negotiations. They wanted the Japanese to open up their distribution system across the board, weaken the ties between the keiretsu business groups, and crack down on cartels: in other words to abandon key features of the machine that had been labeled Japan, Inc. At about the same time, the pressures for burden sharing on the security side of the relationship came to a head during the Persian Gulf Crisis, during which time Japan faced unprecedented (in the postwar period) demands to contribute to the multilateral effort to turn back Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.

As ambassador, Armacost was in a position to participate in and observe this full range of developments: what are usually seen as the “cooperative” ties between the United States and Japan in the area of security as well as what are usually seen as their “competitive” relations on the economic side. It should be noted that the ambassadorship is in fact one of the few positions in the U.S. government where the occupant of the job is regularly forced to deal with both sides of the relationship. The division between those who deal with security and those who deal with economics has generally been so pronounced, in fact, that one can predict with confidence the bias of ex-officials’ writings on Japan by the position they occupied. Glen Fukushima, coming out of a job in the U.S. Trade Representative’s office, and Clyde Prestowitz, coming out of a job in the Commerce Department, both emphasized the competitive side of U.S.-Japan relations in their writings. Prestowitz’s account, in fact, was subtitled “How We Are Giving Our Future to Japan and How to Reclaim It.” On the other hand, officials with service on the political and security side of the relationship such as George Packard and James Auer have consistently stressed the need for cooperation with Japan.

Perhaps because Armacost spent four years working both sides of the relationship, he presents—relative to all of the above—a much more balanced account of the relationship. Although, as noted above, he comes down firmly on the side of the friendship (perhaps reflecting in the end his deeper roots on the political and security side), his book actually captures the complexity of a U.S.-Japan relationship where competition and cooperation regularly occur at the same time. It is not simply that the two countries must balance incentives to cooperate on the security side with incentives to compete on the economic side, but in every aspect of the relationship, the two sides have to balance—to use some political science terms eschewed by Armacost himself—the absolute gains from cooperation versus the incentives to bargain hard over the relative gains.

What this book has to offer political scientists is some rich empirical material with which to challenge the tendency in much of international
relations theory to model the world in terms of false dichotomies. Just as Armacost poses a false choice with his title, *Friends or Rivals?*, international relations theorists such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Greico create false dichotomies when they describe nations as facing choices between cooperating or defecting/emphasizing absolute gains or relative gains. In a world of complex interdependence, well described in Keohane’s own earlier work with Joseph Nye, the absolute gains from cooperation tend to be so great that nations rarely can afford to forgo them. Instead, most diplomacy tends to involve a hard competitive struggle over the details of the cooperative settlement against a background where both sides know they have to bridge their differences in the end.

Episodes recounted in Armacost’s book, on the economic side and on the security side, illustrate this complexity. Armacost’s term as ambassador began and ended during periods of particularly intense U.S.-Japan conflict over economic issues. He arrived in Tokyo in 1989 just as the Bush administration was gearing up for the Structural Impediments Initiative talks, and he left in 1993 just as the new Clinton team’s effort to extract “results-oriented” trade agreements was getting underway. Armacost covers these episodes in his second and sixth chapters.

His presentation of these issues, given his stated aim of selling readers on the importance of choosing to make Japan a “friend” rather than “rival,” is quite balanced. On the one hand, he covers the major American complaints which add up to a charge that the Japanese system is unfairly stacked against foreign firms. Direct foreign investment in Japan has been kept to 0.3 percent of GNP, compared to much higher levels in other advanced industrialized nations. Foreign construction firms were barred access by a Catch-22 provision requiring that they have experience in the market before they would be allowed to bid for projects. At the same time he emphasizes, however, that he has “always regarded trade as a mutually-beneficial activity, not a zero-sum game (35). Many firms, including Motorola, Intel, Compaq, and Proctor and Gamble, he notes, have made healthy profits based on the inroads they have made into the market.

The key to resolving economic disputes, he suggests, lies in getting both sides to focus on the mutual gains instead of the distributive stakes, something which he claims can be assisted by some good old-fashioned salesmanship. More than previous ambassadors, he sought out Japanese audiences and spoke to them bluntly both about the need for basic changes in the trade relationship and about how American economic proposals would benefit Japanese consumers as well as U.S. firms. Particularly during the SII talks, when the American agenda was designed in part with this strategy in mind, Armacost regularly challenged his audiences to recognize that the American demands—for a relaxation of regulation in the distribution sector, resulting in lower consumer prices; for more public investment, resulting in better roads and larger airports—were just as much in Japan’s interest as they were in America’s. Successful salesmanship of this sort during SII, he argues, helped produce important trade agreements.

While Armacost’s account of U.S.-Japan economic disputes points out
the mutual interests buried in what is generally seen as the conflictual side of the relationship, his account of bilateral diplomacy surrounding the security alliance identifies important elements of tension within what is seen as the cooperative side of the relationship. The catalogue of contentious issues he inherited in this area included the following:

While Japan’s defense budget had grown dramatically in absolute terms, it still claimed only 1 percent of GNP. Host nation support had expanded, but the Japanese continued to resist picking up many of the yen-based costs of our forward presence. Japanese air and naval capabilities had improved, but restrictions on acquiring offensive or power projection capabilities remained firmly in place. While legal obstacles to two-way defense technology exchanges had been removed, little Japanese technology had been passed to the United States, and the FSX dispute...highlighted Japan’s continuing drive for technological autonomy. (82-83)

And all of that was before the Persian Gulf Crisis which ushered in a period of unprecedented tension over the degree to which (and the ways in which) Japan would be willing to contribute to the cause of maintaining stability and security in the world. Armacost covers these issues in chapters 3 and 4.

During his years in Tokyo, Armacost participated in the task of trying to rectify to some degree these “asymmetries” in the security relationship. For the first two years of his tenure in Tokyo, he worked to convince the Japanese to finance all of the yen-based costs of America’s military presence in Japan—pressure which led to a 1991 deal increasing the nation’s host nation support over the next five years to an estimated $17 billion (87). Armacost also helped pressure the Japanese to contribute what would eventually total $13 billion to the multilateral Gulf War effort.

Armacost’s account of these and related negotiations confirms his observation that “there was plenty of room for tough bargaining over the details of defense cooperation.” (77). The Japanese often resisted demands until pressure built up to the point where relations were endangered. Early in the Persian Gulf crisis, for example, then Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto coldly rebuffed a request from two distinguished American visitors asking Japan to increase its contribution beyond the $1 billion pledged at that point. The two visitors were left feeling irritated that the session was “more akin to negotiating with a competitor than consulting with an ally.” It was only after the U.S. House was led to pass a bill threatening to withdraw American troops at 5,000 a year that the Japanese increased their contribution to $4 billion (108-109).

After reading Armacost’s account of his years in Tokyo, one is left amazed that all of this happened in just four years. The two nations’ relations are now so important that they must consult not only about economic and security issues that directly affect their bilateral relations but about issues that arise all across the globe. Topics which occupied Armacost during his years in Tokyo included the U.N.-led effort to reconstruct Cambodia, the Latin American debt crisis, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. While Armacost insists that this means the U.S. and Japan must remain “friends,” however, it is clear from his accounts that in all of these joint endeavors, there will also be an
important element of rivalry and conflict.

Notes


3. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Glenville, IL: Scott Foresman, 1989).


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As the twentieth century draws to a close, the political representation of minorities is as widely debated as it was at the end of the last century. The terms of these two debates, one hundred years apart, are in important respects quite similar. The 1897 edition of the Encyclopedia of Social Reform referred to "the inevitable consequence of the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of minorities," a condition aggravated by "the habit of manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts for party purposes...nicknamed the gerrymander."1

More than sixty years after those words were written, the most oppressed minorities, African Americans in the South, had regained the franchise, thanks in large measure to the Voting Rights Act. But their ability to elect candidates of their choosing in venues where they remained an arithmetic minority was another matter, and it still remains problematic, as it does for some other racial and ethnic minority groups and for numerous voters of various ideological persuasions.

Today, as in the late nineteenth century, proposed solutions to the underrepresentation of ethnic, partisan, and ideological minorities among officeholders include forms of balloting known as proportional representation—particularly that involving the single transferable vote (PR/STV)—which are thought to overcome the problem of minority vote dilution in a winner-take-all system. This dilution occurs either through submergence within the larger whole in an at-large, or multimember district, or through gerrymandering in a single-member-district system. In both cases, the strategy of the legislative majority in charge of establishing voting rules and drawing boundaries is to create as many voting districts as possible in which its side is more numerous.

A welcome contribution to the debate over proportionality in voting is the work under review, a collection of essays edited by Kathleen L. Barber which focuses on the actual working of PR in Ohio during and after the Progressive Era. Barber is also the author of the majority of the essays. The spirit of the late Leon Weaver of Michigan State University, long-time advocate of establish-
ing PR throughout the nation, infuses the book; he is the co-author of one of the chapters.

Especially noteworthy is Barber’s introductory chapter, “The Roots of PR.” This is a deft rendering of the history and politics of the idea, which go back to the eighteenth century in Europe and the United States. The author emphasizes the importance of John Stuart Mill in the popularization of the reform on both continents in the nineteenth century. This brief, concise, and informative essay—along with the following two chapters, also by Barber, which respectively locate PR within the Progressive Movement and explain its technical aspects—would make an excellent introduction to PR in a course on election systems or political representation.

Chapters written by Barber, Ronald J. Busch, Robert J. Kolesar, Dennis M. Anderson, and Leon Weaver and James L. Blount are case studies in the actual implementation and operation of PR/STV as a substitute for winner-take-all elections in five Ohio cities beginning in 1915: Ashtabula, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Toledo. The authors show that in each city PR delivered on its promise to attack boss rule and to provide the minority representation that single-member-district, first-past-the-post systems did not. “Minorities gained representation where they had been underrepresented or not represented at all before,” writes Barber. Significantly, it was its very success in electing minorities that tended to cause its abolition. By 1960 PR/STV was no longer extant in any Ohio city.

After summarizing the municipalities’ experience with PR and defending it against critics, Barber proceeds in a final chapter to argue for the potential usefulness of this election method as a remedy for ethnic and racial minority underrepresentation—a method, she believes, which is superior to single-member-district remedies. This chapter, “The Future of PR,” consists of a brief but informed account of constitutional and statutory law governing minority representation from the 1960s forward, including the Supreme Court’s Shaw v. Reno decision in 1993 and its progeny, which have restricted the use of gerrymandering as a means for increasing the number of elected black and Hispanic officials. Her treatment of the various answers to the question of what should be done to insure fair minority representation is even-handed, although it is clear that she prefers PR/STV.

Her views on this matter are close to those of Lani Guinier, who paid for her own criticism of the current election system by having her nomination as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights withdrawn by President Clinton before her Senate confirmation hearings in 1993, after Republican attacks on Guinier as a “quota queen” turned her into a political lightning rod for the new Democratic administration.

There is much to be said for the superiority of PR/STV over “affirmatively” gerrymandered single-member-districts as a vote-dilution remedy, not only because it provides greater representation for various kinds of minorities but because it tends to undercut the two-party system, which has also traditionally served to constrict political competition in a nation, ironically, whose political establishment lauds the virtues of the marketplace.

From the vantage point of the late 1990s, however, there is little chance that this election method will be
adopted by Congress, states, or more than a small handful of smaller governments. Therefore, the problem of minority underrepresentation, at least in the foreseeable future, will of necessity continue to be framed within the context of the current winner-take-all system.

Whether or not this prediction is correct, Barber has made an important, historically informed, and eminently readable contribution to the continuing debate over minority political representation both in Ohio and in the United States.

Note

1. Quoted by Kathleen L. Barber in the book under review, p. 6 (emphasis in the text).

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Boyle and Sheen have prepared a very useful document, an encyclopedia on how religious freedom of practice and belief fare in over sixty countries around the world from every major regional grouping: Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. On the whole the work is very representative, although one wonders why Afghanistan would be omitted from the list. This world report is an edited accumulation of descriptions of religious freedom from the various countries, where possible, from experts living in those societies. Since every culture has its own interpretation of religious freedom or whether such is permissible, it is necessary to have some objective standards by which to measure the existence or non-existence of these liberties. For Boyle and Sheen that standard consists of a number of declarations by the United Nations, especially including the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Also providing important measuring rods are the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention on the Rights of the Child, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The editors point out the existence of national and regional declarations on human freedoms. The basic point in the text is that while practically every country makes constitutional or legal claims or proclamations regarding the importance of freedom, threats to religious liberty of belief and practice abound. Though some countries demonstrate greater recognition of religious liberty than others, practically every nation hosts some significant threat to the practice of religion, especially involving religious or racial minorities or women. In addition, the editors make clear, there is a need to be ever vigilant regarding threats to freedoms presently observed.

Troubling points for religious freedom revolve around a number of areas, including the relationship between national laws and international declarations and principles, the belief in a religion's superiority and the right of others to practice
their religions, the relationship between the state and the religion, religious beliefs regarding the status and role of women and gender freedom and equity, the interconnection between religion and racial/ethnic bigotry and bias, religious beliefs in a society mandating military service, the freedom to pursue secular thought that runs counter to religion, and the right to proselytize on behalf of one's faith. Even countries with great records on religious freedom receive critiques for injudicious handling or neglect of certain freedoms. It would have been helpful if the editors had provided some grade or labeling and/or a rating chart illustrating how close or distant each country was to approximating the ideals set by the editors.

There are many strengths to this book that make it an indispensable resource for teachers, students, researchers, or the average individual who wishes to be informed regarding religious freedom around the world. First, it is a very comprehensive treatment not only regarding the number of countries and world regions covered but also in terms of the detailed description accompanying each entry. There are regional introductions, marking general trends and traits followed by country by country examination. With each country, the reader is provided with information regarding population, annual population growth, percentage of urban dwellers, employment percentage, rate of literacy, and the number of United Nations and/or regional conference declarations of freedom subscribed to by the given country. Each entry gives general, summary details regarding the country's history, ethnic/racial make-up, culture, etc., so that issues of religious liberty have sociocultural contexts. Secondly, the work turns a critical eye to each country under examination. One gets the impression that there is no nationalistic or propagandistic agenda at work, except the concern for securing the maximum possible amount of religious freedom. For example, absent is the effort to present Islamic nations more or less favorably than Christian countries and vice versa. A selective bibliography provides resources for further study along with this world report. One wonders, however, that given the size of this project if a more expansive list of books and articles might be desirable.

One must, of course, read the text as a collection of reports from various parts of the world. Quite possibly, there are factual errors, questionable assumptions, and a reflection of already arrived at political positions that might lead to misunderstanding in some areas. For example, in its regional introduction of Africa, the book claims (p. 19) that "The polarisation of Christians and Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa was an unintended consequence of colonial rule." Undoubtedly, this is the case. But it should be pointed out that conflicts between Muslims and Christians in all of Africa, including sub-Saharan Africa, predated and was often unrelated to the presence and activities of European colonialisists. Discussing the U.S. religious scene (particularly on pp. 154-56) the book makes a number of confused or even inaccurate statements: (a) that African traditional religious traditions were forbidden practice in the U.S. during the colonial period (p. 154); (b) that "The mass civil rights movement began during Kennedy's presidency" (p. 155); (c) speaking of major black churches as being Baptist "congregations" (p. 156) rather than
Conventions and omitting the Church of God in Christ, the second largest black denomination; (d) citing Jews as constituting “between 1–2 per cent of the population and there are smaller numbers of Muslims, . . .” (p. 156) though the percentage of religious devotees is more like 5 or 6 percent Jewish and Muslims are just about equal in numbers; and (e) stating that the first woman Reform rabbi “was appointed” in the early 1980s (p. 164), though Sally Priesand was ordained in 1972. Finally, opting for greater freedom for individual women’s access to abortion accents gender equity, but what are the implications for the unborn child and the protection of the most vulnerable and least protected? The response to this question, of course, reflects one’s political position on abortion, and therein is the problem of making a judgment on an issue of religious freedom. Hence, this text covering a host of countries and regions must be read as a report and double-checked against more precise statistical and historical resources.

This issue of abortion points to a major difficulty about world affairs derived from a reading of the text. Is it really possible to have absolute religious freedom in any nation or culture? We might divide a state’s response to religion into three main categories: (a) a hostile, persecutory stance; (b) a mixed position embracing both a degree of tolerance combined with a strong critical posture; and (c) a situation where religious liberty is widely accepted and encouraged by the government and society in general. The editors’ goal, as is that of most Americans, presumably, is to attain the third position. Invariably, however, there will arise in every culture, given the myriad number of religions and religious expressions constantly being augmented by immigration and formation of new movements, situations where what one group claims as a mandatory right of religious self-expression and practice contradicts profoundly the consensus values of the society and/or the host of other religions in that society.

How does a community greatly concerned about violence accommodate the Sikh’s request to bare ceremonial swords when such display or public possession of weapons does not comport with accepted policy or law? How does a society enforce gender equity when a great number or religious traditions encourage patriarchy? To what extent is it the duty of the state to intervene in religious affairs to promote the goal of equal treatment of women? How can the state really push for racial inclusiveness and fair treatment when the major religion of the nation has enshrined in its doctrine and practice the principle or even the necessity of race discrimination? Does not society have an inherent duty to protect the health and well-being of children, even at the point of abrogating parental supervision? Then how can the Christian Scientist or other religious faith have absolute religious liberty when the state is duty bound to insist that a sick child receives medical care, regardless of the faith stance of the parents? If a society permits the use of the illegal Peyote drug in one religious ceremony, how does it justify the prohibition of marijuana in another? How do we balance one religion’s right not to be verbally attacked with another’s right to seek converts by doing just that to the other religion?

There are, then, three cautionary points for the editors of this work and for all of us concerned with reli-
gious freedom. First, in every society there has to be some consensus on what is acceptable and what is not. No matter how liberal or relativist a society, sooner or later one person's or group's freedom contradicts the well-being of others. Second, religious groups must, therefore, differentiate between what is absolutely beyond compromise in their tradition and what is expendable under certain circumstances, as did the Mormons in the late nineteenth century in making a distinction between the religious right to practice polygamy and the right to forego that practice to live in obedience to American law. Third, and finally, persons and groups must realize that a strongly held belief or practice might entail a willingness on their part to suffer disadvantage or discomfort from the general society. In many circumstances, religious minorities in a given society complain about a level of discomfort or proscription that is far distant from what the majority in that same society would suffer should they live in countries where the former was the dominant religion. What is needed, therefore, is a clear statement of religious freedom that allows the maximum possible freedom for all but that recognizes the need to set reasonable limits.

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Earth is a human-dominated planet. This idea is not new; it was first developed by the great Russian geochemist W.I. Vernadsky, who coined the term "noosphere" in 1945. Vernadsky believed that the biosphere was entering a new evolutionary phase, the noosphere, in which humans radically transform the surface of the planet by human thought transferred into action. According to this idea, humans now are the primary geologic force modifying the earth's surface. Recently, Peter Vitousek and colleagues quantified the extent of the surface transformation in their article, "Human domination of Earth's ecosystems" (Vitousek and others, 1998). The question remaining today is whether humans can at the same time grow in population and maintain the high quality of living now enjoyed by more developed countries (MDCs) on a global scale (Hardin, 1993). This question is mimicked on a smaller scale here in the United States, where we admittedly have the toughest environmental regulations anywhere, but still fall short of long-term sustainability in such basic resources as water, air, and soil. How is national environmental policy developed? The objective of American Environmental Politics is to answer that question. The question this book doesn't answer is whether political solutions are capable of having a truly long-lasting, positive impact.

Human culture, as world population has exponentially grown, increasingly relies upon the land and ocean for the extraction of goods and services to produce wealth and welfare. We have transformed 40–50 percent of the land surface, consume 35 percent of the primary production of the continental shelves, and use more than half of the world's fresh water. The expansion of culture, which results in ecosystem transformation and introduction of exotic species, is causing extinction at a rate
100 to 1000 times background rates. With growth in production of goods and services comes waste. The biogeochemistry of the planetary environment has been fundamentally changed by industrial and agricultural byproducts discharged into the earth's surface waters, ground waters, and atmosphere. Mining of groundwater and surface water has changed the hydrologic cycle in many areas of the planet. The result is a complex array of environmental problems that ranges from local contamination of groundwater to global climate change.

_American Environmental Politics_ examines the laws that govern the management of resources and the control of pollution. Environmental policy development, however, is extraordinarily complex for two reasons. First, the problems are scientifically complex, often on the frontiers of our understanding and with relatively high levels of uncertainty. Thus, the scientific landscape changes drastically over relatively short periods of time. We have learned, however, that we are inflicting change upon the planet at faster rates than at any time in the history of earth. We also have learned that the earth responds in a non-linear fashion to nearly all perturbations. Hence, the high levels of uncertainty when attempting to predict the fate of our impact. Second, environmental issues have a humanistic, as well as scientific, dimension. Environmental problems must be solved in the existing social, economic, and political frameworks. The social response to environmental issues is extraordinary in and of itself (Harper, 1996). Our current academic economic paradigm may or may not be applicable to environmental issues because it considers natural resources and waste reservoirs as externalities of infinite scale (e.g., Daly and Cobb, 1989). Finally, the desire for short-term economic gain exerts tremendous political pressure to short change long-term environmental considerations. The politics of the environment often is tricky, having to overcome deeply entrenched ideas and special interests, many of which are documented in _American Environmental Politics_.

Ultimately then, environmental policy is set in the political arena. _American Environmental Politics_ is a good introduction to how political groups and government agencies interact to create environmental policy, adequately illustrating the difficulty of developing coherent environmental policy. This book, like the article by Lave and MalÉs (1989), shockingly shows the extent to which science is marginalized in the political process. Lave and MalÉs (1989) suggest that Congress is ineffective in developing useful laws "because so many powerful groups demand ad hoc reactions." More than anything, _American Environmental Politics_ is about those groups. In the process, Davis gives an introduction to the history of contemporary (post-1960) American environmental law.

The scope of the book is well defined and focuses on the politics of the environment to the general, but not complete, exclusion of science, economics, and religion. As such, the book focuses on the origin and mechanics of major environmental legislation primarily from the post-1960 era. According to Davis, "analyzing the dynamic and stable features in the development of environmental policy calls for four different approaches." The first chapter of the book introduces environmental politics as a concept, gives a list of the
major national environmental laws, and defines how mass movements, interest groups, political parties, and government procedures are used to understand the development of environmental policy. The remaining chapters each examine the historical and scientific background, major laws, programs, agencies, and issues that shape the development of environmental policy in the areas of pollution and land use. The historical background given in each chapter is essential, but those interested in the history of the environmental movement can find more complete summations in books such as Wilderness and the American Mind (Nash, 1983). Likewise, the scientific information is rather weak, and sometimes incorrect. This information, however, is vital to understanding the issues and anyone interested should consult books such as Our Changing Planet (Mackenzie, 1998) or Environment and Society (Harper, 1996). For raw data, consult the World Watch Institute's Vital Signs series or Oxford University Press' World Resources: A Guide to the Global Environment series. The use of such additional resources will highlight the gulf between what we know about environmental change and how we regulate environmental change.

Davis first analyzes pollution control policy in chapters two through five. These chapters provide a critical analysis of the development of major laws such as the Clean Air Act, the Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The historical background on these laws shows these laws to be in large part ad hoc responses to pressure by interest groups. As a result of compromise, one of the failures of the current regulatory environment is that the true cost of pollution is never assessed. For instance, Davis makes the statement that "recycling often wastes money." This is true only because society does not pay the true cost of waste disposal. Our current mentality is that of the infinite commons. We tend to think of the atmosphere, land, deep ground water, and oceans as infinite reservoirs capable of diluting any amount of waste we input to the system. Unfortunately, waste disposal into "infinite reservoirs" is effectively subsidized because resources such as the atmosphere, groundwater, and the oceans are effectively commons. As an example, energy costs are kept artificially low because waste gasses enter the international commons of the atmosphere. Subsidies increase resource use and waste production causing local (e.g., over irrigation), regional (e.g., acid rain), and global (e.g., greenhouse gas accumulation) problems. Commons such as the atmosphere are considered externalities in economics, and thus cost of waste disposal is not generally included in the cost of production (Daly and Cobb, 1989). These examples clearly show how economic concerns result in opposing special interests that influence environmental law.

Chapters five through eight provide an analysis of laws affecting land transformation. These chapters critically analyze the origin of laws such as the Wilderness Act, the Endangered Species Act, National Parks Acts, and Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Davis characterizes laws such as these as "positive" because they focus on protecting the land and its inhabitants. Land transformation, however, is ultimately the main cause of most en-
environmental problems and therefore is, like pollution, a negative (Vitousek et al., 1998). Chapter eight is particularly important in this light because it focuses on land management and the controversies surrounding the "wise use" movement and "sagebrush rebellion."

The anti-environmental special interests are legion, and are interested because environmental regulations are expensive and thus cut into profit and make land less valuable. Unfortunately, Davis does not address the anti-environmental special interests as clearly as the topic could be covered. Harper (1996) makes a detailed assessment of the opposition to the environmental movement. He points out that litigation, especially strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), is a powerful technique used by anti-environmental interests. Furthermore, Harper points out that extralegal methods are often used by corporations, sometimes in cooperation with the government. Davis tends to focus more on the political debate rather than the strategic tactics used by anti-environmentalists to further their agenda.

Finally, Davis ends the book with an eclectic assortment of topics including population, the consumer movement, and green parties. This perhaps is the weakest part of the book because an extremely complex and controversial topic such as population cannot be adequately covered in just a few pages. Davis suggests that population growth is not an American environmental issue. To the contrary Hardin (1993) makes a very strong case that population is an American issue and that American foreign policy contributes to population growth.

Overall, this book will be most useful to students with little background in politics and social science. Scientists in the environmental field should find this book useful because it would raise their awareness of why environmental law is often poorly conceived. Last, given the dire, but not hopeless, straits that humans have generated on spaceship Earth, we should all question the politicization of the environment. American Environmental Politics highlights the many successes of environmental law, but also shows that most law is an ad hoc response to disaster rather than responsible actions to sustain the future.

References


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Richard Fenno’s latest work on the political behavior of U.S. Senators is in many ways a sequel to Homestyle, his classic study of House members published in the late 1970s. As with Fenno’s previous work, Senators on the Campaign Trail examines the ways in which senators interact with, and are responsive to, their constituents. Unlike Homestyle, however which focused mostly on how House members behaved in their districts between elections, Fenno’s most recent work concentrates on senators’ campaign activity. Despite these differences Senators on the Campaign Trail will inevitably be compared to Homestyle. Although lacking some of the theoretical significance of its predecessor, Senators on the Campaign Trail provides an excellent and frequently neglected perspective on the importance of candidates and campaigns to the representative process.

Fenno’s contribution to the field of congressional politics derives largely from his methodology. Instead of studying campaigns from afar and reducing candidates to their accumulated expenditures and political experience, Fenno travels with a select number of candidates over periods of months and even years. This “drop in/drop out, tag along, hang around” method of research allows Fenno to develop insights into the campaign process that are based on the complexity and individuality of each candidate. This method obviously differs from the traditional political science approach of focusing on the attitudes and voting behavior of the electorate. As Fenno rightly argues however, “…campaigns are important to election outcomes and candidates are important to campaigns” (p. 237).

In this work, Fenno travels with twenty senatorial candidates (incumbents and challengers) across sixteen states over a eighteen year (1976–1994) timespan. Throughout the work, his chief concern is in exploring the representational link between politicians and their constituents. Specifically, he is interested in what motivates politicians to pursue a career in the Senate, how effectively they convince the voters that they should represent them in the Senate, and how incumbents build and maintain support within their constituency.

In terms of pursuing a career in the Senate, Fenno finds that the senators he studied were all motivated by the twin goals of elective office ambition and institutional ambition. The former refers to the pursuit of elective office and the latter to influence within the Senate chambers. For example, former Massachusetts senator Paul Tsongas campaigned for the Senate, and sought institutional influence based on his deep interest in a variety of public policies. On the other hand, William Cohen, former senator from Maine, was motivated more by the personal challenge of competing for the Senate. In each case, Fenno argues that how the senators viewed their goals (especially their institutional goals) affected how they behaved in the Senate and how they ultimately represented their constituencies.

Most of the book focuses more directly on how effectively candidates structure their campaigns. Fenno explores many aspects of a Senate campaign at both the primary and general election level. In chapter 4, he
studies three successive campaigns for the Senate in Iowa featuring two Democratic incumbents and a Democratic challenger. The incumbents both lost because of missteps on the campaign trail but the challenger, Tom Harkin, won by defeating the candidate who had ousted one of the Democratic incumbents. Fenno argues that the more traditional approach to election studies might attribute Harkin’s success to his prior political experience and his campaign expenditures but it would probably not have considered one of his most valuable assets—the information he acquired about the campaigns of his unsuccessful Democratic predecessors. Fenno’s approach to congressional elections picks up this crucial fact whereas the more traditional method does not.

The importance of longevity is yet another lens through which Fenno explores congressional representation. Senators who have been re-elected comfortably over many terms have clearly established a sense of trust with the voters. How have they managed to do so? Although Fenno ultimately concludes that there is no set formula for longevity, he does believe some insights can be drawn from an examination of the careers of Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell and Arkansas Senator David Pryor. The senators’ campaign styles differ considerably, with one described as somewhat stilted and aloof and the other as a back-slapping extrovert. Still, Fenno argues that what the two men had in common was their ability to craft political persona that were consistent with their respective states. The characteristics of a successful political persona include authenticity, consistency, and good character.

While generally perceptive, Senators on the Campaign Trail does suffer from a few shortcomings. First, and most obviously, Fenno’s case study approach may leave some readers less than convinced. To his credit, Fenno readily concedes that the senators he studies are not a representative sample and his conclusions are not necessarily generalizable. At best, he provides us with novel and interesting ways to think about the campaign process although some of his more detailed conclusions (e.g., the importance of authenticity, consistency, and good character to longevity) can only be tentatively accepted.

Another shortcoming of the book is that it focuses exclusively on white men. Fenno can almost be forgiven for this since the Senate has had few members who do not fall into this category. Still, during the eighteen-year period in which Fenno traveled with incumbent senators and challengers there have been a number of non-white and female candidates who have sought this office. Examples include two-term Massachusetts senator Edward Brooke, two-term Maryland senator Barbara Mikulski, and three-term Kansas senator Nancy Kassebaum. Additionally, ten female candidates ran for the Senate in 1992 with four succeeding, including the first black female senator. Had Fenno studied any one of these candidates we might have learned whether the task of representation becomes more complex for incumbents who deviate from the traditional stereotype of a U.S. Senator.

Finally, Fenno’s discussion of the impact of the Clarence Thomas confirmation vote on the 1992 Georgia Senate race was somewhat incomplete. He notes, probably accurately, that Democratic senator Wyche
Fowler lost support among liberal women as a consequence of his support of Thomas. What Fenno does not mention is that Fowler's support of Thomas was likely motivated by his concern for the interests of another element of his core constituency—African Americans. Polls taken in Georgia at the time of the hearings showed that a clear majority of blacks and women supported the nomination. Fenno suggests that Fowler should have either opposed the nomination or expressed regret for his vote afterwards. He seems unaware however that either strategy would have led to electoral consequences among Fowler's black constituents.

These few criticisms notwithstanding, Fenno's latest work is an important contribution to the field of congressional election studies. While the traditional method of examining congressional elections based on economic indicators, presidential approval ratings and measures of candidate experience and expenditures will continue to maintain a central place in the literature, the insights derived from Fenno's more qualitative approach should also inform future research.

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U.S. immigration policy proves as difficult to understand for the analyst as for the potential migrant seeking to enter the United States. While offering opportunities for immigration each year that exceed those of any other nation in the world, the United States also denies entry to more potential immigrants than do all other nations in the world combined. With relatively few periods of low immigration, the United States has long led the world in immigrant admissions. Yet, these opportunities for migration have for much of the nation's recent history been limited to migrants from certain parts of the world. The steady growth in immigration has spurred increasingly vociferous popular demands for further restriction. Yet, Congress seems incapable of responding to the demands. So, the United States is at once open and restrictive, a nation of immigrants, and a nation seeking restrictions on immigration.

In The Face of the Nation, Keith Fitzgerald seeks to link diverse elements of contemporary U.S. immigration policy into an analytical whole. His examination of U.S. immigration policy is part of a larger project to develop an institutionally driven theory for policymaking and state development and to show the strengths of this approach to understanding the evolution of U.S. immigration policy and constraints on policymakers in reforming immigration.

Fitzgerald's analysis of immigration examines three components of the policy—immigration to permanent residence (what Fitzgerald identifies as "front-door" immigration), refugee policy, and control of undocumented immigration ("backdoor" immigration). Each of these policies emerges in turn from popular efforts and congressional initiatives begun in the 1870s to restrict immigration. Prior to this time, all who appeared at a U.S. border were eligible for admission. Thus, there
could be no "refugee" or "undocumented immigrant." This early period of U.S. immigration history did see some local efforts to restrict immigration, but the nation had no enforcement mechanism to make such controls meaningful. In fact, during the first forty years of federal efforts to control immigration, the federal government lacked the infrastructure to enforce most restrictions that it created. Thus, the early U.S. efforts to prohibit the immigration of people with certain professions (e.g., prostitutes and contract laborers), with certain beliefs (e.g., anarchists or advocates of the overthrow of the U.S. government), or from certain parts of the world (initially China, but eventually most of Asia) were often toothless threats. By the 1920s, the nation had the ability to restrict immigration, by requiring visas issued at U.S. embassies abroad and enforcement agents at major ports and land borders. With these administrative capabilities in place, the United States enacted its most limited immigration—Congress reduced the number of immigrants and gave Northern and Eastern Europeans primary access to these immigrant visas.

According to Fitzgerald, the development of the administrative bureaucracy and the restrictions on who had the eligibility to immigrate reflect the creation of a policy coalition dominated by domestic labor, facing competition from immigrant labor; local communities, facing the cost of providing services to immigrants; and patriotic organizations, fearing a decline in American culture or values. By the 1920s, this policy coalition had sufficient support in Congress to enact the most draconian restrictions that U.S. immigration has ever faced.

The policy coalition did have its weaknesses, however. The National Origins Acts did not restrict immigration from the Americas. Subsequent efforts, even during the Depression, were not able to bring Western Hemisphere immigration under the restrictionist legislation (laying the foundation for subsequent debates over undocumented agricultural immigration). These efforts to restrict immigration from the Americas were countered by a newly created player in the policy coalition—the administrative agencies empowered to enforce immigration law, the U.S. State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

With the establishment of mechanisms to control immigration and the selective allocation of this resource primarily to Northern and Eastern Europeans, the government soon found itself in an uncomfortable position internationally in that it could not respond to international population crises and offer admission to select groups over and above the limits. Thus, the State Department lacked a tool in its foreign policy arsenal. This dilemma first came home during the 1930s with the evidence of German persecution of Jews. While many in the State Department turned a blind eye to these reports, the inability of the agency to respond demonstrated a weakness from the department's perspective—it was hamstrung by the national origin restrictions in the immigration law. In response, it created first informally and then increasingly formally, a separate category of immigration for refugees. By 1953, refugees supplemented immigrants to permanent residence in the immigration law. Fitzgerald's examination of the slow evolution of refugee policy from a series of informal reactions to a statu-
ctory component of U.S. immigration law under the direction of the U.S. Department of State suggests a useful way of thinking about this component of immigration policy. The State Department has always been selective in its application of refugee status, usually to the nationals of governments that the United States opposes ideologically. From a state-centered approach, this selective application makes a great deal of sense. The State Department never sought a universal policy. Instead, it sought and created an additional foreign policy tool to be applied when it benefits the agency and, perhaps, U.S. foreign policy.

Fitzgerald's discussion of the shaping of a constituency around the control undocumented is less satisfying than the discussions of immigration to permanent residence and refugees. The network that emerged initially sought to permit a sanctioned exception to immigration restriction for immigrants from the Americas. Thus, the National Origins Acts allowed for unlimited immigration from the Americas. This opportunity, however, did not ensure sufficient immigration to agricultural labor in the southwest. In order to fill this void, a new policy network emerged to create and perpetuate the Bracero program and to limit the ability of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to enforce prohibitions on undocumented migration. This policy coalition was dominated by western agricultural interests and, intermittently, included the immigration service itself and some Mexican American civil rights organizations. Until the late 1980s, this policy coalition succeeded at separating the debate about undocumented immigration from impinging on the ability of U.S. employers to employ the undocumented. Inexplicably, Fitzgerald does not assess or incorporate Kitty Calavita's (1992) analysis of the Bracero Program that shares a similar state-centered focus. Although narrower in scope, Calavita's findings demonstrate that the Immigration and Naturalization Service actively undermined the Bracero Program in order to mask its inability to meet its legislative requirement to control undocumented immigration.

Fitzgerald's efforts to construct a comprehensive state-centered theory to explain the evolution of U.S. immigration policy over the past century take up the first three of the volume's eight chapters. This effort—to construct what he identifies as a theory of "improvisational institutionalism"—is incompletely connected to the case study presented in the volume's final five chapters. While basic contentions such as the limit placed on future policy options by past compromises (for example, the creation of the Bracero program making control of undocumented immigration more difficult) and the increasing role of government agencies as players in the policy networks (e.g., the role of anti-communism and anti-colonialism in raising opposition to the National Origins restrictions) are well developed, Fitzgerald does not offer a sufficient discussion of how newly emerging concerns come to shape policy making and, equally importantly, when these new concerns will be able to have influence and when they will not. Not all policy networks are created equal. The network that created the National Origins restrictions declined relatively rapidly while the network that liberalized immigration law in the 1960s has seemingly withstood a much more sustained challenge and, in fact, has increased the numbers of
immigrants admitted in the face of widespread public opposition.

A second concern about Fitzgerald's approach emerges from the failure to establish the connection between the policy networks that have been created around immigration and the compromises that have been made in the past to today's immigration debate. A central contention of the book is that the "improvisational institutional" model sees each new policy outcome as limited by previous compromises. If that is the case, what are the limits on policymakers today?

Finally, considering the title, the book is surprisingly quiet on the topic of national identity. The period under study saw the most dramatic changes in the nation's history in the ethnic and racial composition of the immigrant flow. Yet, Fitzgerald dedicates little attention to the question of the impact of this diversity on national identity. Instead, the policy focus and concern with institutional arrangements would make an examination of identity precarious at best. Here, then, the title slightly misleads.

In sum, Kevin Fitzgerald offers a timely study of the evolution of state regulation of immigration and the state's ability to implement these restrictions. He demonstrates the appropriateness of an institutional focus and suggests the cross-cutting pressures that have been applied to this policy issue from its first days. Fitzgerald does not, however, build on this model to demonstrate how an improvisational institutional model shapes an understanding of contemporary immigration debates. Like several other models discussed by Fitzgerald, improvisational institutionalism can not fully decipher the complexities of U.S. immigration policy.

Reference


Anthony Giddens is one of the most prolific and respected social theorists working today. In this decade, he has managed to produce nearly one book per year across a range of topics including modernity, contemporary politics, and social science methodology. The book currently under review collects a variety of previously published essays from the mid-seventies to early eighties which deal with leading figures in the history of social thought and particularly sociology. It is comprised of three broad sections: first, four extended essays on Weber and Durkheim; second, an extremely long piece on the history of positivism; third, five shorter works focusing on leading social theorists of the post-war period. As those familiar with Giddens's corpus will see, these essays are often supplements to previous book-length work and, as such, do not break any radically new ground. Still, a mind often reveals itself most clearly when in dialogue with the classics and the pieces contained in this book offer a clear view
of how Giddens positions himself with regard to the leading research programs of sociology.

One of the most remarkable elements of Giddens’s work has always been his synthetic vision. The range of these essays is often astounding and together they provide nothing less than a whirlwind tour of the history of social theory. Even when recounting positions with which he is in disagreement, Giddens’s reconstructions are always generous, reliable and instructive. Indeed, this is without question the book’s greatest strength, for in critiquing these authors Giddens is often forced to abbreviate his remarks for want of space and the reader is occasionally referred to his other works, where more adequate treatments are to be found. Thus, the book often seems to be at its strongest where the reader is weakest, that is, when the reader is less familiar with the subject of discussion (for myself, e.g., Garfinkel’s hermeneutic sociology), the writing is both highly informative and usefully critical; on more-familiar subjects, these virtues are still present, but less powerfully so.

In his Introduction, Giddens endorses an approach to intellectual history based loosely on the works of Quentin Skinner, that is, one which approaches texts in terms of their authors’ intentions, though he quickly adds the caveat that these “intentions” may be of a broader range than Skinner himself would allow (pp. 8–10). This approach is particularly on display in the first section of the book where the theories of Weber and Durkheim are discussed in relation to the particular political situations that obtained in Germany and France at the time they wrote. It is largely absent in the later essays, however, and the figures treated there are located for the most part in a purely intellectual context.

The essays on Weber usefully relate his broad methodological texts to his views of the German polity: “Weber’s concern with ‘capitalism’, its presuppositions and consequences... has to be understood as an outcome, in large degree, of a preoccupation with the characteristics of the specific problems facing German society in the early phases of its industrial development” (p. 31). Giddens stresses that Weber’s methodological individualism was quite different from that of an economist: human action “had a ‘subjective’ content not shared by the world of nature” (p. 41). While broadly sympathetic to his approach, Giddens finds in Weber “an inherent tension which gave his writings their strongly defined character of pathos” (p. 55). Weber, he finds, was unable to tie together the liberal, democratic values which he favored with his view of modern society as something governed, in alternation, by bureaucracy and charisma.

The chapters on Durkheim also outline the relation of his social theory to contemporary French politics, particularly the Dreyfus Affair. By linking Durkheim’s academic writings to his pro-Dreyfus politics, Giddens is able to combat various myths that have arisen about Durkheim which depict him as far more conservative than is in fact the case. Earlier critics have misunderstood Durkheim’s functionalism as “an abstract and ahistorical relationship between the individual and society... If, however, the whole of Durkheim’s writings is seen in terms of the historical framework of the movement from mechanical to or-
ganic solidarity, the resultant picture is quite different: a guiding theme of Durkheim’s work is the depth of the contrast between traditional forms of society and the modern social order” (p. 94). Here, too, however, Giddens finds a fundamental schism. Durkheim’s work struggles to assess both the material and the moral forces which shape human society and, while he made considerable progress in analyzing both factors, “he never solved the problems which the analysis of [their] interplay presents, and, where he discussed social change, it is often as if there are two quite independent sets of processes going on” (p. 134).

The long chapter which describes the many guises that “positivism” has worn shows off both the strengths and the weaknesses of Giddens’s style. For a sixty-page history of positivism, one cannot imagine doing much better. From Comte, who coined the term, to the “logical positivists” of the Vienna School, to Popper, to the “post-positivist” writings of Kuhn and his followers, the enormously diverse history of positivism is shaped into a fairly orderly narrative with the chief virtues and vices of each incarnation of this concept briefly and accurately sketched. The erudition displayed in this elucidatory task is truly astonishing. The difficulty, for the reader already familiar with this history, is the lack of an overarching argument to sustain one’s interest over the course of the story. The links between each stage of positivism are often surprisingly slight with the coherence of the tale sometimes appearing to rest on the terminology which these various generations shared. Towards the end of the essay, Giddens gestures towards a “network model of science” that he believes may be able to accommodate the claims of positivism’s critics while holding on to an account of objectivity (p. 186). But the outlines of this model are only briefly sketched here and, in comparison to the rich historical work which has preceded them, seem inessential.

The final pieces are all briefer attempts to analyze some later social theorists (Parsons, Marcuse, Garfinkel, Habermas and Foucault) and offer pointed critiques. To my taste, the first two are the most successful. The Marcuse essay in particular contains a reassessment of a controversial figure that both appreciates his unique insights while bringing home the force of the various objections that have been made to his work. Projecting Marcuse’s thought both backwards to Marx and Heidegger as well as forward to Habermas and Foucault, Giddens demonstrates Marcuse’s unique position at the crossroads of much modern radical thought. At the same time Giddens shows how Marcuse was not always able to resolve all the tensions that come with such a position.

As a whole, the book reaches toward defining a basic orientation for sociological research. That position is one that takes its bearings from the traditional “founders” of the field, with their firm commitment to the dichotomy of fact and value. Added to this, however, is an appreciation for recent developments in the philosophy of science which necessitate a modification of these claims and an appreciation of the more interpretive approaches currently on display in the field of anthropology. A full, synthetic statement of Giddens’s position is, however, regrettably absent from this volume; to find it, the
reader will have to turn to his other works, particularly his *New Rules of Sociological Method*.

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As the nation’s capital, Washington, D.C. is a special place. Ninety years ago, an observer commented on the “tendency to look upon it with propriety, as the people’s city, occupying a territory peculiarly the property of the whole nation…” (Forbes-Lindsay, p. 7). And it is that sense of propriety, the feeling that the District belongs to the American public that creates the situation that Charles Wesley Harris explores in his book, *Congress and the Governance of the Nation’s Capital*. Washington, D.C. may be the home of the federal government but it is also home to 600,000 people who lack both legitimate representation in Congress and effective local self-government. This injustice is the undercurrent running through the book.

In the 1790s, George Washington led a procession, complete with brass bands and costumed Masons, to a barbecue and land auction in the area that was to become the nation’s capital. Washington, attempting to promote settlement of the swampy area, purchased four lots himself (Monkkonen, 1988). As Harris notes, by the time that the area officially became the nation’s capital in 1800, it had a population of 14,093 inhabitants, of whom 23.5 percent were black. From the start, the national government, especially Congress, played an intrusive role in the city’s affairs.

**A Federal Capital City**

Washington, D.C. is a federal capital city. Donald Rowat argued in his 1973 book, *The Government of Federal Capitals*, that a federal government “wishes to control and develop the capital in the interests of the nation as a whole, while the people of the capital naturally wish to govern themselves to the greatest extent possible” (p. 1). *Congress and the Governance of the Nation’s Capital* uses Rowat’s thesis as the conceptual framework for its analysis. As Harris puts it, there is a “problem of democracy in the nation’s capital,” more precisely, a problem of dual democracy (p. 276). His book is built around several questions: What is the nature of the problem and how can it be resolved? That is, which remedy will provide greater autonomy for the District, representation for its citizenry, and maintain the unique quality as the nation’s capital?

The first chapter of the book provides a succinct governmental history of the District up to the passage of the Home Rule Act of 1973. The conditions of limited self-government and restricted representation are established; the heavy-handedness of the House Committee on the District of Columbia is emphasized. The subsequent chapters address what has happened during the home rule era. ("Home rule" is a misnomer, however, because the District lacks the structural, fiscal, and policymaking authority commonly associated with that label.)

As noted earlier, many of the
District’s problems stem from its unique relationship with Congress. Congressional intervention into the District’s operation comes in many forms, one of which is official challenges to and vetoes of District legislation. However, contrary to Rowat’s argument, this intervention seldom involves the clash of federal concerns and local interests. Instead, Harris notes that “more often than not the prime motivating factor behind the effort to veto the District legislation originated from the parochial interests of neighboring states, moral issues that could be exploited by single-issue interest groups on a national level, and local lobbying groups and leaders who were unsuccessful at the council level” (p. 65). And despite congressional challenges of thirty-eight acts of the District government during the contemporary home rule era, only three acts have been vetoed. Two of the three vetoes—the Location of Chanceries Act of 1979 and the Schedule of Heights Amendment Act of 1990—represented genuine national-local conflict. Thus, although the District government’s actions are subject to second-guessing by Congress, oftentimes the well-publicized congressional uproar fades away. One explanation seems to be the House District Committee’s protectiveness of Washington, D.C. The Committee has evolved from a persistent adversary to a solid advocate of the District’s interests. The role reversal may stem, in part, from “the identification of the committee’s black leadership with the self-government objectives of the District’s black majority” (p. 57).

It is where money is involved that congressional power is most pervasive. “Congress has used the appropriations process to set conditions for the District that are intrusive, condescending, and often in conflict with policies adopted by the local government” (p. 157). Evidence of this contention is presented in chapter 6. In effect, virtually all District government expenditures, whether funded by locally generated revenues or not, are appropriated by Congress. Further, the federal payment to the District, intended as compensation for the federal government’s impact on the jurisdiction, is subject to political whims. And finally, appropriations bills for the District frequently contain riders forbidding or requiring action by the District government.

Land use is a topic in which federal and local interests may diverge. Harris examines two mixed-use development projects in downtown Washington: Techworld and Metropolitan Square, however, neither case is particularly supportive of the Rowat thesis.

Options for the District of Columbia

The last three chapters of the book take a broader look at the challenge of balancing federal and local interests in a federal capital city. Chapter 8 is especially intriguing as it considers an array of structural solutions aimed at addressing the District’s representation and/or self-determination issues. These solutions include: (1) retrocession to Maryland, (2) semi-retrocession, that is, a mechanism by which District residents would vote for federal legislators in Maryland, (3) full voting rights for District residents as a kind of faux statehood (in some versions, the District would be allotted two U.S. senators, in other plans, there would be only one senator), (4) full self-determination rights for the Dis-
trict, and finally, the proposal that is most comprehensively evaluated by Harris, (5) statehood. Even the most modest of the options would require a series of positive actions by several jurisdictions. The District was able to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in Congress for the Full Voting Rights Amendment in 1978, but the effort for ratification by the states fizzled. It is statehood, of course, that most effectively addresses both the legislative representation and self-determination issues. Harris cogently analyzes the pros and cons of eight considerations surrounding statehood. However, even with relatively favorable conditions in 1993, supporters of statehood were unable to muster sufficient support on the House floor to pass a bill "to admit the state of New Columbia into the Union" (p. 231).

The prospects for statehood have dimmed since Harris finished writing his book. The advent of the Republican-controlled Congress and the District's near financial collapse make it unlikely that the option will receive serious consideration in the near future. (In the meantime, the House District Committee has been demoted to subcommittee status.) Nor is the public mood encouraging. Americans appear to be less favorable to District statehood than Americans were to Hawaiian and Alaskan statehood decades ago (Meyers, p. 17).

The structure that the United States has created—a federal district—is one that is emulated in other federal systems. However, nowhere do federal capitals experience the limited representation and restricted autonomy of the District of Columbia. Admittedly, all of the federal capitals experience a measure of the "national interests versus local concerns" conflict that Rowat alludes to in his thesis. But evidence from the Washington, D.C. case leads Harris to refine Rowat's contention. Yes, there is substantial tension between the federal government and the District, but it is not necessarily a function of divergent national-local perspectives. Other motivations trigger the conflict: ideology, partisanship, parochialism, and, of course, race. Race is mentioned occasionally throughout the book and Harris confronts it squarely at the end of chapter 8. He offers a careful understatement, "With its predominantly black population, the District is probably the target of more than its share of racist thinking" (p. 233). Later, he comments that the widely held view of District government mismanagement "is probably enhanced by racial overtones" (p. 267).

He throws down the gauntlet with this statement at the end of the book: "The challenge of dual democracy requires the nation to take a double-minded approach to the local governance of the federal district: The District of Columbia as a national capital and the District of Columbia as a place to live" (p. 276). As he has amply demonstrated, these are parallel but not necessarily compatible notions.

It is undeniable: Washington, D.C. is a special place—for many reasons. As such it has been the subject of much research and rumination. In addition to Harris's fine book, readers interested in the subject are directed to two others: Meyers' carefully crafted work, Public Opinion and the Political Future of the Nation's Capital and Jaffe and Sherwood's more provocative treatment, Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D.C.
References


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Arguing empirically and ideologically against cross-national “market liberal” trends, the sociologist Lane Kenworthy explores variations in national economic performance. Born as a dissertation, this ambitious book carefully tours a wide range of literature in multiple disciplines, debunks familiar arguments, challenges unvarnished market prescriptions, advocates a mix of economic competition and cooperation, and thus illuminates big puzzles which lie at the intersection of modern capitalism and the state.

As such, it composes a thoughtful example of the genre of economic sociology, an orientation defined by the editors of the recent Handbook of Economic Sociology as “the application of the frames of reference, variables, and explanatory models of sociology to that complex of activities concerned with the production, distribution, exchanges, and consumption of scarce goods and resources.” First introduced as a term by Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, and identified with such historical institutionalists as Joseph Schumpeter and Karl Polanyi, economic sociology is now at ease with the limited range of reference and normative proclivities of neoclassical economic analysis. Now undergoing something of a boomlet, the strengths and limits of economic sociology are on display in this volume in particularly attractive form.

Kenworthy’s subject is economic success in seventeen rich OECD countries between 1960 and 1990, thus spanning capitalism’s golden years and difficult period after the crisis of 1973. Rather than treat capitalism all of a piece, he considers how various mixes in the policy repertoires of capitalist democracies, combining markets, cooperation, and state intervention, affect these outcomes. Whereas critical neo-marxist work has tended to focus on the policy instruments capitalism seems to require to flourish, Kenworthy reverses the causal arrow to ask how different policy repertoires shape the performance of capitalist economies.

During the first half of the period assayed by this book, market liberalism seemed passé, falsified, as it were, against the analytical proclivities of mainstream economic theory by the dynamic performance of various corporatist and quasi-social democratic economies. With the loss of confidence in these, and strong Keynesian prescriptions in the latter part of Kenworthy’s period, this orientation to knowledge and ideology
powerfully returned, to emerge as strongly hegemonic in both Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s America.

_in Search of National Economic Success_ is organized as a quarrel with this tendency and with its ready acceptance in the academy, especially by economists. Crisply organized, it proceeds by outlining the basic tenets of liberal market theory (chapter 1) and analyzing the character of the choices this perspective characteristically makes, while introducing its own alternative theoretical arguments (chapter 2). Non-market constraints, Kenworthy contends, are required as a result of the endogenous play of decisions by individuals and firms in the marketplace which can, and often do, produce sub-optimal outcomes.

What follows is an empirical assessment of economic performance using indicators of growth, productivity, investment, output, trade balances, inflation, and unemployment. Treating this data set as his object of analysis, Kenworthy proceeds to examine the _blé noires_ of market liberalism: equality, government intervention, and robust labor organizations. He takes these in sequence. First, he questions (chapter 3) the most common hypotheses claiming to demonstrate why equality depresses economic performance by showing that equality is compatible with a successful economy. Second, he challenges (chapter 4) the market liberal view with respect to five types of government intervention: fiscal policy, redistribution, regulation, labor market policy, and industrial policy. The neo-liberal case, he discovers, is supported, only marginally, in the instance of high taxation. Government programs geared to achieve redistribution, moreover, actually secure their purpose, their critics to the contrary. Third, he focuses (chapter 5, the book’s best) on labor unions and labor markets, demonstrating, against standard expectations, that strong unions and positive national labor market policies promote positive economic performance.

These results in hand, Kenworthy is emboldened to develop his own theoretical perspective (chapter 6) based on his initial insight, much like that of Thomas Schelling, that locally rational decisions under market conditions do not necessarily aggregate into rational collective outcomes. Kenworthy appreciates the price system’s strengths, and hardly wishes to replace it with strong planning instruments. Rather, he suggests that a synergetic mix of competition and cooperation at the micro, meso, and macro levels is more likely to produce satisfactory economic performance than markets or plans alone. The best performers, he finds, are countries which have adopted corporatist forms of interest intermediation and the least those which have been most market-oriented.

_in Search of National Economic Success_ thus provides a data-driven corrective to simple views of market superiority which resist governmental activity and stylize it as intervention rather than treat it as a constitutive element of a national economic development strategy. In this way, the volume clears important ground, opening up a series of questions concerned with which policy mix should be adopted in a given country at a specific time.

Notwithstanding, the book’s silence about political factors, feasible agendas, and distinctive national configurations vitiates some of these gains. The volume is written as if the
book’s economic sociology harder. But, in part, these are issues outside its ken, and that of economic sociology more generally. For they require attention to politics and norms, the book’s missing pieces. Since, surely, there are powerful interests that profit from suboptimal collective economic outcomes, which political processes, coalitions, and patterns of mobilization might promise to shift specific politics towards more collectively satisfying results?

Note


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Following a long tradition of public philosophers beginning with Alexis de Tocqueville, Seymour Martin Lipset sets out to account for “American Exceptionalism,” the recognition that America is an “outlier” among the world’s advanced industrialized nations. Lipset’s arguments are clearly and persuasively laid out through a rich array of polling data, differences in measures of behavior such as religious activity and litigiousness, descriptions of cultural norms and values by sociologists and others, and accounts of the observations of historians. The U.S. is
an outlier among nations in its commitment to mass education and its modest welfare state; Americans pay lower taxes and support less government and are less supportive of government intervention and state authority than their competitors. The U.S. is unique in its commitment to a creed of "liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire" (p. 19). America has a unique class structure that emphasizes "egalitarian social relations," a "stress on meritocracy," and "equal opportunity for all to rise economically and socially" (p. 53). Americans "are the most churchgoing in Protestantism and the most fundamentalist in Christendom" (p. 61). They have a "greater commitment to philanthropic activities" than residents of other nations (p. 67). The United States "has lagged behind the industrialized nations of Europe where many social programs are concerned" (p. 71). It has "stood out among the industrial nations of the world in frustrating all efforts to create a mass socialist or labor party" (p. 77) and has the "weakest union movement in the democratic developed world" (p. 108).

But what is particularly interesting about America's public philosophy is that its negative traits are intertwined with its positive attributes: the problems confronting the nation, "such as income inequality, high crime rates, low levels of electoral participation, a powerful tendency to moralize which at times verges on intolerance towards political and ethnic minorities, are inherently linked to the norms and behavior of an open democratic society that appears so admirable" (p. 13). America's commitment to individual rights, liberty, protection of citizens against the abuse of power are naturally associated with the most commonly cited problems. Characteristics of American society that appear contradictory are intimately related:

The lack of respect for authority, anti-authoritarianism, populism contribute to higher crime rates, school indiscipline, and low electoral turnouts. The emphasis on achievement, on meritocracy, is also tied to higher levels of deviant behavior and less support for the underprivileged... Concern for the legal rights of accused persons and civil liberties in general is tied to opposition to gun control and difficulty in applying crime-control measures. The stress on individualism both weakens social control mechanisms, which rely on strong ties to groups, and facilitates diverse forms of deviant behavior. (p. 290)

"Those... who focus on moral decline," Lipset writes, "ignore the evidence that much of what they deplore is closely linked to American values which presumably they approve of, those which make for achievement and independence" (p. 26). Americans are highly contentious, not because they disagree over core values, but because they "quarrel sharply about how to apply the basic principles of Americanism they purport to agree about" (p. 26). Unlike Europeans, whose disagreements seem to reflect competing interests, Americans' conflicts are rooted in fundamental moral commitments. Unlike Europeans, who take their national identity from common historical traditions, Americans gain their national identity from ideology. Becoming an American is a "religious, that is, ideological act," rather than the result of birth (p. 18).

Many of these key characteristics of American public philosophy are illuminated through a comparison between the United States and Japan.
Lipset describes in detail Japan's uniqueness, arguing that it and the U.S. are the two outliers in the developed world and the most different from each other, yet the two most successful economies. The Japanese group, consensus model of society is most at odds with American individualism and competition. A key to Japanese success has been their ability to successfully merge traditional values of deference, loyalty, hierarchy, duty, obligation, and conformity with the demands of modern industrial production. Lipset summarizes the debate between those who argue that Japan's traditional society is better suited to provide the context for a successful modern economy in the future, and those who argue that the U.S. is the model of industrial efficiency. He concludes that both countries have maintained much of their unique or exceptional character as they have become economic superpowers, demonstrating that different kinds of societies can successfully produce powerful modern economies. *American Exceptionalism* is compelling evidence of the great value of comparative analyses in illuminating the central characteristics of nations.

Lipset's assessment of America's exceptional nature includes a discussion in some detail of three groups in American society that are exceptions to the exceptionalism. First, African Americans, because of their history of slavery and racism, are much like European workers and less like whites as they "respond to group-related, rather than individually oriented values" (p. 113). As a result, they, as well as white elites committed to equality, favor group-oriented solutions to the problems confronting them such as affirmative action. Second, American Jews are unique: like blacks, they are "committed to liberal social reform," but they are also seen as at or near the top of the social system. Although they only make up about 2.5 percent of the population, they are usually accorded one-third representation, along with Catholics and Protestants, in public ceremonies and other settings (p. 151). The high status enjoyed by Jews in America and the strong support for worldwide Jewish causes are unique in the world. Like Jews, the third group Lipset examines, American intellectuals, are to the left of mainstream America, but provide further evidence of American exceptionalism because of the moral-based content of their intellectual arguments and commitments. Both the left and right on American campuses are unusually committed to political correctness: "both are more moralistic, insistent on absolute standards, than their ideological compatriots elsewhere in the developed world" (p. 207).

Lipset's analysis helps explain the growing sense of moral decline: Americans take their public values seriously, but "no country could ever measure up to our ideological and religious standards" (p. 268). That problem is compounded by another: Our "egalitarian and meritocratic foundations tend to undercut just those institutions that sustain the values that so concern us... America... has not had a stable ruling class to promote such standards of moral conduct and fair play" (p. 268). Characteristics of American society such as high rates of crime, the declining two-parent families, Lipset argues, are not a crisis in values, but are reflections of enduring commitments. But Lipset is quite optimistic in assessing the contemporary debate over individuals and civil society. He finds that "individualism
strengthens the bonds of civil society rather than weakens them" (277). People who are the most individualistic are the most likely to be engaged in voluntary activities. Individualism is compatible with religious activity. The decline of civic engagement described by Robert Putnam and others, the growth of cynicism and declining trust in government and breakdown in respect for authority, and the exaggeration of societal problems and political scandals in media reports have not threatened the stability of the American political system. America's core national values have remained remarkably consistent and reflect an enduring attempt to achieve moral and ideological consensus.

Like other thoughtful and provocative works of social science, American Exceptionalism raises as many questions as it answers. For example, if much of American exceptionalism is rooted in its hesitancy to embrace the welfare state, then what do we make of the growing crisis of the welfare state in Europe and North America, where more and more governments seem anxious to cut spending and commitments? Democratic societies seem to be more and more troubled by interest group politics and the unceasing demands for benefits and subsidies. Are the challenges to the American welfare state by the Republican Congress in 1995 more similar than different to those launched by conservatives and skeptics elsewhere in the industrialized world? The demographics of the developed world seems to call for more social commitments. Is an individual ethic sufficient to provide for collective concerns such as the health and income needs of populations declining in age, or is a political discourse of shared responsibility essential in anticipating and responding to these changes? If ecologists are correct, fundamental changes are required in industrial and commercial activity in order for economic activity to be environmentally sustainable. Is American exceptionalism possible in the face of growing environmental threats? The wasteful consumption levels of Americans contribute to the misery and poverty in which others struggle and often fail to survive. Can American exceptionalism provide the basis for formulating a response to the growing tension between the North and South? Lipset makes a persuasive case for the future of American exceptionalism. But there are numerous challenges to his optimism that American public philosophy is sustainable and sufficient to respond to the challenges ahead.

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Recent changes in the United States Congress have been dramatic to say the least. The new Republican majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate have resulted in significant changes in both the policy context and the rules of lawmaking. Until 1994, the political science literature on legislative behavior and the policy process was fairly comprehensive. However, it was generally limited to the study of forty years of Democratic majorities. The change in leadership to the Republican party demands an updated study of Congress, which Burdett Loomis's sec-
ond edition of The Contemporary Congress provides.

By presenting a broad overview of the factors that influence legislative behavior, Loomis’s text offers congressional scholars an excellent resource for analysis. The author argues that members of Congress face tension between centralizing and decentralizing political factors. Explaining how this tension developed, and how it exists in the new Republican-controlled Congress, are the primary themes of the text. In this second edition, Loomis introduces more in-depth coverage of legislative behavior within the context of the Republican majority.

Loomis argues that Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, was set up by the founders to be decentralized, that is, to respond to constituents. Over time, the Senate has also become more responsive to constituents, interest groups, and individualistic concerns. However, despite Congress’s decentralization, its primary purpose is to work collectively in passing laws. Therefore, some centralization is necessary, through party leadership and rule-making, to facilitate collective action. The resulting relationship between the various centralizing and decentralizing forces shapes the policymaking process.

In developing his framework of the legislative process, Loomis provides a concise history of legislative behavior, focusing on constitutional design, the development of committees and subcommittees, and the role of House and Senate leadership in rule-making and party control. In particular, Loomis emphasizes that decentralizing tendencies, such as elections, have existed in Congress since the early years of the republic. As the country and the government grew, so did decentralization. For instance, the committee system was institutionalized to provide greater policy expertise. As much as strong party leaders, such as Reed and Cannon, attempted to centralize policymaking within their parties, decentralization has been a strong force in Congress.

Loomis discusses four factors which encourage decentralization: constituents and elections, interest groups, committee work, and the individual legislators themselves. At the same time, another set of factors encourages greater collective action: political parties, party leaders and the president, and institutional rules and folkways. In many cases, the needs and wishes of constituents and interest groups do not coincide with the needs and wishes of the party leadership. As a result, legislators are caught in a tug of war—respond to constituents and groups, who provide votes and money for future elections, or respond to party leaders, who provide campaign money as well as facilitate policy-making goals through rule-making and committee positions. The resulting interplay between these forces affects policy outcomes.

According to Loomis, the Democratic-controlled Congress of the post-World War II era continually grew more decentralized. Constituents, groups, and individual committee work competed with party leadership over lawmaking. As a result, major policy goals were often difficult to achieve. In response to this perceived gridlock, the Republican party in the 1994 election promised greater centralization in Congress. The party agreed to changes, such as stronger party leadership and clearer policy goals, through the Contract with America, in order to bring
House and Senate Republicans closer together and expedite policy-making. However, as Loomis concludes, this strong centralization was relatively short-lived. While the House did pass most of the measures included in the Contract with America, few were actually signed into law. Furthermore, the 105th Congress has seen a return to decentralization as junior Republican members struggle to maintain their seats and find it necessary to be more responsive to voters.

Loomis relies on Fenno’s (1975) quote to help explain the legislative process: “It is the members who run Congress. And we will get pretty much the kind of Congress they want. We shall get a different kind of Congress when we elect different kinds of Congressmen.” In 1994, the United States did elect a different kind of Congress, at least in terms of political party. However, it remains to be seen whether this change in members has resulted in a change in the legislative process or even different kinds of policies. Loomis suggests that the policy process of the Republican majority is just as decentralized as it was under the Democratic majority.

One could argue that the policy process is too slow and disjointed, due to the influence of constituents and interest groups. Has Congress become too decentralized today? With campaign costs continuing to skyrocket, legislators are finding it more important to respond to their voters and campaign contributors. Their responsiveness may epitomize the sort of republic the founders wanted, one where voters did have a say in the policy process. At the same time, the founders wanted the policy process to be deliberate and effective, demanding collective action. Centralizing and decentralizing forces will always exist for Congress, but campaign finance reform may be the most effective route to balancing out these forces, and providing a better basis for sound legislation. However, the high level of coordination needed to achieve effective campaign finance reform makes such legislation unlikely. The policy process is likely to continue to be decentralized, unless strong party leadership or presidential leadership insist on change.

One weakness of this text is that the author’s arguments about the Republican-controlled Congress are somewhat limited. The time-span for studying the Republican leadership is short, since they have held the majority only since 1994. On the other hand, scholars have had over forty years to study the Democratic leadership. It is very easy to see the decentralization process occur in the Democratic Congress. It is more difficult to draw conclusions about the Republican Congress. Moreover, other changes have occurred besides the Republican majority, which will likely affect legislative behavior. For instance, will the decrease in majority members, due to the Republican majority, as well as the Supreme Court’s ruling on minority-majority districts, result in policy changes? This sort of question is difficult to answer without a longer time period for analysis. Nonetheless, Loomis’s study is an important one, as it provides the most up-to-date coverage of the Republican leadership.

This text is most appropriate for an upper-division undergraduate course on Congress or legislative behavior. Since it is fairly short, it could easily be included with other texts, or stand alone with supplemental readings. Loomis has provided some
of the best documentation for students of Congressional behavior. The book refers to nearly every classic text and journal article on Congress; it also provides an excellent overview of the current debates about legislative behavior. Many undergraduates struggle with using journal articles in their own research papers. Loomis’s text should make this struggle somewhat easier.

Furthermore, Loomis’s chapter on rule-making provides an excellent overview, particularly for undergraduates. Loomis emphasizes the strategic importance of rule-making in Congress, how writing the rules of law-making is often more important than writing the actual laws. Also, he provides a thorough history of congressional rules and folkways, and how they have developed and evolved over the past two hundred years.

While Loomis’s framework of centralization versus decentralization captures the essence of American lawmaking, the author also provides many further questions for research. For instance, to what extent will party leadership change under the new majority? Also, what impact will women and minority members ultimately have under the new leadership? Finally, as congressional folkways and traditions continue to become less important to junior members, what standards of behavior will replace them, and how will these changes affect policy-making? Loomis has updated what was already an important contribution to the study of Congress. In bringing together the large body of literature on Congress, his text can be seen as a building block for studying the Republican majority in the 1990s.

Reference


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In Racial Politics at the Crossroads: Memphis Elects Dr. W.W. Herenton, Marcus D. Pohlmann and Michael P. Kirby provide a comprehensive analysis of the narrow and racially polarized election of Memphis, Tennessee’s first black mayor, Dr. Herenton. In 1991, Memphis’s black community elected a black mayor almost twenty-five years after the candidacy of the first black mayoral candidate. Dr. W.W. Herenton defeated nine-year incumbent Richard C. (Dick) Hackett by approximately 142 votes. Rather than merely providing an assessment of this one election, the authors discuss the history of institutional obstacles, ideological divisions in the black community and southern racism that prevented black mayoral victories in earlier years even after the city’s black population surpassed its white population. Thus, this text is a significant contribution to the African American, southern, and urban political and historical literature.

Pohlmann and Kirby use both qualitative and a quantitative methodology in their analysis of racial
politics in Memphis. They point out that a history of white resistance and black protest resulted in a racially polarized environment that impeded the political activities of blacks in Memphis and in other southern cities of its size. Yet unlike voters in Atlanta, Birmingham, Charlotte, and New Orleans, blacks and whites in Memphis failed to establish biracial coalitions to elect a black mayor before the 1991 mayoral election. The authors do not argue in their text that a higher level of racial polarization exists in Memphis. Rather, they contend that an environment of “racial reflexivity” has dominated local elections since blacks became serious mayoral candidates in 1975:

Because of that area's interracial history, any candidate's attempt to gain support across racial lines is immediately met with considerable suspicion within that candidate's own racial group. The candidate making such an appeal is seen as naive at best or as "selling out" at worst. As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to register and turn out large numbers of that group's members. (p. xxi)

While black mayoral candidates in other cities formed electoral coalitions to elect black mayors, those in Memphis from 1975 to 1987 failed to do so because of racial reflexivity. Local elections usually included a black candidate who received most of the black vote, a white conservative candidate who received most of the white vote, and a moderate candidate who failed to garner significant amounts of support from either group. Black voters wanted a black mayor for symbolic reasons, but also believed that white mayors had ignored their interests and needs. Also, Memphis has a strong mayor-weak council system of government. Most whites preferred the white conservative candidate out of the belief that the city would be better off under a white mayor. Others rejected black candidates because of their character, such as 1987 candidate John Ford's numerous scandals, 1982 candidate J.O. Patterson's absenteeism on the City Council, 1987 candidate Dedrick "Teddy" Withers absenteeism in the state legislature.

In Racial Politics at the Crossroads, Pohlmann and Kirby give a thorough analysis of the complex racial political dynamics in Memphis and the mayoral election which resulted in a transition from white to black governance. However, their contention that Memphis historically has lacked the same number of white liberals as many other cities is problematic. It is without dispute that black mayoral contenders have not received crossover votes from white voters. Yet, the authors stated that "organizations like the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center and the local branch of the national Council of Christians and Jews provided the black community with a reliable group of white liberal allies. They were not large enough to provide the base for a significant electoral coalition" (p. 29). Although these were small groups, what efforts did black mayoral candidates make to expand this white liberal base as did candidates in other southern racially polarized cities?

In addition, the authors should have included more information on former Congressman Harold E. Ford, Sr.'s role in local elections and the internal divisions in the black community which led to split black votes and candidate losses, especially in the 1983 and 1987 mayoral elections. Before Ford's retirement, he was the most influential actor in Memphis.
politics since the eras of E.H. Crump and Robert Church, Jr. The authors mentioned his effective political base, constituent service and delivery of federal funds to the city, but several black mayoral candidates blamed Ford for their losses. The authors should have given more insight into the differences black candidates had with Ford and with other black candidates, i.e., 1987 mayoral candidate Minerva Johnican’s rivalry with Harold Ford, 1982 candidate J.O. Patterson, Jr.’s conflicts with the Fords, three-time contender Otis Higgs, and other black mayoral candidates.

The text has three major contradictions. The first concerns the authors’ statement that the city’s white politicians have not participated in the overt race baiting of other southern segregationists since the mid-1920s. E.H. Crump, the political boss whose machine dominated Memphis politics for almost 50 years, at times did participate in overt race-baiting. He authorized attacks on persons who opposed his machine, ran his enemies out of town and/or threatened their lives, and vehemently opposed labor unions.

Based on the examples provided in the text, Mayor Henry Loeb, Jr. also engaged in overt race-baiting. The authors mentioned that audiences at his Loeb Dutch Treat Luncheons at times shouted racial epithets and that he called a special session of the state legislature to pass a runoff requirement in 1959 so that a black candidate could not win an election for public works commissioner. In 1960, he turned his chair to black community activists when they sought the desegregation of the public facilities and refused to address police brutality in 1970 after a group of white police officers murdered a black teenager. In addition, many Memphians blamed Loeb for the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

If he had not taken such an unyielding position with sanitation workers, their strike would have ended much earlier and Dr. King would never have come to Memphis.

Second, in the Dick Hackett and the Conservative Legacy section in chapter 1, the authors stated that:

Dick Hackett depended upon white conservative values, but avoided racial appeals or even indirect racial cues. His administration was credited with improving the city’s economy. Blacks did not share equally in that improvement, but various downtown and tourist projects did provide a number of low-skill jobs for the inner-city black population. . . . His relatively moderate approach to racial issues helped prepare the city for black governance. (pp. 23, 31)

It is unclear whether Hackett was a conservative or a moderate who was supported by conservative whites because of the lack of an alternative white candidate and an unwillingness to vote for a black candidate. He probably was a conservative who did not make racial appeals or directly challenge W.W. Herenton and other black candidates because of the city’s growing black voting-age population. Third, why is the “Otis Higgs and Coalition Politics” section included in chapter 1 which dealt with the “White Politics” of E.H. Crump, Henry Loeb, Jr., Wyeth Chandler, and Dick Hackett?

In 1991, W.W. Herenton “ran against old-line, traditional Memphis not against Dick Hackett.” In many ways, the city of Memphis still fits a 1968 Time magazine description as a “backwards river town” in terms of its politics. The local political arena
remains dominated by family “dynasty” politics, a lack of coalitions in most political races due to an us versus them mentality, attempts of white voters to annex suburban cities, racial polarization on the Memphis City Council, etc. Historically, whites have resisted black political efforts, but black candidates and voters played a role in their losses by refusing to form coalitions with the few white liberal organizations in the city, splitting their vote and failing to turn out at the polls on election day. The 1991 Memphis mayoral election showed that victory was only possible there after the black community put their differences aside and united behind one candidate.

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Popular discourse on affirmative action issues typically evokes opinions about the status of minorities and women with regard to education and employment. For example, affirmative action opponents and skeptics raise concerns about scholarships awarded on the basis of minority status and targeted student financial aid. The case of Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education (1986) challenges the authority of a school board to grant protection from layoffs to some personnel on the basis of race or national origin even within the boundaries of the Equal Protection Clause. Another belief is that affirmative action affords job opportunities to unqualified minorities over non-minorities. An interest in affirmative action proceedings stems from issues of fairness. Apart from the prevalent attention given to affirmative action issues in education and employment, Voting Hopes or Fears? analyzes affirmative action measures with respect to voting—one of the basic rights of citizens of the United States. The serious consideration of voting along racial lines is necessary not only to identify possible alternatives to the system of electoral representation in the United States, but also to disclose further implications of polarized voting for the country including the increasing multiminity communities into the twenty-first century.

The core tenet of the book demonstrates that even in light of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 allowing black citizens of the United States to participate “fully” and “equally” in the American political process, black political office seekers are at a greater disadvantage when competing against white political office-seekers in majority-white electoral districts. The salience and pervasiveness of race in American society is so strong that it continues to influence electoral campaigns in terms of the framing of issues and candidates, and election results. Voting Hopes or Fears? contests the notions of equality, electoral opportunity and fairness for black political candidates in biracial electoral races in majority-white districts. Race is a key factor in biracial elections and finds a remedy in redistricting along racial lines. Other alternatives must now be put forward as the United States Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno has ruled that redrawing electoral districts along racial lines to give advantages to a particular group is in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Using mixed methodological strategies, the author examines a series of questions pertaining to race, equality, black electoral participation, and the Voting Rights Act. Qualitative strategies such as content analysis of (actual and conceived) mainstream print media articles coupled with the quantitative analysis of public opinion survey data help to replicate political and social reality to garner evidence on the effect of racial appeals in campaigns. Admittedly, the author describes the complex use of methodologies as "unusual." The important aspect of the methodology is the evidence found to support the idea that racial prejudice still exists in the American electorate.

The "peculiar" methodological design is one of the strengths of the book. The empirical evidence is well planned taking into account the possibility of spurious relationships among the variables. Voting Hopes or Fears? controls for spuriousness through systematic testing of possible red flags raised by counterfactual evidence in the literature on electoral behavior. The book strongly, yet politely, asserts contradictory findings to significant literature including the work of Abigail Thernstrom.

One weak aspect of the argument in the book is the allusion to factors that have been attributed to race of interviewer effects. The author mentions that "the stampede of whites toward the 'undecided' category in biracial contests more than doubles." While this finding is attributed to the notion of "situational blame" of whites toward blacks, the research study makes no perceivable steps to discount the race of interviewer factor. However, a clever finding is the addition of the undecided vote to the votes for the white candidate in a bi-racial election. This interestingly predicts much more accurate pre-election polls. This finding, in turn, can inform the literature on race of interviewer effects.

It is a slight misnomer to label Voting Hopes or Fears? as a convincing or effective work, even though it possesses these elements. The denotations of convincing and effectiveness somehow relate to the "appearance of being worthy of belief." The careful use of methods, the graceful admission of some of the shortcomings of the research as its focus is rather specific, and the scholarly aggression with which the author questions the ideas of other research makes the book deserving of more exact terms.

For lack of better words to describe the efficiency of the work, it may be better to place Voting Hopes or Fears? in the context of some other literature. The discussion of "situational blame," "attributional blame," and the concept of negative reactions to black candidates on the part of whites speaks to the research on the concept of racial resentment. In addition to offering a critique of Thernstrom's Whose Votes Count? (1987), Voting Hopes or Fears? proffers a counter-approach to the work of Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines essentially arguing the decline of prejudice in society among whites. Thus, the ideas of Voting Hopes or Fears? add to the discussion and literature on electoral politics, especially in regard to minority groups.

Although the study makes use of complex methods (that are given adequate explanation within the text and supplemental explanation in the appendices), Voting Hopes or Fears? is capable of being useful to the general public, the student, the academic, and the policymaker. The book is
valuable to the individual who is interested in the ongoing issues of affirmative action and the implications for democratic society.

Broader implications from this research lead to closer scrutiny of the current system of electoral participation and the necessity of affirmative action measures in terms of voting because of the reality of race and prejudice sentiments that persist in American society. The future of electoral fairness may not only be in black and white, but in a black, white, and other minority spectrum. Studies conducted on conflict between different minority groups suggest several possibilities for socioeconomic and political competition. From the claim that Hispanics fare less well politically where blacks hold a majority or plurality, findings from McClain and Karnig (1990) suggest that: (1) cities in which blacks and Hispanics are in the minority, where competition for representation appears to be between minorities and whites, the share of political representation may be increased through the formation of political coalitions; (2) cities in which blacks have a majority or plurality, where Hispanics are likely to compete with blacks for political resources and representation, Hispanics may be less likely to establish coalitions with blacks and more likely to form coalitions with non-white Hispanic groups. Thus, the concept of fairness and equal representation of other minorities may be a dilemma for the American electorate as intergroup competition increases.

The author notes that moving beyond race is a goal worthy of attention. The history and continued presence of racism and discrimination in American society and institutions, however, makes color-blind objec-

tives problematic and impractical. As the interrogative portion of the book title suggests, U.S. electoral politics can lead to the acknowledgment of the problems of race in the U.S., or it can lead to the continued voting of whites based on fear which can even further provoke racial hostilities. The author’s assessment of race and equal opportunity moves from fear and hope and leaves the reader with a sense of faith especially in an uncertain time of U.S. electoral politics which is influenced in part by polarizing litigation from the courts. It is important to note that faith calls one to action. Faith, if not accompanied by deeds, is useless. Faith will prompt us to actively pursue ways to promote fairness and equality of all citizens.

Notes

9. James Alan Kendrick is currently a graduate student in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. His areas of research interest include minority group politics and black electoral behavior in the U.S. and Great Britain.

James Alan Kendrick


Despite the still-prevailing idea that schools should not be involved in politics, public schools are caught up in politics. School board members are elected or appointed by elected officials, frequently by the mayor. School bonds and referenda are a normal part of local politics. School systems have huge budgets with the authority to make long-term contracts for a variety of goods and services. School systems are important sources of employment. Schools provide an array of opportunities for political entrepreneurs. In short, schools are political organizations.

In the recent explosion of books on school reform, few have seriously considered the political complications related to the multiple functions of big-city schools. Wilbur Rich’s Black Mayors and School Politics is a notable exception. The typical view of the role of public school systems is that of human capital development. The function of the school system is to prepare graduates for the job market or to go on to higher education. However, public school systems, as Rich reminds us, function as more than a tool for educating children. Big-city school systems, for example, are also major employers. In many old rust-belt cities, the school system is the largest employer. In Detroit, the school system operates more local workers than Chrysler, the city’s largest private employer. Gary’s school system is the city’s second largest employer. The Newark public school system, with 7,500 workers, ranks high on that city’s list of major employers.

In Detroit, Gary, Newark, and many other old rust-belt cities, the emergence of school systems as principal employers was precipitated by the outmigration of manufacturing jobs and diminishing employment opportunities in the city center. Black Mayors and School Politics shows that for many teachers, school board members, administrators, and other school system employees, concerns about improving education for children may coexist and even compete with concerns about the viability of the system as a source of wages, professional development, and economic advancement. "The school pie feeds many families, and slicing it is a major event within the local economy" (p. 5). Rich argues that "this economic significance of school politics" produced the kind of political relationships that hamper school reform efforts.

Black Mayors and School Politics is a powerful and bold analysis of the "relationship between black politicians and school policy" (p. 4). What Rich found in Detroit, Gary, and Newark is disturbing. In all three cities, efforts to achieve equity and excellence in the classroom through reform failed in the face of powerful opposition from the "public school cartel"—a coalition of professional school administrators, union leaders,
school board members, and school activists who control school policy. The public school cartel can be formidable opponents to school reform. According to Rich, these entrenched and powerful interest groups maintain control of school politics not for the sake of children but to promote the interest of its members.

Rich’s study is based on person-to-person interviews with school officials. These interviews revealed the extent to which jobs and employment were the primary concerns of school board members and other cartel members. As an employer, school systems are very labor intensive—employing workers such as administrators, teachers, teacher aides, librarians, counselors, coaches, clerical workers, janitors, and even piano tuners. The Newark public school system was viewed by many as a “community employment agency” (p. 209). “The primary mission,” says a Newark school board member, “is not to educate the kids but find employment for the community. Their primary concern was to get money and employees” (p. 209). A former Detroit school board member saw his role as expanding opportunities for black adults. “Our role was more than just to educate but to give blacks positions and jobs, so that they can hire other blacks in the future” (p.145). One cannot understand the politics of big-city school reform without first understanding the important role, and sometimes defining role, that school systems play in the local economy.

Black Mayors and School Politics illustrates how the economic significance of the school systems in Detroit, Gary, and Newark produced a kind of politics not conducive to meaningful and systemic school reform. The school “cartel” seemingly grew more determined to control school policy as the school systems in the three cities increasingly became listed as one of the largest employers in the region. As Rich observes, “substantive reform involves changes in governance, institutional structures and personnel” (p. 7). The school “cartel,” however, is likely to resist substantive reforms because such reforms typically disrupt organizational routine, may alter the favored way of doing things, or may threaten job security.

The role of public schools as large employers affects the politics of all large districts. Public choice theorists, conservative analysts, and others have emphasized the role that the public school bureaucracy can play in blocking school reform (Chubb and Moe, 1991). Rich’s study of three black-led cities, however, shows how the racial dimension gives it a particular spin in communities where African Americans occupy important positions in the decision-making apparatus and in political life. For example, Rich found that the black mayors in his three cities were “bystanders,” unwilling to challenge the prerogatives of middle-class black teachers and school administrators. Black mayors have been reluctant to take on the core of the local black middle-class, black professional educators. Why? Black educators’ political and social roles within the black community give them added clout. They tend to be active in political parties and campaigns, to have leadership roles in local civic associations, and to be prominent members in major church congregations. Their influence in cities such as Detroit, Gary, and Newark is bolstered by the fact that many attended the same colleges and universities, are members of the same fraternities and so-
The Politics of the Black "Nation"

To rally people against the black establishment" (p. 150).

Complaints about the failure of American public schools are familiar. The National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) stated in bold terms: "the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity" (p.2). While the charges of utter system failure may be exaggerated, there is not much question that the problems are severe, and that they are especially so in the large central city school districts that have been undergoing racial change. School officials in black-led cities face special challenges, which are not present, at least in the same form, in most suburban school districts. In the first place, the problems they face are more intimidating. They are formally charged with preparing inner city children for an increasingly technological society, but social background and available economic opportunities have already done much to determine the odds for education success when a child first enters the classroom. Racial change in population, while not the cause of these problems, present unique challenges to the task of shaping an effective response.

Education historians David Tyack and Larry Cuban (1995, p. 8) observed that "educational reforms are intrinsically political in origin. Groups organize and contest with other groups in the politics of education to express their values and to secure their interests in the public school." The thrust of this book is that educational policy-making is political. In Detroit, Gary, and Newark, those in control of school policy making have been skillful in maintaining power. This skill, however, has not benefited the thousands of...
African American students whose opportunities are limited because the public schools failed them. Behind the idea that schools should be out of politics lies institutional systems called public schools that often reinforced injustice for some at the same time that they offered opportunity to others. Reforming public education is a political task. Black Mayors and School Politics presents a classic case of the triumph of politics over the interest of poor and minority children.

References


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As a challenge to many mainstream approaches the African American politics tradition has sought to expose deficiencies in dominant theoretical approaches, formulate new concepts and approaches, and define, redefine, and liberate concepts and approaches that have been misapplied, mal-applied or unapplied to the African American political experience. Thus, the African American politics tradition more often than not is iconoclastic and paradigm-shifting. In short, on different fronts, it seeks to de-center theoretical and empirical approaches that are ill-equipped to address the African America experience. Of course Hanes Walton, of the University of Michigan is not a neophyte to this task. He has been at this for some time. Of special note, however, is his Invisible Politics which exposèd some of the limitations of behavioralism to the black political experience. In the present work, African American Politics and Power, Walton and his very capable group of collaborators turn their attention to the political context variable, which is a collective reference to a number of situational, environmental and ambient factors that can affect political behavior.

Why is this so significant? African American Power and Politics is divided into nine sections. The first two sections address issues of definition and methodology. Meanwhile, the remaining sections look at different aspects of the relationship between the political context variable and African American political behavior. Prior to these sections, however, Walton devotes considerable space to explaining why consideration of the political context variable is crucial. Before the reader gets to the first chapter, there is a foreword by political scientist William Boone, a preface by Walton, an introduction by congressman Donald Payne, and a prologue by political scientists Kenneth Jordan and Modibo Kadalie. In fact, the reader will have to arrive at page xxxvii before getting through these preliminaries. By this time, the reader will be very anxious to get to rest of the book, and inevitably, she will wonder if some of this could
have been omitted or integrated into the succeeding chapters. Nevertheless, the importance of these pages will be fully appreciated because they effectively delineate the problematic. While Jordan and Kadakie explain the conceptual difficulties problems related to the limited and narrow utilization of the political context variable (more on this below), both Boone and Payne describe some of the practical challenges for African Americans and others produced by a transformation of the political context ushered in by the conservative Reagan-Bush era.

Many edited volumes fail to maintain a sufficient common thread throughout the work. What should be mere seams between different sections, all too often become disjunctive gults that result in fragmented work. Fortunately, this is not the case with *African American Politics and Power*. There are epistemological, methodological, and empirical objectives that effectively hold the work together and afford a brief look at how these objectives reveal the de-centering significance of this work.

First, as noted, Walton and his collaborators seek to broaden the application of the political context variable. Generally, the employment of the political context variable correctly assumes that "...political behavior, at either the individual or group level, is not independent of the political environment... in which it occurs." But Walton and his collaborators argue that most applications of the political context variable have been essentially Keyesque [my term], as in V. O. Key and his seminal work, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. In this regard, the enduring legacy of Key is the postulate that there is a direct relationship between the size of the black population in an area and the level of intensity of racist political practices by whites. Although this conclusion retains significant validity, Walton and his collaborators point out that this conceptualization of the political context is far too narrow and, more important, such studies examine the effect of the political context variable on white political behavior only. Jordan and Kadakie state unequivocally that, "...white scholars (have) failed to show in their research how white attitudes, behaviors, and demographic concentrations have affected African American voter behavior or how African Americans have responded to the racial character of the local context."

Walton and his collaborators focus on the ascendancy of Reagan-Bush conservatism, and the attendant deteriorating economic and political climates as important contextual factors for African American political behavior. Accordingly, there are sections on constitutionalism, the role culture, and the effect of this transformation on socialization, for example. But appropriately, more space is devoted to the relationship between the contextual shift and African American participation. In this section, contributions by important analysts, like Katherine Tate and Paula McClain, examine the significance of context on the Reagan-Bush transformation on the African American political experience in a variety of subnational research settings. The contribution by William Dawson, however, offers some sense of the depth and magnitude in a generalized way. After examining the volatility of African American political attitudes, he opines that the environment wrought by the Reagan-Bush era, unfortunately, will lead to
a "politics of isolation" and fragmentation in black public opinion.

The second epistemological concern is more fundamental. Walton and his collaborators recognize that race has been and remains an important organizing principle in American politics. But contrary to this, mainstream political science, including the pluralist model, the so-called Chicago School modernization theory and the race relations approach view race as a diminishing causal factor in politics, or as mere epiphenomenon. Meanwhile, as noted, the present work is firmly situated within the African American politics tradition where the principal mission is African American empowerment. Conversely, the race relations approach is more concerned with how factors and variable effect the white community.

The hegemony of the race relations approach is evinced in theoretical as well as practical politics, and, thus the worldview that produced such an approach became part of the political context. For example, Walton discusses how the Reagan-Bush transformation lent legitimacy to theories of constitutional inequality—neoconservative, neoliberal, and African American conservative—that sought to disavow the recognition of race in policy formulation and implementation. This worked to undermine important policy initiatives and instruments that aided African Americans. Moreover, McClain and Tatum clearly explain how this political context greatly contributed to the rather schizophrenic deracialized campaign strategy of Doug Wilder as he ran for governor of Virginia in 1989 and in his aborted presidential candidacy in 1992. This latter phenomenon deserves greater attention, as a deracializing political context seduces many African American politicians to make crucial and often unfortunate strategic decisions about how to reach out beyond their base.

Walton and his collaborators address a number of methodological issues. But they see the case study approach as indispensable to explicating fully the political context variable. While not totally dismissing important correlational methodologies like regression analysis, they believe that such models unavoidably omit important variables that can only be revealed in a carefully designed case study. Thus, each case study chapter is formulaic to some extent. With few exceptions, at the beginning, the problematic is outlined; then data and methodology are discussed; and then important concepts are defined. Although this has the potential for crude banality, these common structures are actually very useful for developing continuity in the analyses. While the reader will know what to expect with regard to basic structure, each contribution was uniquely fresh, in part, because of the variety of research settings. For example, Walton and his students examine mayoral elections in Savannah, Georgia; Walton and Maxie Foster examine the campaigns of former Klansman David Duke; Katherine Tate examines Black female senatorial candidates; and Walton and Marion Orr look at national urban policy.

_African American Power and Politics_ is a useful volume because it identifies another vehicle to explicate more fully the African American experience. It provides a useful concept and a methodology that can be readily replicated in other research settings. And clearly much more needs to be done. As usual, Walton
did his historical homework. For example, he discusses how mainstream political science, specifically *American Political Science Review* and *Political Science Quarterly*, are essentially bereft of any serious consideration of African American politics. Moreover, Walton’s macro-literature review/analysis indicates the need for more works like this. After all, the de-centering process is a long and tedious one. Those in the African American politics tradition have much to repair because of the ill-applied dominant approaches. In *African American Power and Politics*, Walton and his collaborators provide some directions.

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Invitation to the Scholarly Community

The National Political Science Review (NPSR), a refereed publication of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, is seeking to expand its contributor and subscriber base.

The NPSR was conceived with emphasis particularly on theoretical and empirical research on politics and policies that advantage or disadvantage groups by reason of race, ethnicity, or gender, or other such factors. However, as a journal designed to serve a broad audience of social scientists, the NPSR welcomes contributions on any important problem or subject which has significant political and social dimensions.

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