THE CHALLENGE TO RACIAL STRATIFICATION

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Volume 4

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THE CHALLENGE TO RACIAL STRATIFICATION

National Political Science Review

Volume 4

Matthew Holden, Jr., Editor

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Editor's Introduction

It has been the practice, which the present editor follows, to organize the material of each annual volume in a broad topical theme.[1] The predominant theme of this volume is racial stratification as a major factor in politics, and the challenge to racial stratification. "Race" is a somewhat mystical concept. It has little precise scientific basis when applied to human populations. Nonetheless, it is a critical social fact. In some sense the *group* called a race is often engaged in some struggle over the material values such as physical protection, income, and skill, as well as over the deference or symbolic values that show that the group is "being taken into consideration" by others (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950).

Racial stratification is a means of describing the outcome of such struggles. Long ago, sociologists adapted the word *stratification* from obvious geological facts. The earth is composed in strata that are visible to the eye. Sociologists began to speak of "social strata," and of "social stratification," to refer the idea that some groups (whether called "classes" or not) would tend to have persistent precedence over other social groups. We use "racial stratification" in a similar way. The obvious evidence of the contemporary world is that, on balance, whites tend to dominate over blacks. Whether one imputes "racism" in the sense of intense hostility that is almost visceral, or whether one imputes the rational intention to create a structure dominance of one race over another or whether one deals merely with a current pattern, the fact of racial stratification is virtually global.

The facts of racial conflict have been so much discussed in the United States that American scholars may forget how significant it has been in recent world history since the sixteenth century. The invention or emergence of a concept of a white race as a dominant organizing motif was essentially a product of the nineteenth century (Biddiss,1970). Racism, as the concept that persons of European ancestry possessed a distinctive superiority to all others, and that those of English descent possessed this superiority to the nth degree, was a critical part of the intellectual defense of the last wave of imperialism (Moses, 1898: 7; Huttenback, 1976). I would accept the view that the empires were built upon wide administrative latitude, coupled with an idea of racial superiority and pride (Moses, 1898), so that Arendt may have been right to speak of bureaucracy as a combination of racism and bureaucracy (Arendt, 1960). The capability to enforce a racial imperialism was notably reinforced by changes in science and technology that, for the first time, gave Europeans the power to override virtually all others that they encountered elsewhere in the world (Holden, 1973).

In thinking about such matters, political scientists (and others seriously interested in politics) might take into account three propositions related to the work in this volume: (1) We here examine not merely the generic phenomena of power and conflict inherent in human life, but some special features of ethnic groups, among which African Americans are one of the foremost; (2) American racial stratification was created on purpose, though not necessarily by all who presently benefit from the consequences of its creation, and appears to have become self-sustaining; (3) American intellectuals, and the educated elites with whom they most often interact, have made a decisive contribution to the doctrines that reinforce stratification, and it is improbable that stratification will be further undermined without important intellectual contributions to that purpose (Holden, 1986).

Slavery is the crucial definition of stratification. The reality of the slave society was, to some degree, taken account of in the formation of the Constitution in the late eighteenth century. This is a grim subject that political scientists have seldom been willing to confront, but the evasion introduces errors into our present thinking. Slave reality permeated every aspect of society and politics and the consequences are still resonant in the twentieth century. When political science contains mature, empirical, studies of nineteenth-century administration, legislation, federalism, public opinion, and so on, all will reveal the power of slavery, the interstate slave trade, the debates over the suppression of slave importation, and the 1850s' moves to reopen the foreign slave trade.

In this perspective, the foundation paper "The Constitutional Legacy of Slavery," is an invited commentary from Professor Donald Robinson. The invitation was based upon the Editor's regard for Robinson's deeply informed study, two decades ago, (Robinson, 1971) of the politics of American slavery. The author begins his commentary with a historical analysis of the political environment under which slavery was established and maintained, and the ways in which slavery contributed to formulation of the Constitution. Robinson applies his historical understanding to contemporary political problems in the United States and in the rest of the world, and where many of "new-born," fledgling nations, still are developing their own constitutions.

In an intensely stratified society, it is to be expected that there will be some desire by the subordinated populations to escape subordination. So it was in the free black communities prior to the Civil War. Gayle Tate's "Antebellum Black Communities and Political Mobilization" is an account of political mobilization in those communities from 1830 to 1860. The author provides a historical analysis of the development of the African-American church, the benevolent society, and the press as interlocking institutions as a response to the American Revolution. From that point there is a discussion of the nature of African-American political mobilization, and the internal and external events whose direct and indirect influences promoted political activism in these communities.

It is standard political folklore, among African Americans, that the black church has been the natural and historic center of resistance to white supremacy. Ronald E. Brown and Monica L. Wolford examine that idea in "Religious Resources and African-American Political Action," an empirically important piece on "why and how religion has reinforced group-based incentives for political action among African-Americans." This article

presents the findings of various research efforts to determine the nature of the relationship between religion and political activism. Most importantly, the authors try to demonstrate how religious culture in the African-American community tends "to socialize individuals to participate in [political] activities . . . that will improve the . . . well-being of group members." The authors report that there is a strong positive correlation between church-based political activism and protest-based activism. They conclude that strong ties to religion and religious organizations "encourage members to engage in political action . . . when the government is perceived as not being responsive."

Stephen L. Wasby's article, "Civil Rights and the Supreme Court: A Return of the Past," is an opinion commentary generated by a question posed by the Editor on this subject. The challenge to racial stratification in the United States has been notably focused by the presentation of claims, by and in behalf of blacks, in the federal courts of the United States, with their ultimate resolution coming from the Supreme Court. This is well-known. The Supreme Court, for a period of years, was the vehicle through which blacks and their allies tried most often, and with most success, not merely to raise the public consciousness but to secure actual decisions of fundamental importance. The Supreme Court killed segregation, which was a vital element of the system of racial stratification as it then existed. Within the past ten or fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has shown increasingly limited willingness to accept challenges to racial stratification framed in the terms that blacks and their allies have most recently found compatible.

Wasby's article relates essentially to three points: (1) Is it plausible to regard the Supreme Court at present as similar to the Waite Court in the last part of the nineteenth century, which systematically chose rationales that undercut congressional and executive attempts to support black freedom (Holden, forthcoming)? (2) What theory should political scientists adopt in order to anticipate when pursuing judicial remedies to racial stratification will prove useful and when it will be counterproductive? (3) How should blacks, and those who share their interests in racial equalization pursue effective political strategies, including congressional strategies, that do not require them to act chiefly as "wards of the court"? (Miller, 1966).

It is apparent that the challenge to racial stratification has been unequally successful at different times. If politics is described in Lasswellian terms then it is nowhere more profoundly vindicated than in the distribution of chances to remain alive or in the distribution of the official sanction of death: the powerful implication of Mitchell Rice's, "Race, Capital Punishment Policy and the Supreme Court." The challenge to racial stratification, in contemporary times, has been remarkably unsuccessful in this regard. Using an analysis of the *Furman v. Georgia* (1972) and *McCleskey* cases, the Rice article evaluates capital punishment by race where statistical evidence of the racial discrimination was presented. The centerpiece of the analysis is the interpretation of the Supreme Court's decisions. The author argues that the Court sought to protect the criminal justice system. In so doing it upheld the institutional proclivity toward racial discrimination in capital punishment. From this the author argues that the Supreme Court decision inherently places a higher value on the life of whites, and a lesser value on the life of blacks.

Augustus J. Jones, Jr. and Michelle Donaldson Deardorff ("State Attorneys General as Policy Makers: AG Responses to the *Hodgson* and *Akron* Abortion Cases") are not directly concerned with racial stratification. This study is concerned primarily with the nature of responses by attorneys general to Supreme Court rulings on two cases, concerning the question of a woman's fundamental right to an abortion.

The findings are that there were few dissimilarities between the fifty attorneys general polled, neither age nor gender causing variations of interpretations. Eighty percent of the states made no significant legislative changes in response to the rulings; whereas the other 20 percent had responded. The authors concluded that there is a strong likelihood that states may soon seek to limit the right of minors to an abortion via parental consent statutes.

From the Editor's perspective, racial stratification is relevant to the extent that decisions about abortion significantly throw a greater burden upon young black women. Racial stratification is also relevant not because of abortion per se, but because of the role of attorneys general in exercising prosecutorial discretion. Attorneys general have wide discretion in the advice they offer to government officials, in the conduct of civil litigation relevant to public policy, and in criminal litigation. The historical reality is that attorneys general have not utilized their discretion to attack, and have often used it to sustain, racial stratification. Hence, as blacks enter into the governmental processes of the states, the relevant practical question will be whether they can motivate attorneys general to adopt a different pattern of action.

The fact of stratification is strongly expressed in contemporary intellectual and professional worlds. From a policy perspective, overcoming the unequal distribution of opportunities in the intellectual and professional world is a critical item. In "Prospects for Minority Doctorates in the Year 2000," Donald Deskins begins his analysis with a summary of the content and findings of other studies undertaken before his own. He then points out that his study is intended to ascertain what share "future minority PhD" will be, and to what extent African Americans will be able to profit from the increase in jobs in the academic marketplace.

The remainder of the article focuses on past, current, and anticipated trends in the conferring of the PhD to minority students. This analysis is very comprehensive and considers the question at hand from several perspectives—all of which are based on current information regarding recent trends in the factors that most directly influence a minority student's ability and decision to pursue an advanced degree: educational preparation, financial feasibility, locational factors, and racial/cultural barriers. The article concludes with a number of policy recommendations designed to enhance the prospects of minority PhDs in academia.

The next two articles deal with two states, South Carolina and Virginia, to which the experience of racial stratification has been integral. South Carolina was the state whose delegation insisted that slavery be given some sanction in the Federal Convention of 1787. In the political thought and action of John C. Calhoun, the 1861 secession crisis, the blood and tears of Reconstruction, the repudiation of Harry Truman's civil rights program, and the legal defense of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, South Carolina was the psychological linchpin.

In "Crime, Corruption and Conflict of Interest in the South Carolina General Assembly," William V. Moore and Cole Blease Graham, Jr. deal with

recent federal criminal investigations and convictions of state legislators in the South Carolina that has evolved following the civil rights movement, the Voting Rights Act, and related changes. Moore and Graham highlight the historically autocratic tendency of politics in South Carolina, and the evolution to a more democratic politics—particularly with regards to voting apportionment and the nature of the federal investigation and pursuant prosecutions. They estimate the relative impact of these investigations on the actual proclivity of state legislators to corruption. Four normative dictates are asserted to explain legislative corruption: the exploitation of public office for private gain; the use of market-centered services for personal use and the exclusion of private citizens; the abatement of values and services that serve the public interest; and the disregard for public opinion and values regarding exploitation and corruption.

Virginia has been equally important, and has the ironic history of being the symbolic home of Jeffersonian democratic ideology, too good-mannered to discuss Jefferson's own racism comfortably; and the sole state thus far to elect a black candidate to its governorship. The question that Mark William Hertzog ("White Flight in the Voting Booth") considers is that of voting behavior among racial groups (in particular among the majority) in Virginia statewide elections for offices in the 1980s. Hertzog classifies voter turnout and voter choice by race in all Virginia state localities and finds that there are variations in the racial composition of the two parties, an effect that the author attributes to an inverse proportion of vote cast, based on the percentage growth or decline of blacks in predominately white areas. One of the most important factors influencing the participation of white votes in Virginia elections in the racial composition of localities in which they live. The larger the percentage of blacks in the area, the more likely whites are to vote in a given election.

Racial stratification may be considered as an intellectual phenomenon, and the idea of "multiculturalism" may accordingly be seen as a challenge. Kent Worcester ("C.L.R. James, Multiculturalism, and the Canon") comes to this issue through an in-depth depiction of the environment in which James was born and lived, a presentation of James's life, his lifeworks, and the evolution of James's perspectives on multiculturalism and the canon—controversies that James's writing and speeches spawned, in particular, the condemnation and censure that James endured from many supporters of nationalism within the African diaspora. The article concludes with reflections on diversity, Eurocentrism, "political-correctness," and the author's belief in the need for a consensus among all of the contending viewpoints to the benefit of everyone.

The challenge to imperialism in the mid-twentieth century, resulting in the independence of African nations, was a crucial facet of the challenge to racial stratification. At the same time, the nations that achieved independence in the 1960s are still struggling to make that independence substantial and to overcome volatile internal politics. The political experience of Nigeria is particularly fruitful for study in this regard.

One of the most extraordinary cases was in the Biafran case of the attempted breakaway of Ibos. Emmanuel Uwalaka ("Determinants of Attitudes toward National Integration in Nigeria Twenty Years after Civil War: An Empirical Investigation of Two Ibo Localities") gives a comprehensive ex-

amination of Nigerian nationalism, based on the theories of Karl Deutsch. Uwalaka examines "primary exogenous variables" and "secondary exogenous variables," and patterns of their impact on the each other and national integration, within the context of Ibo nationalism. He further asserts the importance of mass media in framing and educating various ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Larry Diamond and Oyeleye Oyediran ("Military Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria") consider the current regime's timetable for liberalization and elections; the creation of political parties and the formulation of an electoral administration; the Nigerian "structural adjustment" program (an economic plan) designed to decrease consumption and to boost exports. The authors then consider the social impact of that structural adjustment, including protests and violence; and the citizenry's concern about corruption in the government. Transition to democratic government will be exacting not only because of the relative resistance of the ruling regime, but also because of the failure of that regime to gain the confidence of its people.

The most striking example of racial stratification in recent times has been the regime in South Africa, especially since 1948. This is the sole case in which a government in a relatively advanced industrial nation has purposely set out, without apology, to establish the rule of one race over another. What is equally remarkable, from the viewpoint of a political scientist, was the overt declaration of a decision, in 1989 and after, to abandon the policy of white supremacy.

M. Donald Tryman and Saba Jallow ("Apartheid in Retreat: An Assessment of Political Reform in South Africa") argue that economic considerations played a decisive role in President F.W. De Klerk's decision to release the African National Congress leadership, specifically Nelson Mandela, and to undertake what appears to be a new departure in South African policy. Economic sanctions imposed by an ever-widening circle of Western governments further imposed penalties to the extent that they motivated the government to undertake reforms permitting the normalization of relations between South Africa and other nations.

Franke Wilmer ("Approaching the Twenty-First Century: A World Society Model of Global Politics") is not explicitly attentive to racial stratification in international politics, at least as a primary consideration. However, her article on a "world society" model of global politics represents a departure in which elements of "realist," "idealist," and "complex interdependence" models are compared and adapted.

The author's concept is that a "world society approach" will yield solutions amenable to all parties interested in problems of a global nature, and that the imbalances between "first" world nations and economically disadvantaged second- and third-world nations can be rendered less acute and problematic. Although Wilmer does not make the point explicitly, one of the underlying theses might well be that "idealist" theory took for granted, at least in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century versions, the concept of a "white" race in a dominant position relative to other "races." Idealist theory could be regarded as the inversion of the doctrines of imperialism then also taken for granted.

Note

1. Lucius J. Barker, ed., *New Perspectives in American Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989); *Black Electoral Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990); *Ethnic Politics and Civil Liberties* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

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The Constitutional Legacy of Slavery

Donald L. Robinson

Smith College

In the mid 1960s, when I approached Clinton Rossiter, my doctoral adviser, for suggestions about a topic for my dissertation, he said he had been looking for someone to do a study about "Negroes" (the style then) in the founding of the American republic. Knowing of my involvement in the voter registration drive in Mississippi during that period, Rossiter thought this topic might interest me.

He was right.

My initial approach to the project was indeed informed by my work in Mississippi. Everyone involved in the civil rights movement knew that the drive for racial justice after World War II owed its origin to a rising sense of outrage and demand for justice that was felt most keenly in the black community. The public record on this point, however, would surely be misleading. Focusing on the leading events of that period—Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the legislative histories of the Voting Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964—a graduate student two hundred years from now might think that white men (Supreme Court justices, presidents, senators, members of the House of Representatives) were the principal actors in the drama. Yet anyone who was even marginally involved in the politics of that period realizes that this picture is false. Black leaders were among the prime movers of those events. Thurgood Marshall's brilliant advocacy of a strategy crafted by Charles Houston was instrumental in bringing and winning the suits that led the Supreme Court to its epochal decision in *Brown*. Roy Wilkins and thousands of others shaped and channeled the demand that produced the Voting Rights Act and led the way in implementing it. Black leaders from Martin Luther King, Jr., to Stokely Carmichael built the huge social movement that made the demand for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 finally irresistible.

I experienced these monumental developments in the mid-1960s, and so, as a graduate student approaching the American founding period (1765–

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1800), I hoped and expected to discover that blacks had been active then, too.[1] Researching the documentary sources—the records of the Stamp Act Congress, the First and Second Continental Congress, and the Federal Convention, the *Annals* of Congress, diplomatic papers and the like—I did indeed find some evidence of black activity: petitions from blacks against slavery and the slave trade, accounts of black units in the Revolutionary War, tales and rumors of slave revolts. Nevertheless, a candid reading of this documentary evidence forced the conclusion that blacks were not active players in the formal politics of that period. Their presence and their labor were vital components of the society that founded a republic in America at the end of the eighteenth century, but they were, as I wrote in 1971, "almost entirely mute, politically passive."[2] In the Caribbean, the menacing figure of Toussaint L'Ouverture loomed just over the horizon, but in the thirteen British American states, there were no Nat Turners, no Frederick Douglasses.

Gradually the focus of my project shifted to a consideration of how the founding was affected by the presence of blacks. It became "a book, not about black people, but about white people."[3]

The point of *Slavery*, as it finally emerged, was to show that slavery intruded everywhere into the work of the American founding. Its existence mocked the ideology of the Revolution. It introduced sectional strains in the military strategy of the Revolutionary War. It complicated the debates at the Federal Convention of 1787 over representation and the powers of Congress, the president, and the courts. It embarrassed the foreign policy of the fledgling republic, especially toward the island of Santo Domingo, the second nation in the New World to gain independence from its European colonial masters. In the ongoing controversy over the governance of territories, it stirred passions and provoked a sectional competition that eventually led to a terrible civil war. In short, the book analyzed the profound and myriad ways in which the initiation of republican government in North America was shaped by the reaction of white men to the presence and actions of black Americans.[4]

Indeed, it is not too much to say, as Judith Shklar did in her presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1990, that the United States embarked on two experiments simultaneously: democracy and tyranny. Professor Shklar noted that there were four political phenomena that distinguished American politics from its cultural neighbors: white adult male suffrage, federalism, judicial review, and chattel slavery. The latter—which she carefully distinguishes from the far more nearly universal phenomenon of racism—was "truly unique" in a modern constitutional state. It was because of slavery that America could be "neither a liberal nor a democratic country" until the Civil War amendments.[5]

In the twenty years since the publication of *Slavery*, my scholarly work has explored different paths. My writing on the presidency, on political parties, and on constitutional reform draws on the work I did for *Slavery* on the Federal Convention of 1787 and reflects the same love-hate relationship with the moral life of the American nation. But I have had almost no occasion since 1971 to write about race relations in America.

In accepting this invitation to present an anniversary reflection, I not only embrace an opportunity to return to an important subject, but I address a

topic that connects with my developing interest in the comparative study of constitutions generally.

Many Americans are offering themselves these days as counselors to nations attempting to establish constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Hubris tempts us to assume the posture of a mentor who teaches by the example of his or her own achievements. We have made federalism work; we have entrenched in our constitution a bill of rights, and an independent judiciary stands watch over these rights; our regime has been stable for over two hundred years. We admit there are scoundrels in American politics, and the culture is imperfect: always materialistic, often racist and sexist. But we think that the Constitution and the American spirit of constitutionalism, if not perfect, are near enough. Most Americans readily assume the role of exemplar and mentor, where constitutionalism is concerned.

The truth about ourselves is of course far more complicated than this spirit of self-congratulation would suggest. I firmly believe that, if we were readier to admit the shortcomings in our own tradition and practice, we would be not only better able to overcome our own sad failings as a nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," but more useful to others in the universal search for "more perfect" forms of governance.

On patriotic occasions, some politicians still love to quote Gladstone's famous remark that the Constitution is "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man." President Ronald Reagan, for example, proclaiming Constitution Week in September 1986, said that the framers of the Constitution showed "dedication to the ideals of republican self-government and unalienable God-given human rights that gave transcendent meaning and inspiration to the American Revolution." He urged all Americans to "reflect upon the precious heritage of liberty under law passed on to us by our Founding Fathers." "For 200 years," he added, "people from other lands have come to the United States to participate in the great adventure in self-government begun in Philadelphia in 1787."[6]

People like President Reagan seem utterly ignorant (if they care at all) about how such rhetoric sounds in the ears of Americans whose forebears came here, not to join in a "great adventure in self-government," but in chains, bound to do other men's labor.[7] Thus it fell to Justice Thurgood Marshall to point out that the "wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers" was not "particularly profound, " especially where human rights were concerned.[8]

The fact is that the American founders held a range of opinions about racial slavery. On one side, clearest and most determined, were the South Carolinians, John Rutledge, Pierce Butler, and the Pinckneys, who affirmed slavery as an institution essential to their way of life, the basis of the Southern political economy. At the opposite extreme were the Pennsylvanians, Benjamin Franklin, Gouverneur Morris, and James Wilson, for whom slavery was a moral outrage, an institution incompatible with republican government.

The gulf between these positions was in principle unbridgeable. That the nation-building enterprise did not collapse into this chasm was owing in part, ironically, to racism[9] (a belief on the part of some that the victims of slavery did not fully count as humans) and in part to a willingness on the part of

compromisers, led by the men of Connecticut, to accept the glib myth that slavery would in due course vanish. In *Slavery*, I showed that the latter opinion was itself a manifestation of racism, as revealed by the readiness of its proponents to accept the Fugitive Slave Clause. As first proposed by Pierce Butler of South Carolina, the clause would have required that fugitive slaves be "delivered up like criminals" by Northern authorities. James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, objected that the Northern states would incur "public expense" by these roundups, and Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, said that he saw no more propriety in requiring the public to seize and surrender a slave than a horse. No one seems to have noticed, or cared, that Butler's scheme posed a great danger for free blacks in the North. Horses belonging to Northern owners would have protection against roving bands from the South. Free blacks might not. Butler readily agreed to amend his resolution to relieve authorities in the North of the burden of responsibility for the pursuit and capture of fugitives, and the deal was done.

James Madison alone emerges from these debates as a man ready to deal realistically and creatively with the challenge of eliminating the anomaly of slavery from a country built for liberty. He is best remembered, where slavery is concerned, as the author of the three-fifths formula for compromising the differences between North and South. It was, indeed, an imaginative solution to the conflict between those (mostly Southerners) who insisted that slaves be counted fully for purposes of distributing representation but not at all for taxes, and those (mostly New Englanders like Elbridge Gerry) who insisted that slaves were like horses, producers of taxable wealth but not constituents of a republic. It bears repeating, however, that Madison's formula did not make blacks three-fifths of a human being. It was much worse than that. It gave slave owners a bonus in representation for their human property, while doing nothing for the status of blacks as nonpersons under the law.

More to Madison's credit were quiet bits of evidence of his prudence in denying legitimacy to slavery by keeping all explicit reference to it out of the text of the Constitution (credit here must be shared with Gouverneur Morris, the principal author of the final wording of the Constitution's text),[10] and his dogged, if ultimately unsuccessful, advocacy of popular election of the president. The significance of the latter point is often missed,[11] but it is enormous.

The method of choosing the chief executive was one of the great issues of the Convention. The leading innovators (Wilson, Morris, Madison) believed that the authority of the president should rest on direct popular election. Gradually, as the Convention turned its attention to this question in mid-July, this bold position seemed to be gaining adherents. But on 17 July, Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, raised a devastating objection: direct popular election, he said, would gravely disadvantage the South, since slaves of course would not vote.[12] Others seemed not to realize the force of this objection, but Madison did. Two days later, he attempted to reply. He admitted that the South would suffer in the short run, but in due course, he said, this provision might help to induce the South to liberalize its suffrage requirements.[13] Was Madison suggesting that the South might eventually grant suffrage to blacks? His own notes on the debate are not clear on this point.

In any case, Williamson's objections were fatal. The Constitution would simply not be ratified in the South if it provided for direct popular election of the president. Once more, the clear-eyed and steadfastly determined Southerners threw down the gauntlet, and Northerners hurried to find a way around the difficulty. By distributing electoral votes according to a formula that gave Southern states a three-fifths increment for slaves and allowing states to set standards for suffrage, the Convention opened the way for an approximation to direct popular election, without threatening the commitment to slavery.

Thus, it was slavery that led to the electoral college, instead of the direct popular election of presidents. In one of the more intriguing ironies of our nation's history, this device contributed to the decisive election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860.[14] Lincoln got less than 40 percent of the popular vote in 1860, but his 180 electoral votes were substantially more than his combined opposition, who got 163 electoral votes. Stephen Douglas, who tried desperately to reconcile North and South on a constitutional foundation, finished second in popular votes, but got only twelve electoral votes.

Twice, in 1876 (when Samuel Tilden got more popular votes than Rutherford B. Hayes) and 1888 (when Grover Cleveland got more popular votes than Benjamin Harrison), this odd device has given the presidency to a party that ran second in the popular vote. If that happened under modern circumstances, we could be in deep trouble. If, for example, a president is elected with less than a majority of popular votes and then takes this nation to war, we may pay a high price for having made "peace with oppression" in 1787.

One wants to be fair to the framers, and above all to avoid blaming them as individuals for the sins of the culture, in which we all share. We must be careful not to imply that they should have done better unless we are prepared to show how better provisions might have been achieved politically.

At the same time, we must be lucid in recognizing the terrible mistakes made at the founding. In the end, the framers failed on their own terms. The union they made was held together, not by the wisdom of their arrangements, but by the weight of Northern industry and armed forces. It is crucial to recognize this. Awareness of the shortcomings of our own founders may make us wiser in assessing the efforts of modern framers in other countries, other "new" nations.

In our own time, for example, South Africans, black and white, are trying to work out a constitutional settlement in the context of racial apprehensions and institutional legacies not unlike our own. It goes without saying that any formula that denies majority rule will be an affront to the opinions of mankind. On the other hand, it is no capitulation to white oppression to say that any formula that fails to grant special protections to the white minority invites a bloodbath. The great advantage that South Africans of both races have over their American founding counterparts is that no one there is pretending that a national constitutional settlement can avoid this issue. It was the American illusion on this score that made a civil war of almost stupefying brutality all but inevitable.

Recently I heard a lecture by Gary Jacobsohn, professor of constitutional law at Williams College, outlining the thesis of his forthcoming book on Israeli constitutionalism. Jacobsohn's book takes its title, *Apple of Gold*, from Abraham Lincoln's metaphor for the relationship between the Declaration of

Independence and the Constitution. The Declaration, wrote Lincoln, is an "apple of gold." Its commitment to liberty is the primary cause of our great prosperity. The Constitution, on the other hand, is a "picture of silver," subsequently framed around it.[15] The Constitution establishes the framework and procedures of government but it is the Declaration that defines its moral purpose: self-government, based on equality.

Israel has no written constitution. Its government is established by organic acts setting up the Knesset (parliament), the ministries, and the judicial system, electoral laws, and other basic institutions of government. Like Great Britain, Israel has no bill of rights, and its judiciary claims no power to review the acts of other branches of government, no ultimate authority to interpret the evolving unwritten constitution. Instead, judges, including those serving on the highest court, must rely on ordinary statutes and the moral consensus of the nation to protect human rights.

Jacobsohn draws on Lincoln's figure of speech to make the point that Israelis, too, find the moral purpose of their nation's existence in the document of 14 May 1948 that proclaims their independent nationhood. The Israeli "apple of gold" declares that the establishment of Israel fulfills the ancient longing of the Jewish people for a national home in Palestine. Organic acts, the "frame of silver," provide the machinery of government to realize this aim, set forth in the proclamation of independent statehood. In the absence of a bill of rights, if we ask what rights people have in Israel, this proclamation makes clear by what standard we are to answer that question. People's rights must be consistent with the nation's purpose: to preserve the homeland in Palestine established by and for the Jewish people.

An American, hearing this analysis, wants to cry out that this formulation denies universal human rights to residents of Israel. Palestinian Arabs living in Israel can never be more than second-class citizens of such a nation.

Modern Americans hold new nations to high standards when it comes to human rights. It would be more fitting, in light of our own founding, to be more modest. Most people know that the United States Constitution, as originally framed, contained no bill of rights, but too few know why. George Mason, of Virginia, proposed on 12 September, as the Convention was concluding its business, that a committee be formed to prepare a draft bill of rights. With the aid of the declarations readily available in various state constitutions, he said, it could be done "in a few hours" (Mason had been the principal framer of Virginia's bill of rights in 1776). Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and Roger Sherman of Connecticut joined in Mason's call, but the motion was defeated, by the unanimous vote of all ten states present.[16]

Madison's notes on this debate are sketchy, but historians have assumed that the reasons given by Hamilton in *The Federalist,* number 84, explain the framers' reluctance: that a bill of rights was both unnecessary (state constitutions contained sufficient safeguards) and dangerous (the list might omit something and thereby imply the denial of a vital right).

There was another factor, however. Responding to criticism of this omission in the South Carolina ratifying convention, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney noted that delegates from the Deep South had particularly opposed the insertion of a bill of rights. "Such bills generally begin with declaring that all men are by nature born free," he explained. "Now we should make that

declaration with a very bad grace, when a large part of our property consists in men who are actually born slaves."[17]

Popular demand, manifest during the drive for ratification, eventually made it necessary to add something in the way of a bill of rights. But the odd form of the amendments shows that Pinckney's concern was widely felt. The bill of rights in the constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts begin, as Pinckney thought they should, with an affirmation that rights are based on universal human nature. By contrast, the First Amendment in the United States Bill of Rights takes the form of a prohibition on Congress ("Congress shall make no law...."). It was not until the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery, following the Civil War, that the Constitution could be amended to extend the "privileges and immunities" of citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States. Even then, the rights of citizenship were defined in terms of prohibitions on the power of state governments ("No state...shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").

Thus, when we criticize Israel for denying universal human rights to Palestinian Arabs, we ought to remember our own history: how the accommodation to slavery prevented us from preparing a proper bill of rights, even for white citizens. It is but one example of the truncation of American constitutionalism stemming from the legacy of slavery.

Yet it may be that a final irony lurks here. If we succeed in internalizing this history and are able to soften and deepen our approach to others as they struggle to fashion constitutional government for themselves, great benefits may flow. If so, it will be further evidence that good can come from evil, despite our deserving.

Notes

1. I mention these expectations in the Introduction to Donald L. Robinson, *Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), especially pp. 6–9. The book was reissued in paperback, with a new preface and bibliography, by W.W. Norton and Co., in 1979.
2. Ibid., 7.
3. P. 9. I am happy to say that others have, in the meantime, made some progress in understanding what blacks were expecting and doing in colonial and early national America. See, especially, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., *In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process: The Colonial Period* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); and Derrick A. Bell, Jr., *Race, Racism and American Law*, 2d. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). For a survey of other recent writing about slavery, see the bibliographical essay in the paperback edition of my *Slavery*, 545–56.
4. Five years after the publication of my own book, I read with deep admiration Edmund S. Morgan's *American Slavery—American Freedom* (New York: Norton, 1975). Morgan notes that the resort to slavery came only after repeated failures to establish a viable colony in Virginia by other forms of labor. Having once committed themselves to production by slavery, Virginians grew prosperous, developed social graces, and hired Scottish tutors to teach their children the lofty doctrines of the Scottish Enlightenment. Whereas I had shown that slavery was an inescapable challenge for the founders' project of nation building, Morgan

probes deeper into the central irony, showing that it was slavery that *made it possible* for the sons of Virginia to love liberty in the first place.

5. Judith M. Shklar, "Redeeming American Polititcal Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 85, 1 (March 1991): 4, 8–9.
6. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1986, pp. 1204–5.
7. President Gerald Ford struck a more sensitive tone in remarks at Independence Hall on July 4, 1976, the bicentennial of the Revolution. "For all but the black slaves—many of whom fought bravely beside their masters because they also heard the promise of the declaration—freedom was won in 1783.... This union of corrected wrongs and expanded rights has brought the blessings of liberty to 215 million Americans, but the struggle for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is never truly won...." *Weekly Compilation*, 1976, 1127.
8. "Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association in Maui, Hawaii," 6 May 1987 (typescript supplied by Justice Marshall's office).
9. My dissertation committee at Cornell strongly urged me not to use the term *racism* in my characterization of the framers of the Constitution. To this day, I do not understand this guidance.
10. For a good example of the care the framers took on this point, see my analysis of the evolving language of the fugitive slave clause, in *Slavery*, 89, 501.
11. Indeed, I missed it myself when writing *Slavery*. It was not until I was doing research for my book on the constitutional foundations of the presidency, *To the Best of My Ability* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987) that I noticed it.
12. Max Farrand, ed., *Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911, 1935), 2: 32 (hereafter cited as: II Farrand 32). See also *To the Best of My Ability*, 81–83.
13. II Farrand 57, 109–11.
14. I thank Professor Armstead L. Robinson for bringing this irony to my attention.
15. Roy Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 4: 169. Lincoln's metaphor is based on Proverbs 25:11.
16. II Farrand 587–88 (12 September 1787).
17. III Farrand 256 (speech delivered in the South Carolina House of Representatives, 18 January 1788).

How Antebellum Black Communities Became Mobilized: The Role of Church, Benevolent Society, and Press

Gayle T. Tate

Rutgers University

This article will examine the early character of black political mobilization in Northern black antebellum communities (1830–1860). Mobilization sought to challenge existing superordinate-subordinate relationships rooted in white supremacy, activated black communities, and readied these communities for political struggle. In the earliest years of the republic, nine of ten persons of African ancestry were enslaved (note tables 1 and 2). Northern slavery was virtually gone in the first two or three decades of the nineteenth century. But, in some cities of the North, blacks were a significant percentage of the population. The manuscript census data for 1830 (although viewed with caution) indicate that there were 9,795 blacks in Philadelphia or 12.17 percent of that city's people. There were 1,875 blacks in Boston, who constituted 3.05 percent of that city's population. The blacks in New York numbered 13,960 or about 6.89 percent of the total population.[1] The question is how they coped with their environment. This presents the issue of mobilization.

Mobilization is a collective process by which groups move toward specific goals (Oberschall, 1973 and Gamson, 1975). To adapt from Charles Tilly, it can be conceived of as a defensive strategy against a perceived common enemy (Tilly, 1977:72). If we extrapolate from this idea of a goal-oriented collective process of groups, we can assert that Black political mobilization instilled in African Americans a common understanding of their oppressed status by virtue of their race, gender, and color, which led toward the stabilization of black communities, and the empowerment of the black church.

There was "defensive mobilization," to adapt a concept from Minion K.C. Morrison, (Morrison, 1987:11), developed in the urban North as a function of racial discrimination, sexism, and social isolation. White practices that ex-

pressed the notion of African inferiority, and political exclusion were catalytic conditions for collective political struggle in antebellum black communities. As black institutions mobilized, the political consciousness and social commitment of community residents were not only crystallized but collectively transformed through the process. Group consciousness has, in McAdam's hypothesis, an intrinsic relationship to institutional formation and indigenous leadership. Reciprocally, institutional formation and indigenous leadership sustain the group consciousness (McAdam, 1985:41–44).

Table 1
Negro Population Growth and Distribution, 1790–1860*

Year	Total Population	Negro Population	Percent
1790	3,929,214	757,181	19.3
1800	5,308,483	1,002,037	18.9
1810	7,239,881	1,377,808	19.0
1820	9,638,453	1,771,656	18.4
1830	12,866,020	2,328,642	18.1
1840	17,169,453	2,873,648	16.1
1850	23,191,876	3,638,808	15.7
1860	31,443,790	4,441,830	14.0

Source: *Negro Population in the United States, 1790–1915* (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times).
* These figures are at best an approximation of the black population during this period. Given those blacks that lived in outlying areas, and others who had reason to shy away from census takers, these figures cannot be wholly accurate.

Table 2
Slave and Free Black Population, 1790–1860

	1790	1800	1810	1820
Slave	697,624	893,602	1,191,362	1,538,022
Free	59,557	108,435	186,446	233,634
Total	**757,181**	**1,002,037**	**1,377,808**	**1,771,656**
	1830	**1840**	**1850**	**1860**
Slave	2,009,043	2,487,355	3,204,313	3,953,760
Free	319,599	386,293	434,495	488,070
Total	**2,328,642**	**2,873,648**	3,638,808	4,441,830

Source: *Negro Population in the United States 1790–1860* (New York: Arno Press and The New York Times).

Our thesis is that the mobilization process worked out of three related variables: (a) those material realities that were catalytic in engendering early institutional formation and development; (b) the priestly and prophetic function of black institutions that shaped the course of protest activity in African-American communities; and (c) the interconnected organizational

formations—the black church, the black press, and mutual benevolent societies—that determined racial unity, spirituality, and self-determination as the dominant themes of mobilization. The institutional formation of the black church, mutual benevolent societies, and the black press were the initial signs of black political mobilization.

The Slavery Context

In the lives of all persons of African descent, slavery was the overarching factor; it shadowed their existence and laid the foundation for all subsequent relationships between blacks and whites (Franklin & Moss, Jr., 1988:116–21; Foner, 1983:3–4). But those who were legally free lived in a tenuous, quasi-free status.[2] Reenslavement of escaped fugitives, and the captivity of free blacks, was an ever-present danger. Benjamin Quarles shows how both the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 excited protest and resistance in Northern black antebellum communities. Racial prejudice supported "substitute arrangements for keeping blacks in their proper place" (Harding, 1983:117). The stigma of imputed Black inferiority was derived from the slave condition. "We are," as Frederick Douglass wrote, "then a persecuted people; not because we are colored, but simply because that color has for a series of years been coupled in the public mind with the degradation of slavery and servitude."[3]

Material Realities in Early African-American Communities

The overall plight of African Americans throughout the antebellum era was that they were poor. There were, indeed, "pockets of grace." A small number of free African Americans did successfully engage in carpentry and other building trades, millinery, sewing, and other skilled work. Other free persons became entrepreneurs. Ministers, teachers, and others (Wesley, 1939:69–70; Horton & Horton, 1979: 53–66; and Franklin & Moss, Jr., 1988:142–44) formed a beginning professional class. Poverty, however, was the norm.

Northern blacks were placed in economic competition with arriving immigrants. By the 1840s, African Americans were competing for menial jobs with immigrants displaced from Ireland by the potato blight and subsequent famine. Commonly, upon mastering a skill, as Frederick Douglass recounts from his personal experience, blacks found that white workers protested against their presence in the workplace (Foner, 1983:211–13). Blacks were often subject to firing based on the capricious whims of white workers (Litwack, 1961:155–59,; Curry, 1981:18–22). Many families were totally dependent upon the small wages of African-American women who worked as part-time or full-time domestics, washerwomen, or boardinghouse proprietors to limit the impact of impoverishment (Horton & Horton, 1979:16–21; Pleck, 1978:490–511; Blassingame, 1973:92–94; Yee, 1992:41, 52–53). Black families' dire poverty was a rationale for denying them both menial labor as well as coveted factory jobs.

Exclusion was also evident in the ordinary political domain. Access to the ballot proved almost unattainable. Legally, African Americans enjoyed the formal right to suffrage in some Northern states. Their actual participation

was restricted. In New York, for example, the property qualification of $250 effectively excluded poor whites and most blacks from voting (Walton, 1972:47–50; Berry & Blassingame, 1982:144–47). "In 1835, with an estimated population of 15,061, a mere 84 could exercise this right, and in 1855, only 100 of the 11,840 blacks in New York city could cast ballots" (Foner, 1983:207). Suffrage grievances were expressed through petitions filed by blacks but were rarely addressed by state legislators. In New Jersey, for example, "the 1844 convention debated the question of suffrage at some length, it ignored the Negro, and two petitions from blacks seeking the privilege of voting were filed without comment" (Foner, 1983:207).

African Americans attempted, in a combination of tactics and strategies, to wield a measure of political influence in the political process. One strategy of gaining political leverage by African Americans was the founding of their own independent political parties in hopes of exerting political pressure on candidates. The Political Improvement Association in 1838, the Political Association of New York founded in the same year (these two groups later merged), and the New York Suffrage Association in 1855 (Wesley, 1939:69–70; Bracey, Jr., Meier, & Rudwick, 1970:xxxvii) were examples. These all proved unsuccessful. Politicians were largely unresponsive. The tactics, strategies, and influence vital to political survival were severely circumscribed. Blacks comprised less than 1 percent of the electorate. In several northern and midwestern states, laws restricting black migration also attempted to limit their potential political influence. "Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Oregon—even barred them [blacks] from entering their territory" (E. Foner, 1970:261). Thus, alienated from mainstream politics, often denied suffrage and citizenship, and threatened with removal by various colonization schemes popular with many prominent political figures (Litwack, 1961:20–24, 272–74, 277–78), the "sons and daughters of Africa" were pariahs in American political life.

Early Institutional Formation

Slavery and racial oppression were external factors that provided the impetus for separation. African Americans' aspirations for freedom, self-determination, and political and social equality were powerful internal factors. In the Revolutionary era, African Americans found the inherent notion of freedom extolled by the patriots particularly appealing. Free African Americans optimistically believed they would have political participation in the new society. The recognition of slavery embodied in the new Constitution to placate Southern planters and Northern businessmen in the quest for the new nation provided evidence to the contrary—African Americans were "involuntarily sacrificed"[4] for this nation's agenda to be conceived. The experience seems to illustrate Derrick A. Bell, Jr.'s argument that the rights of African Americans are "involuntarily sacrificed" at specific periods in American history when whites are seeking political reconciliation or alignment. In the post-Revolutionary era, from 1787 to 1820, it rankled African Americans that their liberty was not granted by the freedom ethos of the new nation. Gradually, by the 1820s, as prospects and promises dimmed, African Americans were forced to observe critically that the forecast for them was bleak (Curry, 1981: 221–23; Litwack, 1961:64).

All these factors imbued blacks with a sense of futility in their freedom quest. This sense of futility was more often a psychological as well as a political response to material conditions, when African Americans had reached their lowest point of frustration with American society's exclusionary practices. Fundamentally, African Americans were in fact responding to the solidification of the political and economic structure. There were few opportunities for them to engage the system at any level and to derive either material or symbolic benefits. Even those blacks who were upwardly mobile suffered visibly from racial prejudice. They sought to align themselves with other blacks even while seeking assimilative paths into mainstream society. When this sense of futility was reached, racial incidents were perceived as further signs of injustice, and tended to engender a political or social collective response. They substantiated the need for African Americans to mobilize themselves around their racial identity and common ancestral ties. This collective response may have ultimately precipitated a protest and/or separatist movement.

The Emergence and the Duality of the Black Church

In early institutional formation, African Americans created and developed an alternative social structure. Community leaders received group validation to shape political mobilization and discourse. As a notable example, the collective consciousness of the community turned a racial incident at the St. George Methodist Church in Philadelphia into a political spark of commitment and mobilization. At St. George's, Rev. Richard Allen was a critical actor. Allen was an ex-slave with consummate oratorical skill, and his activities enlarged the black membership. Tensions soon developed over seating space in the overcrowded church. African Americans were soon being asked to sit along the walls, and then finally in the galleries of the church. At worship services one day, Richard Allen and Absalom Jones were dragged from their knees while in prayer. After prayer, led by these men, the majority of African Americans left the church *en masse* in protest (Allen, 1960:25–26; George, 1973:53–56). Later that same year, 1787, the group, having founded the Free African Society, founded two African churches, St. Thomas African Episcopal Church and Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church.[5]

The en masse protest at St. George's became the catalyst for black institutional development. This set the stage for the racial incident, in the manner that Morrison says the Montgomery boycott was a catalyst for black political activities of the 1960s. Allen had wanted to establish a separate church for blacks before the incident. He had encountered both black and white opposition. He continued with his plans for a separate church, and thus incurred the displeasure of St. George's elders (Allen, 1960: 25–26).[6] Without the Philadelphia black community's decisive support, at that instant of mass exit from St. George's, the probability of a separatist religious movement would have been remote. It was African Americans' desire for autonomy that underpinned the superficial ruse of the seating issue provoked by the white hierarchy to demonstrate their dismay, displeasure, and the need to regain control. "It was the issue of separate black worship facilities that brought tempers to the boiling point; the seating problem simply caused the emotional

juices to flow" (George, 1973:55). The community's validation and support of the leadership, at this point of futility, made religious separatism a reality. In the ensuing decades, the separatist religious movement gained momentum and began to spread throughout the North, while simultaneously blacks were becoming persona non grata in many of the predominately white worship houses. Religious separatists chose to endure neither racial harassment in white churches nor segregated worship facilities, but instead to determine their own religious expression.

This religious facet in the incipient stage of political development of black communities was rooted in duality. The transcendental values of religion are bi-functional (Thomas J. O'Dea, 1966). The priestly function of religion provides order for individuals in their new spiritual identity and serves as a social barometer by encouraging individuals to maintain and stabilize the status quo (O'Dea, 1966:14, McClain, 1974:4–6). While religion does indeed validate society's standard through the imposition of its own stable value system that serves to reinforce its own existence, it also sets up a barometer to assess society's morality. In general, this moral barometer finds society wanting on social issues that effect the larger community. The transcendent aspect of religion supports a utopian belief system that may challenge the norms of present-day society. The differences between the transcendent and temporal planes create tension, anxiety, and unrest (O'Dea, 1966:14; Wilmore, 1983:50–2; Cone, 1984:59–62). Founded on protest and struggle from its inception, the black church infused the prophetic tradition within its priestly function intertwining the transcendental and temporal values of religion. "Born in protest, tested in adversity, led by eloquent and courageous preachers, the black church was the cutting edge of the freedom movement during most of the nineteenth century" (Wilmore, 1983:95).

By merging the quest for political emancipation with its otherworldliness promise, the black church sustained its duality by serving the spiritual and earthly needs of an oppressed people. This dichotomy is not as great as it may appear. Heaven may be interpreted as the ultimate state of freedom, an extension of the earthly freedom quest. African Americans then could protest against their earthly oppression at the same time they soothed their souls. This challenge to oppression, whether a pamphlet, a boycott, a formal protest, or a Sunday sermon, was the black church's clarion call for justice in the land and divine retribution should the American political system fail to find accordance with God's divine plan of equality. The assumption and institutionalization of the protest mantle was in direct opposition to the predominately white antebellum churches and imbued the black church with both an ecclesiastical and secular mission. The Black Church maintains a clear prophetic tradition as part of a priestly function throughout its history. This tradition brings into judgment not only the institutions of society (such as political structures), but the institutional church as well (McClain, 1974:4).

Mutual Benefit Societies

In the antebellum period, urban blacks also generated many mutual benefit societies, lyceums, self-improvement associations, and fraternal orders. Sporadic employment and economic stress, loss of familial ties in the urban

Northern environment and the lack of outlets for organized social participation and camaraderie provided the basis for these mutual benefit societies. The mutual benefit societies were decidedly secular, yet they demonstrated the same dual functioning as the black church. Black community activists, believing that divine grace was determined by good deeds, strove for godliness in assisting the unfortunate and uplifting the moral tenor of the community. After Allen and Jones formed the first society, the Free African Society, in 1787, similar societies spread as rapidly as had the black churches. By 1855, "Philadelphia's blacks had 108 mutual benefit societies with 9,762 members, an annual income of $29,000, and permanent investment totaling $28,365" (Foner, 1983:239).[7] The societies chiefly depended upon membership dues, with funds allocated for community projects, the maintenance of social programs, and accumulated surplus capital that served as loans to black entrepreneurs. Societies were governed by constitutions and by-laws that stipulated the dues and procedures that governed individual members. Dues varied between ten to twenty-five cents per month according to the economic status of individual society members. Some, of course, offered comprehensive social welfare programs, often including funeral expenses, disability insurance; and the guarantee of sick benefits payments of approximately one to two dollars per week for three to six months; an annual widow's pension of ten to twenty dollars; as well as schools for orphans and craft apprenticeship programs for community youth (Foner, 1983: 239; Quarles, 1969:101–4). Burial allowance for members in good standing could range from ten to twenty dollars.

Large societies that evinced effective functioning and tight organizational structure had cross-membership with members belonging to several organizations at one time. A few societies, formed along occupational lines, also functioned as quasi labor unions seeking employment and better wages for black workers.

African-American women were particularly active, despite nineteenth-century conventional standards for women that emphasized their domesticity. Their impetus came from the need to fight the sexism that daily crippled their lives, as well as from their sharing the community's combative posture against slavery and racism. Black women used their economic viability as family providers as a springboard to their community activities (Horton & Horton, 1979:18–21, 64–66; Yee, 1992:41, 52–53, 55). On the whole, black men encouraged black women in community activism while simultaneously urging traditional compliance with women's domesticity (Horton & Horton, 1979:64–6; and Yee, 1992:54–55). Community activism, with its myriad organizational and task functions, more than any other collective actitivty, with the notable exception of the black church, prepared African-American women for their militancy in the abolitionist movement. Dorothy Porter commented on the overlapping functions of women's literary societies. "The young women, in particular, in these cities who organized these groups," she wrote, "frequently combined the desire to learn with the desire to perform work of an altruistic nature in behalf of those in slavery, as well as for the many destitute Negro children" (Porter, 1936:564)

The Association for the Benefit of Colored Orphans, founded and publicly launched in the years 1833–36, was a notable example of such a women's society. It was founded by two African-American women. Its board soon

came to comprise twenty more. It goal was an orphanage for black children under twelve years of age "where they [should] be boarded, clothed, and suitably educated" (Foner, 1983:241–42). Seven years later, the society's headquarters was on Fifth Avenue in New York City. Receiving community funding, individual donations, as well as city and state support, the orphanage served hundreds of children. The African Dorcas Association, established for the purpose of "procuring and making garments for the destitute,"[8] was successful in clothing poor schoolchildren in many urban communities. Church-affiliated societies, such as the African Female Bond Benevolent Society of Bethel Church, the Female Methodist Assistance Society, and the Female Beneficial Philanthropic Society of Zoar, were also recognized for serving community needs.

Mutual benefit societies incorporated destitute community residents into their organizational purpose. They institutionalized the mutual self-help concept, and engendered pride, social awareness, and racial consciousness in their spiritual mission. These societies, in providing the needed social, psychological, and economic support, formed networks of cohesiveness within the community structure, and provided social stability to fledgling communities.

The Black Press

The third instrument of mobilization was the black press. Until its creation, racial discrimination was at the helm and the voices of the vulnerable were silent. African Americans were caricatured in the white press to support whites' racial attitudes. Even abolitionists and others of liberal persuasion who espoused freedom were often ambiguous on the notion of equality and left much to be desired in their own racial practices. In the light of these realities, the creation of the black press expanded the base of African American societal criticism and strengthened the African-American political voice. The first newspaper, *Freedom's Journal*, founded in 1827, gave the silent, the oppressed, voices: "We wish to plead our own cause. Too long have others spoken for us."[9] Having common grievances totally ignored by the white press, with "no public channel," the black press pledged to fight for "our brethren who are still in the iron fetters of bondage"[10] and collective elevation of free blacks. "Our paper is devoted, as well as to our social, moral and religious improvement, also, to our civil and political rights."[11]

Although principally abolitionist in form and content, black newspapers strove, with international and national articles, to educate their readership to a broader political awareness. Dominating antebellum black newspapers was strident criticism of the internal contradictions in American democracy. *The Colored American*, edited by Reverends Samuel Cornish and Charles B. Ray, offers a good sample of the tone. "The colored people of these United States are the involuntary subjects of a social and political despotism, alike unrighteous and cruel."[12] Editors also tried to focus on those common issues that served to unite persons throughout the African diaspora. *The Colored American* also concentrated on Haiti, asserting that country to epitomize the self-determination and leadership of which blacks were capable. "Hayti needs population to develop her agricultural and mineral resources and to

fortify and defend her against the invasion of a slave power of the Western world."[13] The black newspaper, as an instrument of protest, facilitated the umbrella issues of racial uplift, freedom, and the emancipation of the slaves.

Although the black press was unified, the disparate elements of black communities, its own institutionalization was impeded by financial difficulties. The economic base was fragile. Approximately thirty black newspapers were born during the antebellum era. Nearly all died financially within a short period, mostly after either a few months or, at best, a few years. Overall, the newspapers were undercapitalized from their inception and more often depended upon faith rather than funds. Although antebellum newspapers commanded a large optimistic audience, this audience was a fundamentally poor one. Cash flow remained a critical problem. Subscribers often did not remit payment in a timely fashion, if at all. Most editors were either ministers, abolitionists, or had other businesses, and were financially committed to other community projects as well. Frederick Douglass's several papers operated for an aggregate of sixteen years (1847–1863). The *Anglo-African* lasted for five years (until 1856). Thus, as the other needs of the community took priority, the growth of the black press became more tentative. Despite these obstacles in its institutionalization phase, the black press succeeded in developing a public forum that defined and clarified the overall direction of the freedom struggle.

Collective Mobilization

Collective mobilization and elevation, the moral and material uplift of African Americans, had both spiritual and political dimensions. Rev. Lewis Woodson, whom some call the "father of black nationalism,"[14] emphasized the spiritual quest. Under the pseudonym "Augustine," Woodson wrote a series of ten letters to *The Colored American* during the 1830s and 1840s. Woodson proved to be an important theorist in the nationalist tradition and his ideology was said to be the forerunner of modern black nationalism. Given the hostile environment and the oppressiveness of their condition, African Americans had to heal themselves: "To produce a moral revolution, such as it needed in our case, has ever been found a work of the greatest difficulty, even when every facility for its accomplishment was afforded. But how much more difficult must it be with us, when a thousand obstacles are thrown in the way."[15]

Woodson argued that freedom must first occur in the mind. The soul, the spirit, and the mind—the individual psyche, in short—could only be developed and reinforced through racial unity and solidarity. To aid the individual in his or her mental development, Woodson proposed the enlightenment tools of education, the black church, and the black press. These three primary tools of the enlightenment process served an expressed utilitarian function. Education was to broaden knowledge of one's history and heritage. The spirituality of the black church was to serve as a moral barometer. The black press was to propel and sustain the issues of freedom and racial unity. The enlightened individual would serve as a catalyst to mobilize the community around racial solidarity and self-determination. With an acute awareness of political issues, an informed and enlightened

critical mass would both individually and collectively challenge oppression and seek political emancipation.

In the minds of such antebellum advocates, racial unity and self-determination required them to eradicate stereotypical notions of African-American inferiority. Whites entertained the common belief that African Americans had no history and thereby warranted no respect as a people. "Blacks held that this lack of knowledge of their past—these missing pages in their history—hindered them in their fight for full citizenship" (Quarles, 1969:110–11). In retrieving their historical past, some African Americans argued that it was African genius that gave birth to Western civilization. They held that the formidable West African empires of Mali, Songhay, and Ghana were a testament to black legislative and administrative ability. In fact, such African Americans argued, those attributes of government, leadership, and invention that were so admired in American society had their genesis in African civilization and provided fitting evidence that African Americans were also capable of historical greatness, wisdom, and self-government.[16]

Education was also understood as another level in combatting notions of African American inferiority and was highly valued. Frederick Douglass encouraged blacks to learn trades because their monopoly on most menial jobs such as servants, stevedores, porters, and coachmen was now being taken by recent Irish immigrants. Maria W. Stewart, another fiery abolitionist, implored black women to move beyond conventional trappings to develop business acumen and education as tools for the future. "How long shall the fair daughters of Africa be compelled to bury their minds and talents beneath a load of iron pots and kettles?" (Stewart, 1835:16).[17]

The National Negro Convention of 1853 received and accepted a proposal for an industrial college in which black students could master skilled trades. Initial preparations for the college proceeded optimistically with Frederick Douglass at the helm. In the end, however, the sponsors were unable to finance the plan. On local levels blacks established private schools when possible. Some black communities established private schools and proposed higher learning centers for black youth. African Americans also explored the option of the utilization of funds from benevolent societies for the "establishment of libraries, reading rooms, schools, academies and one general college embracing all the mechanical arts"[18] in each city. This plan did meet with some success and many libraries, reading rooms, and academies were initiated with the assistance of benevolent societies.

The Connections between the Three Instruments

Collective institutional protest against slavery, racism, and impoverishment was the third aspect of black self-determination. The overall character of black political protest was generated by oppression and by its oppositional response of struggle and the desire for freedom. Shaping the protest praxis—pamphlets, sermons, articles, petitions, benevolent programs, and convention movements—were the varied dynamics of black community activism. Ministers' activism in community and abolitionist struggles associational ties in black communities, and the moral and political suasion of the black press constituted a broad organizational apparatus. This apparatus became a

tributary to the larger abolitionist movement as it gained influence in the 1830s. Black ministers' protest centered around the abolitionist twin goals of emancipation of slaves and the uplift of free blacks that embodied the same goal of black self-determination. Cornish and Ray used their *The Colored American,* to promote both abolitionism and black self-determination. "We have thought, that abolitionists started with a view to the abolishment of slavery,...but in carrying forward these measures, they intended to advocate equal rights for the free colored man, and his moral elevation in the scale of human being."[19] On the other hand, Rev. Henry Highland Garnet used his pulpit as well as his lecturer position on the abolitionist circuit to protest against slavery and argue for militant slave resistance. Rev. Samuel Snowden, minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church on Beacon Hill, was noted for his strident attacks upon slavery. Indeed, he endeared himself to people such as David Walker, the militant nationalist (Horton & Horton, 1979:50). While marching to the tune of abolitionism, Snowden also criticized the prejudiced treatment of blacks within the movement. He argued that the true test was the treatment of blacks in practical interracial situations.

The black press consistently placed the issues of slavery and racial discrimination before the public with all the fury of an avenging angel. For African Americans who were steeped in frustration most of the time, the written form of political protest, often passionate, was a healthy outlet and expression for black anger. Frequently stressing activism as a path to liberation, the black press became an effective instrument of mobilization. The editors merged abolitionism and black self-determination as one collective effort. Their overall effectiveness provided a connective link to all black communities. They gave people rekindled hope that freedom was inevitable.

The benevolent societies also contributed to the mobilization of black communities. They paralleled the black church, expressing strong convictions on the issues of mutual self-help, slavery, and racial prejudice, with the former issue being the core of their uplift movement and the latter two issues viewed as caste barriers impeding their progress. Associations, when able, used their constitutions and by-laws, illustrative of their moral perspective, to mesh both their concepts of mutual self-help and contemporary political criticism. "As daughters of a despised race," the Female Literary Association of Philadelphia saw it was their "duty...to cultivate their talents...that by so doing, we may break down the strong barrier of prejudice."[20] The preamble that "no man within her precincts (New York) can now hold another as his property,"[21] acknowledged the recent emancipation of slaves in that state.

Some societies used their monies to sustain the abolitionist movement. The Ladies Literary Society of the City of New York, for example, furnished monies to sustain the newspaper, *The Colored American.* Additionally, the society funneled cash to support the New York Vigilance Committee, under the aegis of the firebrand, David Ruggles. It was also noted for its diligence in providing assistance to escaped fugitives (Porter, 1936:574). Many associations, critically appraising society, demonstrated a political awareness of the issues as well as a commitment to further political protest.

Summary and Conclusions

The political mobilization of urban blacks evolved out of the material realities of slavery, racism, sexism, and impoverishment in American society.

It also was framed by African Americans own aspirations for self-determination. Both factors had decisive impact upon African-American communities and served to underpin African Americans' political consciousness and mobilization efforts. Within the same realm, African Americans' collective protest efforts, whether it was to institutionalize their alienation with alternative social structures or to affirm their self-determination with a common social and political agenda, challenged the existing American political institutions.

Of the three interlocking institutions of the antebellum era, the black church was particularly critical. The black church's prophetic tradition, at the core of its priestly function, provided the moral barometer for the spiritual evolution of African Americans as a people, the organizational tactics and strategies for political mobilization, as well as the organizational maintenance for the continuity of struggle within the existing institutional arrangements. Despite its progressive principles of justice and equality, and, in some instances, its revolutionary objectives for social change, the institutionalization of its organizational apparatus, the black church lost much of its dynamism in seeking institutional and structural changes in society.

Yet, if the cyclical patterns of social movements has as one its dependent variables the despair and failed promises of each cycle (Albert Hirschmann, 1982), then we may expect the black church's impact upon the consciousness of African Americans to reemerge in new periods of political mobilization. Other ancillary organizations will still operate in tandem to the material realities that circumscribe the African-American existence.

There may be profound similarities in the manner in which antebellum and present-day African Americans mobilize to effect political change. If so, there is a need for comparative studies of the two political-historical periods. If this is so, we need to broaden our scope of the theoretical and ideological components that serve to underpin African-American political life. Part of that theoretical and ideological construct is a continuing examination of the interrelationship between black community institutional development, its specific organizational goals and behavior, and the prevailing influence of the intertwining sacred and secular character of the black church.

Notes

1. Fifth U.S. Census Report (1830). Also note the *Negro Population in the United States, 1790–1915* (Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1918).
2. Benjamin Quarles, *Black Abolitionists* (New York: Oxford University Press 1969) 62, 154, 198–200, 201–114.
3. Frederick Douglass, editorial, *The North Star*, 13 June 1850.
4. Derrick A. Bell, Jr. *Race, Racism and American Law* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980), 29–30.
5. Even though Allen left the Free African Society, the founding of Mother Bethel is dated at 1787.
6. Note the comments of Minion K.C. Morrison in his book, *Black Political Mobilization: Leadership, Power, and Mass Behavior*, that the Montgomery boycott was a catalyst for black political activities of the 1960s. In a similar fashion, the en mass protest at St. George's became the catalyst for black institutional development.
7. New York African Clarkson Association Constitution and By-Laws of Abyssinian Benevolent Daughters of Esther Association, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York City.

8. Annual Report of the African Dorcas Association, April 1829, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York City.
9. *Freedom's Journal*, 16 March 1827.
10. Ibid.
11. *The Colored American*, 10 October 1840.
12. Ibid., 8 July 1837.
13. *The Weekly Anglo-American*, 22 December 1860.
14. Floyd Miller, (December 1971) "The Father of Black Nationalism: Another Contender," *Civil War History*, 310–19 & Gayle T. Tate, (Spring 1988) "An Angle of Vision: Black Nationalism," *Western Journal of Black Studies*, 40–48.
15. Augustine, *The Colored American*, 10 February 1838.
16. David Walker, *Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World*, (complete publication), ed. Charles M. Wiltse (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965) 19–21; Hosea Easton, "A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and Civil and Political Condition of the Colored People of the United States," in *Negro Protest Pamphlets* (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969) 6–14, 18–20; Martin R. Delany, "The Political Destiny of the Colored Race," in *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism*, ed. Sterling Stuckey (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) 203, 216–28.
17. Maria W. Stewart *Productions of Mrs. Maria W. Stewart* (Boston: Friends of Freedom & Virtue, 1835), 6.
18. *The Colored American*, 27 January 1838.
19. *The Colored American*, 25 April 1840.
20. Quote taken from Dorothy Sterling, ed. *We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,), 110.
21. "Address and Constitution of the Phoenix Society of the New York and the Auxiliary Ward Association," in *Early Negro Writing 1760–1837*, ed. Dorothy Porter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 141.

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Religious Resources and African-American Political Action

Ronald E. Brown
Monica L. Wolford

Wayne State University
The University of Michigan

A sense of political efficacy embodies the expectation that as a member of a democracy one should be able to have an impact on government behavior (Easton & Dennis, 1973: 83). This expectation is based on the idea that governmental officials must be responsive to citizen demands. Many studies reveal that people who believe that the government is responsive, who have a strong sense of political efficacy, are politically active (Campbell et al., 1976; Jennings & Niemi, 1982; Langston, 1980; Matthews & Prothro, 1966; Verba & Nie, 1972). However both direct experience and social learning in the political system leads some citizen groups to believe that there is a gap between the ideal of government responsiveness and the sociopolitical reality of government functioning. Experiences with racial conflict and the ongoing struggle for political incorporation have undermined this sense of political efficacy among members of the African American community. To them the norm of political responsiveness is not always embodied in our system of government. Empirical investigations have shown that African Americans are more likely than white Americans to perceive the government as being unresponsive (Abramson, 1977; Brown, Jackson, & Shepard, 1991; Dawson, forthcoming; Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson, 1989). Particularly illustrative is the finding from the 1986 American National Election Study (ANES) that blacks were ten times more likely than whites to strongly agree with the statement "government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than a white person." This sense of alienation from the functioning of government does not seem to be ameliorated by the increase in black elected officials since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In 1984 over 50 percent of the respondents in the National Black Election Study (NBES) felt that black officials did not have any power to change things for

blacks in American society and that white officials would always get their way (Tate et al., 1988: 94).

Awareness of this gap between the ideal of government responsiveness and the reality of low political efficacy has not translated into low levels of political action for African Americans. That is, in spite of the perception that the government tends to ignore African-American political demands and a widespread belief by African Americans that the system is to blame for many of the ills that confront African-American communities (Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989), black voting and electoral campaign rates are similar to those of whites (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990). And blacks are more likely than whites to engage in protest-demand forms of political action (Detroit Area Study, 1989: 21; Jennings & Niemi, 1981). This is not what we would expect if political action were driven solely by a belief in the efficacy of individual political action. Therefore some mechanism other than efficacy must account for the persistent moderate to high levels of political action within the African-American community. The question then is, what phenomena underlie these rates of political activity?

Explanations currently being put forth are based upon the premise that ascriptive treatment on the basis of race fosters group-based incentives for political activism (Dawson, forthcoming; Verba & Nie, 1972). That is, what is perceived as good for the group, is also perceived as having a positive outcome on one's own life chances (Dawson, forthcoming: 193). Politically active African Americans are thus likely to see their individual fate as linked to that of the group. African Americans who exhibit a sense of racial-group consciousness (Dawson, Brown, & Allen, 1990; Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989; Shingles, 1981) and those who are members of racial interest group organizations (Miller, 1982) are more politically active. Also, strong racial-group identification with black political elites has a positive effect on political participation (Dawson, Brown, & Allen, 1990). Having blacks running for public office and living in cities where blacks are part of the governing coalition increases the political interest and voting rates of African Americans (Browning, Marshall, & Tobb, 1984; Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Preston, 1987). The transformation of church-based civil rights organizations into electoral-coalition building organizations also influences political participation rates (Barker, 1988; Hamilton, 1991; Tate & Brown 1991).

This chapter seeks to further clarify why and how religion reinforces group-based incentives for political action among African Americans. It is the thesis of this essay that the African-American religious culture socializes individuals to participate in activities that will improve the spiritual and natural well-being of group members. This sense of personal obligation was nurtured in slavery, grew into adolescence during the reconstruction and pre-civil rights era, and reached maturity in the civil rights and black power era (see Lincoln & Mamiya 1990: chap. 1). Cornel West (1988: 40–49) as well as Sterling Stuckey (1987) argue that this sense of personal obligation is grounded in an African-American prophetic tradition that produces individuals and collectivities that believe that only through the efforts of the group as a whole can societal institutions be transformed so that they operate in a fair and just manner. In addition, it is argued that if given the opportunity, individuals who feel a strong sense of spiritual connectedness toward the

black community will draw upon this prophetic tradition in their quest for a moral society.

Hence, church-based political good works are rooted in a cultural tradition in which God is conceptualized as a spiritual and natural liberator (Cone, 1991; Henry, 1990; Stuckey, 1987). A God who is a redeemer negates the sense of natal alienation that is experienced by those who have marginal political power (Henry, 1990). Acceptance of God's spirit into one's life produces for *all* believers a personal sense of worth and dignity. It is this sense of redemption or feeling that one is free from the destructive winds of a sinful world that provides the individual with the spiritual and human strength to work in God's vineyard to produce a harvest of justice, equality, and peace (see Hopkins, 1990: chap. 2).

Therefore, the hope and promise of a society where blacks are first-class citizens motivates religious blacks to be politically active; to be active even if individual and group action fails to make the government responsive (see Cone, 1986; Finkel, Muller, & Opp, 1989; Fireman & Gamson, 1979; Hopkins, 1990; Muller & Opp, 1986). Michael Walzer (1985) makes this point in his essay "Exodus and Revolution" by arguing that a political interpretation and reading of the Exodus account results in active and lively participation in religious and political life in order to produce a holy nation—a place where there is equality and justice (pp. 108–9).

The felt need for activists who identify with the role of suffering servants to engage in political works was best illustrated in Birmingham, Alabama, on 2 May 1963, when 958 African-American elementary school children participating in a church-based protest marched against racial injustice (see Branch, 1988: chap. 20). Indeed, for those children who were highly religious, a strong personal belief in the redemptive power of God and the support of other like-minded church leaders and members gave them the courage to march for freedom— even if it meant school expulsion, arrest, and possibly death.

The Birmingham children's march also illustrates the significance of politicalized church-based organizations, another important resource for the development of personal and political obligations. These organizations provide the infrastructure for formal and informal political discourse, the recruitment of volunteers, the raising of money, and the moral encouragement and support needed to engage in collective action. As a result, the stage is set for political good works to occur (see Chong, 1991; Holden, 1973; McAdams, 1982; Morris, 1984).

While predominantly middle-class churches are the prime organizational setting for political activism (Branch, 1988; Lincoln & Mamiya, 1990; Morris, 1984), education and income are not individual determinants of church-based activism (Tate & Brown, 1991). A "this world liberation perspective" is an organizational value and as such church members learn that they have a personal obligation to be politically active. Members who are politically active are socialized to believe that engaging in political good works is legitimate Christian activity by church leaders who use worship service to convey this message (see McAdams, 1982; Morris, 1984). Tate and Brown's (1991) work indirectly demonstrates this point, church members exposed to church-based political information concerning the 1984 presidential election were more likely to report voting and engaging in campaign activities than

church members who were not exposed to church-based political information. However, engaging in church-based campaigning itself did not make one more likely to report voting in the 1984 presidential election. Hence, we may argue it is the endorsement of political actions that are valued by church-based political elites that motivated church members to participate in the political process.

Chong (1991: 91) raises this same point, maintaining that the most difficult part of organizing a movement is the task of building up the movement to the point where an obligation or incentive to contribute to it arises, in order for this to occur, a group of highly motivated individuals must provide the leadership required to convince others that large-scale coordination will be a profitable activity. Those active in church-based efforts may feel compelled to engage in collective actions because others like themselves see some benefit. However, without a political entrepreneur, for example, a pastor constantly encouraging those active in church-based efforts to vote, they may not participate in this activity.

Holden's (see Barker, 1988: chap. 1) argument that the hope of deliverance, defiance, and cynicism are rooted in black political culture increases our understanding of why church-based political participants were no more likely to vote in 1984 in comparison to the non-church-based politically active. In the context of the 1984 presidential campaign, Jackson's candidacy was seen by some voters as defiance politics (see Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989). This presidential campaign called the nation to repent from racial injustice (see Barker, 1988) and some activists hoped for a change in mainstream American national politics. At the same time some activists who calculated the benefits of voting decided that neither Walter Mondale nor Ronald Reagan would help the racial group. In the end, for some of the church-based politically active, the sense of personal obligation toward the group ended with the Jackson campaign.

Criticisms Of Church-based Political Action

In spite of theological arguments and empirical evidence pointing to the conditions under which religious culture influences political good works, there are those who are unsure of the benefits of a religious-based process of political mobilization. Political learning within the institutionalized black church is said by some people to have a negative influence on political mobilization. Frazier (1976) and Reed (1986) argue that the African-American church is inherently a noninterventionist, and thus a conservative, quasi-secular institution. Political discourse and the development of democratic practices are thought to be rare in black churches. Authors like Reed (1986) have argued that church members are discouraged from engaging in high-risk political activities that may endanger political arrangements that church leaders have established with local and national political elites. African Americans whose only exposure to political discourse is within a church setting are thought by these theorists to have lower rates of high-risk political activity, for example, protest types of political action, in comparison to those who are members of other political organizations. These organizations may

include political parties, labor unions, and progressive grass-root organizations.

Moreover, Reed (1986), maintains that political learning and mobilization of working- class and poor blacks is a low priority of church-based political elites. He points to data that reveal that high-income blacks were more likely to report voting for Jackson in the 1984 Democratic primary/caucus race than were low-income blacks. Furthermore, Jackson delegates were by and large college graduates. All in all, Reed's position is that resource-poor blacks are best served by nonreligious institutions that have a history of internal democratic decisionmaking.

Another perspective is that the post-civil rights church has *lost* its commitment to those who lack economic resources. Theologians such as West (1982), Rivers (1990), and Cone (1986) agree with Reed that the active pursuit of political incorporation in the post-civil rights era has moved church-based elites away from the development of strategies, organizations, and actions that could mobilize resource-poor blacks. So, "this worldly political liberation" often means electoral-based political action. Church-based political elites are viewed as arguing that protest-demand activism is not as effective as electoral activism. Political incorporation and playing by the rules is said to be valued more by church-based elites.

The criticism levied against the commitment and/or ability of African-American church leaders to encourage those with low personal resources to engage in "political good works" raises the following empirical questions: (1) what is the nature of political actions available to those who wish to engage in "public good works"; (2) what are the relationships among dimensions of political participation; (3) are church-based political action and protest-demand activism negatively related or unrelated; and (4) how important are religious and organizational resources as determinants of black political action. These questions are addressed in the remainder of this chapter. We begin by addressing the criticism of church-based political action; using 872 respondents who completed both the preelection and postelection surveys in the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES) to empirically describe the relationship between religion and black political action. Finally, the implications of our findings are discussed in the conclusion.

Addressing the Criticism

We know from the research literature that church-based political action includes electoral and protest-demand forms of expression (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson, 1989; Hamilton, 1991; Morris, 1984; Walters, 1988: 164–65). It is implausible that the electoral activities would be subsumed or co-opted by traditional political campaigns as they stem from a separate organizational source. Clearly if African-American church-based activists are products of an organizational environment in which elites down play the significance of protest-demand political action, then these activities should not be part of the repertoire of church-based organizations. Yet, church-based organizations have participated in many protest types of activities. In the 1930s and 1940s, members of the Abyssinian Baptist Church participated in racial discrimination demonstrations against department stores, a bus company, and the

World's Fair (Hamilton, 1991: 99–107). This tradition of protest is not dead. In the 1990s in Detroit and Los Angeles, churches are used to organize people in a grass-roots war against crime, drugs and unwanted liquor billboard advertising (AA. Crumm, 1991; *Los Angles Times*, 1992).

Examining the Data

Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson's (1989) published piece on political participation in the context of the 1984 election leads us to posit that church-based action should be one of four dimensions of political participation, consisting of, voting, traditional campaigning, protest-demand action, and church-based action. Furthermore, each of these dimensions are expected to have unique indicators. Moreover, with the exception of the linkage between church-based political action and voting, we expect to find substantive relationships among the various modes of political action. This hypothesis is based in part upon findings by Kaase and Marsh (1979: 92–93, 119–20). Their study of political action in Western democracies revealed that within the United States there was a moderate correlation between conventional political participation and potential for protest activities. This is particularly relevant given that blacks scored higher on the potential for protest that whites did. If indeed church-based political action is defiance politics, we expect to find a positive relationship between church-based political action and protest-demand action. We therefore posit:

Hyl: Church-based political action, traditional campaign action, protest-demand action, and voting will be clearly definable dimensions of political participation,

Hy2a: Church-based political action will be strongly related to traditional campaign action but will have weaker though positive ties with protest-demand action and voting,

Hy2b: Positive relationships will be exhibited among the other expressions of political action.

In terms of the relative significance of religious resources as predictors of political action, we contend that religious resources, (religious guidance and church attendance) should be positively correlated with engaging in public good works that require working with others, for example, church-based action, traditional campaigning, and protest-demand action. In order to estimate the relative influence of religious resources and other organizational resources on political action, a multivariate equation is estimated. We posit:

Hy3a-c: Religious guidance will have a positive effect on church-based political action, traditional campaign action and protest-demand action,

Hy3d-f: Church attendance will have a positive effect on church-based political action, traditional campaign action, and protest-demand action.

In the next section, we will present the measures used to test the various hypotheses proposed above.

Methodology

The 1984 National Black Election Study, conducted by the Program on Research on Black Americans at the Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan in 1984, provided the data for this project.

Measures

Four constructs were used to model black political action: (1) church-based action, (2) traditional campaign action, (3) protest-demand action, and (4) voting.

The church-based political action construct was composed of three indicators expressed on a three-point scale. These indicators are:

1. During this election year, did you attend anything at a church or place of worship in support of a candidate?

2. Did you do any work for a candidate through your church or place of worship?

3. Did your church or place or worship take up a collection plate for any candidate during the election year?

The traditional campaign political action construct was composed of five indicators expressed on a five point scale. These indicators are:

1. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?

2. During the campaign, did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners or things like that in support of a particular candidate?

3. Did you help with a voter registration drive or help get people to the polls on election day?

4. Did you give money to help or raise money for any of the candidates?

5. During this election year, did you help campaign for a black candidate?

The protest-demand political action construct was composed of four items expressed on a four- point scale. Respondents were asked whether or not (in the last five years) they had done any of the following things to protest something they felt needed to be changed in the nation, their neighborhoods, schools, or communities. These indicators are:

1. contacting a public official or agency;

2. signing a petition in support of something or against something;

3. attending a protest meeting or demonstration;

4. picketing, taking part in a sit-in, or boycotting a business or governmental agency.

The voting construct was composed of four indicators expressed on a four-point scale. These items are:

1. Were you registered to vote in this election?

2. So far as you know, do you expect to vote in the national election this coming November or not? State?

3. Did you vote in the 1980 presidential election?

4. In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick or they didn't have time. How about you—did you vote in the election this November?

Resource Variables

Two items were used to measure religious resources. The first is a measure of religious guidance. Respondents were asked: Would you say that religion provides some guidance in your day to day living, quite a bit of guidance, or a great deal of guidance? Those who stated a great deal of guidance were coded as high, those who stated some were coded as medium, and those who stated a little were coded as low. The second measure taps church attendance. Respondents were asked how often they attended religious services. The categories ranged from every week to never. Those who stated every week were coded as high and those who stated never were coded as low.

Organizational resources were measured by several variables. Membership in national black organizations was measured by asking respondents if they were members of any national black organization working to improve the status of black Americans. Twenty-three percent of the respondents stated yes. A dummy variable was created by coding the yes category as 1 and the no category as 0.

Partisan inclination was used as a psychological organizational resource variable. This variable was created from two variables. Respondents were asked if they identified with a political party and also how strong their identification was with a party. Four groups were coded: strong Democrats, Democratic-leaning partisans, other political affiliations, and Republican-leaning partisans.

Contact with unions is a measure of organizational affiliation with labor unions. Respondents were asked if they or anyone in their household was a

member of a union. If the respondent was a union member, the variable was coded as high; if someone in the household was a union member, the variable was coded as medium; and if no one is a union member, the variable was coded as low. Liberal/conservative scale was used to measure one's ideological perspective. Respondents were asked to self-identify themselves as liberals or conservatives and to tell how strongly they identify with the ideological label. The scale ranged from self-identified strong liberals to self-identified strong conservatives (years of schooling, one's age at the date of the interview, and gender were used as control variables).

Results

Levels of Political Participation

Table 1 shows the percentage and mean levels of participation for all of the items that compose the four types of political participation. As expected, from previous work (Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989; Verba & Nie, 1972) African-American respondents were more likely to report engaging in voting activities than any other form of political action. Beyond voting, talking about the 1984 presidential campaign was the second-highest reported level of action (see table 1).

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Political Participation

Variable	Percent	Mean	SD
Church-based Political Action			
Church-based political meeting	22.1	1.22	.415
Church-based political work	09.4	1.09	.292
Church-based contribution	20.4	1.20	.403
Traditional Campaign Action			
Talk about politics	41.3	1.41	.493
Give money to campaign	20.0	1.20	.401
Help with voter registration	18.4	1.18	.388
Work for black candidate	17.3	1.17	.379
Attend political meetings	21.5	1.22	.411
Protest-Demand Action			
Sign petititions	51.7	1.52	.500
Contact public officials	30.6	1.31	.461
Attend protest meeting	16.0	1.16	.367
Boycotting	09.0	1.09	.286
Voting			
Registered voter	90.0	1.90	.300
Plan to vote in 1984	91.4	1.91	.281
Voted in 1980	67.1	1.67	.470
Voted in 1984	79.3	1.79	.406

Source: National Black Election Study (1984), Program for Research on Black Americans, University of Michigan.

Measurement Model

In order to first estimate a measurement model of political action that allows us to simultaneously explore the relationships between church-based political action, traditional campaign action, protest-demand action, and voting, a confirmatory factor analysis technique was used. The analyses were undertaken using the LISREL VI program (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1984).

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test a number of restrictive measurement models of political participation. For comparison, the unitary factor model and the final factor model are discussed here. Compared to the unitary factor model with a chi-squared of 1205.56 and 104 degrees of freedom, the four-factor model has a chi-square of 149.82 with 98 degrees of freedom, an improvement in fit of 1055.74 with 6 degrees of freedom (p.001). The measurement model that includes the four hypothesized dimensions of political participation yields the best overall fit to the data (see table 2). These results confirm the first hypothesis, mainly that church-based political participation is one of four dimensions of political action.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b were confirmed by the data (see table 3). The structural relationship between church-based political action and the voting scale was low but significant (phi=.179). The relationships involving traditional campaign action were the most interesting. Campaign action was strongly correlated with church-based action (phi=.618) and protest-demand action (phi=.689) and was modestly correlated with voting activism (phi=.296). Finally, the significant though modest positive correlation between church-based political action and protest-demand action (phi=.315) lends credence to the argument that the protest tradition is part of the African-American religious tradition.

Religious and Organizational Resources and Political Action

The relative significance of religious resources as determinants of political action is shown in table 4. The two religious resources included appear to have quite different effects. Religious guidance, as hypothesized, had a strong positive relationship to church-based political action (beta=.135) but had much weaker relationships to protest-demand action (beta=.065), and was related to voting (beta=.080). The hypothesis that religious guidance would be related to traditional campaign political action was not confirmed by the data (Hypothesis 3b). Frequency of church attendance on the other hand was only related to protest-demand action (beta=.096) and this relationship was negative! This finding certainly supports the argument by some that the African American church is a conservative political organization. We will return to this point after discussing the other findings in table 4.

The point made by critics of the black church that secular types of political organizations may be in a better position to mobilize African Americans is somewhat confirmed by the data. The data reveal that being a member of a national black organization is a catalyst for all four types of political action. Other organizational resources also improve the likelihood of political action. Most noticeable is the effect of identifying oneself as a strong Democrat. These individuals have higher mean levels of political action in comparison to the

other self-identifying partisans. Not surprisingly though, in comparison to strong Democrats, those leaning toward the Republican party are the least likely to engage in protest-demand activity. Unions also act as an organizational enabler of political activity. Their range is more circumscribed, however. The greater the contact the individual has with the union (directly or through other members in the household), the more likely the individual is to vote, to participate in traditional campaign activity, and to engage in protest-demand action.

Table 2
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Model of Political Participation (Four-Factor Solution)

Measure	Standardized Lambdas**	ME*
Church-based Political Action		
Church-based political meeting	.687	.529
Church-based political work	.667	.555
Church-based contribution	.446	.801
Traditional Campaign Action		
Talk about politics	.469	.780
Give money to campaign	.607	.632
Help with voter registration	.485	.765
Work for black candidate	.646	.583
Attend political meetings	.713	.492
Protest-Demand Action		
Sign petititions	.582	.661
Contact public officials	.653	.573
Attend protest meeting	.550	.697
Boycotting	.443	.804
Voting		
Registered voter	.808	.347
Plan to vote in 1984	.729	.468
Voted in 1980	.503	.747
Voted in 1984	.796	.367

Source: National Black Election Study (1984), Program for Research on Black Americans, University of Michigan.
Measures of Goodness-of-Fit
Hoetler's Critical Number = 619.93
X /df = 149.82/98 = 1.53
Goodness-of-Fit Index = .975
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index = .965
Root Mean Square Residual = .035
*Measurement error (theta delta)
**All lambas are significant at p<.001

Identification as a liberal or conservative is included in these analyses as a contrast variable to the various group affiliation variables. It is interesting to note that it is one's degree of affiliation with a partisan group that accounts for political action rather than the ideological label (being a liberal or conservative) that is associated with the group and the individual. More specifically, being a strong Democrat is more salient for political action than is one's self-ideological identification.

Table 3
Phi Matrix for Four Factor Model of Political Action

	Church-Based Political Action	Traditional Campaign Action	Protest-Demand Action	Voting
Church-based political action	1.00			
Traditional campaign action	.618 ***	1.00		
Protest-demand action	.315 ***	.689 ***	1.00	
Voting	.179 ***	.296 ***	.318 ***	1.00

Source: National Black Election Study (1984), Program for Research on Black Americans, University of Michigan.
* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p <.01

Earlier we saw that frequency of church attendance was not a predictor of political action. What is more critical to understand, however, is how membership in certain churches can be important for political mobilization. Therefore we must examine the relationship between membership in politicalized churches and our four measures of political action. The previous work of Tate and Brown (1991) on the 1984 NBES, leads us to posit that exposure to church-based political messages increases the propensity for individuals to become politically active. Our measure of church-based political education differs from Tate and Brown's in that their measure did not include the respondent's belief about the desirability of churches or places of worship to be involved in political matters. We include this indicator and two items tapping the respondent's exposure through church to information about the presidential election. Individuals who support church involvement in secular politics and who are exposed to church-based political messages should be the most likely to engage in all four forms of political action. These individuals are aware of the historical and contemporary significance of the African-American church in the liberation struggle. This will make them feel more strongly that they have a personal obligation to be politically active.

Causal Structures and Political Action

Figure 1 presents the structural model used for assessing the impact of exposure to a politicalized church setting on the four types of political activism, while controlling for the effects of socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status is presented here as a block modelled construct (Marsden, 1982). Both politicalized church membership and socioeconomic

status are allowed causal paths to all four types of political action: church-based political action, traditional campaign action, protest-demand action, and voting. As expected, the effect of politicalized church membership on church-based political action (beta= .842, p. 001) and traditional campaign political action (beta= .716, p.001) were particularly strong. The influence of politicalized church membership on protest-demand (beta= .522, p.001) and voting (beta=.322, p.001) were somewhat weaker but still positive and highly significant.


Table 4
Descriptive Multivariate Model of Religious and Nonreligious Resources on Collective Political Action

Variable	Church-Based Action	Traditional Campaign Action	Protest-Demand Action	Voting
Religious guidance	.135 ***	.055	.065 *	.080 **
Frequency of church attendance	.052	-.016	-.096 ***	-.030
Black organization membership	.221 ***	.340 ***	.294 ***	.109 ***
For following 3 variables comparison group is strong Democrats				
Democratic-leaning partisans	-.124 ***	-.211 ***	-.079 **	-.185 ***
Other political affiliation	-.127 ***	-.121 ***	-.065 *	-.278 ***
Republic-leaning partisans	-.084 **	-.104 ***	-.096 ***	-.154 ***
Contact w/ unions: R & household	.028	.064 *	.126 ***	.097 ***
Liberal/conservative scale	.060	-.004	.002	.002
Control Variables				
Education	-.029	.110 ***	.254 ***	.189 ***
Age	.023	-.008	-.068 *	.226 ***
Gender	.030	-.079 **	-.018	.028
N	645	695	699	688
R squared	.122	.231	.248	.241
Adjusted R squared	.107	.219	.236	.228

Source: National Black Election Study (1984), Program for Research on Black Americans, University of Michigan
* p < . 10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

In contrast, the effects of socioeconomic status on the four types of political action were generally weak. The exception was the moderate (beta=.411, p.<001) causal link to protest- demand political action. Most interesting was the negative covariation between socioeconomic status and church-based political action (beta=.-.213, p.<.01). This would seem to indicate that church-based political action is favored by those of lower socioeconomic status. Traditional campaign political activism had a weak but positive relationship

Figure 1
A LISREL Model of Politicalized Church Membership on Political Action *



with socioeconomic status (beta-.198, p.<.001). Socioeconomic status was not related to voting.

All and, all these findings support the thesis that church-based political education encourages church members to feel a personal obligation to engage in political activity. Lincoln (1984) argues that black churches must take the lead in saving the nation from the destructive forces of racism. If indeed, African-American church political leaders view their role, as did the early Puritans (Marsden, 1990: 15–16), as that of creating a new Jerusalem, pastors and other church leaders may want to use their organizational prestige to convince activists that it is their duty to engage in both low-risk (electoral) and high-risk (protest-demand) activities.

Discussion

Our major argument in this chapter has been that African-American church culture encourages members to engage in political action even when the government is perceived as not being responsive. Such action is made possible because members are socialized to believe that they have a personal obligation to participate in collective actions that will improve the overall spiritual and material well-being of members of their racial group. Our findings reveal that while church-based political action is a separate and distinct form of political action, it does show substantial positive relationships with political actions that require working in solidarity with others. As expected, our findings also show that voting and church-based activism yields the weakest covariation pattern.

While critics claim that church-based politics are basically clientele politics, our findings lead us to speculate that at the individual level, church-based political action is related to electoral as well as protest-demand political types of action. Those involved in church-based efforts do not appear to be favoring noninterventionist strategies but rather appear to select actions that they think will simultaneously benefit themselves and their racial group. The personal obligation that drives church members to work in campaigns and to demonstrate against racial injustice is rooted again in the belief that one must be willing to engage in political struggles to liberate the race.

The fact that politicalized church membership was a predictor of all forms of activity reinforces our argument that appeals to one's Christian duty to engage in public good works may motivate highly religious persons to engage in political good works. Indeed, these churches appear to be civic development institutions that move their members to engage in politics.

Contrary to Reed's (1986) arguments, individuals with low socioeconomic resources are the most active in church-based political campaign work. If we are to increase the propensity for political action among the poor within the African-American community, the politicalized church seems to be the place where political education will have its greatest impact. One's faith and felt need for collective action may be key factors that move poor people to participate in political matters despite of the unresponsiveness of government.

While politicalized churches may be in the best position to mobilize resource-poor individuals, there remains the question of their readiness to do

so. Are black pastors and their allies within the party system willing to take a critical look at current rules of the game that may discourage traditional campaign participation among those with low income and educational levels? The fact that pastors and activist members of "this world liberation churches" are leaders of sociological religious entities (see Tillich, 1963) means that they can fall prey to selfish organizational ambitions. These ambitions can range from being a power broker in a local community to gaining certain fixed benefits from local political elites. Challenging a political order that has produced some benefits may be perceived as too risky for those pastors who have gained some political power. Church leaders and members who benefit from such arrangements may wish to maintain the current political status quo. Likewise, black elected officials and incumbent Democrats may also wish to avoid any discussion of electoral transformation that will effect their chances of reelection.

Nevertheless, pastors and church leaders have an obligation to encourage those who are "poor in spirit." Fostering what Held (1990: 292–93) refers to as human mothering is a means of changing power relationships. This involves teaching and socializing people to believe in their own human potential for transformation. In this type of church culture, the pastor creates an environment where democratic discourse is dominant. A likely result could be church members and church leaders placing more pressure on public officials to be more accountable to black political demands.

Furthermore, a grass-roots movement for political change could spring forth from a more democratic black church culture. These potential changes would radically alter the perception among some scholars concerning the effectiveness of church-based political mobilization. Research in this area will certainly continue, and as it does, we will gain more insight into the internal and external forces that determine the scope and direction of church-based political action and its interrelations with other forms of activism.

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Civil Rights and the Supreme Court: A Return of the Past

Stephen L. Wasby

State University of New York at Albany

Some Imagery about the Court since the War

The high point in African Americans' experience with the Supreme Court was the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision.[1] The suggestion has been made that, with respect to racial equality and civil rights, the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist has turned back from a firm commitment to racial equality in its interpretation of the Constitution and statutes. In that view, the Court resembles the late nineteenth century Supreme Court under Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite. That earlier Court undercut the Reconstruction Congress's efforts to protect civil rights and enshrined "separate but equal" in our jurisprudence.

If scholars are to explain the current situation and provide a basis for estimating the future, they must "get back to basics." These basics include conditions of racial stratification in the United States: demographics, including the extreme separation (segregation) of the races in our metropolitan areas; continuing wide gaps in income distribution; federal agencies' contribution to segregation through their mortgage policies; and local governments' significantly different expenditures on schools and municipal services depending on neighborhoods' racial composition.[2] In focusing on basics, political scientists, in particular, must deal with history, including exactly what major governmental institutions have accomplished. If we mischaracterize the actions of any institution of government, we are likely to overestimate what it can or will do. If political scientists are to explain how and when people use the Supreme Court fruitfully, a careful look at the Court is required.

A Closer Look at the Supreme Court

The rulings that we associate with the Warren Court early in the twentieth century's second half *were* supportive of individual rights. And Americans

who came to political consciousness during the late 1950s and 1960s came to take that for granted. Yet if we look at the overall course of our post-Civil War history, such rulings were atypical. Because, despite the 1948 case outlawing judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants,[3] the Vinson Court was *not* a staunch support of individual rights, the Warren Court, particularly in the glow following *Brown*, was certain to look much better than what had preceded it. However, the late Warren Court's attention to, and high level of support for, individual rights were, in the long sweep of American history, aberrations. Because they were unusual, they were vulnerable to attack both at the time and later, when supporting attitudes changed.

From the viewpoint of racial equality, in the first half of the twentieth century, there were some—but only a few—high spots in the Court's record. The Court did tell municipal governments they could not overtly prevent minorities from living in certain parts of town, but then refused to interfere with private efforts—racially restrictive covenants—toward the same end, implicitly sustaining them.[4] The Court finally outlawed the white primary,[5] but only twenty years after its first rulings on the subject, the same time it took to overturn judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants. The period up to 1950 also saw the first steps along the road to *Brown* in the cases invalidating graduate school segregation. But these rulings supportive of minorities seeking their civil rights had little practical effect and the existing order was little disturbed. Even desegregation of law schools, however important for leadership of the minority community, did not affect large numbers of people.

Why Go to the Supreme Court?

The Supreme Court acts, of course, on issues that are brought to it and that it chooses to accept. The initial question is the strategic judgment made by lawyers who might take a case to the Court: they have to decide why it should be done at all. They must look at the Court's rulings realistically and ask, "Would this be the Court to which you would want to take cases?" And they must ask this repeatedly, as the answer they receive at one time may change over time, particularly with changes in the Court's personnel and its responses to its environment. That leads us to want to understand why people would think to use the Court to achieve their civil rights goals, part of the larger question of how people behave as they see circumstances emerging.

The conventional view is that people take cases to the Supreme Court when they find it propitious to do so. After all, lawyers and interest groups with which they are associated are, we believe, rational actors. Their language, in which they talk of their strategy and tactics, reinforces that picture—even when they are responding to pressures and "putting out brushfires" rather than initiating action. Perhaps the NAACP's long-term litigation campaign directed at segregation took place because Charles Houston saw something in the Court others did not see. That may well have been part of it. We must recognize, however, that at times people will seek rulings from the courts, and especially from the Supreme Court, even if they are unsure that a favorable ruling is likely or even if they know their chances are unfavorable. We must also remember that much civil rights litigation is responsive rather

than under the control of civil rights organizations. If one has initiated a case and won in the lower courts, one may be dragged to the Supreme Court, even if one did not initially wish to go there. Litigation is also reactive when events force interest groups to act, when there are "insults" that cannot be allowed to pass without a challenge—the reason the Boston and Detroit school cases were initiated—or when the government itself attempts to undo prior gains, as when the Reagan administration sought to reopen consent decrees resolving municipal employment discrimination. In such situations, civil rights groups have no choice but to intervene.

Despite the wish to avoid negative precedent, at least four important overlapping pressures propel lawyers to the Supreme Court: habits of mind, the momentum of a case or controversy, organizational maintenance, and the absence of any other arena in which to carry on the combat. The last reason is the most often cited. If access to the legislative and executive branches of government is closed or limited, or if they do not espouse views favorable to one's cause, the courts remain the arena to which one is likely to turn even if with some foreboding. That the other avenues were not open certainly helps to explain the NAACP's use of the courts in the long process leading up to *Brown v. Board of Education*, although some legislative activity —such as the anti-lynching campaign[6]—was also underway.

Habit is important here. Once having found an arena in which they have achieved success, lawyers are inclined to return there, again and again, and to pass on the word for others to do so. Thus, a federal judge has observed that a generation of lawyers was taught to "Seek ye first the kingdom of the federal courts" to pursue civil rights claims. When that avenue of potential redress became less productive, the lawyers found it difficult to give it up. When the Supreme Court is not supportive, one might try to achieve narrow victories rather than broad ones. But one would continue to take cases there, even under less-than-ideal circumstances because, as a former ACLU lawyer put it in a statement indicative of this mind-set, "It's the only Supreme Court we've got." The American Civil Liberties Union's actions support the point. Having said, repeatedly, that it would not take cases to the Supreme Court, first when the Burger Court began to take shape, again when Ronald Reagan became president, and most recently in the early 1990s, the ACLU has continued to do so.

Such a mind-set tends to filter out defects. Thus, even after Justice Brennan suggested that civil rights lawyers would do better in state court than before his colleagues, the lawyers were reluctant to pursue those advantages—even after some state high courts had handed down favorable rulings on housing and school finance. The mind-set can even prevent someone from recognizing that the object of one's affections has warts—or from letting anyone else suggest it. When the NAACP fired its staff attorney Lewis Steel for his 1968 *New York Times Magazine* article criticizing the Supreme Court for sidestepping issues—the title, "Nine Men in Black Who Think White," is indicative of his argument—it is likely that Steel's view was treated as flat-out *wrong*, not simply as anathema.

The NAACP's action may, however, have been only an unwillingness to bite in public the hand that fed it, and thus to be an instance of organizational maintenance. This is still another, and crucial, reason, for some action directed toward the Court. Organizational maintenance needs may have been the

most significant reason for the NAACP's actions on the road to *Brown* and certainly help explain the shift away from teacher salary equalization suits to efforts to equalize school facilities.[7] Thus, even if the Court's permeability to external views is an important part of lawyers' calculus in how to proceed, matters internal to those seeking redress from the Court must also be considered.

Momentum, related to habit, applies to a particular case or set of cases in a litigation campaign. It may explain why Albion Tourgee proceeded with *Plessy v. Ferguson* even though he felt victory unlikely unless the Court's composition changed before his case reached the justices:[8] he may have been caught up in the set of efforts to test separate transportation accommodations. A set of cases in a litigation campaign may be commenced under favorable omens, only to have the omens change in mid-litigation, too late for lawyers to stop their cases. This occurred with the litigation campaign aimed at welfare rules that negatively affected the poor, a campaign of great relevance to African Americans. After initial Supreme Court victories on durational residence requirements and due process, cases on benefit redistribution encountered a new set of justices. What had begun in the glow of the Warren Court came a cropper on the Nixon appointments, and the litigation campaign was ended.[9]

The Warren Court

African Americans' *present* concerns are, of course, with the Rehnquist Court, but perhaps the Supreme Court reached where it is long before William Rehnquist became Chief Justice. Because most commentators, in their attention to the Warren Court, use it as a baseline, we need to have an *accurate* baseline. However, in this examination, we do have the advantage of hindsight—or, as I prefer it, hindmyopia—which can provide a broader perspective than was available to lawyers in the trenches at the time. What then about the Warren Court, which seemed a liberal beacon in protecting individual rights? Despite the Court's rulings on freedom of expression, and especially its "criminal procedure revolution," which were like nothing the nation had seen, the principal point to be made is that, on matters of civil rights, of particular importance to African Americans, the Warren Court really wasn't all that great.

The Court's rulings on issues like freedom of expression showed that the justices could assist the interests of African Americans indirectly. The 1964 ruling in *New York Times v. Sullivan*, which stemmed from an advertisement by civil rights leaders attacking police misconduct in the South, constitutionalized the law of libel, protected critical political speech, and also saved civil rights leaders from substantial money judgments.[10] *Reynolds v. Sims*, the "one person-one vote" redistricting case, created the basis for increasing state legislative representation by blacks, particularly in central cities and, when coupled with the Voting Rights Act, in rural areas as well. And, to the extent minorities disproportionately come in contact with the criminal justice system, criminal procedure protections had the potential of benefiting them. Moreover, although rulings on the right of association stemming from the NAACP's post-*Brown* troubles did not speak of race, they protected that

organization's activities. This illustrates the point that the Court may be more willing to uphold African Americans' interests when those interests are merged with others or can be sustained without having to talk explicitly of race.

If such rulings assisted civil rights indirectly, what did the Warren Court do with respect to cases in the core areas of civil rights, such as education and access to public accommodations?[11] Less than for other individual rights issues. If the Warren Court had been successful in helping produce protection of civil rights, we might not have seen increasing disaffection for use of litigation to achieve civil rights and increasing support for groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, which relied primarily on direct action rather than litigation.[12]

Although *Brown v. Board of Education* was really Earl Warren's first case, the "liberal" Warren Court did not appear full-blown with his 1953 appointment (and almost a decade passed before the Court had the personnel to be consistently liberal); more important, it never fully achieved the "liberal" label for African Americans. After the 1954 *Brown* ruling, the Court immediately backed off from its spirit by holding a year later that "all deliberate speed" was to be the standard for movement toward desegregation and by providing the basis for school board excuses for inaction. Having handed the South that victory, the Court for all practical purposes retreated from the school desegregation battlefield until after Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly Title VI, which provided for the removal of funds from governmental units that engaged in discrimination, and the executive branch had developed implementing regulations (the "HEW desegregation guidelines").[13]

There were, to be sure, the famous Little Rock and Prince Edward County cases,[14] but those were situations of extreme resistance that the Court could have ignored only at peril to its legitimacy. In the former, the Court made clear that public resistance was not an acceptable reason for a school district's inaction on desegregation. The Court also overturned Prince Edward County's closing of its schools rather than desegregating and then providing public funds to "private" schools open only to whites, creating the set of black children Robert Kennedy called "the generation without an education."

Apart from these two cases, however, until 1968 there was only one other signed school desegregation ruling. Some *per curiam* (unsigned) cases as early as 1964 can be read as requiring "action now," but if the Court wanted to produce action, it chose an unfortunately low-visibility way of saying so, making it easier for the message to be ignored.[15] Although the Court could have provided some basic standards, it provided no guidance for lower court judges and state and local school officials seeking it. Because the Court failed to engage in adequate oversight of foot-dragging Southern federal courts, to the extent that administrative desegregation guidelines were linked to judicial action, the Court's slow pace until the late 1960s also hindered desegregation. That meant that *Brown* had limited practical effects in terms of quality education for minority children. Thus the Warren Court did little to implement the ruling with which it is perhaps most closely associated in civil rights. Only in 1968—at the very end of Chief Justice Warren's tenure—did the Court demand action in school desegregation, when it said that "freedom of choice"

plans were not acceptable unless they produced desegregation, and that plans must realistically work *now*, not at some future date. (Also in 1968, the Warren Court revived the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and in dictum approved of the 1968 Open Housing Act.)[16]

The Warren Court's treatment of the many cases generated by the civil rights movement further illustrates its mixed civil rights record. Acting quite differently from its pattern in school desegregation, the justices accepted for review a large number of cases stemming from sit-ins and demonstrations, and overturned convictions in a very high proportion of them.[17] The Court thus showed that it could provide "bottom-line" support for those engaged in the civil rights movement. Yet, throughout, the Court avoided the basic constitutional question posed by the sit-in cases: whether a proprietor could invoke the assistance of the police to arrest for trespass those who had been refused service and would not depart. The Court did so by using a variety of unremarkable techniques, such as finding "state action" in the statements of mayors and chiefs of police that blacks would not be allowed to eat at the establishments in *their* towns and finding no evidence to support arrests of demonstrators for breaching the peace. Yet the Court that had found "state action" in judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants could not bring itself to find that a police arrest for trespass in a private establishment, coupled with a conviction by a judge, was state action enforcing racial discrimination.

Later demonstration cases also showed that the Court, despite its otherwise exemplary record on freedom of expression, was reluctant to be at the rights frontier to assist African Americans. While willing to legitimate a peaceful walk to the South Carolina state capitol to petition for redress of grievances, the Court drew the line sharply against demonstrators' gathering at courthouses or jails to sing songs in support of black brothers and sisters standing trial or in jail.[18] The Court thus was unwilling to allow demonstrations directed at symbolically important targets.

Perhaps some justices were simply acting prudently, if forcing the issue might have led a majority of their colleagues to rule against those sitting in—a ruling that would have been devastating for the civil rights movement in its efforts to secure a national public accommodations law.[19] Certainly a ruling from a Congress finally prepared to act would be more acceptable to the country than one from the unelected Supreme Court. When the Congress did act and the law was challenged, the Court, showing deference to Congress, quickly sustained it. And, still faced with sit-in cases "in the pipeline" from before passage of the 1964 Act, the Court wiped them away by broadly interpreting the new statute.[20]

That the Warren Court, despite its lukewarm action, was nonetheless far more supportive than the Court of earlier periods leads to asking not why the Court of recent times has turned back, but why the Warren Court was so committed to civil rights. Executive action and elite public opinion are important reasons. President Eisenhower never once said anything positive about *Brown*, yet he was not hostile to the Supreme Court's rulings, and his immediate successors were either neutral or supportive of the Court. That gave the Court some leeway in which to issue rulings more liberal than the public would have sought—but not too far from what the public would tolerate, because when it went beyond those limits, it was met with attacks.

Elite public opinion provided both support for the institution ("diffuse support") and support for particular decisions ("specific support")—at least more than did the general public.[21] After World War II, when we were engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, the elite also found it important to have our institutions provide overt public support for civil rights. Indeed, desegregation, including *Brown v. Board of Education*, has been accurately called a "Cold War imperative."[22] And, despite congressional hostility to the Court's actions, elites could obtain enough support in Congress to block efforts to overturn the Court. This lesson was learned in the late 1950s but only after the Court suffered a close call. In 1956 and 1957, the justices handed down a number of rulings on aspects of internal security in which it limited congressional committee investigations and constrained states' abilities to investigate and fire suspected subversives. These rulings prompted both the John Birch Society's "Impeach Earl Warren!" campaign and bills to remove the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over most internal security matters. When the legislation came within only a few votes of passing, the Court must have "got the message," and in 1958 and 1959, marched back down the hill, severely limiting the "offending" rulings.

In this, the Court showed that it could be a prudent, pragmatic, self-protective institution. Having received much criticism not only for its actions in internal security, but also obscenity and reapportionment, school prayer, and criminal procedure, it could ill afford another area of conflict. So one could surmise that the area in which it chose to lay low was civil rights—even when most in the North saw the issue as belonging solely to the South and thus were more willing to support necessary action to bring about some results.

The Burger Court

Many expected the Court, with a new Chief Justice and other new members appointed by President Richard Nixon, to become quite conservative—and to do so promptly. This expectation was reasonable, given Nixon's sustained attack on the Court in the 1968 presidential campaign, particularly for being "soft on criminals," and his selection of nominees to the Court on the basis of their position on criminal procedure. What was surprising (perhaps more so than the Warren Court's rulings) was that the Court under Chief Justice Warren Burger immediately brought "all deliberate speed" to an end and handed down other pro-civil rights rulings in the early 1970s. The Burger Court was *not* the Warren Court. Yet, although there was attrition of liberal criminal procedure precedents, the Burger Court generally was the "counter-revolution that wasn't."[23] The justices were conservative, but to a large extent they were self-restrained. They applied, not overturned, some Warren Court precedents, and created new rights.

Why did the Burger Court, although seemingly more in touch with public opinion, not change as much as anticipated and immediately adopt a conservative stance on civil rights? One reason is that the Nixon administration was less concerned with opposition to civil rights than with limiting defendants' rights. Although the administration, reflecting the country's mood, certainly sought a slower pace for school desegregation and opposed "forcing busing," it was generally supportive of civil rights enforcement, and even produced

the first major affirmative action plan for employment in public works construction (the Philadelphia Plan).

Rulings in support of African Americans' interests extended through the Burger Court's first years. The justices gave a broad reading to employment discrimination law (Title VII) and upheld judges' broad remedial authority in school desegregation cases, including busing; and, in the first Northern school case, from Denver, favored the plaintiffs by providing a burden of proof that facilitated bringing the evidence-heavy cases that were necessary to prove discrimination in large Northern cities.[24]

This stance was not to last, however. Nineteen-seventy-four produced what appeared to be the end of the road for favorable rulings. To use the marathoner's term, the Court had "hit the wall"—but, unlike the successful marathoner, did not break through to improved performance. Confronted in the Detroit case with segregation that had created a largely minority city and a ring of nearly white suburbs, the Court backed off from its earlier support for school desegregation and, artificially separating issues of housing and education and elevating school district boundaries to an undeserved importance, refused to provide interdistrict remedies,[25] thus leaving white suburbs untouched by desegregation. There were to be some rays of light in school desegregation when the Court upheld system-wide remedies against the Dayton and Columbus, Ohio, school systems for having maintained the equivalent of *de jure* segregation since 1954, but otherwise the march forward was pretty much over.

The Court's stance on employment also changed. When the Court confronted entrenched segregation resulting from seniority systems, the Court supported seniority rather than minorities' interests. (Later, the Burger Court allowed judicially imposed quotas as a remedy for persistent discrimination, but rejected affirmative action programs that protected minorities at the expense of whites during layoffs.)[26] The Burger Court also limited access to federal courts, in some instances with clear negative effects on minorities. This was most notable when the rules were rewritten to make attacks on suburban exclusionary zoning or on police brutality quite difficult.[27] Thus *when it counted*, the Court limited school desegregation; limited progress toward ending employment discrimination; protected white suburbs; and limited minorities' access to the courts to challenge discrimination.

Perhaps most revealing of the "new" ("true"?) Burger Court approach was its shift from upholding an "effects" test for proof of job discrimination ("disparate impact") to insisting that, under the Constitution, one had to show discriminatory *intent* ("disparate treatment") and its extension of the "intent test" to housing and to voting cases.[28] The intent test was at the heart of a mode of examining discrimination claims that required finding fault and that led to rulings providing remedies only to specific *individuals* who had been discriminated against.

What caused the Court to turn back? The Court's right turn in 1974 and 1975 may have reflected not only the delayed effect of the new justices' conservatism but also the majority's realization that the Court had lost support of liberal activists in Congress on civil rights. Thus simple Republican politics, coupled with normal replacement of justices—major elements to examine as we try to anticipate when the Court will shift and when it will not—played a role. So did more conservative public opinion resulting from

a return to "normalcy" after the heady but disturbing 1960s. Particularly important for civil rights was decreased Northern support for desegregation as school desegregation, initially perceived as a "Southern problem," began to "come North" and liberal supporters of *Brown* bailed out when *their* communities were challenged.

The Present Court

What has produced the present Court? Our greater concern has been the Warren Court and early Burger Court. But where the Rehnquist (or Reagan/Bush) Court has moved in its return to the past is as important as the place from which it has come. Among the principal reasons for the present Court's stance, one is inclined to name the self-proclaimed conservatives of the Reagan administration and the still more conservative public opinion—opinion hardly favorable to civil rights—to which Ronald Reagan appealed. Indicating the tone of public opinion were claims of "reverse discrimination," and the Court accepted the "innocent victims" argument made by whites challenging affirmative action programs.[29]

Hostility to civil rights was evident in the president's unwillingness to support removal of tax exemptions for private schools that discriminated on the basis of race—on which the Court ruled against the administration[30]—and in resistance to changing the "intent" test for voting discrimination the Court had read into the Voting Rights Act—where he lost in Congress. At least as important as specific policy stands was that the administration set about, more systematically than any previous administration at least in this century, to select federal court judges ideologically acceptable in terms of the president's "social agenda."

Still more important, President Reagan was able to elevate Justice Rehnquist, the most conservative of Nixon's appointees, to the center seat on the Court and to name other conservatives to the Court. One can assume that justices, particularly when they are chosen for their ideology, know why they are chosen, but the new appointees' own ideology would have led them to support the president's social agenda in any event. It took little more than a single term for Rehnquist to control the Court, with needed allies for strong conservative dominance provided by the appointments of Justices Scalia and Kennedy by Reagan, and Souter and Thomas by Bush. (Justice Stevens is the only moderate appointed after Nixon was president, as Justice Blackmun became liberal after he joined the Court.)

The Burger Court "counterrevolution" against the Warren Court that had not occurred under Burger flowered at the end of the 1980s in the Rehnquist Court. The Court frequently read narrowly Congress's intent on matters of individual rights and engaged not in promised "self-restraint" but in conservative activism in reversal of precedent. Especially significant was that the Court limited use of federal courts by state defendants to challenge their convictions and showed particular impatience with death sentence cases. Of particular concern for African Americans was the Court's rejection of a challenge to the capital punishment process on the grounds it was racially discriminatory.[31]

For all the rhetoric about "quotas," the Court's posture on affirmative action remained unclear. A majority upheld affirmative action requirements

as a judicial remedy for hiring and promotion and narrowly reaffirmed the validity of government set-aside programs established by Congress. Yet local government set-aside programs were subjected to a much stricter test.[32] Most important for job discrimination against minorities and women was a set of June 1989 rulings making it far more difficult for someone to succeed with a job discrimination complaint; in particular, the Court severely limited the Burger Court's 1971 effects test to prove a violation of Title VII.[33]

Court and Congress

The Supreme Court of the 1990s may seem like the Waite Court of the last century, which undid civil rights gains that Congress had enacted. If that is so, what is the present Court's relation to Congress? Through its actions, the new Court—or rather, the new old Court, if one follows the implicit argument—has produced altered relations between Court and Congress with respect to civil rights. Instead of a liberal Court hectored by conservative members of Congress and not assisted by hesitant presidents (Eisenhower, Kennedy), one finds a conservative Court attacked by a broad-based coalition that is able to argue successfully that the Court, when it has limited protection for civil rights claimants, has gone too far—or, put differently, not gone far enough. The Congress is now the body that returns the interpretation of statutes to where they had been before conservative justices limited their reach.

Two particularly significant instances of legislative reversal of the Court on civil rights matters came in President Reagan's tenure. In one, Congress reversed the Court's requirement of the "intent" test for the Voting Rights Act and provided for the easier-to-satisfy "effects" test. Then, after the justices ruled that only a specific *program* receiving federal funds was subject to federal antidiscrimination provision,[34] in the aptly named Civil Rights Restoration Act, Congress said that an entire agency was subject to the law if any part received federal funds. The most far-reaching reversal of the Congress's reversal actions was the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which overturned all or part of seven Supreme Court rulings—five from the 1988 Term and two more from the 1990 Term—limiting minorities' and women's efforts to challenge job discrimination. As Congress has regularly overturned the Court's readings of statutes, what is significant is the frequency and pattern of such reversals and the fact that they occurred with respect to civil rights.

The Court may—indeed, will—continue to surprise us because its holdings on matters concerning African Americans do not develop in a perfectly linear fashion; certainly the 1992 ruling on segregation in higher education demonstrates that. If we had images of Congress as the civil rights villain, its recent actions—not one, but several—should change our perceptions. And, at the same time that the Supreme Court seems to have returned to the late nineteenth century, even without a new Reconstruction, we might take hope in Congress's having done something of the same sort.

Notes

1. *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), and, for the current era,

Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989).

3. *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
4. *Buchanan v. Warley*, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); *Corrigan v. Buckley*, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
5. *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
6. See Robert L. Zangrando, *The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909–1950* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1980).
7. See Mark V. Tushnet, *The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925–1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).
8. Jack Greenberg, "Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy" presented at the Cardozo Lecture, October 1973 (New York Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1974), 12–15.
9. See ibid.
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Anthony Lewis, *Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment* (New York: Random House, 1991).
11. There were no Warren Court rulings on the substantive law of employment discrimination. Those rulings did not come until the Burger Court.
12. But we must be careful not to underestimate the extent to which the civil rights movement relied on law. See Robert Jerome Glennon, "The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott," *Law and History Review*, 9 (1991): 59–112.
13. See Gary Orfield, *The Reconstruction of Southern Education: The Schools and the 1964 Civil Rights Act* (New York: John Wiley, 1969); Beryl A. Radin. *Implementation, Change, and the Federal Bureaucracy: School Desegregation Policy in HEW, 1964–1968* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1977).
14. *Cooper v. Aaron*, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); *Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County*, 375 U.S. 391 (1964).
15. For further attention to the Supreme Court's strategy, see Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D'Amato, and Rosemary Metrailer, *From Brown to Alexander: An Exploration of the Supreme Court's Strategies* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977).
16. *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County*, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); *Jones v. Mayer*, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
17. Joel B. Grossman, "A Model for Judicial Policy Analysis: The Supreme Court and the Sit-In Cases," in *Frontiers of Judicial Research*, ed. Joel Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York: John Wiley, 1969), 405–60.
18. *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 362 U.S. 229 (1963); *Cox v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 536 and 379 U.S. 559 (1965); *Adderly v. Florida*, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
19. See Bernard Schwartz, *Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 522–24.
20. *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States*, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); *Hamm v. City of Rock Hill*, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
21. For a summary of public opinion studies, see Stephen L. Wasby, *The Supreme Court in the Federal Judicial System*, 4th ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1993), 353–62.
22. Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," *Stanford Law Review*, 41 (1988): 61–120.
23. Vincent Blasi, ed., *The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
24. *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424 (1970); *Keyes v. School District No. 1, City of Denver*, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
25. *Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717 (1964).
26. *Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C.*, 478 U.S. 421 (1986), and *Firefighters v. City of Cleveland*, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); *Firefighters v. Stotts*, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), and *Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education*, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
27. *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); *Rizzo v. Goode*, 423 U.S. 490 (1975).

28. See *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252 (1977); *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 447 U.S. 55 (1980).
29. For an analysis of that argument, and of affirmative action generally, see Ronald J. Fiscus, *The Constitutional Logic of Affirmative Action*, ed. Stephen L. Wasby (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992).
30. *Bob Jones University v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
31. *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 481 U.S. 501 (1986).
32. *United States v. Paradise*, 480 U.S. 149 (1964), and *Johnson v. Santa Clara County*, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); *Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C.*, 110 S.Ct. 2997 (1990); *City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.*, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
33. *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio*, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989).
34. *Grove City College v. Bell*, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).

Racial Discrimination, Capital Punishment Policy, and the Supreme Court: The Death Penalty as a Political Devaluation of Black Life

Mitchell F. Rice

Louisiana State University

> *If a black man kill a white man, that be first degree murder; if a white man kill a white man, that be second degree murder; if a black man kill a black man, that be manslaughter; but if a white man kill a black man, that be excusable homicide—unless a woman was involved, in which case the black man died of apoplexy.*
>
> —A lawyer's joke about homicide in Kentucky

Understanding the Fundamental Significance of Race and Capital Punishment

For nearly a half-century scholars and researchers have been concerned with the discriminatory application of the death penalty. Social scientists writing in the 1930s and 1940s, although lacking reliable statistical information, inferred that blacks who perpetrated capital crimes against whites received racially selective sentences.[1] Even Gunnar Myrdal in his classic *An American Dilemma* commented on the ratio of white and black death sentences in the segregated South. According to Myrdal,

> the Negro constitutes less than thirty percent of the population in these states, but has more than twice as many death sentences imposed. Actual executions make the racial differential still greater, for 60.9% of the Negro death sentences were carried out as compared with 48.7% of the white.[2]

From these observations have come a steady flow of empirical research findings that have concluded, for the most part, that killers of whites are more likely to receive the death penalty than the killers of blacks.[3] William Wilbanks, in *The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System,* concedes that in capital punishment the race of the victim consistently influences sentencing decisions.[4]

More recently, research by the federal government has strongly supported the view that racial bias exists in capital punishment sentencing. The U.S. General Accounting Office's evaluation synthesis of twenty-eight empirical studies of death penalty sentences from 1972 to 1988 showed a pattern of racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty. The synthesis found that in 82 percent of the studies, race of the victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty. This finding was quite consistent across data sets, data collection methods, and analytic techniques regardless of whether the study was considered of high, medium, or low quality.[5]

In the early 1990s a discussion of racial discrimination in capital punishment sentencing is quite timely and relevant within the context of black politics. Blacks' strategic efforts over the years have used the judicial system to redress social and political inequalities in American society. The judicial system, especially the federal judiciary, has been viewed as the safeguard for civil rights of blacks.[6] Yet, it is now the judicial system, as will be discussed, that is admittedly considering race as a key criterion in capital punishment sentencing. Blacks found guilty of murder, particularly in cases where whites are killed, are victims in a judicial system in which racism seems to be most pronounced. Racism in the judicial system and capital punishment sentencing have not been adequately addressed by black politics and the issues appear to be impervious to remediation by black politics/electoral efforts. The black political agenda in the 1990s must seek to develop a strategy to eliminate racism in capital punishment sentencing and black political scientists must add capital punishment policy to their research agendas.

This chapter, utilizing case content and legal and social science literature analyses, examines the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *McCleskey v. Kemp* (1987) and the provision of a particular sort of public policy—capital punishment. Specifically, the chapter addresses two significant questions. Why has the Supreme Court decided that capital punishment can be administered in a discriminatory manner? Why would the Supreme Court allow society to discriminate on the basis of race in the administration of capital punishment? These questions and the critical issues they raise may best be understood within the frameworks of the American political system described by Harold D. Lasswell and David Easton. Lasswell defines politics as "who get what, when, where, and how" and "the study of politics [as] . . . the study of influence and the influential."[7] Easton views politics as the authoritative allocation of values and resources in society.[8] Within these frameworks, it is generally argued that blacks lack authoritative influence in the political system. Or, stated another way, the influentials make authoritative decisions about values including who receives capital punishment and who does not. Simply put, the allocation of mandatory death is a political decision. Smith, Rice, and Jones argue that these frameworks allow the influentials to pursue their self-interest or self-preservation.[9] This would suggest that capital

punishment is used as a means of self-preservation by the influential group in American politics. Therefore, understanding the fundamental significance of race and capital punishment sentencing is of critical importance to the black community because, as will be discussed, the death penalty adversely affects blacks more than any other ethnic group.

The first section of the chapter provides an overview of capital punishment, a discussion of *Furman v. Georgia* (1972), in which the Supreme Court ruled capital punishment unconstitutional, and a statistical examination of capital punishment sentencing by race. The next section provides an interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling and rationale in *McCleskey* and argues that the Court sought to protect the criminal justice system at the expense of racial discrimination in capital punishment sentencing. The third section discusses the Baldus Study, the statistical evidence that was at the center of the *McCleskey* case. The conclusion suggests that the Court's decision in *McCleskey* has placed a lesser value on the lives of black offenders who kill whites.

Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court: An Overview

Of the nearly 3,900 executions in the United States between 1930 and 1967, about 54 percent involved black defendants.[10] In 1992 there were nearly 2,600 inmates on death row.[11] The United States has more individuals on death row than any other country except Pakistan and is the only Western industrial country to still have the death penalty.[12] By the end of 1988 a total of 2,124 inmates were under sentence of death, an increase of 8 percent over 1987.[13] Table 1 points out the demographic profile of prisoners under sentence of death for 1988. About 40 percent were black and about 99 percent were males. Nearly 300 individuals were consigned to death row in 1988 and about one-third were black individuals. Of the 139 individuals removed (vacated or commuted) from death row in 1988, slightly more than one-third were black.

The U.S. Supreme Court began to address the issue of racial discrimination in capital punishment sentencing some twenty years ago when the state of Georgia's capital punishment system was challenged in the case of *Furman v. Georgia*.[14] The 5-4 *per curiam* decision, in which nine separate opinions were written, with none of the justices in the majority joining in the opinion of any other, ruled that the death penalty "constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendment" because it was imposed in an arbitrarily, standardless, and unpredictable manner. In *Furman* several justices vowed never again to allow circumstances in which "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases which it is not."[15] Justice Douglas found the "uncontrolled discretion of judges" to be constitutionally impermissible.[16] Justice Stewart considered the death penalty unconstitutional because it was "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."[17] Justices Brennan and Marshall in concurrence found the death penalty unconstitutional per se in a civilized society and both expressly denounced the arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty.[18] Both justices as a matter of principle rejected the imposition of the death penalty in all circumstances.[19] As a result of the *Furman* decision, thirty-nine state death penalty statutes were invalidated and

the death sentences of 631 inmates were vacated.[20] The state of Florida became the first to enact a revised death penalty statute after the *Furman* decision. The U.S. Supreme Court approved the Florida statute in *Profitt v. Florida* along with new statutes passed in Georgia (*Gregg v. Georgia*) and Texas (*Jurek v. Texas*).[21]

Table 1
Demographic Profile of Prisoners under Sentence of Death, 1988

	Year End 1988	1988 Admissions	1988 Removals
Total number under sentence of death	2,124	296	139
Sex			
Male	98.9%	98.3%	97.8%
Female	1.1	1.7	2.2
Race			
White	58.3%	66.2%	61.9%
Black	40.2	30.7	36.7
Other[a]	1.6	3.0	1.4
Ethnicity			
Hispanic	6.7%	10.1%	2.9%
Non-Hispanic	93.3	89.9	97.1
Age[b]			
Less than 20 years	.5%	3.0%	0%
20-24	9.2%	20.3	13.7
25-29	24.4	24.3	17.3
30-34	25.0	20.9	23.7
35-39	17.0	11.5	19.4
40-54	21.8	17.2	23.7
55+	2.2	2.7	2.2

Source: USDOJ, 1989.
[a]Consists of 21 American Indians and 12 Asians present at the end of 1988, 4 American Indians and 5 Asians admitted during the year, and 2 Asians removed during 1988.
[b]The youngest person under sentence of death was a black inmate in Louisiana born in May 1971. The oldest was a white inmate in Kentucky born in October 1911.

Since the reinstatement of the death penalty by the Supreme Court in 1976 at least 176 individuals have been executed.[22] About 40 percent of those executed have been black defendants and in some 31 percent of the executions the minority defendant had killed a white.[23] During this same period, no white defendant has been executed for killing a minority victim and only 15 percent of those executed were minority defendants who had killed minorities.[24]

The *McCleskey Case* and Discriminatory Capital Punishment

In 1987 the Supreme Court was again faced with a constitutional challenge to the death penalty, this time on the grounds that it is administered and

applied in a racially discriminatory manner. In *McCleskey v. Kemp*, Georgia's capital punishment system was the focus of attention for the sixth time.[25]

Jury Trial Level

Warren McCleskey, a black man, was found guilty and sentenced to death by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for the murder of a white policeman during a robbery of an Atlanta, Georgia, furniture store on 13 May 1978.[26] McCleskey and three other armed individuals participated in the robbery of the Dixie Furniture Store. McCleskey carried a .38 caliber Rossi revolver. One individual was armed with a sawed-off shotgun and the other two also carried guns. They forced the manager to surrender store receipts, his watch, and six dollars.[27] A police officer, responding to a silent alarm, entered the front door and was killed by two shots.[28] Although McCleskey's gun was never found, evidence was introduced at trial that McCleskey had stolen a similar gun in an earlier robbery.[29] This disputed evidence, along with the circumstantial confession by McCleskey to a codefendant and a cellmate, led to the conviction of McCleskey by a twelve-person jury (eleven whites and one black). McCleskey was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder.

At the sentencing (penalty) hearing, the second phase of Georgia's bifurcated trial process,[30] the jury considered the aggravating circumstances—that the murder had been committed during the course of another capital offense (armed robbery) and that a police officer was killed during the performance of his duty. The jury recommended that McCleskey be sentenced to death on the murder charge[31] and to two consecutive life sentences on the armed robbery charge.[32] McCleskey offered no mitigating circumstances. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decision on the basis of its review of thirteen similar cases in which the death penalty had been imposed. The Georgia Supreme Court found that McCleskey's death sentence was not disproportionate to others that had been imposed in the state.[33]

The Federal District and Circuit Appeals Levels

After several unsuccessful petitions for a writ of federal *habeas corpus* on other grounds,[34] the U.S. Supreme Court granted a *writ of certiorari* on the basis of statistical evidence, known as the Baldus Study, that purported to show that the race of the murder victim *and* the race of the defendant led to a disparity in the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia and that this disproportionately affected blacks as victims and defendants of capital offenses. In other words, McCleskey argued that his conviction and sentence were racially motivated—a white victim was killed by a black individual.

Specifically, McCleskey argued that racial prejudice had influenced the administration of the death penalty in Georgia in two ways and that these two ways influenced his sentence. The first way was by race of the *victim* or race-of-the-victim discrimination. Murderers of whites were sentenced to death at a significantly higher rate than were murderers of blacks. The second way was by the race of the *defendant* or race-of-the-defendant discrimination. Black murderers received the death penalty at a higher rate than whites who

had committed similar homicides. In essence McCleskey's point was that Georgia's capital punishment statute operated as if "white life is more valuable than black life"[35] and "a white life is dearer [and] the life of a black cheaper."[36] This evidence led McCleskey to maintain that his death sentence had been imposed in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the evidence as insufficient to support McCleskey's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The district court concluded that the statistical evidence was substantially flawed, partially because it could not account for all the variables that influence sentencing[37] and that it did not represent sound statistical methodology.[38] The Eleventh Circuit accepted the validity of McCleskey's argument and its statistical significance in the system as a whole; however, it held that there must be a showing of discriminatory intent and that statistical evidence of racial disparities in sentencing must be so strong that it compels a conclusion of discrimination.[39] Otherwise, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, the defendant must show that race is intentionally and purposefully being used in sentencing and that McCleskey's sentence was a product of race-dependant decision making—"a decision that would have been different but for the race of those benefitted or disadvantaged" by the decision.[40]

The evidence presented, according to the Eleventh Circuit, "only showed that in a group involving blacks and whites, all whose cases are virtually the same, there would be . . . more murderers of whites receiving the death penalty than murderers of blacks."[41] The Eleventh Circuit went on to say that: "[no] single petitioner could, on the basis of these statistics alone, establish that he received the death sentence because, and only because his victim was white [and] the magnitude [of the statistics] cannot be called determinative in any given case."[42] The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit decision. Specifically, the Supreme Court refused to infer either discrimination or arbitrariness and capriciousness in McCleskey's case from the data presented.

The McCleskey *Court and the Value of Black Life*

The majority opinion in *McCleskey* written by Justice Powell and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Conner, Scalia, and White focused most of its attention on McCleskey's Fourteenth Amendment claim. The Court began its analysis with a basic observation: A defendant alleging an equal protection violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful or intentional discrimination and that such action had a discriminating effect on him. Thus, in order for McCleskey to have had valid grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause he needed to prove that the "decision makers in *his* case acted with a discriminatory purpose" or that decision-making officials were "out to get" a person or group on the account of race.[43] At the heart of the case were sophisticated data analyses presented by the Baldus Study.

The Baldus Study and Racial Capital Punishment

The Baldus Study, completed by Professors David Baldus (professor of law, University of Iowa), George Woodworth (associate professor of statis-

tics, University of Iowa) and Charles Pulaski (professor of law, Arizona State University College of Law), constituted the basis of McCleskey's argument that the race of homicide victims and criminal defendants made a marked difference in the imposition of the death penalty.[44] The Baldus Study has been described as "the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing ever carried out."[45]

The study was two separate analyses on homicide. The first, known as the Procedural Reform Study, was a regression analysis of offenders in Georgia who were convicted of murder between 1973 and 1978. Over 500 variables were coded and 230 nonracial variables were used to construct a regression model that provided the overall study's primary conclusion. The second study, the Charging and Sentencing Study, was based on a sample of Georgia inmates convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter whose crimes occurred between 1973 and 1979. Of the nearly 2500 offenders, 1,665 cases involved black defendants and 819 involved white defendants. Of the homicide victims, 61 percent were black and 39 percent were white.

With the findings from these two analyses, the Baldus Study concluded that even after accounting for every nonracial variable that might plausibly have explained death penalty sentences, the race of the victim continued to have a statistically significant correlation with the imposition of the death penalty.[46] As shown in table 2, the death sentence was imposed in 128 cases. These involved 108 cases in which whites were victims. White-victim cases were nearly eleven times as likely to result in a death sentence than black-victim cases.

Disaggregating the cases in Table 2 by race of defendant showed that 22 percent of black defendants who murdered white victims received death sentences, while only 3 percent of the white defendants who murdered blacks faced the same penalty.[47] The Baldus Study found that killers of whites were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than killers of blacks.[48]

Simply put, the Baldus Study concluded that the race of the homicide victim made a marked difference in the rate at which the death penalty was imposed.[49] The study found that for every 5 out of 100 individuals who murder blacks and receive the death penalty, 11 out every 100 who murder whites would.[50] Similarly, another study found that killers of whites are sentenced to death at a rate over two times higher than killers of blacks or killing a white increased the odds of a death penalty sentence by a factor of 4.3.[51] In the area of prosecutorial discretion, the degree to which a prosecutor seeks the death penalty, the study found that "prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims."[52]

An interesting finding of the Baldus Study that has been overlooked by many legal commentators and social scientists is that the death penalty is assessed in only "1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims."[53] This finding raises two ironies: First, since most killers of blacks are other blacks and if the killers of blacks are given the death penalty at the same frequency as killers of whites, the numbers of blacks receiving the death sentence could easily rise.[54] Second, since "the Black community as a whole is disadvantaged by the relative leniency extended to killers of black . . . [both]

black (as well as white) criminals who murder Negroes *benefit* from the undervaluation of black victims.[55] Therefore, remedying the discriminatory application of the death penalty would probably lead to more blacks receiving the death penalty.

Table 2
Death Sentencing Rates by Defendant/Victim in Georgia, between 1973 and 1979 (Baldus Study Raw Data)

Race of Defendant	Race of Victim	# Receiving Death Penalty	Total	%
Black	White	50	228	21.9
White	White	58	745	7.8
Black	Black	18	1,438	1.3
White	Black	2	64	3.0
Totals				
All white victims		108	973	11.1
All black victims		20	1,502	1.3
All victims		128	2,475	5.2

Source: Adapted from data presented in exhibits in *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 753 F. 2d 877, 11th Cir. (1985) and 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).

Table 3
Prosecutorial Discretion in Seeking the Death Penalty among Defendants Convicted of Murder (The Baldus Study)

Race of Defendant	Race of Victim	Death Penalty Sought	# of Cases	% of Cases
Black	White	87	124	70.2
White	White	99	312	31.7
Black	Black	38	250	15.2
White	Black	4	21	19.0

Source: See table 1.

Both of these observations seem to suggest strongly that if race was not a variable in capital punishment sentencing a higher number of blacks would receive the death penalty for killing other blacks. Yet, juries that over time punish black people are making statements about the value of black lives. When black people kill each other, juries do not give a great deal of consideration to deterrence or retribution arguments in capital punishment sentencing. Instead juries who have the power to impose the ultimate penalty, do not do so when blacks kill blacks. In this situation, juries seem to be saying that the lives of victims who happen to be black are simply worthless. This line of thought is also a very stark one because it strongly hints at the notion that the true victims of the capital punishment system are black people that criminal law is suppose to protect—innocent black victims. The underenforcement of

capital punishment on blacks who kill blacks speaks loudly of the unwillingness of the legal system to be fair to the black community.

Another interesting finding of the Baldus Study that seems to have been overlooked by the U.S. Supreme Court was a separate analysis of seventeen homicides in Fulton County, Georgia, that occurred between 1973 and 1979 in which seventeen police officers were victims. In only one case was the death penalty *not* imposed, the case in which the police victim was black.[56] While too small a number to permit statistical analysis, this finding led Baldus and Associates to conclude that the "death sentence in McCleskey's case is not consistent with the disposition of cases involving police officer victims in this county."[57] Moreover, the Baldus Study identified three levels of death penalty cases: (1) those with little or no aggravating factors; (2) those with extreme aggravating factors, and (3) those with intermediate level of aggravating factors. Aggravating factors may include circumstances surrounding the crime. Professor Baldus testified that McCleskey fell into the intermediate level, the level in which the aggravating factors are not so extreme as to insure the death penalty or mitigating circumstances not extreme enough to lead to the likely imposition of the death penalty.[58] In *McCleskey* the jury found two aggravating factors: that the murder occurred during the commission of another capital felony and that the victim was a police officer carrying out his duties.[59] It is at this level that a jury exercises the greatest degree of discretion over when death sentences are warranted, even when they are acting under statutorily guidelines. On this point Barnett observes that "Even when acting under statutory guidance, individuals will differ in their assessments of when death sentences are warranted. . . . Most people apparently have thresholds that separate the 'deathworthy' defendants."[60]

In other words, in Baldus's intermediate cases, a real choice can be exercised by the jury and it is in the exercise of this choice that the influence of racial discrimination becomes most visible. Conversely, in the most aggravated cases a jury typically imposes the death sentence regardless of racial variables and in the least aggravated cases a jury typically spares the defendant regardless of racial variables.[61] Therefore, even with statutory guidelines limiting the jury discretion, all randomness and arbitrariness cannot be eliminated in death sentences (see *Furman* and *Gregg*) because there is no way to predict in the intermediate level which defendants will get death sentences and which will not.[62]

The Court noted that "McCleskey would have to show proof that the state enacted or maintained the death penalty statute *because* of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect."[63] McCleskey's evidence did not meet this requirement because he failed to show that his race was a basis for his sentence.[64] McCleskey had sought instead an inference from the Baldus Study that racial discrimination did exist and that no facts were needed for his particular case.[65] In consideration of this showing in the Baldus Study, the Court held that intent is not established when a state adopts a statute with a discriminatory impact, but only when a state adopts a statute because of this effect. Justice Powell viewed the Baldus data as insufficient proof of purposeful discrimination necessary to demonstrate a violation of the equal protection clause and noted that statistical disparities ordinarily must be "stark" to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent.[66] Since the Court was

unable to find the existence of discrimination directed specifically toward McCleskey or that the Georgia legislature or judiciary had acted with a discriminatory purpose, it therefore, found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. The majority it seemed was concerned with the opening of a Pandora's Box. A decision in McCleskey's favor would have opened the door "for equal protection challenges to *all* criminal punishments by all disadvantaged groups."[67]

The Court stated, "if we accept McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty."[68]

Yet, the Court ignored its ruling some eight years earlier when it noted that racial discrimination "is especially pernicious in the administration of justice."[69] Further, had the Court decided in favor of McCleskey it would have stigmatized the criminal justice system and the white officials who dominate the system as "racist." Taking this to an extreme, the Court was concerned that future courts could be asked to consider statistical evidence indicating bias because of a defendant's hair color, eye color, or weight. In light of this observation and despite the fact that McCleskey's life was on the line, the Court believed that preserving the system was more important than preserving a life sentenced to death by a racist system. Perhaps a more plausible explanation for the Court's decision may be associated with the "well known phenomenon that a [court] is likely to scrutinize the special claims of an individual defendant in a less hospitable light when [it] is aware that the fates of many similarly situated individuals hinge on that individual's case."[70]

Eighth Amendment Claim

In regards to McCleskey's second claim, that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the Court pointed out that it had identified a constitutionally permissible range of *discretion* in imposing the death penalty.[71] In defining this permissible range of discretion, the Court noted that prosecutorial discretion is unchallengeable as long as it focuses "on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant."[72] However, the Court failed to take into account that the Baldus Study showed that within prosecutorial discretion and decision making the race of the defendant becomes a particularized characteristic.[73] Further, the Court observed that McCleskey's sentence was not ('wantonly and freakishly') imposed and it was not disproportionate within any recognized meaning included in the Eighth Amendment.[74] The Court recognized that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system."[75] However, it was the Court's view that the Baldus Study did not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias/racial disparity in Georgia's capital sentencing system.[76]

The Court also expressed concern that if McCleskey's claim would be followed to its logical conclusion, it would cause havoc in the entire criminal justice system.[77] Conversely, the Court suggested that state legislatures are better qualified to analyze the kind of data provided by the Baldus Study than are the courts.[78] This suggestion, however, raises an interesting question.

Why should legislative bodies dominated by whites be concerned with the disparities shown in the Baldus Study if the Supreme Court chose to overlook them? Thus, the Court's decision makes it more difficult for legislatures to address the issues raised in the Baldus Study. The reasoning here is that since the Court chose to disregard the results of the Baldus Study, state legislatures could very easily choose to do the same. Further, it is the legislature's action that is at the heart of the problem. The death penalty statute is a legislative enactment that reflects the will and moral values of the people. Unless these change, the responsiveness of state legislatures to the findings of the Baldus Study is problematic at best.

Discretionary Jury Decision Making and the *McCleskey* Court

A significant issue that the Court was most concerned with was that McCleskey's claims challenged discretionary decision making, "the heart of the criminal justice system."[79] The most important area of discretion is that of jury discretion. The Court considered the jury as the fundamental protector of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.[80] The *McCleskey* Court stated that racial selectivity would have to be "exceptionally clear" because of the challenge to discretion essential in the criminal justice process.[81] If the Court had decided in favor of McCleskey and the Baldus Study then *all* jury decisions could be challenged by statistical studies demonstrating any type of discrimination imaginable.[82] Yet, the Court did not or chose not to consider the following: that some jurors despite their best intentions may harbor latent racial prejudice. As Kennedy observes: "[The majority] articulate a conception that ignores the chameleonlike ability of prejudice to adapt unobtrusively to new surroundings, and further, to hide itself even from those firmly within its grip. They manifest views attuned only to the most blatant deprivations of the equal protection of the laws."[83] Kennedy further states that

> the Court's theory of purposeful discrimination leaves untouched deeper layers of racially oppressive official action. One consists of hurtful decisions taken not because decisionmakers have designs against blacks but because decisionmakers leave blacks out of their decisions. . . . [Another is] 'the unconscious failure to extend to blacks the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care given as a matter of course to [whites]."[84]

These observations suggest that the ideas, preconceptions, and sentiments of prosecutors, judges and jurors that are the underlying structure of the criminal justice process, shape and affect who should receive capital punishment and who should not.[85] Amsterdam observes that "this kind of discretion implies the power to treat black people differently from white people and to escape the responsibility for explaining why one is making life and death decisions in an apparently discriminatory manner."[86] Obviously, black defendants have not fared and will not fare well under this kind of system. Further, the Court, as the highest decision maker in the criminal justice system, may have reflected its own racial bias—one of racially selective patterns of emotional response.[87] The Court was reluctant to label the criminal justice system as racist. This would seem to be a distinct possibility since "little systematic attention has been focused upon the influence of racial

factors [as well as other factors] . . . or social forces which mold the course of judicial behavior."[88]

Conclusion

In accepting the validity of the Baldus Study and at the same time deciding against McCleskey, the Court has in effect devalued the life of blacks who kill whites.[89] The Court's decision "amounts to an open license to discriminate against people of color in capital sentencing. . . ."[90] As Justice Brennan points out, "[The Court] finds no fault in a system in which lawyers must tell their clients that race casts a large shadow on the capital sentencing process."[91] After *McCleskey* states may now execute convicted murderers knowing that the race of homicide victims or defendants may have influenced the death decision, as long as no actor involved purposely produced the result.

Another aspect of the *McCleskey* decision that seems to support a devaluation of black life argument is the majority's failure to examine the Baldus Study's black-victim homicide data. By not giving strong credibility to the Baldus Study, which showed that killers of blacks are less likely to receive capital punishment, the Court has given sanction to the underenforcement of capital sentencing to both black and white offenders who kill blacks. This observation can be pursued from two perspectives. First, a black-victim homicide is not worth the life of the black or white offender. Second, in the case of white offender/ black victim, the white offender's life is more valuable than the black victim. Or, the white community treats the murder of blacks with less seriousness than the murder of whites. As Kleck points out, a black victim represents "less loss or threat to the community than crimes with white victims."[92]

While the concern for white-victim homicide can be explained as a "natural outcome of majoritarian politics" and "racially selective empathy"[93] where whites dominate both the political and criminal justice processes, the bottom line is that blacks who kill whites are the victims of racial selectivity. A functioning majoritarian representative bureaucracy aggregates private preferences of individuals that over time "produce [selective application of] law reflecting at least those preferences that are deeply felt and widely held."[94] Government institutions then administer and apply policy reflecting the majority's will. While a policy may not be racist in theory, its application may prove to be racially oppressive. Carter explains this observation another way:

> Voters routinely make personal choices that reflect a consciousness of race and a willingness to use it in the categorization process necessary to daily existence, government policies that respond to those individual decisions will not be avoided by, for example, prohibiting talk about race. Voters will prefer a world that reflects their own world views, and will seek out, even when race-talk is forbidden, those candidates and those initiatives that in some way reflect their own racialist generalizations.[95]

The Court in *McCleskey* chose to follow the will of the majority despite its racist effect in capital punishment sentencing where a black kills a white. Majority will dominated by white preferences also holds that greater retribu-

tion is demanded when whites are victims because the white dominated society values innocent white lives more than innocent black ones. The *McCleskey* majority has shown no feelings of sensitivity and no feelings to the sensibilities of the black community. The Court's decision was not a surprise to those blacks who hold the belief that the criminal justice system treats blacks and whites differently. That is, the system is racist to black defendants.

From another perspective, the Court's response to the Baldus Study was seemingly a labored but complacent "so what" or "we don't care". Historically, black life has been cheaper than white life, so why should black life be more valuable now? This observation becomes more noteworthy when one considers the Court's prior acceptance of statistical evidence in jury selection, fair housing, school desegregation, and employment claims involving black plaintiffs. Ironically, unlike *McCleskey*, these claims were not directly life threatening. Yet, McCleskey's strategy in the use of more detailed and powerful statistical evidence was not any different than in these prior claims. In those claims where discriminatory intent was absent, there existed a history of racial discrimination and statistical evidence revealed a discriminatory impact. Justice Powell distinguished these types of cases from *McCleskey* on the basis that the decisions involved were less complicated.[96] This would appear to be weak rationale for deciding against McCleskey. The Court seemed to be saying that it decided against McCleskey and reflected its disdain because it did not understand the powerful statistical technique(s) presented in the Baldus Study.[97]

In the earlier cases involving Title VII and jury selection cases where less complicated data were presented, such an understanding was not needed by the Court. With the *McCleskey* decision historical evidence is of little value and a showing of discriminatory impact by statistical evidence is no longer sufficient to uphold a claim of racial discrimination. Instead statistical evidence must show discriminatory impact to be the result of discriminatory purpose. It is virtually impossible for an individual black defendant to show that capital sentencing decision makers purposely discriminated against him.[98]

Purposeful discrimination is even more difficult to prove in the legal system because the identities of prosecutors, juries, and judges are continually changing in homicide trials.[99] Given this situation, a study such as the Baldus Study, must connect "purposeful" with individual, discrete decision makers. The problem here is that aggregate level social science analyses cannot demonstrate intentional individual-based decisions.

Further, the *McCleskey* Court could have decided the case in one of two other ways. First, the Court could have concluded that the death penalty was contaminated with racism. As in *Furman*, this decision would have invalidated all state capital punishment laws. Second, the Court could have rendered a decision that would have required Georgia officials to explain the apparent racial disparity in capital punishment sentences. Despite having these two decision options, the Court instead chose a third course: to do away with racial challenges to death penalty sentencing even at the expense of the life of a defendant who was sentenced to death by a criminal justice system tainted with racism.

One final point needs to be made and it has to do with the Court's reluctance to accept the validity of the Baldus Study. Accepting the Baldus

Study on the one hand meant that race itself was an explanation for the variation in death penalty sentences. However, the Court purposely chose to ignore this explanation. On the other hand, the Court may have meant that the Baldus Study did not explain *why* racism influences capital sentencing decisions. If this was the case, the Court provided credibility to the role of unconscious racism or regressive racism[100]—the return to traditional patterns of racial discrimination from an egalitarian state—when a situation or circumstance produces anger. White victim/black offender cases would seem to be a situation in which anger would be aroused. Had the Court found discrimination along with accepting the Baldus Study, this would have left less room for interpretation. The reason that race influences a decision maker or even the way in which it influences that decision maker would be less relevant if the Court had ruled that race affected the decision.[101]

In conclusion, the *McCleskey* decision in some ways parallels the infamous *Dred Scott* decision of 130 years ago. In *Dred Scott* the Court declared that blacks were not "citizens" protected by the Constitution and the status of blacks was a problem to be solved by legislative bodies. Similarly, the *McCleskey* Court decided that legislatures would have to deal with racism in capital sentencing. Accepting this rationale, it becomes imperative that the future black political agenda directly address the problem of the discriminatory application of the death penalty from a political perspective. One approach might include a direct congressional response.

Yet, this approach presents the same problem at the congressional level as it does at the state legislative level. Representative John Conyers, Jr. (D-Mich.) in 1988 introduced a bill in Congress known as the Racial Justice Act that sought to address the racial disparities presented in the McCleskey case. In his bill Representative Conyers cited several studies that showed evidence of racial disparity in capital sentencing in thirteen states.[102] Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a similar bill in the Senate as an amendment to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988, which was rejected by a vote of 52-35.[103] The proposed legislation sought to create, pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, a federal statutory right to be free from discrimination in death sentencing. Senator Kennedy along with six cosponsors (Senators Mark Hatfield, Paul Simon, Arlen Spector, Patrick Monihan, Howard Metzenbaum, and Carl Levin), proposed the Racial Justice Act as a separate bill to amend Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1696.[104] The bill has yet to become law. In the final analysis, blacks will continue to suffer racial disparity in capital sentencing unless an appropriate legal/judicial response is developed and implemented.

Warren McCleskey was granted a stay of execution on 9 July 1987 (five days before his scheduled execution) after his attorneys produced new evidence that the police had secretly and illegally used an informant to interview him after McCleskey had been assigned counsel. Counsel was not present during the interview. On 23 December 1987 District Judge J. Owen Forrester (the same judge who originally heard the case and decided against McCleskey) held that the state's deliberate placement of an informant in a jail cell next to McCleskey to elicit a confession violated McCleskey's Sixth Amendment right to have a lawyer present during questioning. In this case, Judge Forrester expressed contempt for the Baldus Study by writing that the racial disparities it found were produced by "arbitrarily structured little

rinky-dink regressions that accounted for only a few variables. . . . They prove nothing other than the truth of the adage that anything may be proved by statistics" (*McCleskey v. Kemp*, No. C87-1517A at 12, N.D. Ga. [23 December 1987]).

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Notes

1. See H. Brearley, "The Negro and Homicides," *Social Forces*, 9, 2 (1930): 247-53; Charles Magnum, *The Legal Status of the Negro* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1940); Guy B. Johnson, "The Negro and Crime," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 217 (1941): 93-104; and Harold Garfinkel, "Research Notes on Inter and Intra-Racial Homicides," *Social Forces*, 27 (1949): 369-81.
2. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), 188-92.
3. See, for example, William J. Bowers and Glenn L. Pierce, "Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-*Furman* Capital Statutes," *Crime and Delinquency*, 26, 4 (1980): 563-635; Michael Radelet, "Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty," *American Sociological Review*, 46 (1981): 918-27; Hans Zeisel, "Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience," *Harvard Law Review*, 95 (December 1981); Joseph E. Jacoby and Raymond Paternoster, "Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Penalty," *Journal of Criminal Law*, 73 (1982): 379-87; Raymond Paternoster, "Race of the Victims and Location of the Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 74, 3 (1983): 754-85; Raymond Paternoster, "Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based Racial Discrimination," *Law and Society Review*, 18, 3 (1984): 437-78; and Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, "Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization," *Stanford Law Review*, 37 (1984): 27-154.
4. William Wilbanks, *The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System* (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishers, 1987). Some other more recent works that make a similar argument are David C. Baldus, George G. Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, *Equal Justice and the Death Penalty* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990) and Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro, *Death and Discrimination: Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989).
5. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Death Penalty Sentences: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities*, Report to Senate and House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d sess., 1990.
6. See J. Owens Smith, Mitchell F. Rice, and Woodrow Jones, Jr., *Blacks and American Government: Politics, Policy and Social Change* 2d ed. (Dubuque, IA: Kendall-Hunt Publishers, 1992), 31.
7. Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Get What, When, Where and How* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1936), 3.
8. David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 129. See also David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 50-52.
9. Smith, Rice, and Jones, *Blacks and American Government*, 2-3.
10. U.S. Department of Justice, *Capital Punishment 1979* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Prison Statistics, 1980). In 1939, 199 individuals includ-

ing 77 blacks were executed, the highest one-year total since accurate records have been kept. See Gross and Mauro, "Patterns of Death," 29-30.

11. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, *Death Row U.S.A.* (New York: NAACP, Spring 1992).
12. "Of Race, Crime, and Punishment," *New York Times*, 21 June 1987, p. 22.
13. U.S. Department of Justice, "Capital Punishment 1988" *Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin*, NCJ-118313 (July 1989). By the end of 1990 the number of individuals sentenced to death had increased to 2,356, a net increase of 232 from 1988. Blacks represented 40 percent of the individuals on death row in 1990. See U.S. Department of Justice, *Capital Punishment 1990* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1991).
14. *Furman v. Georgia*, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) at 239-40.
15. 408 U.S. 238 at 313, Justice White concurring.
16. 408 U.S. 238 at 253.
17. 408 U.S. 238 at 310.
18. 408 U.S. 238 at 274-281, 364-66.
19. See *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, (1976) at 227-31).
20. See John H. Culver, "The States and Capital Punishment: Executions from 1977-1984," *Justice Quarterly*, 2, 4 (December 1985): 568-78 and Marc Riedel, "Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman," *Temple Law Quarterly*, 49 (1976): 261-87.
21. *Profitt v. Florida*, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and *Jurek v. Texas*, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). These three cases, along with *Woodson v. North Carolina*, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and *Roberts v. Louisiana*, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), were collectively known as the "Death Penalty cases." See Margaret F. Klemm, "First Degree Murder Convictions in Louisiana: A Descriptive Analysis with Special Emphasis on the Death Penalty" (Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1985).
22. See NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, *Death Row U.S.A.*, 102. Thirty-seven states authorize the death penalty. States that have no death penalty are Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
23. See NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, *Death Row U.S.A.* (New York: NAACP, 1 August 1988). Executions have been and continue to be a Southern phenomenon and a large majority of executions have taken place in nine Southern states. Five Southern States (Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Georgia, and Virginia) account for about 75 percent of all executions since 1976. See Thomas B. Edsall, "Racial Forces Battering Southern Democrats," *Washington Post* 25 June 1989, p. A6 and U.S. Department of Justice, *Capital Punishment 1988*, 3-5. The fact that a large majority of executions occur in the South and that blacks represent a disproportionate percentage of these executions is an interesting phenomenon that is worthy of further research, discussion, and inquiry. This is beyond the scope of this chapter.
24. *Capital Punishment 1988*. Perhaps one explanation for the large number of blacks receiving the death penalty is the lack of adequate and skilled legal defense at the state level. Of the thirty-seven states with the death penalty only eighteen automatically assigned counsel to indigent death row inmates for collateral attacks in state courts. Thirteen states fund resource centers to assist lawyers in capital cases. Five states provide no resource centers and no automatic appointment of counsel. In other words, without adequate and skilled counsel, *habeas corpus* petitions cannot be filed and exhausted at the state level before a federal challenge can be initiated. See "On Death Row in Virginia," *Washington Post*, 25 June 1989, p. B6. This problem is exacerbated by limited fees paid to lawyers

appointed by the states to represent indigent defendants in murder cases. In Kentucky, fees for a murder case are limited to $2,500. Other states limit fees to $3,500. Only Florida and California provide attorneys for federal appeals. For a discussion of this issue see Ronald J. Tabak, "The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s," *Review of Law and Social Change*, 14 (1986): 797-848. Further, appeals by death row inmates may become more difficult in light of a recent action by Supreme Court Justice Antonio Scalia who has indicated that death row inmates from Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi will not be given additional time to file appeals based on their requested need of more legal expertise and assistance. This point was made in Richard Carelli, "Scalia Warns Lawyers in 3 Southern States," *The Morning Advocate*, 22 February 1991, p. B-5.

25. *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). Since the reinstatement of the death penalty, Georgia has executed at least fourteen individuals. Most were black and had killed white victims. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, "Race and the Death Penalty," *Criminal Justice Ethics*, 2 (Winter/Spring 1988): 84-85. Besides the *Furman* and *Gregg* cases, there have been three other cases from Georgia involving capital punishment that have reached the Supreme Court: *Godrey v. Georgia*, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); *Coker v. Georgia*, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); and *Zant v. Stephens*, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983). In *Godrey* the Court found a section of Georgia's capital punishment statute unconstitutional. In *Coker* the Court ruled that the death penalty could not be imposed in rape convictions because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In *Stephens* the Court upheld juries and judges use of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in the imposition of the death penalty. See Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro, "Patterns of Death," 34 n. 30 and "Statistics and the Death Penalty: A Break with Tradition," *Creighton Law Review*, 21 (1987): 278-79.
26. *McCleskey v. Georgia*, 449 S. Ct. 891 (1980).
27. *McCleskey v. State*, 263 S.E. 2d 146 (1980) at 148.
28. 263 S.E. 2d at 148.
29. *McCleskey v. Zant*, 580 F. Supp. 338, N.D.GA. (1984) at 345-46.
30. Georgia's bifurcated trial process divides the criminal trial into two phases: the trial process and the sentencing process. See *McCleskey*, 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1762, note 2. The bifurcated trial process is a procedural safeguard in capital punishment required by the Court in *Gregg v. Georgia* to prevent arbitrary jury discretion. The bifurcated trial process allows a jury to first consider only information to determine guilt. Any additional information to determine the appropriate sentence is considered by the jury in a separate sentencing phase. The process allows all information to be reviewed and considered without causing the unfair prejudice associated with a unitary system. See Note, "Statistics and the Death Penalty," 276-77.
31. For a case to become a capital case, the prosecutor must decide to seek the death penalty. Since most prosecutors are elected officials, the decision to seek the death penalty is often a purely political one subject to community pressure. See Tabak, "The Death of Fairness," 801.
32. In both the trial and sentencing processes, prosecutors may well use prejudicial closing arguments to insure that the defendant is found guilty and receives the death penalty. See Tabak, "The Death of Fairness," 804-10.
33. See James P. Acker, "Capital Punishment by the Numbers: An Analysis of *McCleskey v. Kemp*," *Criminal Law Bulletin*, 23 (September/October 1987): 454-82.
34. Over the course of the case, McCleskey used eighteen different grounds in an attempt to invalidate his conviction and death sentence. See Note, *McCleskey v. Kemp*: The Supreme Court Pulls the Switch on Future Judicial Challenges to the Death Penalty," *The John Marshall Law Review*, 22 (1988): 214-33.
35. 580 F. Supp. 338 at 348.

36. *McCleskey v. Kemp*, 753 F. 2d 877, 11th Cir. (1985) at 920, Justice Clark dissenting.
37. 753 F. 2d 877 at 885.
38. 580 F. Supp. 338 at 352-80.
39. 753 F. 2d 877 at 889-95.
40. 753 F. 2d 877 at 895-900 and Mitchell F. Rice, "The Discriminatory Purpose Standard: A Problem for Minorities in Racial Discrimination Litigation?" *Boston College Third World Law Journal*, 6, 1 (January 1986): 1-22. Further, Rice points out that a race-dependant decision can take three forms: racially motivated administration; racially motivated regulations; and racially selective indifference. "The first involves the discriminatory administration of a law or ordinance. The second refers to a regulation adopted for a race-dependant motive and intentional discriminatory impact. The third involves unconscious actions that lead to discriminatory impacts on minorities" (p.4). See also Mitchell F. Rice, "The Discriminatory Purpose Standard in Racial Discrimination Litigation: From Yick Wo to Arlington Heights." *Southern University Law Review*, 10, 2 (Spring 1984): 219-39, especially 222-23.
41. 753 F. 2d 877 at 895.
42. 753 F. 2d 877 at 896-97.
43. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1766.
44. See David C. Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski, and George G. Woodworth, "Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience," *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 74, 3 (1983): 661-753; David C. Baldus, George G. Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, "Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia," *University of California Law Review* (Summer 1985): 1375-1407; and Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth, "Arbitrariness and Discrimination."
45. Acker, "Capital Punishment by the Numbers," 455-58.
46. See 580 F. Supp. 338 at 353-55.
47. See 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1764.
48. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1763.
49. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1782.
50. A study of California capital sentencing patterns in 1969 is the only one to show that neither the race of the defendant nor the race of the victim was associated with capital sentencing patterns. See "A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First Degree Murder cases," *Stanford Law Review*, 21 (1967): 1297-497.
51. A recent analysis of capital punishment sentences in the state of New Jersey showed that "blacks were one and one-half times more likely to be sentenced to death than white and hispanic defendants convicted in serious or aggravated cases, and three and one-half times more likely in less serious cases." See Joseph F. Sullivan, "Race Engulfs Study on Using Death Penalty," *New York Times*, 26 September 1991, p. A7.
52. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1763-64.
53. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1763.
54. On this point see R. L. Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court," *Harvard Law Review*, 101 (May 1988): 1388-1443.
55. Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp," 1393.
56. See Acker, "Capital Punishment by the Numbers," 463-68.
57. Ibid., 464 n. 45.
58. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1764.
59. 580 F. Supp. 338 at 346.
60. Arnold Barnett, "Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence," *University of California Law Review*, 18 (1985): 1327-74.
61. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1764.
62. Samuel R. Gross, "Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing," *University of California Law Review*, 18 (1985): 1275-1325.
63. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1769.

64. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1771.
65. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1766-67. McCleskey offered evidence based on Georgia laws dating back to before the Civil War to demonstrate purposeful or intentional discrimination. The Court said "unless historical evidence is reasonably contemporaneous with the challenged decision, it has little probative value and . . . we cannot accept official action taken long ago as evidence of intent" (at 1770 n. 20). In dissent Justice Brennan noted that "Georgia's legacy of a race conscious criminal justice system is extraordinary" (at 1786).
66. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1767.
67. See Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp," 1409.
68. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1779.
69. See *Rose v. Mitchell*, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) at 555.
70. Eric J. Muller, "The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death," *Yale Law and Policy Review* 4 (1985): 158-87.
71. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1774.
72. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1775.
73. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1800, Justice Blackmon dissenting.
74. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1775.
75. 107 S. Ct. 17567 at 1777.
76. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1778.
77. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1779.
78. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1781.
79. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1769.
80. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1775-76.
81. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1769.
82. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1779.
83. Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp," 1419.
84. Ibid., 1419-20.
85. See Stephen L. Carter, "When Victims Happen to be Black," *Yale Law Journal*, 97 (1988): 420-47.
86. Amsterdam, "Race and the Death Penalty," 86.
87. See Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp," 1416-17.
88. Ibid., 1417 N. 141.
89. It should be noted at this point that the two black judges who rendered decisions in *McCleskey*, Judge Hackett of the Eleventh Circuit (753 F. 2d 877 at 918-19) and Supreme Court Justice Marshall decided in McCleskey's favor. Justice Marshall was the only dissenter on the Supreme Court who did not write an opinion, perhaps reflecting his disdain for the majority opinion.
90. Amsterdam, "Race and the Death Penalty," 84-85.
91. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1782.
92. G. Kleck, "Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty," *American Sociological Review*, 46 (1981): 783-805.
93. See Kennedy, "McCleskey v. Kemp," 1420.
94. Carter, "When Victims Happen to Be Black," 437.
95. Ibid., 438.
96. 107 S. Ct. 1756 at 1767-68.
97. See Amsterdam, "Race and the Death Penalty"; Kennedy, "McCleskey and Kemp"; and Acker, "Capital Punishment by the Numbers."
98. James E. Walker, "McCleskey v. Kemp: The Adjudication of the Future Direction and Use of Statistical Evidence in the Courtroom," *Howard Law Journal*, 30 (1987): 1165-85.
99. See Acker, "Capital Punishment by the Numbers," 458-67.
100. See Carter, "When Victims Happen to be Black," 432-41.
101. Sherri Lynn Johnson, "Unconscious Racism and the Law," *Cornell Law Review*, 73 (1988): 1016-37.
102. See *Congressional Record*, 21 April 1988, E 1174-76.
103. Ibid., 13 October 1988, D 1342-01.
104. Ibid., 28 September 1989, S-12, 152-01.

State Attorneys General as Policymakers: AG Responses to the Hodgson *and* Akron *Abortion Cases*

Augustus J. Jones, Jr.
Michelle Donaldson Deardorff

Miami University
Millikin University

Using the results of a national survey, this exploratory study examines how state governments have responded to the 1990 Supreme Court cases of *Hodgson v. Minnesota*[1] and *Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health*.[2] In these cases, the Court ruled that it was constitutionally permissible for states to require minors seeking abortions to notify their parents or seek the consent of a local judge before terminating their pregnancy. In one case the Court upheld a single-parent notification law, but in the other they struck down a two-parent notification act when unaccompanied by a judicial bypass procedure, holding the same statute constitutional when accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure. More concretely, focusing on the role of implementors, this analysis investigates the opinions, perceptions, and reactions of the attorneys general to these high Court decisions.

In *Hodgson* and *Akron II*, the Court, building on numerous federal decisions, determined that state parental notification statutes, such as those established by Minnesota and Ohio, were constitutional when accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure. When announced in the summer of 1990, this decision was widely perceived as inviting states to pass legislation limiting a minor's access to the abortion procedure.[3] How the states, especially the attorneys' general offices, have reacted to this decision is a primary focus of this analysis. In carrying out this investigation, we considered several questions:

1. Did the states, particularly the attorneys general, agree or disagree with this decision? Why? How did they find out about the decision? Have they read the decision?

2. Did the states hold any meeting regarding the Supreme Court's decision? If so, who was responsible for calling the meetings?

3. Do the states have any laws limiting minors' right to abort? Did the states alter or modify any laws in response to the Supreme Court's decision?

4. How have the states reacted to these decisions? What predictions can be made about their future behavior in the area of minors and abortion?

Frameworks of Judicial Implementation

Scholars (Johnson & Canon, 1984; Wasby, 1984; Songer & Sheehan, 1990) who have studied the impact and implementation of judicial decisions have demonstrated that while the Supreme Court makes the decisions, it must rely on others (lower courts, legislators, bureaucrats, state officials) for the implementation of its rulings. In addition, the policy milieu in which implementation occurs is influenced by these actors, the media, other interest groups, and public opinion. Because the courts have limited enforcement powers, the implementation of their policies cannot be considered automatic.

Keeping in mind these theoretical considerations, this study examines the attorneys general as primary members of the implementing population responsible for applying abortion policies regarding minors. Generally, implementing agents enforce court decisions (Gruhl, 1990; Johnson & Canon, 1984), but because there are instances in which court decisions are not implemented (Songer & Sheehan, 1990) this enforcement cannot be seen as automatic. Varied responses by implementing agents can be explained by a number of factors: the psychological and behavioral responses of implementors, including the clarity of decisions (Johnson & Canon, 1984); the intensity of the implementors' attitudes regarding decisions; perceptions of the legitimacy of the Court; perceptions of the consequences of decision implementation; and the implementors' self-interest (Becker & Feeley, 1973; Johnson & Canon, 1984). If courts do not clearly articulate to implementors their expectations regarding enforcement, implementing agents will frequently capitalize on ambiguity and use their discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of court decisions.

Further, highly controversial court decisions may encourage agents (including attorneys general) to ignore and evade the commands of the court. Finally, when agents disagree or feel professionally or personally threatened, they may narrowly interpret the court's decisions, search for less disruptive alternatives, or completely disregard the court's commands. Recognizing the various propositions found in implementation literature, we developed several expectations regarding the states and attorneys' general responses to the *Hodgson* and *Akron* decisions.

First, we hypothesized that the conflicting standards and majorities found in the *Hodgson/Akron* cases[4] created ambiguities resulting in the attorneys general giving diverse interpretations of what the Court mandated. Consequently we postulate that there would be diverse state reactions to these abortion decrees.

Second, we proposed that these recent abortion decisions represented a change in policy. In handing down *Hodgson/Akron* the Court retreated from a previous conclusion that a minor has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. By taking this action, the Court relaxed the requirements for regulating the minors' abortion procedure. Hence, the Court is affording the states greater discretion in regulating abortions. We speculate that some states would accept this invitation while others would not do so, basing their decision on external political pressures.

Justification of the Analysis

There were many reasons for conducting this study. An initial reason was that as far as we could determine, no other study has sought to assess how states have responded to the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions. This may be due to the recent nature of the decisions. In short, scholars may have opted to wait before exploring the ramifications, complications, and implications of the decisions. A preliminary study, however, is of value because of the potential to measure the various states' reactions to the decisions. Examining the cases this early allows us to appraise the immediate perceptions and reactions of the states.

A second reason for this analysis is that it concentrates on the attorneys general as policymakers in the abortion area. As the chief legal representative, the Attorney General's Office is where the governor, legislature, and other policymakers turn to determine the legality of their new state abortion policy. The AG also has the responsibility of representing and defending the state and its policies, controlling both litigation and appeals, legally intervening on the behalf of the public, prosecuting those who violate state laws, as well as determining the state's legal policy.[5] Obviously, when the policy to be created, implemented, and appealed is abortion, the AG will be in a position to shape the development and implementation of state policies. While research has been conducted on the role of the AG in implementation, the focus of prior studies has been on legal issues other than abortion: environment (Symposium, 1990); health policies (Lippincott, 1984); and antitrust legislation and litigation (Constantine, 1987).

A third justification for conducting our analysis was that previous works on the courts and abortion have concentrated on the Supreme Court, specifically the *Roe v. Wade* decree. These earlier analyses have focused on the implications of this decision for adults, and the various political, philosophical, moral, and ethical implications of that decision. Unfortunately, these studies generally ignore or give minimal attention to minors (Krason, 1984; Luker, 1984; Horan, Grant, & Cunningham, 1987; Sloan, 1988; Cohen & Taub, 1989). This study seeks to fill this gap by examining cases dealing with minors' reproductive rights and state attorneys general responses to these decrees. It will illuminate the extent to which Supreme Court decisions affect states' policy agendas and contribute to the judicial impact/implementation literature by demonstrating how the attorneys general shape the development and enforcement of abortion policies.

Shifting Standards: A Critical Distinction from a Fundamental to Nonfundamental Right

On 25 June 1990, the Supreme Court decided two cases regarding the power of the states to regulate the availability of the abortion procedure for minors. Both *Hodgson v. Minnesota* and *Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health* examined the constitutionality of state parental notification requirements that require doctors to ensure that parents have been alerted to the child's desire to abort.

In making these decisions, the Court was building on an intricate construction of previous Supreme Court decisions. All abortion decisions inevitably cite the watershed case of *Roe v. Wade*,[6] which determined that an adult woman had a fundamental constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy (under certain delineated circumstances). The Court later expanded this fundamental right to mature minors in *Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth*[7] noting that "constitutional rights do not mature and come magically into being only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."[8] In 1979, the Court in *Bellotti v. Baird (II)*[9] determined that a state could require parental consent prior to a minor terminating her pregnancy, but must give minors the option to "bypass" this requirement. The mature minor must be given a means of exercising her fundamental right.

The Court ruled that a minor who is mature enough to make the decision without parental consultation, a minor for whom the notification of her parents could be physically or psychologically dangerous, or a minor for whom the abortion is definitely in her best interest—must have the option of avoiding parental involvement. While the *Hodgson* case required the notification of both biological parents and the *Ohio* case required only the notification of one parent, both cases provided a version of the *Bellotti II* judicial bypass procedure. The question that was raised in both of these cases was whether these states' notification statutes were constitutional under such previous cases as *Bellotti II* and *Danforth.*

The case of *Hodgson v. Minnesota* required that all minors give notice to both biological parents at least forty-eight hours prior to the abortion. There were two exceptions to this rule. First, if the minor declares that she is the victim of neglect or parental abuse, information is given to the proper juvenile authorities. And second, if she can convince the proper court that she is "mature and capable of giving informed consent"[10] or that an abortion, without notifying both of her parents, is in her best interest. The district court unanimously declared this statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement, while the court of appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals.

The Supreme Court determined that while its provision for a two-parent notification clause was unconstitutional, the bypass procedure protected the statute as a whole.

> Minnesota has offered no sufficient justification for its interference with the family's decision making processes created by subdivision 2—two-parent notification. Subdivision 2 is the most stringent notification statute in the country The Minnesota exception to notification for minors who are victims of neglect or abuse is, in reality, a means of notifying the parents. Minnesota's two-parent notice

> requirement is all the more unreasonable when one considers that only half of the minors in the state of Minnesota reside with both biological parents. A third live with only one parent. Given its broad sweep and its failure to serve the purposes asserted by the State into many cases, I join the Court's striking of subdivision 2.[11]

While the majority of the Court found this two-parent notification provision unconstitutional (Stevens, O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun), O'Connor provided the vote determining that the judicial bypass procedure rendered the entire statute constitutional. This second majority argued that the minors had the alternative of going to court through the bypass procedure in order to avoid the notification of one or both parents.

The *Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health* case differs from *Hodgson* in that it was a single-parent notification statute with a judicial bypass procedure. The high Court affirmed this statute. The judicial focus was not on the constitutionality of a two-parent notification requirement, but on the judicial bypass procedure created by the state.

As in the *Hodgson* case, the doctor is required to notify one of the minor's parents prior to the abortion procedure. Similarly, to gain a judicial bypass of this notification requirement, the minor must demonstrate "clearly and convincingly" that she is mature enough to make the decision; that she has been the victim of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse by one of her parents; or that parental notice is not in her best interest. In this five to three decision (with Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) the Court found the Ohio bypass procedure constitutionally permissible. This bypass procedure differed from others (e.g., *Bellotti II, Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft*)[12] in that it reduced the previous standards delineated by the Court. In accepting this procedure, the Supreme Court signaled to the states, that additional state requirements in preventing abortions by minors will be accepted.

The *Akron* case placed on the minor the burden of proving maturity and best interest through requiring a heightened "clear and convincing" standard of proof. The Court also accepted Ohio's "three forms" of proof, which required the minor to declare in her initial petition whether she will be attempting to prove maturity, best interests, or both. Over the concerns of the dissenters, the majority determined that the state would be sympathetic with minors who might be confused and not know the best means of pleading. Further, the Court determined that the *Akron* statute did not violate the *Bellotti* standard of anonymity although it required the minor to give her full name and the name of a parent several times. The Court reasoned that there is a difference between confidentiality and anonymity. Finally, the Supreme Court accepted the fact that the Ohio process could span over twenty-two days, but did not find this to violate the *Bellotti* standard of speed. Again the dissenters strongly objected to this expansion of the *Bellotti* standard, which began in *Ashcroft* and continued in *Hodgson*.

The dissenters argued that by increasing the power of the state and parent and by relaxing the standards for a constitutional bypass system, the Court would be threatening the fundamental rights of a minor recognized in *Danforth* and *Bellotti II*.[13] The majority opinion by Stevens (*Hodgson*) and the minority opinion by Marshall (*Hodgson*) mirror this concern.[14]

Methodology

In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, a survey was mailed to the fifty state attorneys general and to the attorney general of the District of Columbia. An initial mailing was sent in December 1990 and a follow-up survey was mailed in February 1991. While we had an overall return rate of 63 percent, only 34 percent of responding AG offices filled out the survey. An additional 18 percent sent case information instead of survey response, and 10 percent formally declined to participate for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons included: this was not the role of the AG office, time, current legislation in litigation, and participation in *Hodgson* and *Akron II*. However, of the 34 percent who returned surveys, many only answered specific questions, often refusing to answer many of the more opinion-based inquiries. As a result, the *N* values of many questions vary from a response rate of only four to an *N* of 30, including responses garnered from the case data. While an *N* value of 4 is very insignificant, the views of those states may serve as a preliminary indicator for states who are currently or will eventually be similarly situated.

Of those states[15] responding to our survey with information regarding legislation regulating minors' abortions, twenty of the twenty-nine states have such restrictive legislation (69%). These numbers are very close to the national figures of thirty-two states having such laws (64%).[16] Both figures include states with laws that are presently under injunction. Because the states were promised anonymity in their responses to the survey,[17] we have organized the responding states into four regional areas. In this manner, anonymity is guaranteed, yet comparisons can be made.[18]

Because this survey was conducted less than six months after the *Hodgson* and *Akron* decisions, this research represents the states' *initial reaction* to the Supreme Court's rulings. Despite the preliminary nature of our findings, we believe they are valid. Focusing on the AG position at this time is crucial because we sought to assess their early reactions and actions to the decisions. By evaluating the immediate reactions, we could create a reference point by which to evaluate later reactions, litigation, and legislation. The attorneys' general memories regarding the states' immediate responses (meetings, opinions, and predictions) are likely to be fresh and precise. The intent of this survey was to examine how the states responded immediately after such substantial Supreme Court decisions were made, especially in the area of reproductive rights for minors.

Results of Survey Research

In examining the attorneys general of the states, we attempted to determine whether there were relationships between their regions, the gender of the AG, and the appointed or elected nature of the office. We found no such nexus between these factors and the attorneys' general offices' reactions to the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions. There were no dissimilarities between the four appointed and the forty-six elected attorneys general in their responses to our survey. Similarly, the responses of the three female attorneys general were no different from their male counterparts. Finally, while we saw very little

difference in regional response, it is interesting to note that of the four states that have directly acted in reaction to *Hodgson/Akron*, three of the four are western states. As a result of this discovery, we have recorded our findings in terms of region.

State Response to Supreme Court Decrees

The Supreme Court has allowed the states to restrict the abortion rights of minors through such tools as parental notification and consent statutes. As of June 1990, thirty-two of the fifty states had such restrictive legislation.[19] With the issuance of the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions, the Court clarified the constitutional requirements for parental notification laws. How have the states responded to this clarification? Asked whether their states had responded to their *Hodgson/Akron* decrees, a few indicated they did, but an overwhelming majority (80%) had not (N - 20). Only four states had definite responses to the Supreme Court decrees.

The states responded in several different ways. The citizens of three western states defeated measures that would have required parental notification for minors. One state had a referendum on their liberal abortion laws, while another had a ballot initiative that sought to create a law requiring forty-eight hours notification prior to a minor's abortion.[20] And a third state witnessed an unsuccessful petition effort to change their constitution to restrict abortions. The evidence suggests that at least three states will not accept the Court's invitation to impose more restrictive measures on a minor's abortion procedure.

Nevertheless, most states did not respond to these judgments; consequently, speculation is in order. This limited response could be due to the recent nature of the decision, or it could be that the states have not studied this case in detail and thus are unwilling to take any actions. A second theory could be that there has been little reaction because many states either have notification statutes in place similar to that ratified in Ohio or unlike the Minnesota statute, which requires two-parent notification.

Another potential reason why states have not yet responded is that similar legislation is being debated and has been considered in the state legislatures. One state has legislation currently under debate, four states have legislation under consideration, and two states have bills that have either been defeated or vetoed by the governor. Other states have their laws either enjoined by the state or federal courts and five states have their restrictive legislation under federal court consideration. One state's statute was declared unconstitutional by a district court, but this ruling was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and is currently under review. Consequently, current legislation and litigation may have prevented the states from responding. This could indicate that prior to *Hodgson/Akron*, the states decided to accept the Supreme Court's offer to restrict a minor's right to abort. Potentially, this could mean that it was the *Webster* decision that has been influential in prompting the states to restrict abortions.

State Awareness of Supreme Court Cases

One potential factor explaining the states' lack of response that can be ruled out is the unawareness of the attorneys' general of the Supreme Court

mandates. Asked whether they had read *Akron/Hodgson*, most of the respondents (83%; *N* - 18) indicated that they had. By spending time reading and interpreting Supreme Court decisions, the AG indicates a high level of awareness as to the ramifications of Supreme Court decisions on the state level.

Table 1
Current Status of State Regulations (N = 30)[21]

	States Affected	
	frequency	percentage
Legislation		
Ballot initiative		
passed	0	0
failed	3	10
Currently debated	1	3
Potential legislation	4	13
Failed legislation	2	7
Litigation		
Under federal oonsideration	5	17
Federally enjoined	1	3
State enjoined	4	13
No laws restricting or protecting	4	13
Restrictive laws	19	63
Protective laws	1	3

When asked from what source did they learn about the *Hodgson/Akron* decree, most indicated from the press, principally the print press (newspapers, popular magazines). The respondents' reliance on the press is interesting because it supports earlier findings that the press plays a paramount role in both publicizing Supreme Court decrees (Wasby, 1984) and interpreting them. In other words, just as in other areas (capital punishment, affirmative action), the press has played a role in broadcasting or telegraphing information regarding Supreme Court decisions and in interpreting these decisions for the implementing and consuming populations.

Sixty-nine percent of the respondents (*N* = 12) first learned of the decisions from the print press; however it is important to note that the attorneys general relied on other sources, including other lawyers, electronic media, professional journals and conferences, and work with other governmental institutions. Curiously, when asked whether the guidelines promulgated in *Hodgson/Akron* were clear-cut, most of the respondents (80%), who answered this subjective question (*N* = 10), indicated that they felt the decisions were unclear. Unfortunately, we did not probe why they felt that the guidelines were clear or unclear. However, the fragmented nature of the Court decrees, with their various five to four splits in decisions could potentially explain this particular response. Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion to *Hodgson*

that the majority coalition changes on several occasions, creating a pair of convoluted decisions.

Table 2
Sources Accessed Regarding Decision (N = 38) (in percent)

	Total	West	South	Midwest	East
Print press	32	32	25	27	50
Electronic press	13	11	25	18	0
Professional conferences	3	0	0	9	0
Professional journals	16	16	25	9	25
State govt briefings	8	11	0	9	0
Talking to lawyers	16	26	0	9	0
Other	13	5	25	18	25
		n=19	n=4	n=11	n=4

> As I understand the various opinions today: one Justice holds that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional with bypass . . . ; four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is constitutional with or without bypass . . . ; four Justices would hold that two-parent notification is unconstitutional with or without bypass, though the four apply two different standards . . . ; six justices hold that one-parent notification with bypass is constitutional, though for two different sets of reasons . . . ; and three Justices would hold that one-parent notification with bypass is unconstitutional.[22]

The attorneys general were evenly split on the question of whether they agreed or disagreed with the Supreme Court's mandate in the *Hodgson/Akron* cases. Fifty percent of the state chief attorneys ($N = 8$) agreed with segments of the decrees, while the remainder sided with the dissenting point of view. Not surprisingly, those who agreed with points of the opinion appeared to accept the reasoning of the majority, while those with conflicting opinions sided with the dissenters.

For example, those who agreed with the decision noted such things as the legitimacy of the Court itself ("[the] Constitution is what the US Supreme Court says it is"); belief in the legitimacy of the statute under question ("agree that Notice/Bypass statute are valid. We argued in *Hodgson* that a Court bypass procedure is not constitutionally required to permit avoidance of notice, as opposed to consent requirement"); or support for the decision placing these restrictions under the states' purview ("[the decision] (1) provides states ability to legislate important social policy issues, (2) modifies overreaching of *Roe v. Wade.* (3) Returns social debate to state and local governments where it can be more sensitively addressed"). Those that disagreed cited such reasons as "too invasive on a minor's constitutional rights" and the belief that "not all minors who get pregnant need parental advice. Its a bit like closing the barn door after the horses are out. Those minors that want parental advice will ask. Those that don't shouldn't be forced to or forced to go through a court." Again, this split by the attorneys general is

predictable given that the Court was highly fragmented on this issue of constitutional parental notification statutes and that the issue of abortion itself is indeed divisive. This is demonstrated in a comment by an eastern attorney's general office that noted that "there were two cases with several opinions; a unitary answer is not possible." Given this, it should come as no surprise that the attorneys general were largely divided on this hotly contested issue.

Existence of Parental Consent and Notification Statutes

Our survey found that many of the states that responded did not have parental consent statutes. Of course, this is not surprising because many states do not have a parental consent law in effect. One important point regarding the states restricting minors' abortion rights via parental notification and consent statutes,[23] is that of the thirty-two states with these laws in 1990, all but eleven were enjoined from enforcement.[24] In our survey (see Table 1) currently ten states (33%; $N = 30$)[25] either have their states enjoined by the courts in violation of state or federal constitutions, or are currently appealing similar decisions.

Table 3
States with Notification Statutes (N = 24)
(in percent)

	Total	West	South	Midwest	East
Yes	48	57	67	20	43
No	52	43	33	80	57
		n=7	n=6	n=5	n=7

Table 4
States with Notification Statutes (N = 24)
(in percent)

	Total	West	South	Midwest	East
Yes	50	56	50	60	33
No	50	44	50	40	67
		n=9	n=4	n=5	n=6

Nevertheless, our survey did uncover evidence that the AG offices believe that the *Hodgson/Akron* decision enhances the chance that states will adopt parental consent statutes. More than 67 percent of the attorneys general responding to our surveys ($N = 6$) indicated that it was their belief that the decision made it more likely that their state would adopt parental consent statutes.

This suggests that there is some preliminary evidence that some states may be willing to accept the Court's invitation to restrict a minor's abortion rights.

At least, this appears to be the finding. Most significantly, half of the twenty-four states that responded indicated they had in place a parental notification statute. Because of the small response rate, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding regional responses or attitudes.

However, as with consent statutes, our survey also found that as a result of *Hodgson/Akron*, most attorneys general (75%; $N = 4$) indicated that they were more inclined to adopt parental notification statutes. Again, the small response rate limits the application and interpretation of this question.[26] What is important here are the comments of the four responding offices. Three offices noted the importance of the attitudes, actions, and interests of the state legislature. One Western state noted that the previous year had witnessed "a very divisive session on abortion . . . and is not likely to attack it again soon." Another AG noted that their state "would not have had legislative activity in these new areas absent a new law." On the other hand, a Midwestern state office stressed that the budget and other fiscal matters may be the predominant issue, suggesting that other matters are more important than abortions.

While the judicial environment obviously affects the treatment and construction of new statutes, the impetus for their construction may be found in different areas (political environment, other pressing issues, or the legislative agenda). However, if the attorneys general follow up on their inclination to adopt parental notification statutes, they will be accepting the Court's invitation to propose and approve parental notification laws.

Therefore, while currently only a small number of states have responded directly to these Supreme Court decrees, there appears to be some evidence that more states will be engaged in activities related to these particular decrees.

Judicial Bypass Procedures

Most of the states with parental notification or consent statutes in place also had attached judicial bypass procedures to them. However, Utah did not (the Supreme Court did not require it in 1981)[27] and a second Western state noted that their statute "only requires good faith efforts to notify. Doctor can go forward [with abortion procedure] if unsuccessful." Likewise, an Eastern state reported having a notification statute with no bypass procedure. None of the states noted any concern that their statutes could be retested for constitutionality under *Hodgson/Akron* decrees. Of the states that reported having notification statutes ($N = 10$), 70 percent have judicial bypass procedures. Of the states having consent statutes ($N = 7$), 86 percent have judicial bypass provisions.[28] Considering the long-standing rulings by the Court regarding the necessity of bypass alternatives with consent statutes, this is not surprising.[29]

Nevertheless, most of the states' notification statutes would pass constitutional muster given the decisions in *Hodgson/Akron*. All of the states responding to our survey stressed they had no plans to construct a judicial bypass procedure. These states are either planning to disregard the *Hodgson* requirement, plan not to adopt a parental notification statute, or are planning to respond to *Hodgson* by doing absolutely nothing.

State Perspectives on the Effect of Hodgson/Akron

Of the nine attorneys general who responded to our question regarding the office's evaluation of the impact of these decisions on a minor's reproductive rights, a majority (78%) felt that *Hodgson/Akron* would make it more difficult for minors to exercise these rights. These attorneys general convictions were bolstered by the liberal dissenting opinion of the Court that felt that *Hodgson/Akron* would substantively hinder young girls from terminating their pregnancy. Again, the remarkable thing is not that only nine offices responded, but that nine were willing to make observations on such a political issue. The opinions that were offered, however, tended to stay fairly close to the observations made by the Justices in their various opinions. For example, a Midwestern state noted that the impact of the decision

> [would] depend on the circumstances. The necessity to share unhappy news with parents or to go to court often presents difficulties to minors who, for a variety of reasons, do not want their parents involved. In many situations, however, required notice to parents can remove stress and logistical difficulties caused solely by the minor's desire to hide the fact [of] the sexual activity and pregnancy from parents who would, in fact, be supportive and helpful in reaching and implementing a decision whether or not to undergo an abortion.

Yet another state, taking an opposing view, noted, "Why should a court or parent be involved? Its the *woman's choice* and decision [emphasis theirs]" and then added that these cases would have "no effect in our state—I need to see the data in the *Hodgson/Akron* jurisdiction." Other states commented on the fact that this decision appeared to be an invitation for more restrictive legislation. A Western state argued that "states may require additional conditions before an abortion" and a Southern AG stated, "Guidelines are set out as to how a minor may obtain an abortion; therefore, states will feel compelled to have these statutes in place." Several states recognized a potential long-term impact of this decision would be to return the debate to "the state and local governments." Whether this will result in increasingly restrictive state legislation, as several AG offices have predicted, remains to be seen.

Curiously enough, when asked whether the *Hodgson/Akron* rulings had resulted in a federal court declaring their parental notification statute valid, invalid, or neither, the attorneys general stated that the federal government had neither validated or invalidated their parental notification statute. One state has had their case held at the federal appellate level until the *Hodgson/Akron* decision, and are currently waiting the announcement of that decision.[30] Still, it seems appropriate to emphasize that a few attorneys general indicated that lower federal courts had declared their parental notification requirement constitutionally impermissible prior to the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions.

This strongly suggests that the Supreme Court's *Hodgson/Akron* decree will generate some activity by the lower federal courts because five states' statutes (17%; $N = 30$; table 1) are currently under federal advisement. Three of the five cases are parental notification statutes and are thus directly affected by the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions. Armed with the Supreme Court's ruling that approved parental notification statutes should contain a judicial bypass

option, lower federal courts have followed in the Supreme Court's footsteps. In effect, these courts in the past have disapproved state parental notification requirements that were not accompanied by the judicial bypass procedure.

Interest Group Pressure on the State Attorneys General

In our effort to ascertain whether interest groups had exerted pressure on the attorneys general since the *Hodgson/Akron* rulings, we asked the attorneys general whether prolife or prochoice groups had contacted their offices. Few attorneys general reported that their offices had been contacted by prolife and prochoice forces. Twenty percent of the offices reported contact with prochoice groups ($N = 15$) and fourteen percent with prolife ($N = 14$). Responses by the AG varied. Some states attempted to foster communication with interest groups like the prochoice/prolife organizations. They noted that discussions with these groups included telephone contact, meetings between the AG and interest group representatives, and inquiries regarding statutes currently in litigation. One Midwestern office noted that "we regularly maintain regular contact with prochoice groups and antiabortion groups."

Still other AG offices had no contact with groups or did not keep records of attempted contact. As one Western office noted, "I don't know if they did [contact us]. A lot of stuff I get I toss." These offices see themselves as "nonpolitical" and foster this image. One midwestern office simply stated "the office of the attorney general is perceived as nonpolitical." It appears that whether interest groups lobby the AG regarding litigation or legislation depends on the office's self-perception of its role. This suggests that these groups believe that the attorneys general are extensively involved in the abortion issue and are in a position to indirectly influence policy, and it is up to the AG to determine if this is their office's self-perception.

Conclusion

This study has investigated how the states, particularly the states' attorneys general, have responded to the complex and confusing *Hodgson* and *Akron* decrees. In handing down these decrees, the Court promulgated convoluted standards that the states must meet if their parental notification statutes were to adjudged constitutional. We posited that the ambiguities found in the *Hodgson/Akron* rulings would prompt the attorneys general to react in different ways to these particular rulings. Before turning to our pertinent findings, it seems appropriate to note that although we examined the data in terms of variance of response between elected and appointed attorneys general, male and female officers, and the geographical region, we found no distinction in gender responses or between those elected or appointed. And we discovered only a minimal variance in region.

We also brought to light that, although the *Hodgson* and *Akron* rulings pertained specifically to Minnesota and Ohio, their impact extends far beyond these states' borders. We hypothesized that the fragmented nature of the *Hodgson* and *Akron* decisions would result in disparate reactions from the states; this hypothesis was not negated by our survey discoveries.

As observed earlier, three Far West states' policy agendas were apparently affected by the Supreme Court's June 1990 decisions. Although these initiatives were rejected, the fact that they were placed on the state ballots highlighted the fact that Supreme Court rulings affect the policy agendas of other policymakers, specifically states.

Despite such exceptions, we found that most states had not responded (by holding meetings, proposing legislation, or promoting litigation over the abortion decrees). There are perhaps several reasons for this. One is that it may be too early to expect the states to respond to the abortion decrees, given that the decisions were less than two years old at the time of our study. In other words, before acting, it may be that the states require more time to study and weigh the possible complications and ramifications of the decrees. Or it could be that some states' attorneys general did not respond because they are content with the status quo. States may or may not have a notification statute, but as the referendums demonstrated, the electorate may not wish to alter their current abortion standards.

Some states may have opted not to respond because they are reading *Hodgson* and *Akron* as applying only to the circumstances in Minnesota and Ohio. Finally, it could be that the attorneys general did not respond because they are supposed to be neutral and not take a position on the "hot issues," leaving such "political" concerns to the governor and state legislature. As demonstrated by the varied relationships with special interest groups, the different AG offices may have contrasting perceptions regarding their functions.

This study has also found a high level of consciousness about the abortion decision among the states' attorneys general. We discovered that while the attorneys general relied mostly on the print press as the primary fount of information, they are also dependent on the electronic media, other lawyers, and other sources. Consequently, nonawareness cannot be accepted as a reason for the states' lack of immediate reaction.

While we certainly would have been delighted to have more states' reactions to the *Hodgson/Akron* decisions, we are aware that nonresponse by the states may be significant. The fact that many states did not respond to our survey (35%, $N = 51$) could mean many things, but it could suggest that states are not yet accepting the Supreme Court's invitation to place more restrictions on a minor's decision to undergo the abortion process.

This preliminary study has unearthed a potentially different explanation to highlight the states' lack of immediate reaction to the Supreme Court decision. We hypothesize that state abortion policies are dynamic. In other words, current legislation and litigation may have prevented the states from responding. One state has legislation currently under debate, four states have legislation under consideration, and two states have bills that have either been defeated or vetoed by the governor. Other states have their laws either enjoined by the state or federal courts and five states have their restrictive legislation under federal court consideration. One state had its statute declared unconstitutionally vague by a district court and is pending review. Because many states are currently in the process of creating or defending their restrictive legislation, they probably were cautious and had no response.

We hypothesized that the Court in these decisions continued the trend that began in Webster to narrow the right to privacy. The Court, in these new

decisions, is retreating from the view enunciated in Danforth that the minor has a fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. By subjecting Hodgson/Akron's parental notification statutes to the relaxed equal protection "reasonable reason" or "state's legitimate purpose" test, the Court is clearly signaling that state restrictions will be reviewed more receptively than they have been in the past.

One question this chapter asked was how the states would respond to this invitation. Our preliminary findings suggest that some states will take up the invitation and that some will not. As of 1990, thirty-two of the fifty states have some form of restrictive statute regulating a minor's abortion procedure. Of these thirty-two, only eleven are in effect.[31] The remaining twenty-one states either have their statutes enjoined pending a court decision, or are declared unconstitutional by a state or federal court. Several states have legislation either currently being debated on the floor or in the "pipeline" (table 1).

Consequently, we argue that those states desiring to limit the availability of abortions to minors have either done so or are in the process of so doing. Because these laws and bills originated prior to the *Hodgson/Akron* decision, it cannot be argued that they were enacted in response to the 1990 decisions. A question for future research may be whether these states developed the statutes in response to the Court's decision in *Webster* or whether the *Webster* decree was in part a response to stricter state regulations.

The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the *Hodgson/Akron* rulings in *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*. In this instance, the Supreme Court, among other things, held that before a minor could undergo the abortion procedure, a state could compel her to notify her parents, provided the state's parental notification statute was accompanied by a judicial bypass procedure. This decree makes it clear that the Supreme Court's *Hodgson/Akron* decrees still have the backing of a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court justices.

We conclude by observing that states may not be responding to *Hodgson/Akron* because the political climate is not propitious for doing so. Current budget restraints, the negative signals the three 1990 November referendums may have sent, the direct application of *Hodgson* to an unusual two-parent notification statute, and the fragmented nature of the two decrees, all diminish any encouragement for direct responses to these decrees.

Notes

1. *Hodgson v. Minnessota*, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957 (1990).
2. *Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health*, 58 U.S.L.W 4979 (1990).
3. See "2 Parent-Notice Law on Abortion Voided," *Washington Post*, 26 June 1990, p. A–1.
4. See Justice Scalia's opinion in *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 58 U.S.L.W. 4973–74.
5. Lynne M. Ross, *State Attorneys General: Powers and Responsibility* (Washington, DC: The Bureau of National Affairs, 1990), 37–9.
6. *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct 705, 35 L. Ed 2d 147 (1973).
7. *Planned Parenthood v. Danforth*, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S. Ct 2831, 49 L. Ed 2d 788 (1976).
8. Ibid.
9. *Bellotti v. Baird*, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed 2d 797 (1979).
10. *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957 (1990).
11. From Justice O'Connor's concurring in part opinion in *Hodgson*.

12. *Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft*, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 76 L. Ed 2d 733 (1983).
13. *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957 (1990).
14. Ibid.
15. Not including the District of Columbia, because the national figures do not include DC either.
16. Tamar Lewin, "Abortion Hearing Likely to Spur Judicial Hearings," *New York Times*, 27 June 1990, p. A-14.
17. Anonymity is not granted regarding case information, as this is publicly available.
18. Due to the number of responses, we decided to divide the states into four approximately equal categories. Consequently there may be some awkward juxtapositions among the states.

    West - 13; 10 out of 13 responded - 77% response rate
    South - 12; 7 out of 12 responded - 58% response rate
    Midwest - 13; 6 out of 13 responded - 46% response rate
    East - 13; 10 out of 13 responded - 77% response rate

West	South	Midwest	East
Washington	Alabama	Iowa	Maine
Oregon	Florida	Minnesota	New Hampshire
California	Georgia	Wisconsin	Vermont
Nevada	North Carolina	Illinois	New York
Idaho	South Carolina	Michigan	Rhode Island
Wyoming	Tennessee	Ohio	Pennsylvania
Utah	Kentucky		Delaware
Colorado			Maryland
Arizona			Virginia
Alaska			District of Columbia

19. Lewin, "Abortion Hearing."
20. Susan F. Rasky, "Our Issues and How they Played at the Polls before Uncertain Voters," *New York Times*, 8 November 1990, p. A-22.
21. Several states responded multiple times, percentages are figured by total states; thus some states fall into several categories.
22. Justice Scalia's opinion in *Hodgson*.
23. Only one attorney's general office mentioned that they had protective laws guaranteeing a minor's right to abort, this is the District of Columbia (22 DCMR 600.7). The AG office states that they were unaware of any movement to alter the policy.
24. Lewin, "Abortion Hearing."
25. Percentage is based on states (N - 30) participating in survey; percentages fo not equal 100 percent, because several states fall into multiple categories (n - 48).
26. Instead of being surprised that such a small number answered these subjective questions, we were surprised that four AG offices attempted to speculate on the potential legislative affect of these decisions. However, as one office noted, any new decision changes precendent and makes new legislation likely.
27. *H.L. v. Matheson*, 450 U.S. 398, 101 S. Ct 1164, 67 L. Ed 2d 388 (1981).
28. There was no information given whether the Western state with a consent statute that does not provide for bypass is currently under ligitgation.

29. *Bellotti II* and *Ashcroft.*
30. *Planned Parenthood Association of Nashville v. McWhorter* (89–6026).
31. Lewin, "Abortion Hearing."

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Prospects for Minority Doctorates in the Year 2000: Employment Opportunities in a Changing American Society

Donald R. Deskins, Jr.

University of Michigan

As American society moves rapidly toward the promised prosperity of the twenty-first century, it faces numerous challenges in adjusting to the radical economic and demographic changes that are now under way. At the same time, it is striving to respond to global market pressures and maintain its world leadership and economic competitiveness. The traditional dependency on smoke-stack, goods-producing manufacturing industries that has sustained the economy for most of the century and ensured world leadership since World War II is shifting toward an economy focused on creating knowledge and providing services that require of its workers higher levels of education and technical skills for full participation. The "technology boom" that is partially responsible for transforming American society from a manufacturing to a service-dominated economy will create 25 million more jobs by the year 2000 than were available in 1985, with minorities forecast to occupy 29 percent of the new jobs, provided they are properly educated to do so.[1] Most of these new jobs will require participants to be better educated, especially in technology, sciences, and mathematics.

Among these new jobs the most rapid growth is projected at the top of the job hierarchy in the major occupational category, professional specialty, which includes physical sciences, engineering, life sciences, social sciences, and college and university teaching, all of which usually require the highest level of educational preparation, the doctorate (table 1).[2]

Projected to grow by 3.5 million jobs between 1988 and 2000, an increase of 24 percent, the professional specialty occupational category will continue its rapid growth and increase its share of all occupations from 12.4 percent in 1988 to 13.3 percent by the end of the century.[3]

Table 1
Projected Changes in Professional Specialty Occupations in the United States, (in thousands) 1988-2000

Occupation	Year		Changes 1988–2000	
	1988	2000	Number	Percentages
Professional specialty	14,628	18,137	3,509	23.9
Physical sciences *	687	978	291	29.8
Engineering **	1,616	2,006	390	24.1
Life sciences	154	189	35	23.7
Social sciences	194	239	45	23.2
College and university teachers ***	846	869	23	2.7
All	118,604	136,211	17,607	14.9

Source: George Silvestri and John Lukasiewicz, "Projections of occupational employment, 1988-2000," *Monthly Labor Review*, November 1989, pp. 42-65.
* Physical sciences including computer science.
** Engineering including architecture and surveying.
*** College and university teaching including humanities and education.

It is estimated that by the year 2000 the nation's collective minority population (blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans) will have reached 71 million, or 26.2 percent of the total U.S. population. Between 1990 and 2000 the minority population is expected to increase by 20 percent, compared to a 7.4 percent increase for the nation's population as a whole. At the same time the nation's minority population is proportionally becoming more youthful. In 1990 minorities eighteen to twenty-four years of age represent 27 percent of that total age group and by the end of this century are expected to represent 30.5 percent. This change in the minority share of the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old cohort represents an increase of 7.9 percent over the decade compared to a 4.5 percent decrease for all populations aged eighteen to twenty-four years and a 9.1 percent decrease for the white majority in this age group. These figures clearly identify minorities as the most rapidly growing segment of the population that will proportionately become larger and more youthful than the majority population as the year 2000 approaches (table 2).

To take full advantage of these emerging job opportunities and meet the anticipated demands for employment in the nation's changing economy requires a considerable investment in the development of its human capital.[4] Such an investment needs to be of sufficient magnitude to include those segments of society that have yet to be fully represented and mainstreamed in the education process. If properly prepared, by the end of the century the nation's rapidly growing and increasingly youthful minority population should be well positioned to take full advantage of the expanding job opportunities that are forecast.

Educational institutions at all levels have an enormously important role to play in the proper preparation of society for these opportunities, especially those segments of society that have been traditionally underrepresented on

the nation's campuses. Institutions of higher education, particularly those at the top of the hierarchy, have a special role in this process because of their dual mission, first, to set the nation's future education agenda and, second, to prepare the next generation of leaders, those with doctorates who by the turn of the century will have inherited the responsibility for properly educating a rapidly changing society to become more competitive, productive, humane, and globally engaged.[5]

Table 2
Percentage of U.S. Population by Minority Group, 1976-2000

	All ages					
Group	1976	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Black	11.2	11.7	12.1	12.5	12.9	13.3
Hispanic	5.0	6.4	7.2	7.9	8.6	9.4
Asian*	.9	2.3	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.5
Total minority	17.1	20.4	22.0	23.4	24.8	26.2
White	82.9	79.6	78.0	76.6	75.2	73.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N (1000s)	205,000	226,546	239,959	250,795	260,868	269,444
	Ages 18–24 Years					
Group	1976	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Black	12.8	12.7	14.3	14.6	14.9	15.2
Hispanic	5.8	7.4	8.1	9.2	10.5	11.2
Asian*	2.6	2.3	2.7	3.2	3.7	4.1
Total minority	21.2	22.5	25.1	27.0	29.1	30.5
White	78.8	77.5	74.8	73.0	70.9	69.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N (1000s)	28,687	29,293	28,874	25,929	23,841	24,764

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-25, no. 1002, "United States Population Estimates by Age, Sex, and Race, 1980 to 1987" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988); U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-25, no. 995, "Projections of Hispanic population, 1983 to 2080" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 14.

* In 1980 Asian and Native American populations were reported in the *U.S. Census of Population* as separate groups. In the *Current Population Reports* the category "Other Races" is assumed to be mainly Asian and Native American and henceforth in this analysis is referred to as Asian.

In sharp contrast to these optimistic employment trends, which at the upper end are dependent on the availability of sufficient numbers of PhD;s highly trained in scientific areas, there is mounting evidence that by the year 2000 there will be a shortage of PhDs in the sciences and engineering. In these crucial fields, upon which the nation's future competitiveness is heavily dependent, a shortfall of as many as eight thousand PhDs is anticipated.[6]

Declines in PhD production are also forecast for the humanities and the social sciences.[7] Even in education, the field in which minority representation, particularly of blacks, has traditionally been highest at the doctoral level, the number of doctoral degrees conferred has sharply declined, strongly suggesting that there will also be a shortage of EdD's in the future.[8] If the production of PhD's continues at present rates, by the turn of the century the output in nearly all academic areas will not be sufficient to meet demands.

The Purpose of This Study

The predicted intersection of these contradictory minority demographic and educational attainment trends around the year 2000 poses some serious questions for both the nation and its colleges and universities as attempts continue to mainstream a dwindling supply of minority doctorates, many of whom have been traditionally clustered in academic fields in which the demand is the lowest. The purpose here is to address the vexing question, How will the nation and its institutions of higher education meet the increasing demands for highly trained leaders and simultaneously more fully utilize the nation's underutilized human capital (minorities) in light of the predicted shortages in PhD production?

A comprehensive examination of the relevant data is required to better understand the impact of these contradictory demographic and educational trends. Such an examination requires that

1. doctoral-degree production by major field be examined by race/ethnicity for U.S. citizens over time to determine what the actual numbers and trends in attaining doctorates are for each group by disciplinary area,

2. based on the doctoral production trends identified, projections be made to the year 2000 to determine what each minority group's share of doctorate production by field will likely be,

3. a match between the expected number of minority doctorates and future job opportunities be made for each group to determine the extent to which minority doctoral production will be able to respond to future job demands,

4. the trends identified must be evaluated so that appropriate policy recommendations can be made and actions undertaken to ensure that minorities will be adequately recruited, educated, and represented among the doctorates awarded so they can take full advantage of the employment opportunities that will evolve by the year 2000.

The aims of this inquiry make necessary some limits in scope and clear study boundaries. First, from the outset this inquiry is focused on minorities, with comparisons being made between minority and nonminority groups. It has long been recognized that minorities have been underrepresented among doctorate recipients as well as in the academic ranks. Although women also

continue to face significant problems in attaining PhD degrees and acquiring academic jobs, they have made noticeable progress in recent years compared with that of other underrepresented groups.[9] Since the issues confronting women in the academic arena are somewhat different from those faced by minorities, they are not discussed here. Second, this study is restricted to an analysis at the national level. There is considerable merit in conducting a study of this kind on a regional basis; however, such an undertaking would far exceed the scope of this study. Although all the underrepresented minorities in PhD acquisition will be analyzed, the detailed discussion is mainly focused on blacks, who as a group have been experiencing the most drastic declines in degree attainment and the greatest difficulties in academic job placement and for whom the most detailed information is available over time.

Even though comprehensive data on black doctorate production are available, providing continuous coverage since 1876, the analysis in this paper begins in 1975, for several reasons. First, earlier studies on black doctorate production—such as *Holders of Doctorates Among American Negroes: An Educational and Social Study of Negroes Who Have Earned Doctoral Degrees in Courses, 1837-1943, Black American Scholars: A Study of Their Beginnings, and Doctorate Production in the United States Universities, 1920-1962*—have one aspect in common—they focused on black doctorate production, which had been *increasing* for more than a century.[10] The prospects for blacks to continue making progress in doctoral degree acquisition appeared highly optimistic during the period covered by these studies. They clearly delineated a period that held great promise for black Americans who were contemplating graduate education and academic careers, a period that lasted until the mid-1970s.

Second, by the mid-1970s a downturn in black doctorate production had begun at the same time the number of Asian-American doctorates had begun to grow, and the percentage of doctorates awarded to all U.S. minorities stabilized, never exceeding 7 percent of the total. Thus the year 1975 marks the beginning of a period in which minority groups appeared to be competing for the same limited graduate-training opportunities available in the academy.

Third, at this juncture the National Research Council (NRC) began making easily accessible detailed information on doctorate production for U.S. citizens including all minority groups and the majority (whites) and nonresidents by disciplinary areas. Since 1975 the NRC has provided annual data on doctorate attainment, providing a bases for systematic analysis and comparisons between U.S. minority groups and whites with nonresidents over time. Since 1975, in response to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as amended by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, colleges and universities have been required to compile and report educational participation by race, resulting in the availability of vast quantities of educational statistics from other federal agencies as well.

During the past decade there have been numerous studies of minority doctorate production based upon these educational data. Most prominent among these are the works of Gail E. Thomas, Anne S. Pruitt, James E. Blackwell, and Willie Pearson, Jr. and H. Kenneth Bechtel.[11] Each of these studies brings a slightly different emphasis to the analysis of minority doc-

toral degree attainment. In her 1987 article "Black Students in U.S. Graduate and Professional Schools in the 1980's: A National and Institutional Assessment," Thomas documented recent enrollment and the degree-attainment status of blacks. In black-white comparisons she concluded that blacks were losing ground in degree attainment and remained underrepresented in graduate and professional schools. She also strongly emphasized that national, institutional, and individual investments must be made to advance black educational attainment, which leads to job acquisition and subsequently to upward social and economic mobility. These investments would provide a partial remedy to black underrepresentation in the nation's graduate and professional schools.[12]

In 1989, in "Access and Retention of Minority Graduate Students," Pruitt, though using some of the same data that Thomas used and covering similar issues, focused more on the kind and timing of interventions in the recruitment, admissions, and retention processes that will increase minority participation in graduate studies. Intervention on the institutional level in these areas, she emphasizes, is the action to be taken to ensure increased minority participation in higher education. In her analysis she effectively makes use of comparisons between minority groups along with minority group-white comparisons.[13]

Blackwell, in *Mainstreaming Outsiders: The Production of Black Professions,* studied the process of mainstreaming blacks with doctorates and professional degrees and the development of black professionals. Using black-white comparisons, he not only examined the enrollment and degree-attainment patterns of black professionals but also placed the process in a historical context. He concluded that the issues associated with the mainstreaming of blacks are complex and that the mainstreaming of non-European racial and ethnic groups, particularly blacks, is a recent phenomenon that is plagued with unique problems. He furthered an understanding of the impact that social, political, and economic factors may have on either restricting or facilitating the mainstreaming process.[14]

The scarcity of blacks in the sciences makes Pearson and Bechtel's *Blacks, Science, and American Education* extremely important because it focuses on an area in which future job prospects are the most promising and where black underrepresentation is the highest. Insights into this lack of representation are gained from a discussion of early academic preparation. The authors' review of intervention strategies is useful, as is their discussion of the national benefits to be derived from increased black participation in the sciences.[15]

In this chapter the ground that has already been effectively covered in these works will not be gone over but data similar to those used by these authors, will be reexamined, supplemented, and presented in a different manner.

In some ways the doctoral projections made in this study follow the successful 1978 efforts by John E. Fleming, Gerald R. Gill, and David H. Swinton in *The Case for Affirmative Action: For Blacks in Higher Education* in which annual projections of PhD's were generated for the total and for blacks for the period 1974-1990. This work addressed the degree to which black faculty were underrepresented in U.S. colleges and universities, forecasted the future academic labor market for blacks, and assessed the effectiveness of affirmative action on this process.

The intent of this inquiry is to focus on providing insights into what the future minority share of PhD's will be and the degree to which minorities in general and blacks specifically will be in a position to take advantage of the opportunities that will be available in the academic marketplace in the year 2000. By restricting the focus of the study in the ways mentioned, in no way suggest that the situation in the academy for other underrepresented minorities and women is less problematic than it is for blacks, but only that there are group-specific differences that will not be covered here.

Available Data on Doctoral Degrees

The *Survey of Earned Doctorates* (SED), sponsored by five federal agencies (National Science Foundation [NSF], National Institutes of Health [NIH], U.S. Department of Education [USED], National Endowment for the Humanities [NIH], and the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA]), conducted and reported annually by the Office of Scientific and Engineering Personnel of the National Research Council (NRC), provides the basic data necessary for this examination. The data are readily available, comprehensive, and detailed enough to establish trends in doctorate production for each minority group by field.[16] Annual data on enrollment in graduate training institutions and other institutions of higher education on all levels, along with degrees conferred until 1986 at all levels by academic field, are also available for minority groups from the USED. Reports alternating each year between enrollment and degrees conferred are now both made annually by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the USED. These reports are derived from the annual *Higher Education General Information Survey* (HEGIS) and the *Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Survey* (IPEDS) which replaced HEGIS in 1986.[17] The availability of data on enrollment and degrees conferred makes it possible to identify trends at all levels for all groups over time. The SED and HEGIS/IPEDS data on minority participation in higher education has been available in various forms since 1973.

Population projections for the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year age group are drawn from *Current Population Reports* (CPR) of the U.S. Bureau of the Census. These projections cover the total college-age population as well as whites, blacks, Hispanics, and others.[18] Since specific projections for the Asians age eighteen to twenty-four are not available, the population category "Others," which is dominated by Asians and includes Native Americans, will henceforth be referred to as "Asian" when this cohort is discussed. These population projections for the college-age population are particularly useful because they provide a basis for judging the comparability of the projections made in this analysis with those externally generated, as well as providing a basis for comparing enrollment and degree trends.

Data on full-time faculty employment by rank and race are available from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reports.[19] With this information, trends in full-time employment in the academic ranks can be assessed for each minority over time.

All of these data sets are used as primary data sources in the analysis of the demographic and educational trends identified in this study. Therefore, it is important to establish precisely and examine the trends in doctorate production by field to determine the magnitude of each group's production by field,

as well as the direction these trends are taking. At least a decade and a half of data coverage for each item being considered is available to establish trends that are reliable and therefore useful.

NRC data on earned doctorates, which are found in the *Doctorate Records Files*, table 2, "U.S. Citizen PhD's by Field of Doctorate, Race and Sex, 1975-1990," and table 3: "U.S. Citizen and Permanent Resident PhD's by Field of Doctorate, Race and Sex, 1975-1990," supplemented with table 1 "Number of Fiscal Year Ph.D.'s by Field of Doctorate, Race, Citizenship and Sex" (available annually), provide a data base with the necessary specifications to permit the record of minority doctorates to be examined annually for the fifteen-year period 1975 to 1990, a time length that is long enough to establish trends that are useful for forecasting future doctorate production. The data from the SED are particularly useful because they provide the number of doctorates awarded annually in 276 specialties which have been aggregated into seven major fields—physical sciences, engineering, life sciences, social sciences, humanities, education, and other professional fields—and the total for all fields.[20] These clusters reduce the specialties reported to seven categories that are reasonably unambiguous yet easy to distinguish and manage.

Doctorates awarded in the seven fields are reported for: U.S. citizens, non-U.S. citizens, and the total for both groups. U.S. citizens includes data for Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, white, race unknown and the U.S. total. Non-U.S. citizens are reported as a separate group as is the total for all PhD's awarded, which is the sum of U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens. For this study the above- mentioned NRC categories are used, with the exceptions that non-U.S. citizens will be referred to as *nonresidents* and the category *total minority* will be used when minorities are referred to in aggregate. Henceforth when blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans and total minority are used, it refers only to U.S. citizens unless otherwise specified.

With eight doctoral field categories and a projection period covering fifteen years, a data matrix with 1080 cells can be generated containing data pertinent to this study. These are, of course, far too many data categories to analyze or discuss in one study. A partial solution has been to reduce the data to summary form and present them in tables and field-specific cumulative percentage graphs that display degree-conferred trends as percentages for each group by year over time. Comparisons of the trends for each minority group displayed on the graphs are used for the analysis and discussion in this chapter. The following discussion of doctoral-degree production focuses on the data thus summarized in relation to trends in baccalaureate degrees conferred, undergraduate and graduate enrollment, potential college-age population between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four years, and full-time academic employment, all of which are displayed in a series of similar graphs by race/ethnicity. The intersections of the trends in other educational and demographic categories and those for doctorates are basic to this inquiry.

Doctorate Production, 1975-1990

The total number of doctorates awarded in all fields steadily increased during the fifteen-year period 1975 to 1990 (table 3). In 1975, 32,951 degrees were conferred; in 1990, 36,027 degrees were awarded, an increase of 3,076 the total number of doctorates produced between 1975 and 1990 increased annually by only 0.6 percent. During this period four groups, nonresidents, Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians, experienced increases in the total number of doctorates received, while white and black groups experienced decreases in both absolute and relative terms. Nonresidents, more than any other group, increased their share of doctorates earned in absolute numbers between 1975 and 1990. The additional 4,148 degrees earned by this group in 1990 over 1975 represents a 79 percent increase. However, Native American, Hispanic, and Asian doctorates increased by higher rates during the same period, 158.3, 130.4, and 115.7 percent, respectively. Although the percentage of increase in doctorate production for each of these groups is quite large, no group has numbers at the magnitude of nonresidents because the base numbers for Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians are relatively small.

On the other hand, the number of white doctorate recipients, which has a much larger base, decreased by 11.1 percent with the number of degrees granted in 1990 being 2,703 fewer than it was in 1975. Although white doctorates decreased the most in actual numbers during this period, blacks experienced the greatest percentage decline, 17.1 percent. In contrast to the overall doctorate production increase of 9.3 percent, these figures show that there was significant internal shifting of PhD production among groups.

In examining the absolute numbers, some comparisons can be made illustrating the magnitude of the internal shifting that has occurred. For example, in absolute numbers white doctorates decreased by 2,703, which was more than offset by a nonresident increase of 4,148. While the number of doctorates awarded to blacks decreased by 171, those awarded to Native Americans, Hispanics, and Asians at the same time increased their respective number of degrees by 60, 395, and 331.

Although aggregate black doctorate production declined by 17.1 percent between 1975 and 1990, there were increases in the actual number of doctorates awarded to blacks in four fields: engineering, life sciences, social sciences, and other professional fields. The internal shifts in distribution observed by fields are encouraging, even though the numbers are small. For example, in 1990 blacks were earning in relative terms more degrees in sciences and engineering—areas in which demands are increasing and are forecast to continue to increase—than they earned in 1975. Although the numbers are small, it is significant to note that blacks are now proportionally earning more degrees in the areas on which the future prosperity of the nation is heavily dependent. This shift in PhD degree program selection is a clear indication that more blacks are now responding to market demands in selecting their academic fields.

In sharp contrast, the greatest losses in black doctorate production are found in physical sciences, a high demand field and in education, a field traditionally selected by blacks, where the numbers dropped from 609 to 420. Losses in this academic area are quite dramatic. In 1975 the number of

doctorates in education awarded to blacks accounted for 60.9 percent of all doctorates awarded to blacks in all fields. The 31 percent loss over the fifteen-year period being considered reduces the proportion of education degrees awarded to blacks in 1990 to 50.7 percent. Overall the losses in black doctorate production during the period 1975-1990, dropping from 999 to 828, is alarming and should be cause for concern if more black participation in the academic and scientific workplace is to be realized by the year 2000.

Changes in the proportion of doctoral degrees earned by Hispanics are positive in all fields. The largest rates of increase cluster in science and engineering where the respective rates in physical sciences, life sciences, and engineering are 207.4, 164.1, and 16.0. Hispanics also made considerable gains in doctorates awarded in the social sciences, education, and the humanities. Like blacks, they have shifted their degree selection to science and engineering areas.

By 1990 the total number of doctorates awarded to Asians (U.S. citizens only) reached 617. Increases in doctorates for Asians have occurred in all fields, the largest numerical increases being found in life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering. The increases in doctorates in education awarded to Asians is quite unusual and may signal a new trend, considering the group's tradition of overselecting degrees in the sciences.

As a group nonresidents have had the greatest numerical increase in doctoral degrees conferred during the period. The absolute numerical increase of 4,148 for all doctorates awarded to nonresidents during this time period has not been exceeded by any other group. The overall positive rate of growth (79 percent) in the degrees conferred on members of this group is reflected in the group's degree acquisition in all fields, the highest rates of increases being clustered in engineering, physical sciences, life sciences, and other professions.

The overall increasing rate in doctorates awarded to Native Americans (158.3 percent) exceeded those for both Hispanics and Asians during the period. However, the number of degrees awarded to Native Americans is quite small. In 1990 only 93 doctorates were awarded to Native Americans in all areas.

Whites, numerically the largest group, also had losses in the number of doctorates received. The decrease, however, was only 11.1 percent. White doctorate production as a whole dropped from 24,353 awarded in 1975 to 21,650 awarded in 1990. Among the fields the greatest losses are found in the humanities, education, and the social sciences, in that order. Increases for the group are the strongest in the life sciences, engineering, and other professional fields.

Changes in Academic Field Selections

In 1990, a larger proportion of each group received PhD's in the physical sciences, engineering, and life sciences than in 1975 (table 4). Clearly the trend in field selection for all recipients is moving toward the sciences and engineering, where employment opportunities are predicted to increase rapidly. At the same time, degree recipients have shifted away from the social sciences, education, and humanities. Similar shifts in field selection

Table 3
Change in Doctorates Awarded by Field to Minority Groups 1975–1990

U.S. Citizens Group	Field							
	Phys. Sci.	Eng.	Life Sci.	Social Sci.	Human -ities	Educa- tion	Prof/ Other	All
Black								
1975	41	11	56	153	87	609	42	999
1990	23	28	63	172	70	420	52	828
% Change	-43.9	+154.5	+12.5	+12.4	-19.5	-31.0	+23.8	-17.1
Hispanic								
1975	27	15	39	56	64	92	10	303
1990	83	39	103	164	107	172	30	698
% Change	+207.4	+160.0	+164.1	+192.9	+67.2	+87.0	+200.0	+130.4
Asian								
1975	50	61	54	36	30	39	16	286
1990	108	152	149	82	34	61	31	617
% Change	+116.0	+149.2	+175.9	+127.8	+13.3	+56.4	+93.8	+115.7
Native American								
1975	3	1	2	8	5	16	1	36
1990	5	4	8	23	8	36	9	93
% Change	+66.7	+300.0	+300.0	+187.5	+60.0	+125.0	+800.00	+158.3
Total Minority								
1975	121	88	151	253	186	756	69	1,624
1990	219	223	323	441	219	689	122	2,236
% Change	+81.0	+153.4	+113.9	+74.3	+17.7	-8.9	+76.8	+37.7
Race unknown								
1975	181	75	120	246	23	199	41	1,105
1990	73	35	56	46	35	41	18	304
% Change	-59.7	-53.3	-53.3	-81.3	-85.6	-79.4	-56.1	-72.5
White								
1975	3,355	1,553	3,650	4,682	4,063	5,848	1,202	24,353
1990	3,018	1,669	4,120	3,999	2,736	4,745	1,363	21,650
% Change	-10.0	+7.5	+12.9	-14.6	-32.7	-18.9	+13.4	-11.1
Total U.S. citizens								
1975	3,657	1,716	3,921	5,181	4,492	6,803	1,312	27,082
1990	3,310	1,927	4,499	4,486	2,990	5,475	1,503	24,190
% Change	-9.5	+12.3	+14.7	-13.4	-33.4	-19.5	+14.6	-10.7
Nonresident								
1975	1,099	1,233	1,001	761	447	465	242	5.250
1990	2,158	2,567	1,749	1,084	580	633	623	9,398
Total	+96.4	+108.2	+74.7	+43.8	+29.8	+36.1	+157.4	+79.0
Total U.S. Citizens and Nonresident								
1975	4,857	3,002	5,026	6,066	5,046	7,359	1,575	32,951
1990	5,859	4,892	6,613	6,076	3,820	6,484	2,283	36,027
% Change	+20.6	+63.0	+31.6	+0.2	-24.3	-11.9	+45.0	+9.3

Source: Note: Calculated from data in National Research Council, *Doctorate Record Files, 1975-1990.*

Note: Totals may not add up owing to the exclusion of the "Other and Unspecified" field and the "Other and Unknown" population group.

Table 4
Change in Doctoral Field Selection by Minority Group, 1975-1990
(percentage of field by group)

Field	Group															
	U.S. Citizens															
	Black		Hispanic		Asian		American		White		Total U.S. Citizen		Nonresident		Total U.S. Citizen & Nonresident	
	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990
Physical sciences	4.1	2.8	8.9	11.7	17.5	17.5	8.3	5.4	13.8	13.9	13.5	13.9	20.9	23.0	14.7	16.3
Engineering	1.1	3.4	5.0	5.6	21.3	24.6	2.8	4.3	6.4	7.7	6.3	8.0	23.5	27.3	9.1	13.6
Life Sciences	5.6	7.6	12.8	14.8	18.9	24.1	5.6	8.6	15.0	19.0	14.5	18.6	19.1	18.6	15.3	18.4
Social Sciences	15.3	20.8	18.5	23.5	12.6	13.3	22.2	24.7	19.2	18.5	19.1	18.5	14.5	11.6	18.4	16.9
Humanities	8.7	8.5	21.1	15.3	10.5	5.5	13.9	8.6	16.7	12.6	16.6	12.4	8.5	6.2	15.3	10.6
Education	60.9	50.7	30.4	24.6	13.6	9.9	44.4	38.7	24.0	21.9	25.1	22.6	8.9	6.7	22.3	18.0
Profess/ Others	4.2	6.3	3.3	4.3	5.6	5.0	2.8	9.7	4.9	6.3	4.9	6.2	4.6	6.6	4.8	6.3
Cluster	**Percentage of Cluster Field by Group**															
	U.S. Citizens															
	Black		Hispanic		Asian		American		White		Total U.S. Citizen		Nonresident		Total U.S. Citizen & Nonresident	
	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990	1975	1990
Sciences & Engin.	10.8	13.8	26.7	32.1	57.7	66.2	16.7	18.3	35.2	40.6	34.3	40.5	63.5	68.9	39.1	48.3
Soc. Sci. & Human.	24.0	29.3	39.6	38.8	23.1	18.8	36.1	33.3	35.9	31.1	35.7	30.9	23.0	17.8	33.7	27.5
Education	60.9	50.7	30.4	24.6	13.6	9.9	44.4	38.7	24.0	21.9	25.1	22.6	8.9	6.7	22.3	18.0
Other	4.2	6.3	3.3	4.3	5.6	5.0	2.8	9.7	4.9	6.3	4.9	6.2	4.6	6.6	4.8	6.3

Source: Calculated from data in NRC, *Doctorate Record Files*, 1975–1990

are found among whites, whose trends in field selection mirror those for the total, though white selection of engineering as a field is not as strong as it is for all other recipients.

Between 1975 and 1990 blacks' doctoral-degree field selection shifted dramatically away from education, reducing the group's share in that field from 60.9 percent to 50.7 percent share in fifteen years. The movement of blacks away from the field of education, where they have traditionally clustered, is countered by an increase in the proportion of black PhD's awarded in engineering and the life sciences and to a lesser degree in the social sciences. Although the base figure is low, black doctorates awarded in other professions also increased.

Hispanic doctorates also experienced shifts in field selection. Substantial selections toward engineering, life sciences, and social sciences are in sharp contrast to significant shifts away from the humanities and education. Compared to those of blacks, the swings in field selection of Hispanics are even more dramatic, regardless of direction. The volatility of these internal shifts in field selection by Hispanics occurred as the overall number of degrees increased for the group, compared to an overall decline in the number of doctorates awarded to blacks.

Asian field selection was not as dramatic except in the physical sciences, where the proportion of PhD's earned remained at 17.5 percent throughout the period. A shift in field selection of Asians away from the humanities occurred during this time, while Asian PhD recipients significantly increased in the physical sciences, life sciences, engineering, and education. Asian changes in doctoral field selection took place as the base number of degrees awarded to the group increased from 286 in 1975 to 617 in 1990.

During this period Native American doctorate recipients in all fields increased, and the aggregate number of degrees awarded moved from 36 in 1975 to 93 in 1990. Shifts in field selection occurred, but, owing to the extremely small numbers involved, they may not be significant and are extremely difficult to evaluate because a slight change in the number of doctorates conferred from year to year could result in extremely volatile shifts in field selection that have little meaning.

Doctorates awarded to nonresidents increased from 5,250 to 9,398 between 1975 and 1990. Therefore, the magnitude of the shifts in field selection are significant for this group. In field selection nonresidents have shifted away from the social sciences, humanities, and education and toward all the sciences except life sciences, where the proportion of degrees received declined from 19.1 percent to 18.6 percent. More than any other group, nonresidents consistently selected the sciences over all other fields.

Shifts in doctoral field selection by group become much clearer when the seven fields are reduced to four clustered fields: sciences and engineering, social sciences and humanities, education, and other professions. In this configuration trends in field selection become sharper for all groups, and especially for minority groups, who are electing to earn more degrees in sciences and engineering. In education, a field that blacks have historically overselected, the shifts in selection are more dramatic. In 1975 three of every five doctoral degrees conferred on blacks were in this field, whereas by 1990 only one of every two black doctoral degrees received were in education. This means that increasing numbers of blacks are reducing their selection of

education as a degree field and distributing their selections much more widely across other fields with greater career potential. The shift in field selection from education for nonresidents, whites, and Hispanics, who traditionally have concentrated less in this field, is also clearer. However, slight decreases in selection of this field are found for Native Americans as well. In the social sciences and engineering, blacks also seem to be slightly overselecting, while all other groups have increased their level of participation in these categories. Although the numbers are small, all groups (except Asians) have increased their percentage of selection in the category other professional fields.

Barriers to Black Access

Black access to higher education, whether in enrollment at the undergraduate or graduate school levels, at the baccalaureate or doctoral-degree stage, or in academic employment, has been traditionally confronted with obstacles. In the early 1970s, soon after the civil rights movement reached its zenith, Fred Crossland, in *Minority Access to College,* and the National Board on Graduate Education, in its report *Minority Group Participation in Graduate Education,* identified possible barriers to minority access to higher education.[21] These barriers are described as (1) educational, (2) financial, (3) locational, (4) motivational, and (5) racial/cultural. In addition to these barriers one more: (6) alternative opportunities, is added to assess the impact that alternative career choice may have on graduate school enrollment and subsequent doctoral program selection. In seeking plausible explanations for the decline in black participation in doctorate acquisition since 1975, each of these barriers is examined.

Educational

Inadequate preparation and low scores on standardized tests have been posed separately or in combination as barriers to black access to higher education. Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores, which are only one measure of high school performance, are often over relied upon in college admissions considerations because they are believed to be good indicators of academic preparedness and predictors of college performance. It is well-known that blacks score the lowest of all groups on these tests. Consequently, this level of performance can be used as an explanation for recent declines in black enrollment in baccalaureate degree programs and degrees awarded as reliance on standardized tests in the admission process has increased. When the ratios of black enrollment to blacks in the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year age group are examined over time, these scores seem to have little effect on enrollment; however, when BA degree ratios are examined, it is apparent that black acquisition is declining (table 5). Considering that SAT scores may be affected by many other factors, such as undergraduate grade-point average (GPA) and academic tracking in general, overall SAT performance has declined. As a counter to this decline, during the past decade blacks have made slight gains in both the verbal and the math scores, which suggests that

the test barrier does not fully account for black decline in undergraduate programs unless they are over relied on in the admissions process.[22]

The Graduate Record Examination (GRE) plays a role in graduate admissions similar to that of the SAT at the undergraduate level. Relative to other groups, black scores are the lowest on these tests as they are on the SAT. Again, as with the SAT, blacks over time are gradually improving their GRE scores, but fewer are taking the test relative to their secondary school graduation rates.[23] Although black GRE scores remain low, they are slowly improving, and if they are applied properly and used as but one and not the sole indicator for admissions, the impact on black enrollment in graduate programs should be minimal.

Table 5
Ratio between Enrollment, Degrees, Full-time Faculty, and U.S. Population Ages 18–24 Years by Race/Ethnicity, 1976–89

	Black		Hispanic		Asian		White		Total	
	1976	1989	1976	1989	1976	1989	1976	1989	1976	1989
Population 18–24 years (in 1,000s)	3,676	3,786	1,674	2,385	740	830	22,605	18,384	28,687	25,929
Enrollment										
Undgrad	1:4	1:3	1:5	1:3	1:4	1:2	1:3	1:2	1:3	1:2
Graduate	1:51	1:45	1:76	1:52	1:35	1:16	1:22	1:15	1:24	1:16
Profess.	1:334	1:237	1:335	1:239	1:185	1:46	1:103	1:83	1:118	1:95
Degree										
BA	1:62	1:75	1:94	1:80	1:66	1:22	1:28	1:21	1:31	1:26
MA	1:181	1:269	1:316	1:327	1:190	1:78	1:86	1:76	1:93	1:84
PhD	1:3031	1:3442	1:4838	1:3186	1:1240	1:621	1:819	1:738	1:849	1:727
MD	1:5192	1:4860	1:8246	1:4221	1:3260	1:724	1:1898	1:1437	1:2145	1:1667
JD	1:2420	1:2387	1:2718	1:2081	1:2372	1:1047	1:766	1:580	1:890	1:729
DDS	1:20087	1:21151	1:9929	1:11866	1:5000	1:1986	1:4612	1:5605	1:5288	1:6105
OPD	1:12853	1:6797	1:14946	1:6794	1:2691	1:1363	1:2262	1:1368	1:2598	1:1674
FPD	1:1364	1:1221	1:1273	1:1058	1:769	1:280	1:401	1:301	1:462	1:366
Full-time Faculty	1:188	1:163	1:267	1:236	1:76	1:34	1:55	1:40	1:64	1:50

Source: Higher Educatión General Information Survey and *Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Survey*, 1976–1989, data on enrollment and degrees conferred.

Financial

Lack of financial support, coupled with tuition increases, can negatively affect black participation in higher education. During the 1980s the cost of education was driven up mainly by tuition increases. This was particularly true at the graduate and professional school levels, where the increases in tuition were the largest. Meanwhile, federal support for higher education in the form of student aid changed in constant 1986 dollars from $20.7 billion in 1980 to $22.2 billion in 1990, leaving black students who were heavily depend-

ent on such aid with a considerable amount of unmet financial need.[24] To meet this need, blacks in doctoral programs had to increase their dependence on loans, which grew from 29.1 percent of the total cost of education in 1975 to 43.7 percent in 1985. The shift to loans partly offset the federal contribution to student aid, which decreased from 55.2 percent to 38.6 percent during the same period.[25]

These shifts in the student-aid support base placed an increasing reliance on family income to make up the difference. When changes in black family income as percentages of white family income over time are examined, it is clear that there is little chance that black family income can realistically be viewed as a resource to provide the unmet cost of education. Black family income as a percentage of white family income was the highest in the mid-1970s, when the rates at which blacks and whites were attending college were near parity and federal student aid was at its zenith. Since then median black family income as a percentage of median white family income, after peaking at 60 percent in 1969, dropped from 59 percent in 1976 to 56 percent in 1987, paralleling the decrease in federal aid.[26] The evidence is clear from the combined factors of increased tuition cost, a drop in federal student aid, and a relative drop in black family income that the financial barrier continues to have a negative impact on black participation in doctoral programs.

Locational

Since legal barriers to black access to doctoral programs no longer exist and there is a rather even distribution of doctorate-granting institutions nationally that roughly coincides with the population, location is no longer significant as a barrier. Distance historically was a serious barrier to black access to higher education because the black population, which was heavily concentrated in the South, did not have access to the doctorate-granting institutions in the region. Consequently those blacks who wished to pursue doctoral studies and could afford to do so had to travel long distances and relocate in the Northeast or the Midwest, where doctorate-granting institutions that would admit them were located. The desegregation of educational institutions in the South has had a mitigating effect on the locational barrier - providing blacks with educational opportunities in the region that were previously not available.

Motivational

Lack of motivation among blacks has often been cited as a barrier to black participation in higher education, particularly with each advance up the educational hierarchy. It is difficult to measure systematically the accuracy of this perception. It is indisputable that black participation at the top of the educational hierarchy is limited. To attribute this limited presence to lack of motivation among blacks is on its face a simplistic and even erroneous explanation. John U. Ogbu, in *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective* (1987), asserted that limited black participation in higher education could be attributed to the fact that when blacks

pursue employment in academia they encounter imposed "job ceilings" that restrict their participation to lower-status positions.[27]

It is obvious that not all jobs in higher education, especially the prestigious ones, are open to blacks. This fact, although not stated, is well- known to blacks as it is to nearly all others in society. Blacks' awareness of job ceilings and the lack of role models cause many who have the ability to succeed in academia to reject what they perceive as dead-end fields and channel their efforts to fields in which their greatest chances for success lie. The fact that blacks have traditionally selected doctoral training in education is an example of blacks adjusting their expectations and pursuing careers in a field in which possibilities for success are high. Conversely, they also steer away from those fields that have little or no black participation or that hold little promise of opening up to them, especially the scientific specialties. Decisions by blacks not to elect those areas for study that are or appear to be closed to them are rational and understandable. Such selections do not signify a lack of motivation—only a decision that is driven by empirical evidence.

Robert K. Merton's concept of "anticipatory socialization" is another way to examine the widely espoused but wrongly perceived notion that black underrepresentation in higher education results from lack of motivation. Merton postulated that functions of positive orientation to nonmembership groups result in "anticipatory socialization." Stated another way, anticipatory socialization occurs when a person from a subordinate group adopts and embraces the values and norms of the dominant group to which he or she aspires to belong.[28] Anticipatory socialization can be achieved only in an open system in which possibilities for inclusion and upward mobility exist. A closed system will block opportunities for and dampen the aspirations of the subordinate group member, the consequence of which is dysfunction in the individual who is not fully accepted or is rejected.

A logical response of the subordinate group members to blocked opportunities is to redirect their attention to groups that are more receptive to them and where job opportunities are available for which they can successfully compete. Their rejection of some dominant groups' values, norms, and career areas, which may appear to be a lack of motivation, is in fact a pragmatic adjustment to available opportunities and realities. H. Kenneth Bechtel, in *Blacks, Science, and American Education* states that past practices and current educational policies have taught blacks who seek careers in higher education, first, to identify what their interest and motivations are, second, to identify where these opportunities exist, and, third, to determine the potential rewards and payoffs, before making their choices.[29] These actions will obviously result in high motivation among blacks to choose, for example, education, a field in which they previously could see the potential payoff, and little motivation to choose an area in which the potential payoff is not clear. Each of these constructs, job ceilings, and ajustment to available opportunitiess and realities, anticipatory socialization, provide a theoretical framework in which to understand better the minority response to blocked opportunities and a far better explanation for diminished black access to higher education in some areas than lack of motivation.

Racial/Cultural

The practice of racial prejudice, discrimination, and segregation is well established and undeniable in American history, a circumstance that has blocked the full participation of minorities in all phases of the national enterprise and that challenges all Americans to address forthrightly if the nation is to retain its economic competitiveness in the future. Higher education has yet to address this challenge fully. A concise, clear, and useful discussion of the racial climate on our campuses and related issues is found in John Egerton's article "Race and Equity in Higher Education." Egerton summarizes the visits of reporters to public universities in the late 1960s, just five years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,[30] when the total number of blacks enrolled in higher education approached a half million, an increase of 150 percent since 1960, and when two out of every three blacks enrolled in higher education were found on predominantly white campuses. According to Egerton,

> all of them [the reporters] soon were struck by the high level of racial segregation they found [on campuses], and somewhere along the way, they began to zero in on the issue. To one administrator and faculty member after another, the journalists posed such questions as these: Why is there so little racial integration in higher education? Why is segregation more pronounced in the biggest and best known universities than in the smaller ones? What is this institution doing to aid the nation's transition to an integrated society? If the best of this state are supposed to be here, and if those minds are trying to solve the toughest medical and agricultural and economic problems facing the nation, why aren't they also trying to solve the toughest social problems?[31]

The reporters' questions remain relevant to this day, after twenty-five years, during which time black enrollment in higher education increased in absolute and relative terms by 437 percent, from approximately 205,000 in 1964 (6.0 percent of the total enrollment) to approximately 1.1 million in 1990 (9.4 percent of the total). The responses to the questions the reporters asked twenty-five years ago are also relevant today:

> Feelings of frustration, shame and anger were reflected in the answers to those questions: We're color blind. We no longer make any distinctions based on race. Any qualified student or scholar is welcome here. Universities are not supposed to be instruments of social change. Integration would be too costly, or too far afield from our teaching and research missions, or too politically explosive. The responsibility properly belongs to other institutions, such as elementary and, secondary schools. If we become centers of mass education, we can't maintain our quality or our prestige. Neither white nor black colleges and universities truly want to become fully integrated by race and socio-economic class.[32]

At first glance these response seem astonishing to us today; however, the question now is, if the same questions are posed today, will the responses differ? An answer to this question can be found by examining some aspects of the national political, economic, and social climate relative to black access to opportunities in higher education in the recent past. For example, during the period 1975 to 1990 the nation went through a major political transforma-

tion that resulted in vigorous attempts to dismantle as well as redefine affirmative action. At the beginning of the period there was a national commitment to civil rights and equal opportunity, and legislation was passed in support of equal opportunity. The moral commitments, the laws, and the affirmative-action programs that emerged provided the justification and procedure for increasing black participation in higher education. Since then, with changes in the political climate, support for affirmative action that was once dominated by the idea of "remedial action" has lost ground to the position of "no preferential treatment," followed by "undeserving advantage" and culminating in the doctrine of "reverse discrimination."[33] Through out this period, the dismantling of affirmative action continued, making the effort to achieve equity in higher education for blacks increasingly difficult. Further dismantling of affirmative-action policies and practices by recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions is verification of this change in attitude, providing a legal interpretation supportive of the doctrine of a "color-blind society" strongly espoused by presidential administrations since the mid-1970s.[34]

Institutions of higher education have not been isolated from this change in national attitude. Paralleling the political transformation, universities, after once admitting the largest numbers of black students in history, shifted their concern to the maintenance of "quality" and are now placing an increasing emphasis on "excellence." In essence, academics began to follow the color-blind doctrine endorsed by recent political Administrations. As a result of this change in stance, black representation in universities, starting at the graduate level, has precipitously dropped since 1976. The new policy deemphasizing affirmative action has been implemented first and most broadly at the nation's best higher education institutions, where the decline in black representation has been the greatest.[35]

By definition and function universities should continue to strive for academic excellence. However, the emphasis on excellence when narrowly applied seems to be in conflict with efforts to diversity the student body. The increasing presence of underrepresented minorities on campuses in effect pits diversity against excellence. Justification for the shift in emphasis at universities from diversity to excellence can be found in Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind* and Eric Hirsch's *Cultural Literacy,* which offer arguments that encourage universities to pursue their mission of knowledge creation and increased excellence above all others and to remove themselves from direct involvement with the nation's social agenda.[36] Both authors suggest that the diminished quality of universities today is the direct result of their efforts to admit and educate diverse groups. Implicit in this suggestion is that to achieve the mission of excellence universities must become more selective in student admissions. Such elitist selectivity tends to exclude blacks and other underrepresented minorities or at the least to limit access by such groups.

When we examine the national political, economic, and social climate, contemporary responses to increased black access to higher education do not seem to differ greatly from those made just after the civil rights legislation of 1964. The "color-blind doctrine" is still with us, and the notions that universities are not agencies of social change and that their ultimate mission is to maintain quality have not changed over time. Clearly, race is a barrier to black

access to higher education that needs to be continually assaulted and breached, or the gains that have been made will be lost.

Alternative Opportunities

The availability of alternative careers opportunities has also been posed as a barrier to black access to higher education in some doctoral degree areas where their absence is noticeable. An explanation that is frequently and conveniently given to account for the limited participation of blacks in the physical sciences, for example, is that those blacks who would normally select PhD training in this area are selecting careers in medicine. However, when black enrollment in this professional field is examined, the increased number of black enrollees in medical schools is not large enough to account for the decreased black enrollment in the physical sciences (table 5). Therefore, the strength of the argument that alternative career choice acts as a barrier to black access to the physical science PhD programs is highly questionable.

Doctoral Degrees Forecast by 2000

Doctorates awarded during the period 1975-1990 in the social sciences increased by only two-tenths of a percent, while the humanities and education have declined by 24.3, and 11.9 percent, respectively (table 3). These outcomes support the shortages in doctorate production in both the humanities and the social sciences forecast by William Bowen and Julie Ann Sosa in *Prospects for Faculty in the Arts and Sciences: A Study of Factors Affecting Demand and Supply, 1987 to 2012.* The authors call for immediate initiation of reform in the doctorate-granting process to address this shortage.[37] Their conclusions are derived from several models employing such variables as faculty age distribution, estimated retirements, replacement estimates, population trends, enrollment rates, and enrollment projections. The models used to predict the shortage of doctorates in the social sciences and humanities are complex and may be controversial, but the outcomes are consistent with those generated in this study and seem to be reasonable.

In contrast, PhD trend data in sciences and engineering increased during the period 1975-1990, ranging from a 20.6 percent increase in the physical sciences to a 63 percent increase in engineering. However, even with the increase in the number of PhD's awarded in this field cluster, which are vital to the nation's economic future, a shortfall of at least 8,000 PhD's in sciences and engineering is forecast by the end of the century.[38]

Both of these forecasts, one for the social sciences and the humanities and the other for the physical sciences and engineering, strongly suggest that there will be a shortage of PhD's by the year 2000 if action is not taken immediately to intervene in the process of PhD production in these fields. Similarly, the number of doctorates awarded in education declined during the period, owing primarily to a national reduction in resource investment in this area by universities during the period of economic stagnation in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the value and intellectual quality of education as an academic area was also being vigorously questioned. Thus even in this field, an extreme shortage in doctorates will apparently exist by 2000.

The report *Changing America: The New Face of Science and Engineering* forecasts shortages of PhD's in sciences. Although PhD's awarded in sciences and engineering increased from 1975 through 1990, they are not increasing fast enough to meet future demands. To meet this anticipated shortage, the report strongly suggests that initiatives must be taken to increase the level of black and Hispanic participation in doctoral programs in science and engineering. The inclusion of these underrepresented populations in PhD training is extremely important because larger percentages of their populations are found in the age group eighteen to twenty-four years than for the majority population. The report's rationale for taking action to utilize fully all of the nation's human resources is pragmatically sound if the economy is to continue to grow and the nation is to prosper.[39] In the report, however, little is said about how to increase minority participation in PhD programs. In addressing the forecast shortage of PhDs, Bowen and Sosa also neglect to discuss the role that minorities might play in the social sciences and the humanities.

In this section efforts are made to forecast the number of minority doctorates in the various fields by the year 2000. The methodology is straightforward: based on the number of doctoral degrees received by members of each minority group between 1975 and 1990, the average annual change in the number of doctoral degrees awarded to each group by field is established. Next, the specific annual change in the number of doctorates awarded by group and by field is multiplied by the appropriate number of years, yielding a product that is added to the base year (1990), thus providing projections to the year 2000 or to any year desired. The number of doctorates is projected under the assumption that conditions in the future will be about the same as they are now. The question whether this method of projection is valid is easily answered by comparing the results with those generated in other studies using different and more sophisticated projection methodologies to determine whether they result in a good match.

A set of projections made by the U.S. Department of Education (USED)[40]—which forecasts, in addition to doctorates awarded, enrollment at the undergraduate, graduate, and professional levels; other degrees awarded (BA's, MA's, and professional degrees); and the number of full-time faculty employed—is ideal for this purpose. The projections generated in this chapter by using linear extrapolation of the average annual change are compared by category to those generated externally. The match in projections resulting from this comparison is quite good, and the linear extrapolation method is utilized as the basis for all forecasts made here. Although the projections of enrollment trends and full-time faculty employment are not the main objectives of this study, they are related to degree attainment and enrollment trends, providing the basis for more comprehensive comparisons to be made with the wider range of USED projections.

Since college enrollment, degrees awarded, and full-time faculty employed are dependent on and strongly related to the college-age group eighteen to twenty-four years, it is desirable to examine the relationship between this population and levels of college enrollment, degrees conferred, and full-time faculty. Information on the population aged eighteen to twenty-four years is available in U.S. census data[41] and is used as an independent base to compare the sets of projections made here with those generated externally. This

comparison is achieved by calculating the ratio between enrollment, degrees conferred, and full-time faculty employed, each with the U.S. college-age population (table 6). It is apparent from this comparison that the forecast of the numbers of PhD's generated in this study for the years 1995 and 2000 closely match those generated externally. It is also apparent that ratios of doctoral degrees projected for each of these years are not significantly different when internal and external projections are compared to the underlying college-age population. Comparisons between the projected total numbers of doctorates are close enough to validate the linear extrapolation method used.

The forecasts generated in this study are therefore assumed to be as good as those arrived at externally, which employed more sophisticated demographic models. On the basis of the outcomes of the comparisons of the projections for the total undergraduate, graduate, and professional enrollment, total bachelor's and doctoral degrees, and total full-time faculty employment (table 6), the same method is used to project the doctorates awarded to each minority group by field.

Doctorates by Field, 1990-2000

By the year 2000 the total annual number of doctorates being awarded is forecast to be 38,344, which is 2,317 more than were awarded in 1990. This represents a 6.4 percent increase in all doctorates conferred, a projected increase that is less than the 9.3 percent increase in actual total number of doctoral degrees awarded between 1975 and 1990. Positive doctorate projections for the year 2000 are found in five fields: physical sciences, engineering, life sciences, social sciences, and other professional areas, compared to the humanities and education, both of which are projected to decrease in number by the end of the century (table 7).

Even though the total number of doctorates is forecast to increase, the share of degrees conferred across the groups considered is unevenly distributed. The white share of all PhD's awarded is projected to decline from 60.1 percent in 1990 to 51.8 percent in 2000. The number of doctorates awarded to nonresidents is forecast to increase from 26.1 percent to 31.7 percent during the same time period. In contrast, the total minority share is forecast to show no significant gains but to remain rather stable, just under the 7 percent level for the entire period, as it did for the period 1975 to 1990. Among the minority groups, only Asians and Hispanics are projected to increase their percentage of PhD's, Asians increasing from 1.7 percent in 1990 to 2.2 percent by the end of the century, offsetting the black percentage decline. During the period, the black percentage is forecast to move downward, from 2.3 to 1.9 percent. Although the Native American percentage of degrees acquired during the entire period is forecast to remain below 1 percent, they will still decline over time (figs. 1 and 2).

Doctorates awarded in the physical sciences are projected to increase by 703 between 1990 and 2000 (fig. 3). In the physical sciences the share of PhD's for blacks is projected to decrease as the nonresident share increases from 36.8 percent to 43.6 percent and the white share drastically decreases. The number of total minority PhD's for blacks is projected to decrease as the nonresident share increases from 36.8 total minority PhD's in engineering is expected to

Table 6

Ratio between Enrollment, Degrees, Full-Time Faculty, and U.S. Population Ages 18–24 Years, 1976–2000 (In thousamds)

		Actual								Projected			
		1976		1980		1985		1990		1995		2000	
Population		N	Ratio	N	Ratio	N	Ratio	N	Ratio	N	Ratio	N	Ratio
18–24 Years		28,687		31,293		28,874		25,929		23,481		24,761	
Enrollment													
Total	A	10,985	1:3	12,087	1:3	12,247	1:2	13,710	1:2	14,621	1:2	15,692	1:2
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,618	1:2	15,527	1:2
Undergrad	A	9,562	1:3	10,475	1:3	10,579	1:3	11,863	1:2	12,449	1:2	13,436	1:2
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12,630	1:2	13,397	1:2
Graduate	A	1,083	1:24	1,343	1:23	1,376	1:21	1,547	1:17	1,842	1:13	1,908	1:13
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,702	1:14	1,856	1:13
Prof.	A	244	1:118	277	1:113	274	1:105	274	1:95	330	1:72	348	1:71
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	284	1:84	294	1:84
Degrees													
All	A	1,092	1:26	1,333	1:24	1,782	1:16	1,861	1:14	2,062	1:12	2,149	1:12
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,217	1:11	2,375	1:10
BA	A	919	1:31	929	1:34	979	1:29	1,015	1:26	1,100	1:22	1,129	1:22
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,047	1:23	1,079	1:23
PhD	A	33.8	1:849	32.6	1:960	32.9	1:878	35.7	1:726	40.2	1:593	41.2	1:601
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.3	1:657	37.0	1:669
FPD	A	62.1	1:462	70.1	1:446	74.4	1:388	70.7	1:367	87.8	1:272	92.2	1:269
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73.6	1:324	76.4	1:324
Full-time faculty													
	A	446.0	1:64	452.4	1:69	464.1	1:62	460.9	1:56	458.0	1.52	489.0	1:51
	B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	465.9	1:51	470.8	1:53

Source: A: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, *Projections of Education Statistics to 2002* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1991).

B: Projections generated for this study based on the average annual changes.

Table 7
Doctorates Awarded by Field, 1975–2000

Field		Actual				Projected	
		1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Phys. sciences	N	4,857	4,114	4,381	5,859	6,193	6,562
	%						
Engineering	N	3,002	2,479	3,165	4,892	5,522	6,152
	%						
Life sciences	N	5,026	5,461	5,748	6,613	7,142	7,671
	%						
Soc. sciences	N	6,066	5,856	5,769	6,076	6,145	6,217
	%						
Humanities	N	5,046	3,863	3,478	3,820	3,480	3,142
	%						
Education	N	7,359	7,576	6,717	6,484	6,245	6,006
	%						
Other	N	1,595	1,633	1,743	2,283	2,325	2,594
	%						
All	N	32,951	30,982	31,201	36,027	37,052	38,344
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Projections are calculated from data in National Research Council, *Doctorate Records Files*, 1975–1990.

be 1,260 greater in 2000 than in 1990. Whites are forecast to slightly gain in the acquisition of engineering PhD's by 4.6 percent. The nonresident share in engineering degrees is expected to increase at a steady rate, reaching a percentage of 56.2 by the year 2000, the largest share of PhD's expected to be awarded to any group in any field (fig. 4).


In the life sciences (fig. 5), as in engineering, the share of PhD's projected for whites is lowest in percentage in 2000 (table 8). The total minority share of life sciences degrees is expected to expand (fig. 5). Within this field Hispanics and Asians will gain in number of PhD's, while the black share will be slightly reduced, by one tenth of a percent. Overall the number of degrees in the life sciences is projected to increase by 1,058.

For the sciences and engineering cluster in general, the number of PhD's awarded to minorities is expected to increase. The percentage share for whites, on the other hand, will continue to drop as nonresidents increase their share at a rapid rate. The 8 percent rate of increase for whites is one-quarter less than the 32.3 percent increase for nonresidents.

The social sciences are projected to have only ten more PhD's produced in 2000 than were conferred in 1990 (fig. 6). Much more drastic losses are forecast for PhD's in the humanities, where 678 fewer PhD's are expected by the turn of the century. The 2.3 percent rate of increase in social science PhD's is not significant when the forecast 17.7 percent loss in the humanities by the year


2000 is considered (fig. 7). Within the social sciences the aggregate numbers of PhD's for minorities are expected to increase but by only 126 (table 8). In 1990, 441 PhD's in the social sciences were awarded to minorities, and the number for the group is expected to reach 567 by 2000. Nonresidents will also increased their share of social science degrees, in both absolute numbers (+222) and percentage (+20.3 percent). White PhD recipients in this field, on the other hand, are expected to suffer a drastic loss of 11.4 percent by the end of the century.

Figure 1
Percentage of All Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000



Number of Ph.D.'s
1975—32,951
1980—30,982
1985—31,201
1990—36,027
1995—37,052 (projected)
2000—38,344 (projected)

Figure 2
Percentage of All Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000




Number of Ph.D.'s
1975—32,951
1980—30,982
1985—31,201
1990—36,027
1995—37,052 (projected)
2000—38,344 (projected)

The internal distribution of humanities PhD's across minority groups will increase by 10.5 percent. Both the minority and nonresident shares in the humanities will mirror those expected for these groups in the social sciences. Once more whites will register the greatest losses in this field (table 8).

The change in doctoral degrees in education between 1990 and 2000 is negative, and the number of degrees produced is expected to decrease by 13.7 percent. There will be 478 fewer doctorates awarded in this field in 2000 than were granted in 1990. In aggregate the minority share in education is expected to decrease by 54, while blacks will lose ground, suffering the greatest loss

(30 percent). The Asian share will increase by 24.6 percent while the Hispanic's share will increase by 30.8 percent. Whites will have a smaller share of doctorates in education as they will have in most other fields (fig. 8).


Figure 3
Percentage of Physical Science Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000



Number of Ph.D.'s
1975—4,857
1980—4,114
1985—4,581
1990—5,859
1995—6,193 (projected)
2000—6,562 (projected)

Although the other professional degree category is expected to grow over time from 2,283 to 2,775, the shift in shares is expected to remain stable for all groups. For example, the aggregate minority share will increase from 5.4 to 5.7 percent. The respective nonresident and white share of PhD's in this field will change from 27.3 to 31.8 percent and 57.9 to 53.4 percent, respectively (fig. 9).


Figure 4
Percentage of Engineering Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000



Number of Ph.D.'s
1975—3,002
1980—2,479
1985—3,165
1990—4,892
1995—5,522 (projected)
2000—6,152 (projected)

An examination of doctorate production by field and race displayed in figures 1 to 8 clearly reveals the trends and direction of expected change in doctorate production between 1990 and 2000 described above. The numerical differences between the actual doctorate production in 1990 and that projected for the year 2000 are found in table 8. The data in this table provide the numerical changes and directions in doctorate attainment for each minority group by field. They also serve as a supplement to the information summarized in figures 1 to 9.

Figure 5
Percentage of Life Sciences Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–20000




Number of Ph.D.'s
1975—5,026
1980—5,461
1985—5,748
1990—6,613
1995—7,142 (projected)
2000—7,671 (projected)

Since numbers of doctoral degrees are derived, first, from the availability of potential college-age populations, second, from undergraduate enrollment, third, from the number of baccalaureate degrees awarded, and, fourth, from graduate enrollment, some comments on the trends for each of these categories are in order to clarify the future profile of doctorate production for each group. The U.S. college-age population is projected to decline slightly, by 4.5 percent, between 1990 and the year 2000. In numbers this means that overall there will be 1,165,000 fewer potential members of the college-age population at the turn of the century than there are today. The total minority

population in this age cohort is projected to increase by 552,000, a 7.9 percent increase. This means that the base college cohorts of minority groups are expanding while the total college-age population is shrinking. The largest numerical loss in the age group eighteen to twenty-four is found for whites: an expected decline of 1,719,000, which approaches a drop of almost 2 million in a ten-year period, representing a 9.1 percent decline.

Figure 6
Percentage of Social Sciences Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000




Number of Ph.D.'s
1975–6,066
1980–5,856
1985–5,769
1990–6,076
1995–6,145 (projected)
2000–6,217 (projected)

Although minorities will collectively increase in the college-age group, the numbers and percentages of those in the potential college-age group will

differ across groups. The increase in numbers of Hispanics will be 388,000; however, their rate of increase of 16.3 percent will be less than that of Asians (including Native Americans), which will increase by 22.3 percent. However, since the Asian base is smaller, only 185,000 more will be added by the year 2000. Blacks in this age group will decline by 22,000, a 0.6 decrease. The change in this population must be considered because it will have a direct effect on the enrollment and degree attainment of blacks in the future.

Figure 7
Percentage of Humanities Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000




Number of Ph.D.'s
1975–5,046
1980–3,863
1985–3,478
1990–3,820
1995–3,480 (projected)
2000–3,142 (projected)

Table 8
Change in Doctorates Awarded, by Field and Minority Groups, 1990–2000

US Citizens	Field							
Group	Phys. Sci.	Eng.	Life Sci.	Social Sci.	Human-Educatio ities	n	Prof./ Other	All
Black								
1990	23	28	63	172	70	420	52	828
2000	11	39	68	185	59	294	59	714
% Change	-52.2	+39.3	+7.9	+7.6	-15.7	-30.0	+13.5	-13.8
Hispanic								
1990	83	39	103	164	107	172	30	698
2000	120	55	146	236	136	225	443	961
% Change	+44.6	+41.0	+41.7	+43.9	+27.1	+30.8	+43.3	+37.7
Asian								
1990	108	152	149	82	34	61	31	617
2000	147	213	212	113	37	76	41	838
% Change	+36.1	+40.1	+42.3	+37.8	+8.8	+24.6	+32.3	+35.8
Native American								
1990	5	4	8	23	8	36	9	93
2000	6	6	12	33	10	49	14	131
% Change	+20.0	+50.0	+50.0	+43.5	+25.0	+36.1	+55.6	+40.7
Total Minority								
1990	219	223	323	441	219	689	122	2,236
2000	284	213	438	567	242	644	157	2,644
% Change	+29.7	+40.4	+35.6	+28.6	+10.5	-6.5	+28.7	+18.2
Race Unknown								
1990	73	35	56	46	35	41	18	304
2000	37	8	13	46	35	41	3	37
% Change	-49.3	-77.1	-76.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	-83.3	-87.7
White								
1990	3,108	1,669	4,120	3,999	2,736	4,745	1,363	21,650
2000	2,743	1,746	4,433	3,544	1,851	4,010	1,470	19,848
% Change	-7.5	+4.6	+7.6	-11.4	-32.3	-15.5	+7.9	-8.3
Total U.S. Citizens								
1990	3,310	1,927	4,499	4,486	2,990	5,475	1,503	24,190
2000	3,114	2,068	4,884	4,157	2,128	4,695	1,630	22,529
% Change	-5.9	+7.3	+8.6	-7.3	-28.8	-14.2	+8.4	-6.9
Nonresident								
1990	2,158	2,567	1,749	1,094	580	633	623	9,398
2000	2,864	3,456	2,248	1,316	669	745	877	12,163
% Change	+32.7	+34.6	+28.5	+20.3	+15.3	+17.7	+40.8	+29.4
Total U.S. & Citizen & Nonresident								
1990	5,859	4,892	6,613	6,076	3,820	6,484	2,283	36,027
2000	6,562	6,152	7,761	6,217	3,142	6,006	2,755	38,344
% Change	+12.0	+25.8	+16.0	+2.3	-17.7	-13.7	+20.7	+6.4

Source: Calculated from data in National Research Council, *Doctorate Record Files*, 1975–1990.
Note: Totals may not add up owing to the exclusion of the "Other and Unspecified" field and the "Other and Unknown" population group.

Figure 8
Percentage of Education Doctorates by Minority Group: 1975–2000




Number of Ph.D.'s
1975–7,359
1980–7,576
1985–6,717
1990–6,484
1995–6,245 (projected)
2000–6,006 (projected)

The trends and directions in undergraduate enrollment (fig. 10) clearly show that the minority percentage is increasing, as is the minority group's potential college-age population. Asians and Hispanics are increasing their share in college enrollment the most, followed closely by nonresidents and Native Americans. Blacks and whites are also experiencing increased undergraduate enrollment but at the lowest rates, 10.3 and 10.1 respectively. All these trends are based on enrollment, which is projected to increase by nearly 1.6 million between 1990 and 2000, an increase of 13.2 percent. Graduate enrollment is also projected to increase by 14.9 percent by 2000, which


translates into an additional 235,000 more students over the 1990 enrollment levels to be enrolled in graduate school by the end of the century (fig. 11). Here again, white enrollment is projected to increase slightly, in contrast to the group's projected decline in potential college-age population (table 9). The trends for each of the minority groups are positive and similar, though there are some variations between them. Although black undergraduate enrollment is increasing slightly, its population eighteen to twenty-four years is forecasted to remain at about the same level, to decline shortly after the year 2000.

Figure 9
Percentage of other Doctorates by Minority group: 1975–2000



Number of Ph.D.'s
1975–1,575
1980–1,656
1985–1,894
1990–2,283
1995–2,519 (projected)
2000–2,755 (projected)

Figure 10
Percentage of Total Undergraduate Enrollment by Minority Group: 1975–2000




Number of Undergraduates in thousands
1975–9,520
1980–10,560
1985–10,610
1990–11,863
1995–12,644 (projected)
2000–13,425 (projected)

The percentages (shares) for both graduate and undergraduate enrollment, although similar in trend, are driven down by the infusion of nonresidents. The latter represented 1.9 percent of undergraduate enrollment in 1990 and by the year 2000 are expected to account for 2.1 percent. On the graduate enrollment level, nonresidents accounted for 10.5 percent of the enrollment in 1990 and by 2000 are expected to increase their share to 12.5 percent.

Changes in enrollment levels have a direct effect on future doctorate outcomes. There is no doubt that the nonresidents will continue to increase their share of doctorates. Since their enrollment trend is on an upward

trajectory, the number of degrees received will also increase. In the near future whites will continue to lose their share, owing not so much to increases in minority enrollment as to the size of the increase in nonresidents. Minority graduate enrollment collectively is increasing numerically, but the percentage of increase is small.

Figure 11
Percentage of Total Graduate Enrollment by Minority Group: 1975–2000



Number of Graduates in thousands
1975–1,222
1980–1,250
1985–1,344
1990–1,574
1995–1,691 (projected)
2000–1,809 (projected)

Table 9
Change in Enrollment by Minority Group, 1976–2000 (in 1000's)

1976–1990			1990–2000		
Group	Undergraduate	Graduate	Group	Undergraduate	Graduate
Black			**Black**		
1976	950	72	1990	1,124	84
1990	1,124	84	2000	1,240	92
% Change	+18.3	+16.7	% Change	+10.3	+9.5
Hispanic			**Hispanic**		
1976	357	22	1990	702	46
1990	702	46	2000	932	64
% Change	+96.6	+109.1	% Change	+32.8	+34.8
Asian			**Asian**		
1976	173	21	1990	485	52
1990	485	52	2000	693	73
% Change	+180.3	+147.6	% Change	+42.9	+40.4
Native American			**Native American**		
1976	70	4	1990	95	6
1990	95	6	2000	112	7
% Change	+35.7	+50.0	% Change	+17.9	+1.7
Total minority			**Total minority**		
1976	1,550	119	1990	2,406	188
1990	2,406	188	2000	2,977	234
% Change	+55.2	+57.9	% Change	+23.7	+24.5
White			**White**		
1976	7,827	1,030	1990	9,231	1,221
1990	9,231	1,221	2000	10,167	1,348
% Change	+17.9	+18.5	% Change	+10.1	+10.4
Nonresident			**Nonresident**		
1976	142	73	1990	226	165
1990	226	165	2000	286	226
% Change	+59.2	+126.0	% Change	+27.8	+36.9
Total U.S. Citizens & Nonresident			**Total U.S. Citizens & Nonresident**		
1976	9,520	1,222	1990	11,863	1,574
1990	11,863	1,574	2000	13,425	1,809
% Change	+24.6	+28.8	% Change	+13.2	+14.9

Source: National Center for Education Statistics.

It is clear from these enrollment patterns that the Asian and Hispanic shares of minority enrollment are numerically increasing on all levels. Blacks, however, continue to show a slight increase, which causes some concern and

perhaps discouragement, considering that the demand far exceeds the slight decline forecast in the college-age population. It is important to note, however, that in 1990 black enrollment in graduate school was slightly higher than it had been in the recent past. In 1990 it increased as a percentage of the total after remaining at the same percentage levels in 1984 and 1986, which had increased from a lower percentage, recorded in 1982. This upward enrollment has been confirmed by the most recent enrollment reports showing that the prospects for black doctoral acquisition are improved, limited only by their proportion in the college-age group and their enrollment in graduate school which after decline in 1980s is now increasing.

Minorities and Doctorate Shortfall, 2000

The 38,344 doctorates expected to be awarded in the year 2000 are far fewer than necessary to meet the projected demand. Shortages in sciences and engineering are anticipated to be at least 8,000 by the turn of the century. In the social sciences and humanities the number of PhD's expected will also be insufficient to meet the demand, which is roughly estimated to be 4,476 and 6,222 degrees, respectively.[42]

Together the estimated shortfalls in doctorate production in the year 2000 total 19,018, which suggests that at least 57,362 degrees must be awarded at the turn of the century to meet the demand. In other words, the 38,344 doctorates projected for year 2000 must be increased by 49.6 percent to meet the expected needs. Projected shortfalls in PhD degrees (table 10) are distributed among the physical sciences, engineering, life sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Although shortages in education doctorates are anticipated, the magnitude of the shortage is not presently known. To meet the demand for PhD's will require 437 doctorates to be awarded to blacks in addition to the 714 projected. This would require an increase of 63.4 percent in PhD's for this group by the year 2000.

Among Hispanics, PhD's must increase by 532 to meet their share of the demand, while Asians need to earn 456 more PhD's. and Native Americans must increase their number of doctorates over what is projected in the year 2000 by 56 percent. It is difficult to see how this demand will be satisfied considering that in 1984 the median time period for all fields from the baccalaureate to the doctorate was ten years. In 1984 median completion years ranged from a high of 14.63 years in education to a low of 7.2 years in the physical sciences.[43] Without significant increases in current graduate enrollment it is difficult to see how the projected demand for doctorates in 2000 can be met. So far the needed levels of increased graduate school enrollment to meet future demand have yet to materialize.

The gap between supply and demand in doctorates in the year 2000 will surely not be filled by U.S. whites, whose number of doctorates are projected to decline. Perhaps much of the demand will be met by nonresidents, who are rapidly increasing their share of doctorates, expected to reach 31.7 percent by the year 2000. Further, it is assumed that roughly 50 percent of those who enroll in doctorate programs eventually receive degrees. In light of the 19,018 shortage in PhD's expected in 2000, the enrollment in doctoral programs must be increased in the range of 40,000 by no later than fall 1993. At the time of

Table 10
Projected Doctorate Shortfall by Field and Minority Group 2000

Doctorate Demand
US Citizens

Field	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Native American	Total Minority	White	Total US Citizen	Nonresident	Total U.S. Citizen & Nonresdient
Phys. Sciences*	7	67	80	3	157	1,528	1,685	1,551	3,399
Engineering*	24	29	116	3	172	954	1,126	1,874	3,199
Life Sciences+	41	81	115	5	242	2,417	2,659	1,221	3,975
Soc. Sciences+	113	131	62	14	320	1,940	2,260	713	3,220
Humanities	36	76	20	4	136	1,008	1,144	330	1,472
Education[e]	180	124	41	21	366	2,190	2,556	409	3,122
Prof/Other[e]	36	24	22	6	88	802	890	475	1,431
All	437	532	456	56	1,487	10,839	12,320	6,584	19,018

Doctrate Demand Plus Doctorate Projections, 2000
US Citizens

Field	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Native American	Total Minority	White	Total US Citizen	Nonresident	Total U.S. Citizen & Nonresdient
Phys. Sciences	18	187	227	9	441	4,321	4,797	4,415	9,814
Engineering	63	84	329	9	385	2,700	3,164	5,330	9,214
Life Sciences	109	227	327	17	680	6,850	7,543	3,469	11,475
Soc. Sciences	298	367	75	47	887	5,484	6,417	1,177	9,298
Humanities	95	212	57	14	378	2,859	3,272	1,032	1,749
Education	474	349	117	70	1,010	6,200	7,251	1,154	8,992
Prof/Other	95	67	63	20	345	2,272	2,520	1,352	4,181
All	1,151	1,493	1,294	188	4,126	30,688	34,849	17,929	57,362

Sources: * Calculated from NRC date

+ Calculated from data in tables 6.2 and D.6 in William G. Bowen and Julie Ann Sosa, *Prospects for Faculty in the Arts and Sciences: A Study of Factors Affecting Demand and Supply, 1987 to 2012* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

e Estimates made by author

Note: Totals may not add up owing to the exclusion of "Other and Unknown" population group and rounding.

this writing, this additional graduate enrollment at this magnitiude has yet to appear, although some increases are observed.

Academic Employment Opportunities

According to Bowen and Sosa and the National Science Board, there will be an increasing demand for full-time faculty in the nation's colleges and universities by the year 2000.[44] It is difficult to see how this shortage can be met unless there are immediate signs of significant increase in graduate school enrollment so that the PhD's will be available when needed. It is more difficult to see how minorities, particularly blacks, are going to increase their numbers and position themselves for the career opportunities opening up in college and university teaching and research, considering that this group has long been underrepresented in the faculty ranks and the numbers of doctorates earned have been dropping for more than a decade. It is almost impossible for this group to earn the number of doctorates necessary to meet the demand considering present enrollment trends.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) records on full-time faculty employed between 1975 and 1990 show gains in full-time faculty employment for all groups (table 11). At the end of this fifteen-year period 3,651 more blacks were employed as professors than in 1975, when they held 19,574 full-time faculty positions. The positive trends in these data and the projected decline in the number of blacks awarded doctorates strongly suggest that the number of blacks available for teaching and research careers is likely to diminish in the coming decade and eventually increase shortly thereafter in light of the recent increases in both graduate and undergraduate enrollment, although the rate of this increase is lower than those for the other minority groups and is paralleled only by whites (fig. 12).

Among all the minority groups Asians have made the major gains in full-time faculty employment, increasing their numbers by 150.4 percent between 1975 and 1990, when they held only 9,687 full-time faculty appointments. It is expected that their share of academic employment will increase in the future. Similarly, Hispanics will increase their share of the full-time faculty employment in the future, but at a slower pace.

The total number of faculty jobs increased during the period 1975-1990 by 15.4 percent. White participation has also increased during the period by 11.3 percent, by far the lowest rate. Whites held 91.9 percent of all the full-time faculty jobs in 1990; fifteen years earlier they had held 94.9 percent of the jobs. The hold of whites on faculty positions remained firm during this fifteen-year period, which is remarkable considering the fact that the numbers of whites receiving doctorates have been declining. Perhaps their dominance in faculty position is due to their early entry into these positions and also to the job security offered by tenure. Confirmation of this assumption can be found in the fact that whites are now more heavily concentrated in the top professorial ranks than they were fifteen years ago. In contrast, the minority concentration is at the assistant professor and instructor levels in the same time period. Within the total minority group this employment pattern holds for blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans, but not for Asians, whose pattern reflects that of whites who occupy positions at the top of the faculty hierarchy.

Table 11
Changes in Full-Time Faculty by Rank and Minority Group, 1975–1990


	Rank					
Group	Professor	Associate	Assistant	Instructor/ Lecturer	Other	All
Black						
1975	2,134	2,936	5,695	7,028	1,781	19,574
1990	3,348	4,669	7,168	7,718	322	23,225
% Change	+56.9	+59.0	+25.9	+35.5	-81.9	+18.7
Hispanic						
1975	759	1,167	1,782	2,052	515	6,275
1990	1,887	1,946	2,675	3,435	144	10,087
% Change	+148.6	+66.8	+50.1	+67.4	-72.0	+60.7
Asian						
1975	1,937	2,315	2,888	1,491	1,056	9,687
1990	6,051	4,970	7,476	5,161	594	24,252
% Change	+212.4	+114.7	+158.9	+246.1	-43.8	+150.4
Native American						
1975	151	211	292	311	147	1,086
1990	285	264	306	609	34	1,498
% Change	+88.7	+25.1	+4.8	+95.8	-76.9	+37.9
Total minority						
1975	4,981	6,629	10,657	10,875	3,479	36,622
1990	11,571	11,849	17,625	16,923	1,094	59,062
% Change	+132.3	+78.7	+65.4	+55.6	-68.6	+61.3
White						
1975	92,937	92,937	110,540	81,423	31,525	409,412
1990	130,805	102,570	102,908	109,828	9,489	455,600
% Change	+40.7	+10.4	-6.9	+34.9	-69.9	+11.3
Total						
1975	97,918	99,566	121,197	92,349	35,000	446,034
1990	142,376	114,419	120,533	126,751	10,583	514,662
% Change	+45.5	+14.9	-.5	+37.3	-69.8	+15.4

Source: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, *Job Patterns for Minorities and Women in Private Industry*—EEO–6 summary, (Washington, DC, 1975 and 1990).

Not only will there be a high demand for new faculty by the year 2000 as full-time faculty approach retirement, but Hodgkinson in 1985 forecast that by the year 2009 the entire college and university faculty will be replaced.[45] New faculty must be found for these vacated positions. Individually a black with a doctorate may benefit from the favorable market conditions created by the reduced number of blacks receiving doctorates and the increased

demand for new minority faculty, provided the goal to increase minority participation in academia continues.[46] If no changes in these circumstances occur, the favorable market conditions for new black faculty will continue through the year 2000. On the other hand, if the magnitude of degree attainment by blacks is a sign of group progress and an indicator of increased participation in mainstream social, political, economic, and educational activities, then the future for blacks is not as bright.

Figure 12
Percentage ofFull time Faculty by Minority Group: 1975–2000



Number of Fulltime Faculty
1975—446,043
1981—452,015
1985—464,072
1990—514,662
1995—537,538 (projected)
2000—560,414 (projected)

Other minority groups will also benefit from the same favorable market conditions, as will whites wishing to pursue careers in academia. However, since the respective Asian and Hispanic portions of doctorates are increasing more than other minority groups, the future prospects for mainstreaming are much brighter for them than for blacks and Native Americans, whose numbers of doctorates earned are expected to decline as the demand for PhD's increases.

The trend in white doctorate production is downward over time, and the level of white participation will also decrease but not as drastically as initially assumed, and the effects of their losses in doctorate production are less when the large size of their base number is taken into account.

Black PhD's in the Academic Marketplace

An extensive body of literature on the academic marketplace has developed over the past thirty years.[47] Academic market theories, issues of supply and demand, and forecasts on expected faculty shortages and career paths are thoroughly covered in this literature, and nearly all discuss the long-range implications that shortages in the supply of PhD's may have on the academic community and the national well-being. Many of the authors offer recommendations and proposed courses of action to be taken to address these issues. Minority doctorate issues related to the academic marketplace, mainly focused on blacks, are treated in half of these studies;[48] however, only one author makes black issues his major focus. Freeman, in *Black Elite* and in his chapter "The Implications of the Changing Labor Market for Members of Minority Groups" in Gordon (both of which are derived from the same sample survey data), discusses black academic labor-market activities in detail. The most comprehensive coverage of blacks with doctorates in the labor market is found in articles by Rafky and Mommsen.[49] Each of these studies relies on sample survey data collected in the early 1970s.

Rafky examined the status of black scholars at a group of predominantly white institutions located outside the South to determine whether they were targets of discrimination in the academic setting and to identify barriers to their employment that may exist.[50] The survey, which was stratified by race, provided not only insights on discrimination and barriers to access but also data from which a faculty profile could be generated and black-white faculty comparisons could be made. According to the study, although there was no real difference in the quality of institutions from which black and white faculty received their doctorates, over half the black faculty were concentrated in the social sciences and education as well as being involved in programs for the disadvantaged. When stratified by age, those black faculty under thirty years were shown to be concentrated in the social sciences and the humanities compared to a concentration in education of those over thirty years old. This distinction in selection of academic fields is an example of the members of the older group electing training in academic areas that permitted them to "teach, preach or serve blacks." They chose those areas where jobs were available and avoided those that were closed to them. Younger blacks selected different areas that were perceived to be opening and providing

opportunities for more action-oriented careers that might possibly affect the national social agenda.

In Rafky's research nearly 90 percent of the blacks and whites interviewed believed that exclusion based on race was practiced in these institutions. The degree to which exclusion was perceived was strongest among those black faculty members thirty years old or older who had received tenure and survived and weakest among those under thirty who were trained and hired when national enthusiasm for integration was at its peak. The perception of exclusion among the older blacks who had survived and experienced some success contradicts the notion that blacks who have "made it" in a white environment deny the existence of or underestimate the impact of racial discrimination. Black faculty responded that they were aware of other qualified blacks who had chosen other career paths because of (1) the existence of discrimination, 33 percent; (2) low salaries, 31 percent; (3) better opportunities in other career fields, 11 percent; (4) a negative image of the academy, 9 percent; (5) belief that they did not meet white standards, 9 percent; and (6) belief that schools were not action-oriented, 5 percent. Rafky reports comments of college presidents and administrators indicating their participation in the deliberate exclusion of black faculty.[51] The study identified several non deliberate exclusionary barriers or practices on white campuses that discouraged blacks from joining predominantly white faculties. For example, black doctoral candidates were unaware of job opportunities when they became available. They were not included in the referral process because some administrators viewed recruitment as a racial/ethnic detached process and because there were irrational forces at work in the academic marketplace. The barrier of irrationality can be removed for blacks if mechanisms are in place to bring buyers and sellers together, make the quality and quantity of the product known to all participants, and make the price and conditions known to the parties. Usually such information is unavailable to blacks; therefore, they are at a distinct disadvantage when competing in the academic marketplace.

An examination of the supply, demand, and price for black PhD's in the academic labor market is given central attention in Mommsen's study of black PhD's which was also based on data gathered through a sample survey. Mommsen's study, like Rafky's, found the black doctorate pool concentrated in education and underrepresented in the sciences. The profile of black PhD's created by Mommsen is less detailed but is comparable to Rafky's. Mommsen's study surveyed the entire population of black PhD's, including those from traditional black institutions in the South, whereas Rafky surveyed only black PhD's at predominantly white institutions excluding the South. Thus the career patterns of black PhD's in the two studies differ. Mommsen found that almost all black PhD's had pursued academic careers at black institutions, though nearly all had received their degrees at predominantly white institutions. In light of black history this finding comes as no surprise and is even predictable since most of the black PhD's surveyed had received their degrees before academic employment opportunities at white institutions were open to them. It also suggests that for the most part the doctoral training for the blacks included in this survey had taken place under the dual-labor-market concept. Blacks were being prepared for academic careers almost exclusively at black institutions, while other can-

didates were being prepared for academic careers in the larger market. The demand for black PhD's by area was greatest in the social sciences, and the salary offers for the few blacks recruited by white institutions were slightly higher than the median for beginning white faculty. According to Mommsen, the increasing demand for black PhD's was driven up by student activists who were calling for better black faculty representation on white campuses. Knowledge that the existing supply of black PhD's is small and the demand is increasing will drive up the initial salary of black PhD's, particularly on white campuses, and at the same time create a brain drain at the traditionally black colleges.

These studies characterize black participation in the academic marketplace as constrained. Although blacks have entered the larger academic labor market in noticeable numbers, their entry has not been without difficulties. Once they have found employment in academia, blacks' participation in programs has been marginal and focused primarily in the social sciences and education, and to a great extent they have found that their primary task has been to deal with minority students and the disadvantaged, taking on many institutional responsibilities relative to these groups in an informal rather than in an organizationally structured way.

It is the perception of the respondents to both of these surveys that race is a consideration in the academic marketplace, particularly for blacks. According to Freeman, "Despite the popular connection of discrimination with poverty, labor market differentials by race traditionally have been greatest at the top of the economic ladder,"[52] and in this instance the top of the ladder is at the predominantly white institutions. The fact that almost 80 percent of black PhD's return to black colleges and universities[53] is well-known at the doctorate-granting institutions and could lead to a training program that segments and directs toward a dual labor market comprised of prestigious institutions on one end and black institutions on the other. Both the reality and the perception of the black faculty surveyed in these studies strongly suggest that the academic marketplace has yet to be fully open to them.

Conclusions, Prospects, and Recommendations

It would be irresponsible to conclude that minorities have not made some progress in attaining doctoral degrees and academic employment. The record is clear that progress has indeed been made in doctoral degree attainment. However, when group-specific data are examined, it is also clear that some minority groups are doing better than others in enrollment, degree attainment, and academic employment over time. Asians have made the most progress. They show significant gains in enrollment, in degrees earned, and in academic employment. Success in these areas is shared by Hispanics, but their upward trajectory in enrollment, degrees conferred, and academic-job acquisition is not as high. For Native Americans the projected future in enrollment, degrees received, and academic positions occupied is positive but is not as bright as it is for Asians. In each of these categories Native American gains are recorded but the numbers are so small.

Taken together, the record of minority doctorates awarded is positive, and the minority share of doctorates earned remains stable, hovering just under

7 percent through the entire time period being considered. Minority doctorate acquisition, however, is not increasing at the same rate at which their graduate enrollment is increasing. The rate of increase in degree acquisition between 1975 and 1990 is only 9.3 percent compared with enrollment increases of 24.6 and 28.8 percent for the period.

Enrollment of blacks in graduate school for the same period increased by 18.3 percent, and the percentage of doctoral degrees awarded declined by 17.1 percent, while job acquisition for blacks increased by 18.7 percent. Among the minority groups being considered, the declining black doctorate production is discouraging and make the group's future prosperity much less promising because its base is declining.

Although figures are not available to determine the extent that nonresidents are affecting employment, they nonetheless are having an impact. During the hiring process, however, their identity as a group is lost when they obtain permanent visas. On the graduate enrollment level, however, nonresidents registered an increase of 126.0 percent, the highest recorded for any group, and in doctoral degrees conferred their numbers increased by a rate of 79 percent.

In the aggregate, minorities held their own in each of these categories, with blacks losing in PhD acquisition and Asians and Hispanics making gains. Whites over time are also losing ground, especially in doctoral degree attainment, while nonresidents are showing dramatic growth. Since these trends can easily be extrapolated for the future, the prospects for each group in terms of doctorate production are already in place. There is particularly little chance that the doctorate shortfall expected in the year 2000 can be satisfied by blacks, given the patterns of enrollment and degree attainment identified up to 1990.

To approach a level of doctorate output that will meet demands in the year 2000, extensive increases must occur at all levels of enrollment, and particularly at the graduate school level. For example, if minority participation in higher education is to increase, immediate intervention is needed on all levels, nationally, institutionally, and individually. Not only will there need to be a change in national purpose, but there must be adequate finances and a firm commitment by the larger society and by minority groups, as well as individual dedication, for this goal to be realized. The nation has made some progress in the area of mainstreaming underrepresented minorities, but much more remains to be done.

Accord to Bjork and Thompson, "It is abundantly clear that unless serious corrective action to increase minority faculty (PhD's) is jointly undertaken by the education system, state, and federal government, by the year 2009 the faculty in the nation's colleges and universities will be composed predominantly of white males."[54] Considering the consistency in the recommendations found in the many studies of minority participation in higher education that have appeared since 1970, it would be redundant to repeat them here. Nevertheless, on the basis of the information reviewed in this study it is important to make a few specific recommendations.

It is clear that when black doctorate attainment was at its highest, in the mid- to late 1970s, it immediately followed a period when it was the national will to provide underrepresented minorities with increased access to higher education. As a consequence of this thrust, minority enrollment increased in

higher education, followed by subsequent increases in degree attainment. On the basis of this history it is recommended that

1. *increased minority participation in doctoral programs become a national priority.* Support for this recommendation is found in *Changing America: The New Face of Science and Engineering,* which calls for an increase in the level of black and Hispanic participation in doctoral programs in science and engineering.[55] Precedent and rationale for this recommendation are also found as early as 1970 in *A Chance to Learn: An Action Agenda for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education,* where it was stated that

> the transcendent goal is that inequality in one generation should not, inevitably, be a legacy of succeeding generations. Each young person should have a full chance to demonstrate his intellectual ability and respond to his motivations to excel in constructive endeavor. From a national point of view, we cannot afford the domestic drain of able young persons who, through no fault of their own, are handicapped in making valuable contributions to the life of society.[56]

Minority Group Participation in Graduate Education stated that

> increased minority participation in graduate education is an important national goal to be realized for the social, economic, intellectual, and cultural well-being of all persons. It is for the collective benefit of society that the representation of minority group persons among those earning advanced degrees be increased.
>
> Individual equity is a fundamental concern. Distinctions that confer opportunity and status according to race, religion, sex, or national origin must be removed so minority persons may be afforded a full opportunity to pursue graduate study according to individual motivation and intellectual potential.[57]

The consistent availability of adequate financial support is paramount for minority success in doctoral studies. Lack of financial support is a major barrier to minority access to higher education. Historically, black median family income has lagged well behind that of whites, never exceeding 60 percent of the white family median, and there are no signs that the gap is narrowing—on the contrary, the gap has widened during the past decade. Therefore, it is almost impossible for blacks pursuing doctoral studies to depend on family income to make up the financial shortfall in the cost of education resulting from concurrent increases in tuition and decreases in the amount of federal graduate student aid. Considering the current federal deficit, the prospects for increases in federal support for graduate education are not promising. To eliminate financing as a barrier to minority access to doctoral programs, it is therefore recommended that

2. *a national education trust fund for underrepresented minorities be established to ensure that an adequate, stable source of finance is available for their doctoral education.*

Finally, following up a suggestion, first made in 1976, it is recommended that[58]

3. *precautions be taken not to confuse or mix the educational opportunities offered to foreign noncitizens with the educational opportunities offered to underrepresented minority citizens.*

When these fundamental recommendations are widely accepted and implemented, the issue of minority underrepresentation in higher education as well as in other areas will cease to plague the nation.

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Ethics, Corruption, and South Carolina Legislators

Cole Blease Graham, Jr.
William V. Moore

University of South Carolina
College of Charleston

Changing Political Environment

In a past era, South Carolina's leaders often extolled the virtues of a "corruption-free" legislature. Rarely was a state legislator indicted or convicted. Despite allegations by critics of extensive "wrongdoing" in the legislature, most citizens ignored the critics and acknowledged that the body simply protected its members from the outside world. Standards of legislative ethics were defined internally. If a member violated these standards, punishment was administered by legislative leaders, not courts.

The South Carolina General Assembly, perhaps not unlike many other state legislatures, was run by a few dominant persons who, either individually or in a small group, made the important decisions. Most other state legislators followed suit and often gladly supported the leadership in the hope that a few benefits might fall their way. Most knew better than to oppose the entrenched leadership at the state level; even complaining too much about having to support the leadership could pass for political corruption and bring down wrath from above.

The closed elite of South Carolina legislators reflects the political upheavals in the late nineteenth century that overturned the state's antebellum conservatives (Cooper, 1968). Established figures were replaced by Governor Ben Tillman's Farmers' Revolt (Wallace, 1961). Embodied in the 1895 state constitution, the prevailing "separate, but equal" policy united white political leadership along racial lines. Racial divisions and the preservation of segregation were continued well into the twentieth century by political leaders such as Governor Coleman L. Blease (D-Newberry, 1911–1914) or Senators Edgar

A. Brown (D-Barnwell, 1929–1972) and L. Marion Gressette (D-Calhoun, 1936–1984).

Tillmanism emphasized county-based, localized politics. By controlling registration of voters and creating new counties to reflect emerging rural, white power bases, black citizens were first blunted, then largely excluded from political participation and/or electoral representation.

South Carolina political power devolved to a rural, white, male aristocracy entrenched in the legislature. A legislator who was not directly an aristocrat had to be connected to the elite as a colleague and supporter in order to survive. The white masses voted on cues from the aristocracy and a legislator had to be able to demonstrate to them that the elite knew best.

Government under such a system was a ready-made logroll (Eisenberg, 1961: 155–63). Legislators came to Columbia to make the laws they thought necessary. They also ran local governments. They "delivered" to their county constituency through their state and local actions. Public opposition by one legislator to another legislator's proposal just did not occur. It could only stir up negative reactions from fellow lawmakers when that legislator had to deliver. Every legislator knew the game or lost out if he lapsed even momentarily.

But, political conditions have changed in South Carolina. Alan Ehrenhalt summarizes the new developments this way:

> A generation ago in Greenville, South Carolina, it was easy to see where political power resided. It resided with the state senator, who controlled the county budget and directed the appointment of most local officials, and with the textile companies, to whom he normally was connected. That was real leadership—sometimes one-man leadership. However, it disappeared with the reapportionment at the end of the 1960s. Today Greenville has a democratic government at both the city and the county level. To watch it operate is to watch the interplay of forces that were pretty much irrelevant thirty years ago. (1991: 39)

New systems of election based on reapportioned, single-member districts have brought new types of individuals as legislators and greater diversity of views to both houses of the general assembly. Between 1971 and 1990, women increased from two to thirteen of 124 house members and from none to 2 of 46 senators. There were only 3 black house members in 1971 and no black senators. By 1990, the numbers had grown to 17 and 5 respectively. Four times as many house Republicans (11 to 42) and 12 new Republican senators appeared during the same period. There were no Republican senators in 1971.

Power in the legislature has moved away from the exclusive dominance of rural barons. Legislators now have new and varied constituencies. New leaders originate from freshly drawn legislative districts in urban and suburban districts as well as from the rural areas. It must have come as a shock to voters when so many legislators were indicted.

Crime and Corruption: The Sting—Operation Lost Trust

By the time the United States district attorney announced the completion of indictments in summer, 1991, twenty-eight South Carolina public officials had been charged with violations of the federal Hobbs Act[1] and other federal

laws. Fifteen of 124 House members (13 percent of members) and two of fourty-six senators (4 percent) were indicted. Fourteen House members and both senators were found guilty by a jury or pled guilty. Others indicted or convicted were six lobbyists, a former legislator who had been elected a state circuit judge, one former governor's aide, the head of the state development board, one university administrator, and one private businessperson.

The indictments were based on a FBI sting. Legislators were approached by a "lobbyist" who offered them money for their vote on a specific bill. The "lobbyist" was actually a former state legislator who participated in the sting after he was arrested for violating federal drug laws. Individual legislators were videotaped by federal agents, most frequently in a Columbia motel room, accepting money in exchange for their promise to support a pari-mutuel betting bill then under active legislative attention. As shown on local news broadcasts, the "lobbyist" frequently stated, when the money was in the legislator's hand and going into a pocket, "It's a business doing pleasure with you."

Many citizens were as stunned as the legislators and their family members to see them accepting the cash. Most of the legislators were charged with accepting bribes in violation of the Hobbs Act. One was charged with racketeering and another with cocaine possession. The nonlegislators were indicted on a variety of drug-related or extortion charges. Political corruption and the apparent lack of legislative ethics had found South Carolina.

Legislative Ethics and Political Corruption

Varying general topics in ethics and corruption suggest sharp contrasts between acceptable individual or group behaviors as well as practical dilemmas that are not so clearly resolved. For example, to steal food for one's family when it is not possible to earn money to pay for it may reflect the higher good of preserving the human species just as easily as it may reflect a corrupt solution that breaks the law. Also immediately evident is a range of possible intermediate alternatives, such as negotiating for food today with the promise of future work or being fed by a charity.

Individual legislators typically are faced with sharply contrasting "right or wrong" choices but at the same time have much flexibility in deciding what to do and how they carry out their responsibilities. Traditionally, extensive discretion and minimal restraints have seemed appropriate, so that a lawmaker may have the personal freedom to pursue public problems without fear or impediments. But, individual legislator judgment and flexibility may be a tool for ethical choice or corrupt practice.

The differences between ethics and corruption invite the exploration of a range of conditions that may relate a legislator's perception of acceptable/unacceptable practices to broader principles.

Legislative Ethics

As illustrated in figure 1, Dennis F. Thompson (1987, esp. 96–122) derives three progressive levels of legislative ethics. These levels move from the specific to the general and include these stages:

1. *Minimalist.* "Minimal" definitions of acceptable legislative behavior lie either in the rules of the body or in statutes that regulate members or candidates and those who deal regularly with legislators. These rules or statutes reduce opportunities for personal benefit from financial conflicts of interest.

The "minimalist" definition is the most familiar and the dominant form of legislative ethics. It is attractive since it includes objective standards for behavior, does not specify an ideology or specific theory for legislative action, and includes a small range of behaviors. Minimalist legislative ethics do not ordinarily interfere with the wide-ranging negotiations and the free flow of communications in a pluralist democracy.

2. *Functionalist.* This level involves more speculation about how a legislator should behave or operate, especially whether a legislator should be a delegate or a trustee. In the simplest terms, a delegate does what the constituency wants while a trustee exercises judgment about the right thing for her/his representation district.

A functionalist standard for ethical behavior gives a legislator great flexibility, but it may also be confusing. There may not be consistent opinions to guide a legislator as trustee when issues are reduced to narrow problems or when compromises are necessary. Rigid adherence to opinion may enlist a trustee in negative causes, especially if the "opinion" is misguided or destructive. Even to function as a simple delegate is not always easy. There are the constituents who live in the district and who vote, but with changes in political and economic action, there are also constituents who contribute to campaigns or who invest in industry in the representation district. These influential constituents may live far beyond state boundaries.

3. *Rationalist.* This is perhaps the most theoretical position since it applies substantive principles such as justice or the common good to legislative ethics. Knowing which theory to apply to a problem and to what degree to apply it are vexing considerations for a legislator who would act "rationally."

The gap between ethics based on attractive, but elusive principles and political realities of the real-world legislator may be too large for dependable rational standards of ethics to emerge.

Other scholars advocate the comparison of the actual behavior of legislators with the specifics set forth in selected ethical codes or ethical models (Vogelsang-Coombs & Bakken, 1988). Even if a single comprehensive code or model could be agreed on by legislators, fundamental ethical tensions and problems remain. For example, ethics requires a general, timeless perspective, but the horizon of a legislator is not so universal. A legislator has to look after the interests that lie behind the last successful race for the office as a prelude for the next election. A legislator often deals with supporters and detractors on a face-to-face basis, at the shopping mall, at the public hearing, after the community meeting. Such a particularistic level of legislator activity

frequently requires flexibility, negotiations, and compromise through collegial give-and-take. It is difficult to get to a "moral high ground" for consideration of the general "right thing to do" regardless of the situation. One may even develop a rationale of "situational" ethics to justify actions that may not be so admirable if evaluated by broad moral or ethical standards.

Figure 1
A Legislative Ethics-Corruption Continuum

	Ethics	Corruption
VALUES AT EXTREME OF CONTINUUM:	SPECIFIC	INDIVIDUAL
THOMPSON'S (1987) LEVELS OF LEGISLATIVE ETHICS		JOHANSENS'S (1990) DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
MINIMALIST: Reduces personal benefit from conflicts of interest		PUBLIC OFFICE: Violates defined and specific rules for conduct in office
FUNCTIONALIST: Whether a legislator should be trustee or delegate		MARKET-CENTERED: Norms for official behavior are not clear, nor well defined, and officeholder and outsiders treat corrupt service as normal goods to be bought and sold according to supply/demand
RATIONALIST: Applies substantive principles such as justice or common good to the legislature		PUBLIC INTEREST: Holds public needs in lower esteem than private of special interests
		PUBLIC OPINION: Office holder does not conform to prevailling popular view of acceptable behavior
EXTREME VALUES:	GENERAL	COLLECTIVE

Political Corruption

Political corruption has been an interest of generations of political scientists. Meier and Holbrook (1992) comprehensively examine the empirical basis of political corruption in the American states. They find that political corruption increases where there is low voter turnout or reduced party competition. Corruption is sustained if there is a tolerant historical/cultural tradition, but corruption convictions increase when urbanization and education levels of the population increase. Meier and Holbrook also find that the size of a state's bureaucracy leads to increased corruption and that structural reforms in state government, such as increased centralization or the filing of campaign reports generally do not deter corruption.

Examples of previous studies of political corruption are varied and numerous. Some studies stress theoretical frameworks (Nye, 1967; Peters & Welch, 1978; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Lowi, 1981; Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Levine, 1990) while others emphasize empirical tests (Johnston, 1983; Nice, 1983; Meyers, 1985). Virtually every study contributes a definition of political

corruption. Following Heidenheimer's earlier work (1970), Johansen (1990: 36–37) provides a convenient summary of these definitions (see fig. 1).

1. *Public Office.* A corrupt public official exploits a public office for private gain. In doing so, the official violates the rule of law or explicit statutes or rules by which the terms of public trust invested in the office are defined.

2. *Market-Centered.* If public officials treat services as market goods that may be bought or sold according to supply/demand mechanisms, they may engage in maximization of rational utility for the buyer and the seller. However, the conversion of public services into private goods blunts the broader intentions of democracy by excluding many citizens. The lack of accountability to public standards and to all citizens broadly defines market-centered political corruption.

3. *Public Interest.* Public interests are ideally served by substantive values embodied in principles such as the common good, equity, or justice. A corrupt official reduces these broad values and principles to narrowly defined private or special interests.

4. *Public Opinion.* A corrupt public official does not conform to the prevailing public view of acceptable behavior. The public perception of officials' dishonesty, self-service, or negligence and general measures of citizens' trust in government are derived from survey research.

The general legislative ethics-political corruption continuum in figure 1 provides a framework with which to describe the political corruption of individual legislators in South Carolina. There is no attempt to use the continuum as a scale or to develop an analytic data set from the framework.

Functionalist Ethics and Market-Centered Corruption

Political history and tradition have provided the basis for functionalist legislative ethics in South Carolina. Whether delegate or trustee, whether rural elite or from a new suburban district, legislators have exercised individual judgment about a proper role. They have made that judgment in comparison to their peers with the primary goal of serving their home constituency. Lobbying has provided the fuel to increased market-based incentives for buying and selling legislative responsibility. Long before the FBI sting, lobbying had become more important and more visible in the legislative process.

In fact, the number of registered lobbyists nearly tripled from 1974 to 1986, while their reported expenditures increased tenfold (Botsch, 1986). By 1989, registered lobbyists had increased in number by another 61 percent, while their reported expenditures increased by over $500,000. The increased activity may have come from shifts in policy responsibility from the national

government to state governments during the Reagan administration (Graham & Moore, 1991).

Apart from talking with a legislator about an issue, South Carolina lobbyists have a long-standing practice of tactfully "entertaining" members of the general assembly. Sometimes, legislators did not even have to leave the capitol building to be wined and dined. During the 1984 legislative session, the state's electric cooperatives had lunch sandwiches and barbecue dinners sent to members on the floor of the legislature. The coops hoped that lawmakers would not adjourn before voting on a municipal annexation bill that would protect coop customers. When questioned about a possible attempt to influence members, a coop spokesperson responded to the effect that a $3.95 barbecue plate was not much of a bribe and that adjournment was a decision only the legislature could make. The coop's lobbyist was just trying to be helpful (*The State*, 1984).

Interest groups also hold social events for members of the legislature. One of the largest events is the annual meeting of the South Carolina Textile Manufacturers Association. For example, at the fourteenth annual meeting of the association in March 1990, at least 64 of the 170 members of the general assembly left the debate on the proposed ethics bill to travel to Hilton Head for a weekend as guests of the association. Even though legislators are required by existing state law to report gifts of more than $100 from lobbyists, only eight of approximately one hundred attending the event the previous year even publicly acknowledged having been there.

Interest groups also influence legislators by contributing to their campaigns. Campaigns have become more expensive in South Carolina. In 1988, Senate primary candidates filing disclosure forms reported campaign receipts totaling $903,134 and general election receipts of $1,896,465 for the fourty-six seats. The 124 House members spent $2,200,000 to contest the primary and general elections (Crangle, 1990).

Regulating the Lobbyists before the Sting

According to long-standing South Carolina statutes, a lobbyist is a "legislative agent . . . who is employed, appointed or retained, with or without compensation, by another person . . . to influence in any manner the act or vote of any member of the General Assembly." However, the laws governing lobbying were not very restrictive. Lobbyists were simply required to register with the secretary of state and pay a ten dollar filing fee. A 1990 bill increased the registration fee to $100 for the purpose of helping raise the professional standards for lobbyists.

State law required lobbyists to report how much they spent on entertainment, lodging, and travel; however, it did not require them to say who the money was spent on or what legislation they sought to influence. In addition, lobbyists had to file expense and income reports with the secretary of state within thirty days after the legislature adjourned. The report was required to list "only that income or expense directly related to lobbying." Many lobbyists thought they were not required to report their salaries. For example, in 1989 approximately 390 lobbyists filed reports with the secretary of state's office, but about 110 left blank the space for salary.

The potential for special interests to influence legislative elections in South Carolina under these conditions was enormous. Businesses could legally contribute to campaigns and there were no legal limitations on the amount of money that any specific entity could contribute. In addition, there were virtually no limits on the way campaign contributions could be spent. Candidates, for example, could buy a new car with campaign donations and even give money to other candidates (Crangle, 1990).

In addition, the money could be carried over from one election to another. The reform group, Common Cause, also pointed out the weakness in the state's disclosure system for financial contributions. Candidates had to file campaign disclosure forms with the House or Senate Ethics Committee and report all campaign contributions of more than $100. But, there was no uniform system of identifying contributors. For example, the disclosure forms did not require the candidates to categorize the sources of contributions. With insufficient detail, it was difficult to distinguish the source of donations. In addition, there was no adequate system of monitoring or auditing candidates' filing to assure completeness and accuracy. The two legislative committees charged with the responsibility of receiving the forms lacked sufficient staff to monitor and assure compliance. In short, as with the United States Congress, the regulation of lobbyists in South Carolina was by custom weak and ambiguous.

Thus, the impact on legislators of redistricting together with the growth and weak regulation of interest groups put the state on a collision course with corruption. Legal constraints on lobbyists and the legislative system did not adapt to their new environments. The "rules of the game" had changed, but the rules governing the game had not.

Aftermath Number 1: A Shift to Minimalist Ethics to Control Political Corruption in Public Office: The New State Ethics Law

The reality of extensive crime in the South Carolina legislature made obvious through federal indictments and convictions set reactions into motion. The Democratic secretary of state had a weak record of enforcing the lobbying laws and was defeated in the November 1990 election by a Republican challenger who promised a closer watch. Both the House and Senate tightened their respective rules to reduce excessive lobbyists' spending on legislators. A general feeling was that the federal undercover operation was successful because legislators had become too comfortable with lobbyists and even expected to be courted by them.

Some legislative leaders began a political movement to enact ethics legislation for the South Carolina General Assembly. Many deemed the passage of a state ethics bill as necessary to restore public confidence in the legislature. The supporters of the bill were embarrassed that it took so long to pass it. The Senate and House versions were different and a conference committee mediated a common version. Delay resulted because the members of the ethics bill conference committee served on other conference committees and the legislature struggled to pass the 1991–1992 budget. The ethics bill was not final at the end of the regular session.

The governor called a special legislative session to consider the ethics bill. It passed 23 September 1991, after less than six hours consideration. The House debated the bill for ninety minutes and voted for it 108–0 with sixteen absences or abstentions. The Senate had five opponents and one complained that there were still major loopholes, such as the one that allowed lobbyists still to buy meals for a legislator as long as the meal was for a group. Some observers characterize the new law as uneven, but among the best ten or fifteen state ethics laws in the country nonetheless.

The bill went into effect January 1, 1991. Its major features are:

1. Lobbyists cannot contribute to a legislator's campaign, nor can a lobbyist spend money on a legislator, for example, through entertainment;

2. Legislators have to report business with lobbyists;

3. Campaign contributions can be used only for running campaigns;

4. Campaign contributions are limited to twenty-five dollars in cash;

5. Campaign contributions by a single contributor are limited to $3,500 per stage (primary, runoff, general election; $10,500 overall) for statewide candidates and $1,000 per stage ($3,000 overall) for other candidates;

6. Campaign contributions by a political party are capped at $50,000 for a statewide race and $5,000 for a local one;

7. Lawyer-legislators must report in writing when they represent a client before a state agency and they cannot vote on legislation affecting that agency; and

8. Legislators must provide for enforcement of the bill's various provisions.

Before Operation Lost Trust, the line between a campaign contribution by a lobbyist or anyone else and a bribe was not a clear one. Many of the legislative defendants in trials testified that they thought they were getting a campaign contribution. The bill appears to be a specific reaction to these features of the federal sting and it goes farther than before in limiting potential influence by political contributors.

Before the bill, citizens could get information about political campaign contributions only *after* the election. Now, citizens may learn who contributes to campaign *before* the vote. Critics of the campaign finance provisions contend that the limits are set too high. A single source, such as a large corporation or major law firm, may give $10,500 overall to a single, statewide candidate in an election cycle or $3,000 for a local race. However, the contributions can be made at each stage only if there is competition. For example, if there is no primary opposition, there can be no contribution. A candidate would have to have a contest at all three electoral stages to reach the single source maximum. Local critics still worry about interest group influence, not

only because of the limits, but also because twenty states prohibit corporate contributions altogether.

The bill does not limit overall spending in a campaign, but it does limit the amount of personal money that a candidate may use to $200,000. Of course, the gamble for a candidate is to use personal money as "seed money" and hope that enough money is raised so that the candidate can get all personal money back. If it is not repaid, the most that a candidate can reclaim is $25,000 in a statewide race and $10,000 in a local race. One fear is that only the wealthy will run for public office, since only wealthy candidates would have that much private money to start and have the ability to withstand up to a $175,000 or $190,000 "fine" for not being able to raise money on the campaign trail.

Another purpose of the bill is to reduce the impact of lobbyists, especially in races for the state legislature. The prohibition of political campaign contributions by lobbyists is intended by reform supporters to widen public participation in elections. They also hope to reduce the significant, public impact of lobbyists on an election.

A problem that some see in the new bill is the method of implementation. Enforcement lies with state trial court solicitors, the State Law Enforcement Division, and the State Ethics Commission. However, the bill does not provide for public disclosure of complaints. The reason frequently given in the legislative debate for keeping complaints confidential was to reduce frivolous charges. House rules require the State Ethics Commission to adjudicate a complaint, but the Senate will decide if it or if the State Ethics Commission will handle complaints about a senator. Critics fear a "star chamber" atmosphere that will skew results against the ethics law reforms.

Among loopholes in the new law is a provision that allows lobbyists and their employers to give promotional items worth up to $10 or plaques and trophies worth up to $150 to public officials. To some, a $150 trophy is significantly expensive. Lobbyists' employers may also spend up to $25 per day or $200 per year on lawmakers if a lobbyist's employer invites the general assembly, the House or the Senate, a legislative committee, a delegation, or a caucus to a function. Small groups may proliferate to get invited the maximum eight times by a single lobbyist. It is unlikely that many lobbyists will ask the whole legislature out eight times to a $25 meal. Activity will still abound, since the number of lobbyists' employers has grown at almost the same rate as the number of lobbyists reported earlier.

The new law prohibits future legislators from becoming lobbyists until at least one year after they finish public service. However, it did not prohibit legislators serving at the time the bill was passed from immediately becoming lobbyists if they choose.

A general feeling among observers is that legislators indicted by the sting did not know that the federal Hobbs Act existed. Presumably, the officials involved knew about the state anti-bribery laws but did not think that any enforcement officers—state or federal—would be watching. Some observers feel approvingly that the new ethics law will discourage individuals who ran for the legislature in the past simply for the parties and social life generated by lobbyists. Others fear that all the paperwork under the new law may be too aggravating and discouraging even for solemn and thoughtful candidates.

Aftermath Number 2: Questions about Federal Prosecutions of State Legislators

The first question stems from the high proportion of black lawmakers indicted and convicted. Of the seventeen active legislators, seven (40 percent) were black and all seven were sentenced. Counting the circuit judge, eight (29 percent) of the twenty-eight total indictments involved blacks. This led some black political leaders to question whether black legislators had been targeted and whether the FBI had a policy of singling out blacks on the theory that they were more prone to crime. The United States attorney vigorously disputed the criticisms.

In April 1992, federal sting operations generally were limited by a U. S. Supreme Court decision (*Jacobson v. United States*, 60 LW 4307, April 7). Operation Lost Trust cases on appeal at the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, have seen three new trials granted and two others probably will be granted.

Each case is different, but a major sticking point is whether the evidence showed that the accused legislator explicitly agreed to sell his vote. Among other questions posed as a basis for a new trial include whether the pari-mutuel bill would have actually involved interstate commerce and thus the Hobbs Act charges. Another appeal asks whether the FBI violated its internal rules by using a betting bill as bait in a sting operation.

Lurking beneath the specifics of the dispute in each case is the deeper question of whether it is constitutional for the federal government to interfere in state and local government through an undercover investigation. Arthur Maass (1987) has raised this question and he notes that federal prosecution of state or local officials has been rare in American history. But, federal prosecutions have grown rapidly since 1970. According to a U.S. Department of Justice report, 787 state officials had been indicted on federal charges from 1970 to 1985 (Maass, 1987: 202).

The Hobbs Act, along with federal statutes controlling mail fraud, conspiracy, and organized crime, has been the major authority for federal prosecution. South Carolina lawmakers were generally ensnared by the Hobbs Act, but Maass notes that it was originally passed to deal with organized labor violence, not state or local officials. Also, the Hobbs Act distinguished between bribery (voluntary giving to influence) and extortion (involuntary giving because of fear) and prohibited only extortion. A 1976 federal court interpretation in a New Jersey case blurred the distinction by holding that payments to public officials (a mayor and his colleagues) were extortion, not bribery, since the persons paying feared economic loss if they did not pay. Acceptance of payments by a state or local official became subject to the Hobbs Act (Maass, 1987: 208–9).

Whether the large number of state/local officers prosecuted in federal courts is an interference with state independence or with the nation-state balance in American constitutional federalism is a question now more easily contemplated by South Carolinians. A parallel question is whether the state may preserve its independence by energizing enforcement of its laws controlling political corruption.

Conclusion

If political corruption is on the rise, then so is the emphasis on ethics. Legislative ethics has emerged as an area of renewed concern, especially through the high visibility of wrongdoing by a small number of legislators. Recent political corruption in Congress ranges from Abscam, in which members accepted money from outsiders for the performance of their duties, through abuses of the House Bank, in which members wrote checks on insufficient balances. Excesses have been described in other state legislatures and South Carolina joined them through its Operation Lost Trust.

Gustafson (1991: 1–4) characterizes the field of ethics as a "growth industry," the signs of which include (1) the explosion of books and articles about actual problems rather than abstract ones; (2) the attention that moral issues get from the mass media; (3) the activities of institutions that lead to development of foundations, centers, institutes, or committees; (4) regulations that require public interest representation on advisory boards or review committees; (5) the number of conferences on ethics and public policy and professional behavior; and (6) the emergence of the profession of "ethicist."

While South Carolina has not yet hired an "ethicist" to counsel with individual legislators or created a foundation to promote legislative ethics, it has passed a relatively strong ethics bill for state legislators and assigned jurisdiction over violations to state law enforcement agencies and to the State Ethics Commission. Certainly, the indictments and subsequent guilty pleas and convictions over the last two years reveal that the previous state laws did little to encourage ethical behavior by many members of the legislature. The new legislation passed by the general assembly in the aftermath of the scandal fits Thompson's "minimalist" category for controlling public office-based corruption. But, it remains to be seen if the new state ethics law in South Carolina will renew ethical conduct on the part of individual members of the general assembly.

Notes

1. 18 *U.S.C.A* 1951 (1984). The Code section is more commonly known as the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act or the federal anti-extortion law. In sec. 1951 (b)(2), "*extortion* means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
   In notes explaining the section further, note 4 explains, "Acts constituting essential elements of federal extortion indictment also constituted offense . . . proscribing, requesting, or soliciting of unlawful compensation for official behavior. *Shields v. Smith,* Fla. App. 1981, 404 So.2d 1106, review denied 412 So.2d 270."
   Note 107. Color of Official Right—Generally. "Any public officer, elected or otherwise, who makes performance or nonperformance of official act contingent upon payment of fee, whether or not fee actually is paid or act actually performed, is guilty of extortion 'under color of official right' within meaning of this section. *U.S. v. Dozier,* C.A. La, 1982, 672 F.2d 531; 459 US 943 (1982)."
   Also in the commentary, "A public official can be indicted for extortion under this section even though he did not initiate unlawful transaction but was first approached by a third party. *U.S. v. Nelson,* D.C. Mich 1980, 486 F.Supp 464."

All Quotes from *United States Code Annotated* (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1984).

Samuel Francis Hobbs (D-Alabama) was a member of the United States House of Representatives, 1935–1951. The original Anti-Racketeering Act was passed in 1934. Hobbs's revision was passed in 1945 and "made it a felony for anyone, including a labor union, to obstruct, delay or block the movement of goods in interstate commerce by means of robbery and extortion" (*Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation*, 1965: 575). Public officials were included under the Hobbs Act by subsequent amendments.

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White Flight in the Voting Booth: The Racial Composition of Localities and Partisan Voting in Virginia in the 1980s

Mark Wm. Hertzog

University of Virginia

For all the recent celebration of the increasing willingness of at least some white voters to support black candidates for major offices, recent election returns show a more disturbing trend. Partisan voting in the United States, which has been polarized by race in presidential elections for the last generation (Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde, 1991), appears to be polarized on the state level as well.[1] It appears also that the larger the share of black residents in a given community, the more pronounced and extreme is the polarization. Perhaps most notably, it does not matter whether the candidate is white or black, but whether her party label is identified in the popular mind as supporting (Democratic) or resisting (Republican) black political goals (Grofman, Glazer, & Handley, 1988; Day & Weeks, 1988).

This is a study of elections in one state, Virginia, in the decade just past, to see whether, in that state, the apparent trend is real. Virginia gives us a particularly suitable case study in that, although less than one-fifth of its population is black, it is the only state of the Union that to date has elected a black governor. Presented here are the results of an aggregate regression analysis of election returns by county and independent city in the races for governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general of the Commonwealth from 1981 to 1989, employing U.S. Census data as indicators of income, education, population density, racial composition, age, and percentage of native-born Virginians.

The data presented here show that, in the aggregate, the single most significant factor in determining how white Virginians would vote in the 1980s was the percentage of black people living in the voter's locality, and that this held true whether the candidate in question was white or black. In counties or cities with virtually no black residents, white voters split about

evenly, with a slight advantage to the Democrats. But, on average, as the black population of a locality rises by 5 percentage points, the Democrats' share of the white vote falls by 3 percentage points. This did not begin with L. Douglas Wilder's appearance on the Commonwealth's ballot in 1985; the same facts hold for the Charles Robb election of 1981, in which no black candidate was on the ballot and none was considered likely to be in the near future.

Black-White Coalitions and "Spatial Conflict": Approaching the Factor of Racial Composition

There were two principal early theories of black-white coalitions. Studies seeking to test these theories and determine which whites vote for blacks (or for white candidates supported by blacks), beginning in the 1960s, are far from uniform in their conclusions. One theory, the "median voter hypothesis" (discussed in Rice, 1985), was purely economic, and held that if politics is concerned principally with redistributing wealth or economic opportunity, the voter whose income or holdings are at the 50th percentile—the median voter—will vote with those below that level against those above that level. Thus, blacks would be expected to coalesce with working-class whites against middle- to upper-income whites; such class-based voting has been found consistently in a few major cities (Davidson, 1972; Murray & Vedlitz, 1978).

The opposing theory, based on education and culture, held that wealthier, more educated whites were more tolerant of social diversity and more sympathetic to poorer minorities than were white people of the same economic class, competing for the same jobs—and that the unlikelihood of more than a trickle of blacks moving into their neighborhoods because of the economic disparity between the races made the better-off far less fearful of integration than were working-class whites. Again, this model has been found to work in some major cities (Jennings & Ziegler, 1966; Pettigrew, 1976; Murray & Vedlitz, 1978).[2]

Murray and Vedlitz (1978) explain the inconsistency among cities in part by determining whether the election in question was partisan or nonpartisan. They find that, in elections in five Southern cities in the 1960s and 1970s, working-class whites tended to coalesce with blacks in *partisan* elections, but to vote against black-supported candidates in *nonpartisan* races. Lieske and Hillard (1984), studying Cincinnati elections, also find a dynamic among race, class, and partisanship in determining vote choice.

A factor introduced more recently into the matrix is racial composition. Vanderleeuw (1990), comparing racial voting differences in nonpartisan local elections in New Orleans over time as the black population increased, found that polarization rose sharply when the black population reached about 40 percent—but then began to drop off when it reached about 55 percent and white citizens, presumably, began to get used to candidates and elected officials most of whom were black.

It is well to introduce here, from the pages of sociology, the theory of "spatial conflict." Williams (1967), analyzing the political Balkanization of the suburbs, theorizes that each neighborhood or cultural group, seeking to preserve its own way of life and values, builds a municipal boundary around

itself like the wall of a medieval town in order to exclude those with conflicting mores. Such sheltered communities proliferate, the number and size depending on the ethnic and economic diversity of the region.

Kemp (1986) applies spatial-conflict theory to the politics of a major city, Chicago, which cannot subdivide politically and in which large migrations of population were taking place: middle-class whites to the suburbs, blacks into formerly all-white neighborhoods. She found in essential part (p. 207) that: "in situations of rapid population shifts, coalitional opportunities for blacks have been limited to white groups that either do not live near black neighborhoods or do not face integration because of class barriers," in this case the "lakefront liberals," of the northeast side, separated by downtown and by thousands of dollars in per capita income from the black neighborhoods of the south side. Blacks, "lakefront liberals," and Hispanic immigrants, who arrived in central Chicago largely after Kemp's study, coalesced in 1983 to elect Harold Washington as mayor over the massive opposition of working-class white voters.

Recent studies provide support for the application of spatial-conflict theory, as indicated by the proportion of black residents in a given locality, to partisan state and national elections. Grofman, Glazer, and Handley (1988) presented evidence that increasing Republican strength among white voters, particularly in the South, is correlated directly with the George Wallace vote in 1968.[3] These researchers also found that the decline in the Democratic presidential vote by state between 1940 and 1984 is similarly correlated with the black percentage of population in each state. Day and Weeks (1988), investigating the 1984 U.S. Senate election in North Carolina between incumbent Republican Jesse Helms and his Democratic challenger, Governor Jim Hunt, conducted an aggregate regression analysis of county election returns. They report (p. 943) that: "drawing on the electoral literature of the South, the Helms victory is hypothesized to be related to race, income, urbanization, and farm size. *A regression analysis shows only one variable, the racial composition of counties, as significant*" (italics mine).

It appears from the studies at hand that most whites see themselves as being threatened by or in competition with blacks, rather than as partners in a struggle for economic justice. The more blacks who live in a given area, the more this fear, hostility, or sense of competition appears to be triggered among whites and, therefore, the more hostile whites become to "special privileges" for blacks. Appeals for racial justice or affirmative action in such a setting may boomerang and reinforce white attitudes associating blacks with crime, drugs, illegitimacy, and welfare. Democrats have become identified as the "problack" party. Republicans, meantime, oppose racial "quotas" and promote self-reliance, law and order, low taxes, and "traditional morality."

Socioeconomic class seems to have had no effect at all on Virginia's modern-day partisan divisions. After the demise of Henry Howell's experiment in populist class-warfare politics in the 1970s, Charles Robb constructed a Democratic party that appealed explicitly to Richmond's Main Street bankers and the rural county courthouse squirearchy as well as to the national Democrats' base. Meantime, the Republicans were cultivating older suburbanites, military families, retirees, and—most significantly—white Protestant fundamentalists, many of whom are in the lower end of the socioeconomic

spectrum. Both parties, then, at least to an extent are mixtures of all economic classes.

It follows, then, that a strong correlation may exist between racial composition and partisan voting in Virginia. Politics becomes a great battleground of this economic and cultural competition; government is seen as a powerful tool for enhancing the prospects of one race or the other in the battle.

Methods

The use of aggregate data (the locality, rather than the individual voter, being the unit of analysis) made possible an analysis by ordinary bivariate and multivariate regression techniques. The initial dependent variable was the mean estimated white vote for all Democratic nominees for governor, lieutenant governor, and attorney general in 1981, 1985, and 1989, a total of nine candidates. The method for determining the estimates is set forth under "Calculations and Assumptions."

Data Sources

The data sources in each instance, unless otherwise stated, are U.S. Census Bureau county and city data on Virginia for 1980 or 1986, except for election returns; the Virginia State Board of Elections' final, official general election returns for 1981, 1985, and 1989 are used.

The use of 1980 census data may be subject to criticism. Virginia's population in the past ten years has grown at a rate half again that of the nation, and the growth has been concentrated particularly in the suburban localities of the three principal metropolitan areas (Washington, Richmond-Petersburg, and Hampton Roads). The use of the 1980 data, none the less, was a conscious choice. Although the 1990 total and voting-age populations by race are available by locality, most of the data needed to indicate the other important ecological variables, broken down by locality, are not yet available for 1990, nor in post-1980 projections.[4] Further, the analysis did not require use of actual or estimated population figures at the time of each election, except to determine population per square mile; and given the pattern of growth in Virginia, the 1980 data suffice to determine the *relative* population density of localities and to classify them as urban, suburban, or rural. By using the same data base, one avoids confusing wines of different years,[5] and the 1980 figures are the best *fully comparable* numbers available.

Calculations and Assumptions

It is not possible to say with certainty how many black or white persons voted in a particular precinct or county in Virginia; the Commonwealth keeps no record of the race of registered voters. Further, in Virginia's many small, rural counties, voting precincts necessarily include huge chunks of territory. Until the 1991 redistricting process began, it was not possible to isolate any predominantly black precincts in rural Virginia. Therefore, I have inferred the percentage of actual voters in a given jurisdiction who are black from census data on the black percentage of voting-age population, coupled with

comparisons made by Sabato (1983, 1987) between registration and turnout in predominantly black *urban* precincts and those in predominantly white precincts. Then, based on these urban black precincts and on exit-polling data from 1981 and 1985, I assumed that in each contest black voters across the Commonwealth had given a fixed share of their votes—95 percent—to the Democratic nominees in each contest. From these assumptions I estimated and isolated the share of white voters who voted for each Democrat.

The black and white shares of the electorate in each jurisdiction were estimated as follows:

1. The black percentage of each locality's voting-age population is multiplied by .9, to account for lower voter registration rates among blacks of voting age. This figure (.9) is derived from 1985 and preliminary 1989 exit-polling data indicating that black Virginians voted at a rate about 90 percent that of white Virginians.[6] Owing to the precariousness of this assumption, the initial results and the model created were tested again using different turnout-rate assumptions.[7]

2. The product then is added to the (uncorrected) nonblack percentage of the population.

3. Finally, the share of voters among each race is determined by dividing each figure added in (2) by the sum.

Thus, in a locality in which exactly 50 percent of the voting-age population is black, 50 is multiplied by .9; the sum is 45. 45 + 50 (the uncorrected, nonblack population share)= 95. Dividing 45 into 95, I estimate that the percentage of voters who are black is 47.4, and the percentage who are white is 52.6 (or 50/95).

Based on the research cited above, which shows that turnout of registered voters among blacks equals or slightly exceeds that among whites in Virginia, I have *not* assumed any difference in turnout between blacks and whites *of voting age* except on account of different registration rates. Therefore, percentage of voting-age population is assumed to be equal to share of votes cast, multiplied by the discounting factor.

Then, to extract the white share of the Democratic vote in each election, the black share of the voters, estimated as above, is multiplied by .95. Both exit-polling data on each election, and the actual 1981 and 1985 returns from predominantly black precincts, analyzed by Sabato (1983, 1987), indicate that in these elections blacks gave a surprisingly uniform 95 percent of their votes to the Democratic nominees. The product then is subtracted from the total percentage of the vote for each Democratic nominee, and the remainder is divided into the total estimated white vote to find the estimated percentage of white voters who cast ballots for that particular Democrat.

Thus, in the example above, if Douglas Wilder received 60 percent of the vote, to 40 percent for his 1989 Republican opponent, Marshall Coleman:

1. The estimated black share of voters (47.4) is multiplied by .95. The product, 45.0, is the estimated percentage of the total vote for governor that was cast by black voters for Wilder.

2. 60.0 (total Wilder vote) - 45.0 (Wilder vote cast by blacks) = 15.0 (Wilder vote cast by whites).

3. 15.0 (Wilder vote cast by whites) / 52.6 (total white share of vote) = 28.5 (percentage of white voters supporting Wilder).

Indicators

- *County/city/metro status:* Counties were coded "1," independent cities "2."[8]

- *Population per square mile:* 1980 figures were used.

- *Education:* Four raw indicators were used: percentage of adults having completed twelve or more years of education by race, and median years of education among adults, again by race. Four additional comparative indicators, assessing the raw and percentage differences between the races in each category above, were created: (1) raw difference in percentage of high school graduates, (2) percentage of black graduates as a share of white graduates, (3) raw difference in median years of education, and (4) percentage difference in years of education.[9]

An indicator originally included in the analysis was percentage of college graduates. However, the intercorrelation between rates of college graduation and those of the other two principal education variables were so high as to make this indicator redundant.

- *Income:* Here, six raw indicators were employed: 1979 and 1985 (from the 1980 and 1986 census figures, respectively), per capita income for the jurisdiction overall, then by race (1979 only). The following four comparative figures were then calculated: raw overall change in per capita income between 1979 and 1985; percentage overall change; then raw and percentage differences by race in 1979.

- *Age:* Median age of white persons and percentage of white persons sixty-five and older were used. (There was no theoretical or practical reason for comparing the races by age.)

- *Native birth:* The percentage of white residents in each locality who were born in Virginia.

- *Election returns:* The percentage of the total vote (write-ins included) for governor, lieutenant governor, or attorney general that was received by the Democratic nominee was used, taken down to the first decimal point (e.g., 50.4, 37.9).

- *Racial composition/Black share of vote:* The 1980 percentage of the locality's population that is black was used as the racial composition indicator.

However, in determining each race's share of those voting, the 1980 black *voting-age* population percentage was used.

- *White vote:* From these assumptions, the share of the white vote was calculated as described above. Then, using the returns above, further indicators were created: (1) the total average white vote for all nine Democrats running for these offices in the 1980s; (2) this average exclusively for the seven white Democratic nominees; and (3) the deviation between Mr. Wilder's 1989 result and the average for the seven white Democrats.[10]

Results

Patterns by Locality


The maps appended indicate the extent to which high shares of black residents suppressed white support for Democrats in the years under study. Map 1 shows those localities with particularly high (one-third or more) or low (5 percent or less) percentages of black residents in the 1980 census. Virtually all of the low-black areas are west of the Blue Ridge; the sole exceptions are a few tiny suburban enclaves in Northern Virginia and the "white-flight suburbs" of Colonial Heights, outside Petersburg, and Poquoson, next to Hampton. The areas with large black populations, meantime, are principally in the Southside east of the High Piedmont, on the rural Tidewater peninsulas, and in the cities abutting Hampton Roads.

Compare this to map 2, displaying the mean white vote for the seven white Democrats.[11] The areas giving majorities to the white Democrats essentially are the low-black counties west of the Blue Ridge, excluding the traditionally Republican German pietists of the Shenandoah Valley. The exceptions are the highly educated nonnatives of Fairfax, Arlington, and Alexandria; Williamsburg and Charlottesville, home to the Commonwealth's two "elite" universities; and the abutting counties of Patrick and Franklin—both Gerald Baliles (1981 and 1985) and Mary Sue Terry (1985 and 1989) hail from Patrick County. The localities giving less than 30 percent of the mean white vote to white Democrats were confined virtually to those counties and cities with high black percentages. The Hampton Roads cities, with their large numbers of out-of-state military families and other nonnatives, are not hatched; but the Southside and rural peninsular areas are hatched, as are Richmond and its western exurbs. Danville and Pittsylvania County also are hatched; they were more than 30 percent black, but not quite one-third.


Racial Composition Alone

Table 1 shows that, given the assumptions about black registration and turnout stated above, racial composition alone explains 70 percent of the variation among localities in the mean percentage of the vote for all Democrats, white or black, during the 1980s. A residual analysis, further, shows that there are no outliers and that the distribution of residuals is

Map 1
Black Percentage of Population,
Virgina Counties and Independent Cities, 1980



Map 2
Estimated Mean Percentage of White Vote Cast for Seven White Democratic Nominees for Virginia Statewide Office, 1981–1989, by County and Independent City



random. Figure 1 shows the actual regression plot of these two variables. The reader will note that the pattern in which the data points fall appears to be linear or ever-so-slightly curvilinear, and that the range of data points around the regression line is relatively narrow, with a consistent width along all points.

Table 1
Percentage of White Vote by Locality for Virginia Democratic Nominees for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General, 1981–1989, Plotted against Black Percentage of Locality's Population, 1980

Candidate and Year	Intercept (S.E.)	Slope (S.E.)	R^2
All Democrats, 1981–1989	51.060 (0.933)	-.612 (.035)	.695
White Democrats, 1981–1989	52.555 (0.904)	-.610 (.034)	.707
Douglas Wilder, Gov., 1989	43.158 (1.208)	-.575 (.045)	.546
Donald Beyer, L.G., 1989	49.184 (1.041)	-.660 (.039)	.681
Mary Sue Terry, A.G., 1989	58.006 (0.968)	-.503 (.036)	.589
Gerald Baliles, Gov., 1985	52.815 (1.009)	-.670 (.038)	.701
Douglas Wilder, L.G., 1985	48.504 (1.117)	-.662 (.042)	.651
Mary Sue Terry, A.G., 1985	57.969 (0.903)	-.613 (.034)	.710
Charles Robb, Gov., 1981	50.186 (0.990)	-.606 (.037)	.666
Richard Davis, L.G., 1981	50.617 (0.993)	-.583 (.037)	.647
Gerald Baliles, A.G., 1981	49.104 (1.139)	-.629 (.043)	.618

Note: Intercept is the percentage of the total white vote for the Democrat; this is the prediction of what percentage that Democrat would receive in a locality with no black residents. *Slope* is the increase or decrease in percentage of the predicted vote for the Democrat for every 1 percent increase in the black population of the locality.

The next test determined how well individual candidacies fared, knowing racial composition alone. These results also are set forth in table 1.


Somewhat oddly, the racial composition model fit less well in predicting votes for Douglas Wilder, particularly in 1989, than for his white counterparts. The depressed intercept figures for Wilder offer a possible explanation. A certain share of white voters in predominantly white areas, with racial attitudes that would not be triggered by a white candidate, may have found themselves unwilling to vote for a black man. Thus, more direct racism may have somewhat blunted the effect of racial composition as black percentages of the population increased.[12]

The Complete Demographic Model

I then undertook to find those variables with a sound theoretical basis that may improve predictive power. The addition of three variables improved predictive power by about 5 percent: population density, median age of white

population, and education as measured by percentage of white population that graduated from high school.[13] The income indicators had no significant effect. (The meaning of these findings will be considered in the "Discussion" section.) Results of this respecified model are shown in table 2.

Figure 1
Scatter plot and regression line of mean white vote in each Virginia locality for all nine Democratic nominees, 1981–1989, with black percentage of population, 1980.



Certain oddities appear in examining the 1989 election. By far the greatest increase in predictive power was found with the 1989 Wilder election, in which the R^2 rose from .546 to .717—a 17-percent improvement. In the same election year, the prediction of lieutenant gubernatorial nominee Donald Beyer's share of the vote improve from an R^2 of .681 to .776, a 9.5-point jump. Yet the improvement in predicting Mary Sue Terry's 1989 percentages was minuscule: R^2 rose by .007. These results offer *prima facie* support to the hypothesis above concerning the drop-off in Wilder's intercept—as younger, more educated urban voters would be expected to be more racially liberal—and to the hypothesis regarding the personal assessments of Terry. The improvement in Beyer's numbers may be due more to his regional name recognition in Northern Virginia, where he was a highly publicized car dealer, and his initial lack of name recognition outside that region, remedied

only during the campaign and, usually, among those (younger, more urban, more educated) voters paying the campaign more attention.

Table 2
Percentage of White Vote by Locality for Virginia Democratic Nominees for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General, 1981–1989, Plotted against (1980): Black Percentage of Locality's Population, Population per Square Mile, Median Age of White Population, and Percentage of High School Graduates in White Population

Candidate and Year	Mean % (S.D.)	R^2	R^2 Increase	Outliers
All Democrats, 1981–1989	36.9 (11.7)	.744	.049	0
White Democrats, 1981–1989	38.4 (11.6)	.743	.036	0
Douglas Wilder, Gov., 1989	29.9 (12.3)	.717	.171	1 (Wise Co.)
Donald Beyer, L.G., 1989	34.1 (12.6)	.766	.095	1 (Wise Co.)
Mary Sue Terry, A.G., 1989	46.3 (10.8)	.596	.007	0
Gerald Baliles, Gov., 1985	37.5 (12.9)	.730	.029	0
Douglas Wilder, L.G., 1985	33.3 (13.0)	.708	.057	0
Mary Sue Terry, A.G., 1985	44.2 (12.1)	.730	.020	0
Charles Robb, Gov., 1981	35.9 (11.6)	.712	.046	0
Richard Davis, L.G., 1981	37.0 (11.6)	.691	.044	1 (Danville)
Gerald Baliles, A.G., 1981	33.9 (12.7)	.644	.026	0

Notes: Mean percentage: Not statewide average, but mean of the 136 localities. Localities' mean black percentage was 22.4 ± 16.5; population per square mile was 833.9 n ± n in all instances ± 1,353.8; white residents' median age was 32.6 ± 4.3; and percentage of whites who graduated from high school was 58.5 ± 12.3.
R2 Increase: Improvement of the predictive power of this model, measured by adjusted R^2, over racial composition alone.
Outliers were defined as data points falling at least 3 standard errors from the point predicted by the model.

The Native-Birth Factor

Although the percentage of native-born Virginians was not in itself a significant factor in aggregate election returns, this factor correlated highly with education, age, income, and population density. Therefore, the localities with the highest and lowest shares of native-born Virginians were analyzed. Thirty-nine counties and cities had white populations at least 80 percent of which were Virginia natives; 16 had white populations 50 percent or less of which were of native birth. The results were surprising.

Of the differences in the high-native sample, 78.5 percent were explained by racial composition alone, and 82.2 percent of the differences were ex-

plained by the combined model. In the low-native group, however, a comparatively small 48.7 percent of the differences were explained by racial composition; but when the other three variables were included, the combined model yielded an explanatory power of 84.6 percent. By far the greatest share of added power came from the population density factor, with a Beta of .676.

Different Turnout Assumptions


The truth or artifice of this study rests, of course, upon the accuracy of its assumptions regarding voter registration and turnout by black and white residents. As stated before, Virginia does not keep records of the race of registered voters, and it is possible that our assumptions about black registration and turnout, compared to that of whites, may be in error. In order to determine whether, and to what extent, our models would continue to work given different registration assumptions, I recomputed estimated black registration and turnout at rates equal to 70 percent, 80 percent, 100 percent and 110 percent of white registration and turnout.

The results appear in table 3. Briefly, even if I have overestimated the share of the black population turning out, racial composition remains by far the single most significant factor in determining aggregate party percentages. The 70:100 figure (70 blacks of voting age turning out for every 100 whites of voting age) is included for purposes of comparison, although current evidence suggests this is too low a share to be taken seriously. At 80:100—a share of turnout that could be supported by an assumption that the black registration rate in rural areas is lower than that in cities and suburbs—racial composition alone accounts for 60 percent of the differences in party percentages, and the complete model accounts for 65 percent. The predictive power at 80:100 is about 10 points lower than that at 90:100, but still very strong. In like manner, if in fact I have *underestimated* black turnout, the explanatory power of each model increases.

Wilder versus the White Democrats

Map 3 displays the estimated white vote for Wilder in 1989. One thing will be noticed almost instantaneously: the only areas in which Wilder appears to have won a majority of white votes were the university cities of Williamsburg and Charlottesville, the Appalachian coal fields (then in the midst of the bitter Pittston coal strike), and the Northern Virginia suburbs (upset by Marshall Coleman's close ties to major real estate developers, who many voters treated as Satan's representatives on Earth). Meantime, the only areas in which he pulled even 40–49 percent of the white vote were in the transmontane country, the outer Northern Virginia suburbs, the major Tidewater cities of Norfolk and Virginia Beach, and Albemarle County (suburban Charlottesville). It is here that the effect of racial composition in the localities with large black populations can be seen most readily. I estimate that whites in the leftward-hatched areas gave Wilder *fewer than 20 percent of their votes;* these areas correlate very highly with those with more than one-third black residents. The rest, except for Richmond and the Hampton Roads cities of Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Hampton, are taken in when localities in which he

Map 3
Estimated Percentage of White Vote Cast for L. Douglas Wilder for Governor of Virginia, 1989, by County and Independent City



received 20 to 24 percent of the vote are included (the rightward-hatched localities). In sum, except for the big central cities, *in no Virginia locality in which more than one-third of the residents are black did Wilder receive even one white vote in four.*

Table 3
Explanatory Power of Models Assessing Differences among Virginia Localities in Mean Percentage of Estimated White Vote for Democratic Nominees for Virginia Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General, 1981–1989, Given Various Assumptions of Black Turnout Relative to White Turnout

Share of Black VAP Voting/ Share of White VAP Voting	Racial Composition Alone R^2	Increase from Level Above	Complete Model Adj. R^2	Increase from Level Above
70 black:100 white	.426	—	.508	—
80 black: 100 white	.591	.165	.653	.153
90 black:100 white	.695	.104	.744	.091
100 black: 100 white	.762	.067	.802	.058
110 black: 100 white	.806	.042	.840	.038

Note: 90 black: 100 white is the baseline assumption.

We noted above that the complete demographic model, adding population density, median age and education, increased the ability to explain the 1989 Wilder vote by 17.1 percent. Now, why should these other factors be so much more important, and why should racial composition be so *relatively* unimportant, for the first black person ever elected to govern one of the United States? Here the differences reported earlier between areas with low and high native-born populations are important, particularly their difference in education levels.

This becomes the more apparent if we compare the 1989 Wilder vote to the mean vote received by the seven white Democrats. Seventy-eight percent of the variation among localities with very high shares of native Virginians could not be explained by the demographic variables; about 21 percent was explained by education and racial composition. Meantime, three-quarters could be explained demographically among localities with low shares of natives, nearly half by education alone. All of the sixteen latter localities were among the twenty-one with the highest education rates.

Discussion

The one factor that appears to play the greatest role in determining for which party a white person will vote in a statewide election in Virginia is the racial composition of the locality in which the voter lives. About 70 percent of the differences in partisan voting among the cities and counties of the Commonwealth are explained by differences in racial composition.

The reasons for this are closely bound up together. The white voters least likely to support Democrats live in rural counties with older-than-average

populations, lower education and income levels, very high proportions of native Virginians—and large minorities (or, in a half-dozen cases, majorities) of black residents. It appears, given the relatively high age and low mobility of the residents, that few newcomers move in and that the best and the brightest of the daughters and sons of these areas leave permanently for greater opportunities, thus surrendering these localities to those of lesser ambition who have lived there all their lives and intend to keep doing so.

To those who stay, economic and social benefits are seen as a zero-sum game in which a gain for your neighbor is a loss for you. The social and economic cleavage in these neighborhoods always has been racial; and those who stay, with less money, less education, and no strong desire for a change of scenery, are those most inclined to hold to the old attitudes.

Therefore, the Democratic party is not seen as the great equalizer that a purely economic "median voter" theory would predict. It is instead seen by these white voters as a threat to their economic opportunity and social mores through its advocacy of affirmative action, social spending, and social tolerance. We see the very picture of "spatial conflict," reinforced by ancient prejudices, adding up to the notion that "the blacks are taking over," aided and abetted by the Democratic party. In the resulting economic-cultural battle, played out through politics, many white voters will turn to the Republicans.

Racial composition, then, is the important trigger. The more black people there are in a locality, the more white voters will perceive them as a "threat" to their own economic and social well-being. This aggravates in their minds the stereotypes associating blacks with welfare and social nastiness. The Republican message—law and order, traditional values, lower taxes, reduced social welfare spending to induce self-reliance, and opposition to racial "quotas"—is a perfect fit for this constituency, and its appeal grows stronger the higher the proportion of black residents.

If Virginia had no black residents, the mean locality would have given the Democratic Party's average statewide nominee about 51 percent of the vote during the 1980s (see table 1). As the black proportion of population increases by 10 percent, that locality's Democratic vote would fall by about 6.12 percent. In looking at individual candidates, we see that the level of support in the mean locality, were there zero black population, would fall between 43 and 58 percent during the 1980s. Perhaps more significantly, the rate of change in the Democratic vote for each 1 percent increase in black population was in one case 0.503 percent, and in the other eight ranged between 0.575 and 0.670 percent. In short, the degree to which each Democrat's white vote fell off with a given increase in black population was remarkably similar: a 4 percent drop in Democratic votes for every 6 to 7 percent increase in black population.

This indicates that the Democrats' formula for building a winning coalition in which nearly all of the black vote is included is to appeal to (1) racially and culturally moderate white voters with higher incomes and education, many if not most of whom, will have been born outside the Commonwealth, as in Northern Virginia; and (2) working-class white voters in regions of the state with virtually no black residents, as in the Southwest, to whom the party can appeal on demi-populist economic grounds. An examination of the voting pattern in the Wilder election of 1989 (see map 3) shows that, if there was no

intentional strategy to build the coalition this way, there was at least a happy coincidence.

One of the more unexpected findings of the study was the unimportance of any income indicators, including comparative ones, in explaining anything. In context, it now makes sense. What I have said about low income among whites being tied in with Republican leanings holds true only in areas with large black populations; in the Appalachian and Great Valley regions, in which blacks are virtually nonexistent, no such trend holds true. Further, income is so highly correlated with education in the aggregate that relatively wealthy areas of the Commonwealth also, in many cases, turn out to be more Democratic.

In addition to racial composition, three principal factors, independently or working together, explain another 5 percent of the variation in white vote for all Democrats amongst localities: education, population density, and median age. In this instance, the effect of adding these factors varies rather widely among the candidates, from seven-tenths of 1 percent in Attorney General Mary Sue Terry's 1989 re-election contest to 17.1 percent in Douglas Wilder's 1989 election as governor.

One particular aspect of this difference is notable: support for Wilder shot upward in those counties and cities with the lowest proportions of native Virginians, all of which are among the jurisdictions with the highest education rates. The principal factor in these increases in Wilder's support in the low-native areas was comparatively small increases in mean levels of education. This may mean that there is a "threshold" level of education after which racial attitudes begin to soften, or even liberalize, in exponential fashion. There is variation based on education level in the less-educated, high-native areas; but education's effect on that variation increases powerfully in the most highly educated, low-native regions.[14] Whether more education across the board will lead to blurring of the color line in politics remains to be seen.

Acknowledgments

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Notes

1. "Polarization" is a term occasionally abused. Here it means consistent and highly divergent partisan voting behavior in which a large majority of one group votes opposite to a large majority of another. This obviously admits of degrees, and below a certain level true polarization cannot be said to occur. In the case at hand, however, black and white voters consistently diverge by roughly 50 percentage points in their partisan preferences.
2. A modern manifestation of the education-culture hypothesis is Ladd's theory (Ladd & Hadley, 1975) of an "old class" and "new class" in the Democratic Party. While primarily gauging the source of division between whites, the gulf separat-

ing working-class urban white ethnics and rural white Southerners and Westerners (the "old class") from blacks, Hispanics, feminists and young, college-educated white liberals (the "new class") is the basis of the theory. For a dissent from this theory, see Gopoian, Hackett, Parelman & Perotta (1987).

3. For example, in their Figure 4, the Wallace percentage in each of the 100 counties of North Carolina, as the independent variable, is plotted against the increase or decrease in total Democratic share of the two-party vote between the Kennedy-Nixon election of 1960 and the Reagan-Mondale election of 1984. As the Wallace percentage went up 12.5 percent, the Democrats' share of the vote between 1960 and 1984 fell 10 percent; $R^2 = .681$.
4. An example: The Census Bureau has released estimated black percentage of the population by locality for 1986—but only for localities with at least 25,000 residents; smaller localities merely are coded "S." A large number of localities in Virginia fall below this threshold. It seemed inappropriate to use 1986 data for some localities, but 1980 data for the rest.
5. A particular problem, none the less, is the inferences necessary from the Census data to the actual voters: in certain respects they are bound not to be alike. Certain localities contain large proportions of military personnel and out-of-state (or out-of-area) college students who do not register to vote there. Further, although loosened somewhat in recent years, voter registration requirements in Virginia remain severe relative to those in other states.
6. This is the assumption with the least "hard" support in the study. Lisa Handley (personal communication) has suggested that this assumption could be verified (or slapped down) by a bivariate regression of black proportion of population in each locality (as independent variable) against percentage of *total voting-age population* in each which voted in a given election. For example, if the intercept value was 60 and the value at 100-percent black was 54, then the proportion would be exactly 90 black voters for every 100 white voters (54/60). Regrettably, the only data available on turnout as a share of voting-age population were breakdowns by state (not by locality) of presidential elections, not off-year statewide elections; they cannot reasonably be used here.
7. I regret the necessity of assuming that turnout by race is uniform across localities; of course it is not. The degree of variation in turnout, and the factors contributing to it, can be examined in states in which registration and turnout figures by race are available. Such an examination is beyond the scope of the present study.
8. Metropolitan areas were coded as follows: Washington, 1; Richmond-Petersburg, 2; Hampton Roads, 3; Charlottesville, 4; Lynchburg, 5; Danville, 6; Roanoke, 7; Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, 8; nonmetropolitan, 9. (Fauquier County was coded "1," for although the Census Bureau has not included it in a metropolitan area, presumably due to its total size relative to population, the bulk of its people live in the Warrenton area, which for all practical purposes makes it part of the Washington metropolitan region.) The metropolitan areas also were recoded as a dummy variable: all eight metro areas, 1; all nonmetro localities (code 9 above), 0.
9. For example, if 40 percent of blacks and 60 percent of whites had twelve years of education, the raw black graduation rate compared to the white rate would be -20 percent (40-60), while the share of black graduates per 100 white graduates would be would be 66.7 (40/60). Then, if the median years of education was 11.4 for blacks and 12.0 for whites, the raw black-to-white difference would be -0.6 (11.4-12.0), while the percentage black-to-white ratio would be 95 (11.4/12.0) — thus narrowing the apparent education gap considerably.
10. It will be noted that the "white vote" is defined as the vote of all persons other than blacks. Lest I be accused of ignoring or insulting the various Asian, Hispanic, and other racial and ethnic groups in Virginia, let me state my reasons. Outside of the immigrant communities of Northern Virginia and the urban

Tidewater, and some few hundred members of indigenous tribes living on the middle and Lower Peninsulas, there is no large concentration of any other racial minority living in any locality, and of those resident, relatively small percentages are qualified to vote in Virginia. Further, there is no way reasonably to isolate out those who do vote. Without meaning any slight, then, I classified all non-blacks as "white." Most likely the 1990 census will force more caution in this regard on future researchers.

11. This, again, is based on the assumption of a 90 black:100 white turnout ratio.
12. One other contest fit the model less well than expected: Mary Sue Terry's re-election as attorney general in 1989. Terry was the only incumbent statewide official seeking return to the same office during the 1980s, was highly visible, and was widely considered to be a conservative Democrat; perceptions of her personal politics and performance in office, then, may have "flattened her slope."
13. The other education indicators were tested, but they were intercorrelated so highly with this indicator that I chose not to respecify the model (data not shown).
14. It is not necessarily curious that the 1985 Wilder election falls much more easily into the racial composition model that works for white Democrats. The lieutenant governorship is a powerless office; the holder's main duty is to organize a serious campaign for governor.

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C.L.R. James, Multiculturalism, and the Canon

Kent Worcester

Social Science Research Council

For the past several years, American intellectual-cultural life has been preoccupied by debates over the purpose and content of undergraduate education and the role of "multicultural" perspectives in understanding both the origins and trajectory of United States history and culture, and the relationship of the United States to the rest of the world. A bitter quarrel over the notion of "political correctness," and the evidently profound impact that "p.c. thought" (enforced by the so-called p.c. police) has had on academic decisions concerning hiring, tenure, and so on has complicated and burdened what was initially a pedagogical rift with philosophical overtones. A number of neoconservative thinkers—including Allan Bloom, Roger Kimball, Dinesh D'Souza, and George Will[1]—have either constructed or consolidated their public reputations by warning citizens about the dangers posed by anticanonical, anti-Western, and multicultural trends at institutions of higher education. Articles published in a range of reputable publications—such as the *New York Times*, the *Atlantic*, the *New Republic*, *Newsweek*, and the *New York Review of Books*—have helped to fuel and indeed sustain the controversy, which promises to rage well into the 1990s, if not beyond.[2]

Despite signs that more nuanced reflections are finding their way into mainstream journals of opinion,[3] the multifaceted and overlapping debates over multiculturalism, political correctness, and the canon have thus far been dominated by cautionary and frankly revanchist interventions on the part of neoconservative intellectuals who seemingly oppose any and all efforts to revise the canons of Western thought to incorporate perspectives articulated by or inclusive of marginalized and non-Western social groups. Cast in terms of tradition versus politicalization through reckless innovation, the dispute has effectively placed diverse and fledgling scholarly communities on the ideological and institutional defensive. Ironically, as a result of the rapid spread and apparent hegemony of the neoconservative reading of campus life, the modern university appears from the outside to be in a state of

permanent crisis, in which advocates of traditional values and standards are literally under assault from enemies of the American way of life. Thus one of the most productive and internationally competitive sectors of the economy has become stigmatized and even demonized as dynamic (if sometimes contradictory, and even problematic) processes of renewal and transformation have become symbolically represented as systemic failure.

Despite the obviously *political* character of these debates, the field of political science has remained largely untouched by interrelated disputes over the role of alternative viewpoints and vantage points in the formation of the college curriculum, the proper interpretation of American history, and the construction of modern social identity. In sharp contrast to such disciplines as literary studies, anthropology, and history, political science has experienced little of the introspection or inner turmoil that has marked scholarly debate in this area. Apparently isolated from popular and elite agitation over the condition of higher education in America, political scientists have seemed content to plow their own subfields in the hope that their scientific aspirations will shield them from the concerns of *sophists*, the *demos*, or the *polity*.

To the degree that they have taken notice of such issues as multiculturalism and political correctness, most political scientists have responded by adopting what might be described as a "reformist strategy," in which certain discreet curricular gestures toward inclusion and comprehension are made without any accompanying reconceptualization. While this consensus-seeking strategy of undertheorized reformism has the merit of recognizing the need for change, it neatly avoids many of the difficult questions raised by advocates of multiculturalism and canonical revision: which books should all undergraduates read? which groups constitute the center of U.S. society, and which groups constitute the periphery? are social scientists in a position to effectively address political change at, say, the popular-cultural, or diasporic level? what are the implications for democratic politics when course syllabi and attendant historical narratives are "naturalized" by liberal postwar discourse? As long as political science as a whole fails to effectively grapple with these sorts of questions, students and others will be justified in feeling that its practitioners are strangely unconnected to the real world of political debate. Yet there is little point in having political scientists reproduce already entrenched or reified positions—and there is an almost desperate need for fresh and imaginative thinking in this area.

In searching for innovative approaches to these kinds of questions, political scientists as well as others may find the ideas of the Trinidadian social critic and historian C.L.R. James both suggestive and illuminating. James's writings on history, literature, and democratic socialism transcend narrowly focused dichotomies between Western and non-Western traditions, traditional and multicultural pedagogical perspectives, and canonical and anticanonical loyalties. A true renaissance figure of the twentieth century, James's life and work has much of value to say about where higher education could be headed, and how to think about multiculturalism and the contribution of different cultures and intellectual traditions in the making of American culture and society. It should be noted that James only rarely addressed, in any explicit way, issues of multiculturalism and the canon. His views on these matters, therefore, have to be extracted from other contexts. Yet a number of

James's essays—on West Indian identity, on the contribution of classical and Western ideas to the modern epoch, and on the black studies movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, for example—pose acute and troubling questions for both advocates and critics of canonization and multiculturalism alike. His work, then, has the real potential to undermine fixed positions at both ends of the discoursive spectrum. In order to highlight his imaginative approach to questions of pedagogy, history, and politics, I discuss some of these essays below.

C.L.R. James

As the name C.L.R. James may be unfamiliar to a U.S. audience, it might be useful to first sketch his biography.[4] Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901–1989) was raised in the small town of Tunapuna, Trinidad, attended a first-rate secondary school on a scholarship, and moved to Britain in 1932 to pursue a literary career. His one novel, *Minty Alley*, was published in 1936. While employed as a journalist in London, he became active in the International African Service Bureau, which pressed for African decolonialization, and wrote a number of inspiring books, including *World Revolution 1917–1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International* (1937) *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (1938) and *A History of Negro Revolt* (1938). In this period he also joined the Trotskyist movement, whose exiled leader, Leon Trotsky, encouraged him to sail to the United States in 1938 to become active in African-American issues on behalf of the anti-Stalinist revolutionary Left. In the US, James helped form an independent Marxist political current (the so-called Johnson-Forest Tendency),[5] which described the Soviet Union as "state-capitalist" and which called for a revolutionary-democratic politics based on the self-activity of workers, blacks and other subaltern groups. In finally breaking with Trotskyism in the early 1950s, the Johnson-Forest Tendency set out to promote a non-Leninist radicalism that in certain respects anticipated syndicalist and feminist tendencies of the New Left.

Even as James was actively involved in left-wing politics, he was engaged in an intensive study of U.S. history, mores, and culture. His books *Notes on American Civilization* (1950) and *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: Herman Melville and the World We Live In* (1953) offered special insights into the American character and the country's literary traditions. One contribution was his discussion of the role of the popular audience in stimulating artistic creativity. This U.S. sojourn was cut short by his arrest and internment on Ellis Island in 1952 by the immigration authorities. After leaving the United States in early 1953 (just prior to when he would have been expelled) he lived on and off in London, publishing the semiautobiographical *Beyond a Boundary* (1963), *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution* (1977), and other works. For a number of years he was active in the West Indian independence movement. By the 1970s James had developed a unique reputation as a Caribbean person of letters, and in recent years there have been signs of growing interest in his work on the part of cultural historians and others.[6]

Several aspects of James's biography are particularly interesting from the perspective of the multicultural/canonical debates. For one thing, it was

marked by a number of unusual and productive antinomies. Having received a quintessentially Victorian education in such subjects as Latin, Greek, French, ancient history, and European literature, James went on to write about comic strips, radio plays, and gangster films (in *Notes on American Civilization*), and to defend popular culture in letters to Maxwell Geismar and other prominent intellectuals in the early 1950s.[7] As a product of the English colonial educational system, and as a keen student of Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Marx, James was intimately familiar with core Western values and traditions. At the same time, he was a committed West Indian nationalist and Pan-Africanist who excoriated imperialists and capitalists (and Stalinists) in print and through eloquent oratory. Uncomfortable with the sharp distinction typically drawn between "high" and "low" culture, James's interest in cultural practice was grounded in both aesthetic appreciation and in a deeply historical perspective that valued the role of culture in the development of the modern personality. His was a characteristically idiosyncratic Marxist cultural and political sensibility that artfully integrated Aristotelian, Rousseauian, Trotskyist, and populist themes.[8]

James's unique fusion of social populism, cultural and literary sophistication, and political radicalism reflected in part the particular historical conjuncture—emblemized by West Indian anticolonial struggles, cultural high modernism, the Depression, Trotsky's struggle against Stalinism, and interwar Pan-Africanism—under which he came to maturity. He was, in other words, a child of the 1920s and the 1930s, and therefore a supporter of "advanced" ideas in the spheres of economics, art, politics, and sexuality. It may further be argued that he embodied one of the central contradictions of West Indian development in the twentieth century, that is, that region's fraught relationship to Europe and its quest for an autonomous national identity. James came from a region of the world that was in its very essence multicultural, and yet one whose intellectuals at any rate retained a conflicted kind of affection for Western canonical traditions. We can locate these tensions in a number of James's essays, speeches, and books, including those addressing West Indian identity, the relevance of classical and modern European traditions to Caribbean society, and the black studies movement. But, as I will suggest in the conclusion, we can also learn to appreciate lives like James's for the way they force us to revise our notions of what it means to be "Western," and the degree to which cultural, intellectual, and political traditions represent historically contingent systems of categorization.

Advancing a West Indian Identity

In 1958 C.L.R. James returned to the West Indies for the first time in over twenty-five years. He and his wife, Selma, became active in the Peoples National Movement—led by his old friend and pupil, the distinguished economist Eric Williams—and they jointly edited the movement's newspaper, *The Nation*. Through articles, public speeches, and other activities C.L.R. James sought in this period to articulate a specifically West Indian identity. This was a task of some complexity. The people of the West Indies represented an agglomeration of several distinct yet overlapping histories and cultures,[9] and their relationship to British and more generally Western

traditions was both long-standing and problematic. While James liked to emphasize the autonomous contribution that West Indians could make to world civilization as a whole, he also acknowledged the importance of European and classical Greek influences in the spheres of art, politics, culture, and morality. His position on this question remained essentially unchanged throughout his life. In the early 1980s, many years after his Trinidadian sojourn, he was asked by an interviewer if "Shakespeare, Rembrandt and Beethoven should matter to the Caribbean people." In his reply, James insisted:

> The Caribbean people are *people*, and Shakespeare, Rembrandt and Beethoven should matter to *all* people who are living in the world today, and who are able by means of their language or by means of information and communication to understand or get some insight into what Shakespeare, and Beethoven mean. I don't like that question at all . . . if it means that Caribbean writers today should be aware that there are emphases in their writing that we owe to non-European, non-Shakespearean roots, and the past in music which is not Beethoven, that I agree. But . . . fundamentally we are a people whose literary and aesthetic past is rooted in Western European civilization.[10]

However, roots were one thing and historical development was another. In James's mind, Western traditions were there to be interrogated, transgressed, and transformed. One of the characteristics of the West Indian people(s) that James most admired was how they had transformed colonial inheritances into oppositional practices. To give only one example (expounded upon at some length in *Beyond A Boundary*): the game of cricket, imported to the West Indies to inculcate "gentlemanly" values among the restless and discontented, was turned into a different sort of social activity when the West Indian masses learned how to organize their own leagues, and to bowl faster and play better than their English counterparts. The point was that the West Indies could profit from the political, literary, and linguistic inheritances of the West even as the people of the region created oppositional movements and other instruments of mass emancipation. The road to an independent West Indian identity would of necessity be constructed using a diverse and seemingly incompatible assortment of tools and techniques. It was, for James, a question not of merely reproducing or rejecting European customs and traditions, but of simultaneously reassessing and transcending them.

There were practical aspects to the struggle for a West Indian consciousness. James was strongly committed to the ideal of a federation of West Indian island-nations, which he saw as one step toward building Pan-African unity. Like many, he regarded federation as the only plausible solution to the problem of underdevelopment in the Eastern Caribbean. This was a problem that had both political and economic aspects. As he told an audience in Demerara, British Guiana, "Federation is the means, and the only means, whereby the West Indies and British Guiana can accomplish the transition from colonialism to national independence. . . . " Through political unity, the emergent island-states of the East Caribbean could help to "create the basis for a new nation," one that had a firm identity; and "by reorganizing the

economic system and the national life give us our place in the modern community of nations."[11]

But James's real interest lay not so much in strategic economic planning, or in erecting federal institutions, but in fostering a sense of "social purpose"[12] among the West Indian population. By "social purpose," James clearly had in mind something grander than an aspiration for material progress or national sovereignty. Prosperity and liberal democracy were necessary, but they were at the same time insufficient. What James was calling for was nothing less than a "long and deeply rooted national tradition. . . ."[13] Only through the development of a "national consciousness" could the West Indian people transcend "this matter of shallow roots," as James so indelicately put it.[14] "We can console ourselves," he added, by pointing out that "[s]ize has nothing to do with it. Look at Ibsen and Kierkegaard, and the Greek city-state."[15] It was a matter of developing a national will, a sense of mutual purpose and endeavor.

Through their intimate relationship with the contemporary mass audience, creative artists could play a special role in the formation of a national identity. James singled out one particular artist who he believed had already made a real contribution to the task of defining the West Indian character: the calypso singer Francisco Slinger, "otherwise known as the Mighty Sparrow."[16] Not only was the Mighty Sparrow conscious of the social dimension of independence and political democracy, but the singer seemed to enjoy an unusually fertile connection with an emerging national audience. James wrote:

> His talents were shaped by a West Indian medium; through this medium he expanded his capacities and the medium itself. He is financially maintained by the West Indian people who buy his records. The mass of people give him all the encouragement that an artist needs. Although the calypso is Trinidadian, Sparrow is hailed in all the islands and spontaneously acknowledged as a representative West Indian. Thus he is in every way a genuinely West Indian artist, the first and only one that I know. He is a living proof that there is a West Indian nation.[17]

Thus there were grounds for optimism. Yet one can detect in James's writings from this period a certain amount of misgiving about the prospects for democratic advance in the West Indies. "I have never known," he complained at one point, "a population claiming to be democratic where so many people (both Negroes and Indians) live in such fear of the whole apparatus of government. . . ."[18] At another juncture he wrote: "I have repudiated in unambiguous terms the false and dangerous conception that we have been so educated by the British that the instinct for democracy is established among us. . . . I see every sign that the tendency to naked power and brutality, the result of West Indian historical development, is here all around us. . . . Has democracy sunk ineradicable roots in us? I say that I see no sign of it and many signs to the contrary. . . ."[19]

Critic of colonialism that he was, James nevertheless found certain aspects—such as, presumably, an ingrained liberal-democratic culture—of the "Western tradition" to possess great merit. He did not suppose that West Indian politicians and civil servants would be necessarily more productive or enlightened than their British counterparts, nor did he counterpoise the achievements of European civilization to the virtues of the "barrack-yards"

(working-class quarters) of Port-of-Spain. As I have suggested, James recognized that if West Indians were to move on, they would have to "master a medium," one that has "developed in a foreign territory and on that basis seek and find out what is native, and build on that." He noted that "it is obvious that our present race of politicians are too far gone ever to learn that. But there are signs that this truth is penetrating younger people. It is the West Indian truth that matters above all. Perhaps Sparrow will make a calypso on it."[20] A cruder form of nationalist politics, one that completely disdained the achievements of the West, would only exacerbate the tendency toward "naked power and brutality" that was one of colonialism's unfortunate legacies.

The Contribution of the West

Achieving the proper balance between forging a West Indian identity and learning from the West was a key problem animating the six lectures on "modern politics" that James gave under the auspices of the Trinidad Public Library's Adult Education Program in 1960. His central theme concerned the historical, intellectual, and cultural contributions of classical, Renaissance, and modern liberal thought to humanity and their contemporary relevance for a West Indian audience.[21] Each lecture attracted an audience of several hundred, serving to underscore James's point that cultural and social progress would depend on the involvement of large numbers of people. The series drew on his mid-1950s studies of democracy in ancient Greece, Aristotle's critical method, and the tragedies of Shakespeare,[22] as well as on *Notes on American Civilization* and *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways.*

The series spanned an impressive amount of material in a short period of time. The first lecture introduced the concept of direct democracy, as practiced in Athens and other Greek city-states, favorably contrasting it with liberal representative government. The second traced classical Marxism's roots in French and German philosophy, emphasizing the democratic character of Marx's thought, and the third and fourth lectures spanned a wide array of topics related to contemporary history, such as the emergence of a world market, the threat of fascism, the "failure of the nation-state," and the promise of a better way of life as symbolized by the Hungarian workers' revolt of 1956. The final two lectures portrayed leading artistic figures of the twentieth century and their complex relationship to "crises in intimate relations" that originate in "a dislocation of society"[23] under modern capitalism. The thesis tying these variegated topics together was that only a sweeping reconstruction of public and industrial life could avert the disintegration of modern society.

As any standard survey of Western civilization, *Modern Politics* opened with the Greeks. In this particular survey the city-state's virtues—particularly its capacity to reconcile and integrate individual wills—was a recurrent theme. One reason for this emphasis on classical civilization was that James believed that small nations with meager economic resources, such as those of the West Indies, could achieve grand results in the spheres of politics and culture. A more fundamental justification, however, had to do with the

intrinsic value of classical Greek culture and the "remarkable" character of Athenian civilization. The ancient city-states

> formed, in my opinion, the most remarkable of all the various civilizations of which we have record in history, including our own. . . . And it is not only that we today rest upon their achievements. It is far more wonderful than that. If today you want to study politics, it is not because Aristotle and Plato began the great discussion, not at all; in order to tackle politics today, fundamentally, you have to read them for the questions that they pose and the way that they pose them; they are not superseded at all.[24]

Drawing on a long-standing interest in political theory, James ascribed the exceptional character of social life in ancient Greece to two main factors: mass participation in the institutions of the city-state, and the dense emotional and political bonds harmonizing the individual with the wider community. Since male citizens (but not, of course, slaves, females, or foreigners) had an authentic voice in the polity, they felt an intense attachment to the city-state. This attachment itself constituted "the basis of a good life."[25] In appreciating the need to reconcile communitarianism and free individual expression, Athens attained a more or less rational balance between the "individual citizen and the City-State."[26] Despite two thousand years of scientific and technological progress, humanity never recaptured the organic equilibrium of the city-state. It is with a considerable sense of melancholy that James announced that *"people have lost the habit of looking at government and one another in that way."*[27]

In the domains of politics, art, and philosophy, the citizens of the ancient city-state created the foundations for a meaningful life for the enfranchised minority. But recapturing the spirit of the ancient city-state's communal solidarity—and extending its benefits to all members of society—involved something more complicated than simply harking back to the past. It required a global movement toward the realization of a democratic order in which the alienation of modern individuals from the public sphere, and from the tyranny of political economy, could be meaningfully addressed. This in turn required considering the question of capitalism versus socialism. Drawing on classical Marxist precepts, the lectures stressed the capacity of ordinary workers to effectively intervene in revolutionary crises and otherwise defend their autonomous interests. The Marxist conception of the social power of workers was memorably expressed in the following passage:

> When ten thousand school teachers, bookkeepers, the writers and talkers like myself, and editors and so forth, vote, that is ten thousand votes; and they can have one thousand extra and have eleven thousand votes and defeat ten thousand workers, in votes. But the moment a revolutionary struggle is on, the workers—this group takes the railway, the other one the waterfront, the other one turns off the electricity, and the other one stops the transport; the teachers, etc., can only make some noise but they cannot do anything; they can send the children back home or bring them back or something. In all struggles of this kind it is the proletariat that is master of the situation.[28]

This mastery of the revolutionary conjuncture reflected the structural power of the working class as constituted in the sphere of production. The interna-

tional working class was not only a structurally powerful social group, however: it was in the process of becoming, for James, a vital factor in the establishment of a new social order based on an enlightened form of workplace and community-based councils.[29]

James saw in the West Indian drive toward independence an opportunity of erecting a new type of society that nevertheless shared certain features in common with the ancient city-state. In *Modern Politics*, the movement for Caribbean self-determination is seen as having the potential of fostering a new social and political order. By setting out along the path of self-organization laid out by the city-state, West Indians could break with the colonial past and instigate regional rebellion. But the revolutionary capacity of the West's industrial proletariat to avert the collapse of world civilization was emphasized as well.[30] As paradoxical as it might have seemed to some listeners, Trinidad's most famous Marxist and Pan-Africanist maintained an abiding commitment to the prospect of First World working-class insurrection coming to the aid of Third World nationalist forces, a commitment he combined with a profound respect for classical and Western intellectual traditions.

The Black Studies Movement

The politico-historical context shaping James's work in and around the Peoples National Movement during the late 1950s was markedly different from that of the late 1960s. Much of what he had to say about the relationship of West Indian societies to the West would have seemed unexceptional in 1960 and yet completely objectionable (in certain quarters, at any rate) by 1970. Indeed, charges of "Eurocentrism," a bias towards the canon, and an excessive (even indecent) Anglophilia have been raised by more than a few authors and activists, some of whom come out of a broadly "Afrocentric" tradition.[31] Many of James's critics, however, came to appreciate the way in which his ideas were rooted in concrete generational experiences, and saw that they tended to reflect his Victorian and canonical upbringing. It has also been noted that there is a good deal of common ground between his overall sensibility and a classical Marxism that was itself partly inspired by classical Greek ontology, enlightenment humanism, and Continental philosophy. From this perspective, James's adoption of Marxist principles in the early 1930s signals not so much a departure from, but a peculiar modification of the "old-world" values and beliefs that he was exposed to as a boy. And yet despite—or because of—his Eurocentric Marxism, James was an early and vigorous advocate of Pan-African idealism, African-American civil liberties, and African decolonialism.

It was in his capacity as a spokesperson for black civil rights and liberation that James was asked to speak on the subject of "black studies" in 1969, at Federal City College (now the University of the District of Columbia). The talk was one of many he delivered throughout North America in the late 1960s and 1970s, and it was accompanied in this particular instance by his obtaining a teaching position at the College. Although—in part because of his worker-centrism, and in part because his discourse lacked the appropriate anti-American gestures—he never became a key intellectual guru of the U.S. New Left (á la Fanon, Mandel, Marcuse, etc.), the peripatetic Trinidadian did

manage to achieve a natural rapport with many late 1960s audiences on account of his wry speaking style and principled, articulate radicalism.[32]

The speech given at Federal City College exemplified his virtues both as an orator and as an independent socialist. It also revisited the distinctive ideological position that he had laid out a decade earlier in the context of debates in the West Indies. "Black Studies and the Contemporary Student" opened on a quintessentially Jamesian note: "I have to make certain things clear from the beginning. I do not recognize any distinctive nature of black studies—not today, 1969. However, the history of the United States being what it has been and what it still is, there is a serious struggle going on between the advocates of one lot of black studies and the advocates of another lot. And, therefore, I am compelled for the time being to take sides."[33] There were, on the one hand, advocates of an autonomous, "nation-building" black studies movement (which James was certainly critical of), and advocates of a sort of pacification strategy in which black studies would play the same role in the universities that Nixon's "black capitalism" program was designed to play in the black community. James is clearly an opponent of the latter: "They are saying, 'Well, you want to study black studies; what you really need to do is to get the kind of education which will fit you for your 11 per cent of the top jobs and your 11 per cent of the middle jobs, too.'"[34]

James's general position was neither black-nationalist nor liberal cooptationist; but so long as he had to chose, James sided with the nationalists. As he stated toward the beginning of the talk: "A man like Rap Brown says things that I can't imagine my saying. But if anybody wants to criticize him, especially people in England, I tell them, 'You shut up and leave him alone. What he says and what risks he chooses to run, that is his business, comes from his past and his experience of the people around him.'"[35] For James, militant nationalists like Rap Brown voiced legitimate concerns and experiences of many young African-Americans, and however critical one might be of certain manifestations of black nationalist thought, one had to recognize that it sprang out of an authentic popular movement with a logic and appeal all of its own. As James had forcefully argued in his seminal document "The Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Problem in the U.S.A." (1948),[36] there was an intrinsically democratic dynamic to black nationalist movements, one that Marxists would have to appreciate and even accommodate on its own terms if they were to be serious about intervening effectively in American politics. Furthermore, in James's opinion the black studies movement was correct in insisting on the relevance of the black experience to the history of the West. As he argued in his talk, "[n]ow to talk to me about black studies as if it is something that concerned black people is an utter denial. This is the history of Western Civilization. I can't see it otherwise."[37] If it took a nationalist perspective to challenge moribund conceptions of the West, then so be it.

This is not to suggest, however, that James's position was one of passively accepting whatever demands were raised by a given social movement. For one thing, the impassioned discourse of 1960s-style black power movements was not exactly one he felt comfortable with: "I am not boasting about Black is beautiful. Please, I don't go in for that. If other people want to, that's their affair, if they say 'Black is beautiful,' 'Black is ugly,' Black is whatever they like. I am concerned with historical facts."[38] The phrase "historical facts," of

course, was the critical one. James's interest was in interrogating and opening up the study of Western societies—in strengthening and deepening our understanding and appreciation of history as a totality—and not in Western Civ-bashing. An interesting light on his perspective is cast in a section in which he discusses his conversations with West Indian graduate students in London:

> I am in London and I see some of the students and I ask one of them, "What are you doing?" He says, "I am doing a study of T.S. Eliot." I say, "Fine." I ask another West Indian student, "What are you doing?" He says, "I am working for the Ph.D." I say, "What are you doing?" He says, "I am studying D.H. Lawrence." I say, "Very nice." The most fantastic of them all is another fellow who tells me he is doing Joseph Conrad. Conrad is a Pole who wrote in the English language and wrote very well indeed.[39]

At this point the listener might have supposed that James advised these students to probe, say, the history of the Haitian slave revolution (as he had), or the life of Marcus Garvey (which James had considerable interest in). But his advice went in a rather different direction:

> But why should these West Indian students be doing D.H. Lawrence, Joseph Conrad and T.S. Eliot when a man like Alexandre Dumas, the father, is there? . . . I want to tell you what those novels [e.g., Dumas's *The Count of Monte Cristo, The Three Musketeers*] did. After the French revolution, Europe and the rest of the world broke out into what was known as the romantic period which meant a tremendous expansion of the individual personality of the ordinary man. Previous to the French revolution, men lived according to a certain discipline, a certain order. The French revolution broke with that and people began to live more individual, more experimental, more romantic lives—Personality. Among the forces which contributed to that were the romantic poets and novelists of the day. And not one of them stands higher in the popular field, in the expectation and understanding of the people of those days, than Alexandre Dumas. . . . What I am saying is, not only did the Black people contribute, not only did they fight in the ranks, but in forging the kind of lives which people lived afterwards, one of the foremost men is a man from the Caribbean. How do I make that into Black studies? I can't. No! I can understand some university saying, "We are going to study the lives and works of Black men who have not been done before." That I understand, but to make it Black studies![40]

An instructive passage. James had no special interest in the works of Alexandre Dumas. But he called attention to the romantic author's West Indian origins in order to highlight the intersection and interdependence of Western traditions and the African diaspora. This passage is also instructive for what it says about how James liked to upset listeners' expectations, and thereby undermine their assumptions, be they nationalist or traditionalist. There is something ironic and even deconstructionist about the suggestion that Dumas's romantic individualism could be of significance to the black studies movement.[41] Finally, the passage reasserted the value of "history" over something called "black studies." Ultimately, it was the contribution that the latter could make to the former that excited James. Black studies per se held no intrinsic interest for him.

Conclusion

One could adopt many different kinds of strategies in describing C.L.R. James's relationship to issues of multiculturalism and the canon. While he tended to focus on either issues of immediate political concern (e.g., Soviet communism, West Indian federation, African independence), or abiding intellectual concerns (e.g., Shakespeare, popular culture, the relationship of Hegel to Marxism), in one way or another his whole life could be said to have been engaged in multicultural and canonical questions. After all, James was a product of a multicultural environment. He had no choice. The dominant Western culture that he was exposed to as a secondary school student was itself the product of several traditions—not only that of individual European nations, but also that of discrete historical traditions that predated the very notion of "the West." More significantly, perhaps, in this context, even as he was mastering and refining the lessons of a formal education, he was filtering what he learned through a distinctively West Indian and thereby multicultural lens.

Furthermore, James was also a keen student of the canon. His delightful book *Beyond a Boundary* recounts his deep attachment to such early Victorian authors as Matthew Arnold and William Thackeray, and his book *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways* constitutes a stimulating effort to reinterpret and in a sense canonize Herman Melville's work. There is an almost Straussian quality about his insistence on the enduring importance of Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Rousseau, and Marx.[42] Like the Straussians, who have based their political praxis largely on the writings of Plato, Rousseau, Strauss, and a handful of others, James returned again and again to such canonical questions as the nature of the good society, the purpose of civic authority, and the harmonization of the individual and the society. Had he been able to finish his projected book on Shakespeare (and had his penetrating analysis of Aristotle's *Poetics, A Preface to Criticism*, been published in his lifetime), then his intellectual debts would be more clearly perceived.[43] But even the completed and published works disclose the multicultural and canonical roots of James's thought.

For many writers, of course, multicultural and canonical perspectives are mutually incompatible. Multiculturalism is often viewed as a perfidious movement designed to overturn the canon. Canonists and multiculturalists alike insist that their conflict is a zero-sum game. Certain defenders of the canon would no doubt argue that James's multifaceted position is blasphemous. In particular, they would object to the way in which James's work simultaneously endorses the canon and asserts the centrality of "peripheral" diasporic encounters and intellectual movements. Furthermore, defenders of the canon would certainly repudiate James's infatuation with popular culture, an infatuation grounded in a populist appreciation for those cultural forms that are created in remarkable proximity to the masses themselves. Yet, despite the mounting anxieties of cultural revanchists, there is no obvious reason why one cannot endorse many different kinds of authors and literary tendencies.

In a superficial sense, James's stance is comparable to that of the reformist strategy of political science. The key difference, however, is that James's approach is integrated into a radical, holistic, and multicultural conception

of history, political theory, and political change. His overall stance, then, is multicultural *and* canonical, but it should be remembered that his pedagogical interests were clearly subsumed under his political, intellectual, and historical concerns.

In reviewing his interventions in the West Indian independence movement of the late 1950s—early 1960s, we saw how James stressed the importance of British and other European influences and yet saw the need for the development of an autonomous West Indian national consciousness. Fostering a sense of "social purpose" did not require renouncing the achievements of Western Civilization. But it did involve a sharp break with colonial habits and doctrines, and it also necessitated the creation of new forms of political mobilization and popular culture that could express new identities. An inveterate optimist, James assumed that sweeping changes were on the horizon. But he also warned that progress would have to be based on democratic norms and procedures, and not on a nihilistic rejection of the past.

James's 1960 lectures on modern politics constituted one aspect of his intercession in West Indian affairs on the eve of Independence, and they reaffirm their author's strongly held belief in the contemporary relevance of Western canonical traditions. The lectures make it clear that James believed that a basic familiarity with the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, Marx et al. were an essential component of a well-rounded education. In addition, the city-state was upheld as an attractive and in certain respects viable model for Caribbean development. Again, as in the discussion concerning West Indian identity, there was the sense that aspects of the past would be valuable even as the West Indies embarked on a new project of Third World emancipation.

Finally, in the somewhat different context of the Black power movement of the late 1960s, James advanced an independent Marxist perspective on the Black studies movement that offered critical support to the Afrocentric camp but refused to draw a sharp distinction between Black studies and historical studies per se. Challenging his listeners' militant and nationalist expectations, he suggested novel and provocative avenues for scholarly research that could be undertaken under the purview of Black studies *or* history (or political sociology, or cultural studies, etc.). The question of demarcating academic boundaries was, for James, almost a nonissue in comparison to the question of finding ways to encourage innovative scholarship that actively engaged problems that were of legitimate interest beyond academe.

The logical implication of his approach was that fixed categories such as "the West," "Western Civilization," or even "black studies" had to be reexamined and subjected to searching critiques. Western traditions themselves were more multifaceted, overdetermined, and unruly than their complacent advocates tended to realize. Properly armed with a sense of intellectual and political purpose, James believed that the Black studies movement could inject a welcome blast of determination and realism into the study of history as a whole.

Campus debates over multiculturalism, political correctness, and the canon have become polarized and politicized to an astonishing degree. Perhaps polarization is the price we pay for political clarity. But we should find a way to acknowledge the unorthodox perspectives of a C.L.R. James. Notions of both "the canon" and "multiculturalism" shift under his singular gaze.

Notes

1. See Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Roger Kimball, *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Higher Education* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990); and Dinesh D'Souza: *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Sex and Race on Campus* (New York: Free Press, 1991). George Will is, of course, a columnist for *Newsweek* and a television commentator.
2. One 1992 presidential candidate, Pat Buchanan, interjected himself into the controversy when he said that "our Judeo-Christian values are going to be preserved and our Western heritage is going to be handed down to future generations and not dumped into some landfill called multiculturalism." Quoted in the *New York Times*, 13 January 1992, p. A14.
3. See Louis Menand, "What are Universities For?" *Harpers*, December 1991; and Rosa Ehrenrich, "What Campus Radicals? The PC Undergrad is a Useful Specter," *Harpers*, December 1991.
4. For deeper biographical insight, the reader may wish to consult Paul Buhle, ed. *C.L.R. James: His Life and Work* (London: Allison and Busby, 1986); Anna Grimshaw, *The C.L.R James Archive; A Readers' Guide* (New York: The C.L.R. James Institute, 1991); Anna Grimshaw, *The C.L.R. James Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Paget Henry and Paul Buhle, eds. *C.L.R. James's Caribean* (Durham: Duke University, 1992); and Kent Worcester, *C.L.R. James: A Political Biography*, forthcoming.
5. See Kent Worcester, "C.L.R. James, Marxism and America," in *Research and Society* (Buffalo), 4 (1991).
6. See, *inter alia*, Hazel V. Carby, "Proletarian or Revolutionary Literature: C.L.R. James and the Politics of the Trinidadian Renaissance," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 87, 1 (1988); Edward W. Said, "Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitan Culture," *Raritan*, 9, 3 (1990); Kenneth Suring, "C.L.R. James' Materialist Aesthetics of Cricket," *Polygraph*, no. 4 (1990); and Alan Wald, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left from the 1930s to the 1980s* (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1987).
7. Some of these letters are reproduced in Anna Grimshaw's *The C.L.R. James Reader*.
8. I discuss James's complex political profile in "C.L.R. James and the Gospel of American Modernity," *Socialism and Democracy* (New York), forthcoming.
9. In addition to the descendants of Africans, European colonial settlers, and mulattos, over 35 percent of Trinidad and Tobago's population was of East Indian extraction at the time of the Jameses' visit. The island-nation also contained significant numbers of Chinese and Portuguese peoples.
10. "An Audience with C.L.R. James," *Third World Book Review*, 1, 2 (1984): 7. Emphases in the original. James took strong exception to those who propounded strictly Afrocentric conceptions of West Indian identity. As he wrote in his critique of the Peoples National Movement: "The Populations in the British West Indies have no native civilization at all. People dance Bongo and Shango and all this is very artistic and very good. But these have no serious effects upon their general attitude to the world. These populations are essentially Westernized and they have been Westernized for centuries." C.L.R. James, *Party Politics in the West Indies* (San Fernando, Trinidad: Vedic Enterprises, 1962), 89.
11. C.L.R. James, "Lectures on Federation" (1958) reprinted in C.L.R. James, *At the Rendezvous of Victory: Selected Writings* (London: Allison and Busby, 1986), 90. A year later he insisted during a public lecture in Kingston, Jamaica, that Jamaica's economic difficulties could only be attacked through the creation of federal-level planning mechanisms. "I believe," he states, "that the time has come for the State Plan. So far we have been clearing up the imperialist mess. The activity of the

last years has been to prepare the ground for a new stage of the economy, and that is the economy of the State Plan." James, "Federation — What Now?" (1959), reprinted in *At the Rendezvous of Victory*, 122. Just what mix of private enterprise, welfare provision, and other forms of public intervention would be involved was not clearly specified.

12. See "The West Indian Middle Classes" (1960), reprinted in C.L.R. James, *Spheres of Existence: Selected Writings* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1977), 185.
13. C.L.R. James, "The Artist in the Carribean" (1959), reprinted in C.L.R. James, *The Future in the Present: Selected Writings* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1977), 185. In the speech, James calls attention to the absence of a national tradition in the West Indies that is capable of generating or sustaining great artistic achievement. He argues that "[t]hese conditions can be changed . . . the threads of a tradition can be discovered among us and made into a whole. But to do that, we must have the consciousness that the nation which we are hoping to build, as much as it needs the pooling of resources and industrialization and a higher productivity of labor, needs also the supreme artist" (pp. 189–190).
14. James, "The Artist in the Carribean," 185. By "shallow roots" he had in mind the apparent absence of a national tradition in the West Indies. "For us and for people like us there is no continuous flow such as for instance the Bachs into Haydn into Mozart into Beethoven. There is no Donne in our ancestry for us to rediscover and stimulate the invention of new forms and new symbols" (pp. 184–185).
15. James, "The Artist in the Carribean," 185.
16. C.L.R. James, "The Mighty Sparrow," reprinted in James, *The Future in the Present*, 191–201.
17. James, "The Mighty Sparrow," 191.
18. James, *Party Politics in the West Indies*, 155.
19. Ibid. 122.
20. James, "The Mighty Sparrow," 201.
21. This section draws from my chapter "The Question of the Canon: C.L.R. James and 'Modern Politics,'" in *C.L.R. James' Carribean*, ed. Paget Henry and Paul Buhle (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992).
22. See the following works by James: *A Preface to Criticism* (London: 1956, mimeo); "Every Cook Can Govern" (1956), reprinted in James, *The Future in the Present;* and "Popular Art and the Cultural Tradition" (1954), reprinted in *Third Text: Third World Perspectives in Contemporary Art and Culture*, no. 10 (Spring 1990). For many years James planned to write a book on Shakespeare's tragedies. See Grimshaw, *The C.L.R. James Archive.*
23. C.L.R. James, *Modern Politics* 1960; reprint, (Detroit:Bewick Editions, 1973), 119.
24. Ibid., 3.
25. Ibid., 97.
26. Ibid., 5.
27. Ibid., 4. Emphasis in the original.
28. Ibid., 61.
29. In this period as in others James remained optimistic about the possibilities for radical change on a global level. "There has been a development; the development is along the lines that I have tried to show. Man is ready for great strides forward today" (James, *Modern Politics*, 154).
30. "[T]he passing of colonialism . . . is a sign of the weakness of the capitalist bourgeois state and at the same time it provides ammunition for the breakdown of these imperialist states which dominated them before. Nevertheless there is no question about it: the basic opposition to imperialism must come from the proletariat of the advanced countries" (p.90). As sympathetic as he was to the cause of national liberation, James clearly remained committed to the Trotskyist theory of premanent revolution.

31. See, *inter alia,* John Gaffar La Guerre, *The Social and Political Thought of the Colonial Intelligentsia* (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1982); Aldrie Henry, "On Cricket," in *Tribute to a Scholar: Appreciating C.L.R. James* ed. Bishnu Ragoonth (Mona, Jamaica: Consortium Graduate School of Social Sciences, 1990); Tony Martin, "C.L.R. James and the Race/Class Question," *Race,* 14, 2 (1972); and Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition* (London: Zed Press, 1983).
32. It was in this period that his book *A History of Negro Revolt* was reprinted under the title *A History of Pan-African Revolt* (1969), and *The Black Jacobins,* having been republished by Vintage in 1963, circulated widely among students and activists.
33. C.L.R. James, "Black Studies and the Contemporary Student" (1969), reprinted in James, *At the Rendezvous of Victory,* 186.
34. James, "Black Studies and the Contemporary Student," 189.
35. Ibid. 190. Or, as he concluded his talk: "Life presents you with some strange difficulties, and, at times, you have to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds" (p.201).
36. C.L.R. James, "The Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Problem in the U.S.A." [1984], reprinted in James, *The Future in the Present.*
37. James, "Black Studies and the Contemporary Student," 194.
38. Ibid., 193.
39. Ibid., 195.
40. Ibid., 195.
41. But it was consistent with the friendly references he made to Abraham Lincoln as he set forth a research agenda for the black studies movement. James liked to emphasize, in this speech and others, what he saw in the way in which Lincoln's political evolution both reflected and went beyond white Northern attitudes toward race and the republic.
42. See *Leo Strauss, Liberalism, Ancient and Modern* (1968; reprint, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
43. An excerpt from *A Preface to Criticism* appears in Grimshaw, *The C.L.R. James Reader.*

Determinants of Attitudes toward National Integration in Nigeria Twenty Years after the Civil War: An Empirical Investigation of Two Ibo Localities

Emmanuel Uwalaka

St. Louis University, Missouri

In 1967 the federal military government of Nigeria engaged in a civil war to bring back to the federal fold the Ibos,[1] of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria, who had declared themselves the independent Republic of Biafra on 30 May, 1967. This chapter assesses the extent of Ibos' support for integration process in Nigeria by examining certain economic, social, and political issues. Specifically, I shall explore Ibo attitudes about national integration; which is defined as the process by which the various ethnic groups in the country come to perceive themselves as members of the political unit called "Nigeria" and have lesser attachments to their ethnic group; *social distance* involves the readiness of the Ibos to associate with people of other ethnic groups in Nigeria; *Ibo nationalism* seeks to probe into Ibos' identification with "Biafra" over Nigeria; *ethnicity* is the extent to which the Ibos express positive or negative feelings about their ethnic group; and *media use* characterizes each of the respondents according to the level of exposure to radio, television, and newspapers. Also, I shall examine to what extent demographic variables affect attitudes toward national integration.

However, an examination of the integration process in Nigeria twenty years after the civil war raises a number of questions: To what extent have the Ibo people been reintegrated into the Federal Republic of Nigeria? What is the Ibo people's perception of the extent to which they have been reintegrated into the federation? To what extent do the Ibo people wish to be reintegrated into the federation?

This chapter will examine the above issues by presenting the results of a 1989 public opinion survey of 300 adult Ibos in two localities—Owerri Urban and Ekwerazu. These were two localities chosen respectively from Owerri Local Government Authority and Ahiazu-Mbaise Local Government

Authority. Owerri Urban is the capital city of Imo State of Nigeria and Ekwerazu is a rural town about forty miles from Owerri. These two localities were chosen for study because it would have been logistically impossible to cover the whole Ibo land in a single study. By examining the Ibos' attitudes and perceptions toward the Nigerian integration process policymakers will gain insights on what might be more auspicious policies to promote integration. Moreover, the Ibos' feelings about the desirability of integration will help explain why certain policies fared as they did. In a more general note, the results of this study will be of great importance for other African countries that face similar problems to Nigeria.

Background

The problem of national integration has for some decades been a thorny issue for the new African independent states. This problem, can be traced back to the scramble for Africa during the late nineteenth century.[2] At the Berlin Conference, which began in 1884 and ended in 1885, various European powers set the rules by which they laid claims over all Africa for their own economic and political reasons.[3] One main disadvantage of the African partition by different European countries was that the indigenous nation-building process that was taking place in different African nations before the arrival of the Europeans was disrupted.

However, the problem of national integration in Nigeria is multidimensional. One of the main features of the Nigerian society is its heterogeneity: that is, it is a country with many different ethnic groups, of which the Hausas, the Ibos, and the Yorubas are the major ones. Different languages and religious groups also exist. Consequently, different studies have pointed to ethnic, linguistic, religious, and colonial experience as factors in the causes of the disintegration of the First Nigerian Republic. This disintegration led to the secession by the Ibos on 30 May 1967 as the independent Republic of Biafra.[4] Biafra was brought back into the federal fold after nearly thirty months of civil war.

After the civil war the Nigerian federal government developed and adopted policies that could bring the various ethnic groups in the country together and, thus further national identity. Measures such as reinstating former "Biafran" military personnel and civil servants into the federal army and civil service, respectively, were undertaken. Also, policies such as a universal primary education, a national youth service corp, the creation of states, and a revision of the federal constitution that grants equal rights and civil liberties to all citizens were established. While some of these policies have been aimed at preventing cases similar to Biafra and integrating the Ibos back into the federal structure, no studies have been developed on the attitudes of the Ibos toward integration process in Nigeria.

Independent Variables

In this research I utilize nine independent variables: religion, age, region, sex, ethnicity, social distance, education, media use, and Ibo nationalism (see below for measurement of variables).

Religion. Some studies have demonstrated the impact of religious background on political opinions and behavior. Catholics and Protestants are known to differ in both of these areas.[5] Also, in the examination of attitude toward change, Rokeah concludes that Catholics are the most conservative, Protestants are the next, and nonbelievers are the least conservative.[6]

With regard to this research I expected that if the findings of Rokeah stated above are universally true,support for national integration would be less among Catholics than among Protestants and other religious groups in the two localities examined.

Age. A study by Cutler[7] suggests that age is significantly related to support for public issues. However, Sigel[8] and Cutler[9] point out that variations on support for public issues can be better explained by the period during which an individual came to adulthood rather than by age. The concern with the variable age is with the extent to which it affects attitude toward national integration.

Region. By region I mean geographical setting either a rural or urban. Smock and Bentsi-Enchill believe that the urbanization of African cities has great prospects for national integration.[10] Inkeles on the other hand notes that there is a significant difference in the political opinions of Nigerian urban and rural dwellers.[11] The urban dwellers are more cosmopolitan, economically better off and more in touch with daily happenings than rural dwellers, who are more traditional and less responsive to change. This research investigates the extent that residential settings affect attitudes toward national integration.

Sex. Studies on sex differences have found that there is a significant relationship between sex and support for public issues and that men tend to be politically more active than women. Some studies view this difference as an effect of differential socialization of boys and girls (e.g., Levitt[12]; Campbell, Converse, and Stokes[13]; Milbrath and Goel).[14] However, some other studies have seen a substantial change in attitudes toward women's roles over the last twenty-five years, in a less traditional direction (e.g., Rapoport[15], Erskine[16]). This research tried to determine whether these research findings are applicable to Ibo society.

Ethnicity. Some scholars have studied national integration and ethnicity with varying results. Some studies show that respondents identified more with their ethnic group,[17] while others show greater attainment of national integration with less emphasis on ethnic identification.[18] On the other hand, Wallerstein asserts that although ethnicity is in some respects dysfunctional for national integration, it is also in some respects functional.[19]

Social Distance. The earliest study of the concept of "social distance" is attributed to Emory S. Bogardus.[20] The concept is important because of its applicability to all forms of social life and every aspect of human experience. According to Bogardus, the concept "refers to the degrees and grades of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each other; it explains the nature of a great deal of their interaction."[21]

The use of the variable "social distance" is germane to my research given the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society. It is important, given the animosities the various ethnic groups had to one another before and immediately after the civil war. The variable indicates how Ibos actually feel about other Nigerians.

Education. The importance of education in nation building is demonstrated by the priority accorded to it in the national budgets of African countries.[22] However, Smock and Bentsi-Enchill agree that "few African governments have consciously employed the educational system for purposes of fostering national unity and ethnic toleration."[23] Nevertheless, education has been known to have a direct impact on the way an individual responds to political stimuli.[24] Lane asserts that education is positively associated with political knowledge, political efficacy, political competence, and political participation.[25] If these studies held across cultures, one might expect that Ibos of different educational levels would demonstrate different attitudes toward national integration.

Media Use. Some media studies have demonstrated a direct link between various mass media elements and changes in public opinion. This mass media role has been played through its "agenda-setting" role.[26] I examined the influence of the frequency of an individual's use of TV, radio, and newspapers on his or her attitudes toward national integration.

Ibo nationalism. There are two sides to Ibo nationalism. Pre-civil war, the conventional wisdom was that Ibos' role in the formation of the Nigerian nation was based on what they could politically achieve through such an effort.[27] Hence, according to Anber and Coleman, the Ibos were the most mobile and nationally oriented group in Nigeria.[28] This study probed Ibos' identification with "Biafra" rather than Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework

My theoretical foundation was based on Deutsch's communication transaction-theory.[29] Deutsch suggests that a closer community can be forged through an intensive pattern of communication between national or communal units.[30] Communication among communities of individuals is enhanced by adequate provision of the various elements of the mass media. Transactions among communities of individuals can be measured by—and are probably promoted by—the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them.[31]

Communication theory is, therefore, important in the present research because of the heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society. The ability to mobilize the masses depends on the provision of adequate communication facilities. Interactions among people that can exert an integrative influence can be enhanced by an improvement in the role of language in radio and television programs and in the ability of people to move from one part of Nigeria to another.

This chapter proceeds in the following manner. A model for the theoretical foundation of the present research as seen in figure 1 is explained by looking at how the exogenous variables age, religion, region, ethnicity, and sex affect the intermediate variables education, social distance, media use, and Ibo nationalism. Next, I explain the exogenous variables affect on national integration and the direct and indirect effects of the intermediate variables on attitude toward national integration are explored.

The importance of education in nation-building is widely accepted in developing countries. Smock and Bentsi-Enchill note that in Africa, it is not

unusual for governments to devote one-fourth of their budget to education.[32] Education of the citizens of any country is important if they are to understand the issues of the day and participate in the running of the government of the nation. In the Nigerian context the greater awareness among Nigerian leaders of the need for positively aware and informed citizenry in order to attain national integration led to the introduction of universal primary education in 1975. In the present research, I expected education to have a direct positive effect on attitude toward national integration.

However, before education can affect attitude toward national integration, another factor must come into play. Kim and Stinner assert that educational attainment is dramatically influenced by childhood residence.[33] Sewell, for example, contends that the degree of urban exposure in childhood serves as an important structural element in the communication of values.[34]

Furthermore, Kim and Stinner note that the "amount and quality of educational and cultural facilities available to children in rural areas is more restricted than for those in urban settings."[35] Also, in many developing countries where subsistence agriculture is practiced, children are often kept away or withdrawn from school so that they can help in the farms or herd cattle. The consequence is that persons from rural areas tend to complete fewer years of formal schooling than those from urban areas.[36] Also germane to the present research is the assertion by Tinker and Bramsen that male youths are generally more likely to be allowed to continue schooling than female youths.[37]

Region, Sex, and Media use. In this specific segment of the model I examine the direct and indirect effects of region and sex on media use. Given the explanations earlier on the differences in educational attainment between place of residence and sex, I anticipate differences in media use. Because of the greater opportunities in education and exposure to the media, respondents in the urban area would be more likely to use the media than those in the rural areas. I anticipated a positive association between region and media use.

Social Characteristics, Intermediate Variables, and Attitude toward National Integration. This section is intended to (1) examine the indirect effects of social characteristics on attitude toward national integration; and (2) assess the direct and indirect effects of the predetermined variables on attitude toward national integration.

I argue that ethnicity significantly affects attitude toward national integration directly and will do this through social distance, which is the readiness with which individuals are willing to associate with others. Onwubu strongly argues that "the fact people can think of themselves as superior, more educated or different in language can have a negative effect on cultural fusion in a way that would otherwise mediate the process of national cohesion and integration."[38]

However, in the examination of Ibo nationalism it is argued that because Ibos had the propensity to travel, they were likely to have a feeling of membership in Nigerian community rather than just in one's immediate state or village. Through travel and visiting, the Ibo develops a sense of identity with a larger group. I anticipated that the willingness of the Ibos to accept other ethnic groups as neighbors, or even move from their tribal homeland

to other regions in Nigeria, would have a significant effect on attitudes toward national integration.

Next, I argued that media use can have a significant direct effect on attitude toward national integration, and I examined the assumption that the mass media is an agent of change. Schramm notes that "to bring about the conditions for national development, there must be a great heightening of national goals;"[39] and more specific to this research, the goal of national integration. Broadcasting media and in this case, the radio, Katz argues, can play this vital role.[40]

However, Schramm and Mosel believe that in the process of national integration no single factor can go it all alone; there is interaction among different factors all working together to effect change.[41]

I anticipated, therefore, that when the media is used to promote national policy and the common interest of the citizens of a country, and to promote the loyalty of the citizens to the country, national integration can be achieved. An association between Ibo nationalism and radio exposure was anticipated. Finally, it is argued that at an individual level, one's attitude toward national integration is a function of where one lives and also a function of place of residence through the use of the media. The cosmopolitan nature of urban areas and exposure to the media will logically make urbanites more receptive to change. Thus, I expected a direct and indirect relationship between place of residence and attitude toward national integration. Also, a direct relationship between region and Ibo nationalism was anticipated. Some empirical research results have shown the existence of strong correlations between media exposure and the modernization of individual attitudes and practices.[42] One such evidence comes from Inkeles and Smith, who note that the mass media induces urban working men to hold modern attitudes.[43]

On the basis of the literature review and the theoretical conceptualization of this research, I constructed a path model (as seen in figure 1 below) of factors influencing attitude toward national integration. The following hypotheses were postulated: H1: social distance, ethnicity, region, media use, and education will each have a direct effect on attitude toward national integration. H2: education will have an indirect effect on attitude toward national integration through media use and social distance; H3: ethnicity variable will have a greater total indirect effect on attitude toward national integration than other variables.

Research Design and Measurement

The sample for this study was based on face-to-face interviews conducted between 6 June and 9 July 1989. A proportionate stratified random sample[44] of 300 adults age eighteen and above, were chosen from ten communities in Owerri Urban and Ekwerazu in Imo State, Nigeria. These individuals were interviewed on various attitudinal questions relating to economic, political and social issues.


Table 1 represents a breakdown of the proportional representation of the communities that make up the two localities of study.

I was fortunate to have had the assistance of the minister for Survey and Urban Planning for the state, who designated one of his officials in charge of

maps to produce the maps of Owerri Urban and Ekwerazu with their respective communities and villages.

Through the help of local leaders and teachers, the villages were ranked according to size and population. Samples were proportionately allocated; for example, Umuokirka in Ekwerazu is made up of five villages of which samples were accordingly assigned: Umezuo (13); Okrikama (13); Umugwa (6); Umuagbauu (6); and Okrikaweke (4) for a total of 42. There was an effort to ensure that after interviewing a male the next interviewee would be female. Again based on the information from local leaders and teachers, the villages were divided according to kindred, (that is, people sharing a common origin) and quota samples. For example, the villages of Umugwa in Umuokrika with three different kindred and equal in size and population—Umuwafor, Umungboghihu, and Umuonegbu—were allocated a quota sample of 2 each.

Figure 1
Hypothetical Path Model Predicting Attitudes toward National Integration



Information from local leaders and teachers were deemed correct and reliable because they are the major instruments for both local and state governments in collecting taxes and levies from the people. Levies are mostly imposed and collected based on the size and population of each community, village, or kindred. Within each kindred, respondents were randomly chosen from each household.

Table 1
Proportional Allocation of Sample Size

Strata Communities Allocated	No. of Residents in Strata, N	Proportion of Total	Number Resident
Owerri Urban	30,350	.40	120
Amawom	17,283	.57	68
Umuororonjo	5,125	.17	20
Umuodu	5,533	.18	22
Umuonyeche	2,419	.08	10
Ekwerazu	112,411	.60	180
Umuokrika	26,369	.23	42
Obohia	20,732	.18	33
Ekwerazu Town	2,495	.02	4
Mpam	20,671	.18	33
Ihitte Afukwu	26,135	.23	42
Oparanadim	16,009	.14	26

Table 2
Zero Order Correlations among Variables Included in Path Analysis

Variables	Age	Education	Ethnicity	Media Use	Soc Dis	Ibo Nat	Nat. Inte
Age							
Education	-0.063						
	(p=.138)						
Ethnicity	-0.114*	-0.027					
	(p=.026)	(p=.320)					
Media use	0.051	0.522*	0.089				
	(p=.188)	(p=.000)	(p=.065)				
Social distance	-0.249* (p=.000)	-0.091 (p=.060)	0.194 (p=.000)*	0.232* (p=.000)			
Ibo nationalism	0.014 (p=.406)	0.042 (p=.237)	0.014 (p=.408)	-0.163* (p=.002)	-0.090 (p=.064)		
National integration	-0.050 (p=.201)	0.301* (p=.000)	-0.018 (p=.383)	0.016 (p=.394)	0.258* (p=.000)	0.092 (p=.061)	

*p <.05.

Measurement of Variables

The dependent and independent variables were measured through the creation of constructs. Five factors analyzed subject responses to twenty three

questions in the study questionnaire that could be used in a subsequent path analysis. Principal-component analysis with varimax rotation was utilized. Using a five factor solution and loadings of .30 or above as high loadings, the following constructs were identified: (a) national integration[45]—the dependent variable, (b) the independent variables social distance,[46] media use (how often do you read the newspaper; how often do you listen to news on the radio; and how often do you watch the television for news or for information on current affairs?), ethnicity,[47] and Ibo nationalism (should there be a separate Ibo nation? and when you think of yourself, what comes to your mind first?).

Four demographic variables thought to influence attitude toward national integration were also used: The respondent's *age*, measured in years; *education*, measured in years; *sex*, measured at the nominal level was treated as a dummy variable in which male was coded "1," and female "2"; and *region*, which was measured according to where the respondents were residing when interviewed and dummied by assigning "1" for the respondents residing in the rural area and "0" for respondents residing in the urban area.

Figure 2
Reduced Model Showing Relationship between Region, Media Use, and Ibo Nationalism




Table 3
Direct and Indirect Effects on Ibo Nationalism


Independent Variable	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect Via	Total Effect
Region	.13	X7=.04	.14
		X8X7=-.03	
Media use	-.24	-	.24

Analysis Plan

Path analysis was utilized to test the theoretical model shown in figure 1. Path analysis was chosen because of its unique advantage in enabling the researcher to examine the direct, indirect, and total effects of the independent and intervening variables on the dependent variable.[48] A modified path

model was derived by running a multiple regression on the variables based on the theoretical model. The paths for variables that were not significant at the .05 level were removed. The standardized regression coefficients for those significant variables were put on the paths. The general pattern for testing the model was to analyze the relationship between each dependent variable and the independent variables.

Figure 3
Reduced Model Showing Relationship between Age, Ethnicity, Region, Sex, Education, Ibo Nationalism, Media Use and Social Distance



Results

The data in table 2 show the correlations of the interval level independent variables with the dependent variable national integration as well as other dependent variables.

Path Model of Ibo Nationalism

Figure 2 shows the reduced model of the relationship between region, media use, and Ibo nationalism.

The comparison of the total effects of region and media use on Ibo nationalism shows that media use has greater causal effect on Ibo nationalism than region (total effect of media use is .24 compared to .14 for region; see table 3). An increase in media use will lead to a decrease in Ibo nationalism. Also, an increase in the number of respondents, who live in the urban area, will lead to an increase in media use and a decrease in Ibo nationalism. A look at the coefficient of determination R^2=.074 (see table 4 below) shows that media use and region explain 7.4 percent of the variation in Ibo nationalism.The relationship between media use and Ibo nationalism means that loyalty to the nation increases in favor of loyalty to the ethnic group with

greater use of the mass media.[49] This relationship supports Pye's argument, which states that the problem of creating political consensus in most of the new states is in part one of building new and more universal means of national communications, so that all segments of the society can become more closely involved with each other.[50]

Table 4
Regression Coefficients for the Path Model

Dependent Variables	Independent Variables	Standard Regression	Unstandard Regression	Standard Error
Social distance	Age	-.16	-.01	.01
(R2=.149)	Ethnic	.22	.19	.05
	Ibo Nationalism	-.12	-.11	.05
	Media use	.21	.19	.05
Ibo nationalism	Media use	-.24	-.24	.07
(R2=.074)	Region	.13	.27	.13
Media Use	Sex	-.17	-.33	.11
(R2=.33)	Region	.17	.34	.11
	Education	.47	.15	.02
National integration	Social dist	.22	.25	.06
(R2=.214)	Education	.40	.13	.02
	Media use	.22	.22	.07
	Region	-.16	-.34	.12

Path Model of Social Distance

Figure 3 (see, below) represents the reduced model showing the relationship between age, ethnicity, region, sex, education, Ibo nationalism, media use, and social distance.

The comparison of the total effects of age, ethnicity, region, sex, education, Ibo nationalism, and media use on social distance indicates that media use has greater effect on social distance than any of the other independent variables, followed by ethnicity, age, and education. Total effect of media use is .24 compared to .22 for ethnicity, -.15 for age, and .11 for education (see table 5). These coefficients mean that an increase in media use will lead to an increase in willingness to associate with other ethnic groups, while an increase in ethnicity will result in a decrease in willingness to associate with other tribes. Also, a unit change in age will lead to a decrease in willingness to associate with other tribes, and an increase in the level of educational attainment will lead to an increase in willingness to associate with other tribes. This confirms this researcher's theory, which states that media use works successfully in shaping attitudes by working in conjunction with other variables.

A look at the coefficient of determination R^2=.149 shows that age, ethnicity, region, sex, education, Ibo nationalism, and media use explain 15 percent of the variation in social distance.

Table 5
Direct and Indirect Effects on Social Distance

Independent Variable	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect
Age	-.16	X8X7=.01	-.15
		X8X7X6=.00	
Ethnicity	.22	0	.22
Region	0	X7=.04	
		X6=-.02	
		X7X6=.01	
		X8X7=-.02	
		X8X7X6=-.00	.00
		X7=.10	
		X7X6=.01	.11
Sex	0	X7=-.04	
		X7X6=.01	-.03
Ibo nationalism	-.12	0	-.12
Media use	.21	X6=.03	.24

Path Model of National Integration

Figure 4 represents a modified path diagram of determinants of attitudes toward national integration. A comparison of the total effects of the independent variables on attitudes toward national integration shows that education has greater causal effects than any of the other independent variables on national integration. The next important variables are media use, region, and social distance. The total effect of education is .53 compared to .26 for media use—.23 for region, and .22 for social distance (see table 6). The above coefficients mean, for example, that an increase in the level of educational attainment will lead to an increase in media use and will lead to support for national integration. Also, an increase in media use will lead to willingness to associate with others and support for national integration. Rural dwellers will have fewer years of education attainment and, therefore, less support for national integration. Finally, an increase in willingness to associate with other ethnic groups will lead to support for national integration. The independent variables acting together explained about 21.4 percent of the variation on support for national integration.

Path Model of Media Use

Figure 5 represents the reduced model showing relationships between age, region, sex, education, and media use. Media use is analyzed because its importance cannot be overemphasized in the present efforts by Nigerian

government to mobilize its citizens within the context of Nigeria's five national objectives. These objectives are to build: (1) a united, strong and self-reliant nation; (2) a great and dynamic economy; (3) a just and egalitarian society; (4) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens; and (5) a free and democratic society.[51] As a concrete step to achieve the above objectives the federal military government, in 1987, established a body to be known as the Directorate of Social Mobilization.[52]

The comparison of the total effects of age, region, sex, and education on media use shows that education has a greater causal effect on media use than age, region, and sex (total effect of education is .47 compared to -.07 for age, .28 for region, and .17 for sex; see table 7). In other words, an increase in the level of educational attainment will lead to an increase in media use. Also, an increase in age will lead to a decrease in media use. Equally, urban dwellers use media more than rural dwellers. Males use media more than females. Among the variables that impinge on media use education helps predict media use best.

A look at table 4, from R^2=.330, shows that in the study sample, 33 percent of the variability in media use is explained by knowing respondent's age, region, and sex.

Discussion

This study utilized a path analytic model to examine how attitudinal and background variables influence support for national integration. Path analysis indicated that the variables education, social distance, region, and media use had direct influence on attitude toward national integration. Their relative influence (Betas) was for education .40, social distance .22, region .16, and media use .22. The above variables acting together explained 21.4 percent of the variation on national integration.

Also, media use had a greater casual effect on Ibo nationalism than region. In other words, an increase in media use will lead to a decrease in positive attitude toward Ibo nationalism. Further, an increase in the number of respondents who live in the urban area will lead to an increase in media use and a decrease in Ibo nationalism. Media use and region explained 7.4 percent of the variation in Ibo nationalism.

Next, media use had a greater effect on social distance than any of the following independent variables: ethnicity, age, and education. The total effect of media use was .24 compared to .22 for ethnicity, -.15 for age, and .11 for education.

Based on the literature and theoretical conceptualization of the study, I expected that the attitudinal variables ethnicity, social distance, and Ibo nationalism would be relatively important in explaining attitudes toward national integration. However, only social distance appeared to be significantly related to support for national integration. In other words, the willingness to associate with other ethnic groups demonstrated by the Ibos interviewed enhances integration. Thus part of my theory is confirmed; that is, willingness and readiness to associate with others will promote interaction, mutual relationship, and knowledge among people in a very important aspect if they are to function effectively as a political community.[53]

Ethnicity and Ibo nationalism variables do not have a significant relationship with attitudes toward national integration. This suggests that a revision of this model should include different operationalization of each variable. For example, Ibo nationalism could be operationalized to include support for selected Nigerian political leaders, which would include Ibos.

Finally, results of this study cannot be generalized for all the Ibos that make up part of the Federation of Nigeria, since it was not financially feasible for the researcher to include in the study those Ibos who presumably might have left the geographical units of study for other parts of the state or Nigeria. The study is distinctive because there are no previous studies on the issue that can give us a basis for comparison. However, certain elements of the study shed light on some of the social characteristics of the sample that reflect the present general knowledge of the population of Imo State. The findings indicated that about 99 percent of the respondents spoke Ibo, confirming the fact that Imo State is not only monoethnic but also monolingual. Religion did not seem unusual for the preferences of Ibos. The respondents were predominantly Christians, about 78.3 percent were Roman Catholics and 19 percent were Protestants. Less than 3 percent belonged to other denominations. The age sample seemed to reflect the best statistic available about the Ibo.[54] However, it is hoped that further studies along this line will attest to the representativeness of the study.

Figure 4
Modified Path Diagram of Determinants of Attitudes Toward National Integration




Figure 5
Reduced Model of Relationship between Age, Region, Sex, Education, and Media Use




Table 6
Direct and Indirect Effects on National Integration

Independent Variable	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect Via	Total Effect
Age	0	X5=.04	
		X8=-.05	
		X8X7=.01	
		X8X7X5=.00	
		X8X7X6X5=.00	.00
Ethnicity	0	X5=.05	.05
Region	-.16	X6X5=-.00	
		X7X6X5=.00	
		X7X5=.01	
		X7=.04	
		X8=-.09	
		X8X7=-.02	
		X8X7X5=.01	
		X8X7X6X5=.00	-.23
Sex	0	X7=-.04	
		X7X5=-.01	
		X7X6X5=.00	-.09
Social distance	0	0	.22
Ibo Nationalism	0	X5=-.03	-.03
Media use	.22	X5=.05	
		X6X5=-.01	.26
Education	.40	X7=-.10	
		X7X5=.02	
		X7X6X5=-.00	.53

Table 7
Direct and Indirect Effects on Media Use

Independent Variable	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect Via	Total Effect
Age	-.13	X8=.06	-.07
Region	.17	X8=.10	.27
Sex	-.17	0	-.17
Education	.47	0	.47

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Notes

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3. Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, *Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).
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18. Thomas Remeikis, "Modernization and National Identity in the Baltic Republics: Uneven and Multi-Directional Change in the Components of Modernization," in *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the U.S.S.R.*, ed. Ihor Kamenetsky (Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1977). Of course, recent events in the Baltic States now cast doubts upon this perception.
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21. Ibid., 7.
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23. Smock and Bentsi-Enchill, "Introduction" in *The Search for National Integration in Africa*, 8; See also Smock, "Education and National Integration," 135–36.
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25. Robert E. Lane, *Political Man* (New York: Free Press, 1972), 92–120.
26. Charles B. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 13. See also, Henry F. Schulte, "Mass Media as Vehicles of Education, Persuasion, and Opinion Making," in *Comparative Mass Media Systems*, ed. L. John Martin and Auju Grover Chandhany, (New York: Longman, 1983), 133; and Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2d ser., 36 (Summer 1972): 176–87.
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42. Katz and Wedell, *Broadcasting in the Third World*, 182.
43. A. Inkeles and D.H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).
44. William B. Sanders and Thomas K. Pinhey, *The Conduct of Social Research* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1983), 116.
45. The eight items were: (1) adopting one of the Nigerian languages will contribute to the economic, political, and social progress of Nigeria; (2) how unhappy would you be if Hausa or Yoruba were chosen as national language; (3) elementary and secondary students should be taught two Nigerian languages; (4) the federal government did a good job in resettling most Ibos in their jobs after the war; (5) any Ibo can safely and freely practice his/her religion; (6) students from educationally disadvantaged states should be given special considerations; (7) any Ibo citizen can enjoy equal protection of the law; and (8) it is safe and secure for the Ibos to live in other parts of Nigeria.
46. The items with high loading include: (1) willing to eat with a person of another ethnic group, (2) willing to be a neighbor of a person of another ethnic group, (3) willing to enter a Nigerian organization led by a member person of another tribe, (5) feeling if relative plans to marry a Nigerian of another tribe, and (6) willing to encourage intertribal marriage.
47. The items loading high on ethnicity include: (1) on the whole do you think your ethnic group is more or less clever than other ethnic groups in Nigeria? (2) on the whole do you think the Ibos are better or worse behaved than other Nigerians? (3) in general do you think you have a lot in common with your ethnic group? and (4) would you say that your ethnic group has played a positive or negative role in the development of Nigeria?
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49. For models of this type there is sometimes a question of identification. We need not worry about this problem in the cases below this since it is assumed that the error terms are not correlated.
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51. Directorate for Social Mobilization, *MAMSER At 1 In Imo State* (Imo State: Prime Enterprises Ltd., 1989), 11.
52. For the full objectives of the directorate see Federal Government of Nigeria, *Decree No. 31* of 1987, section 14. Some of the objectives are generally to encourage the people to take part actively and freely in discussions and decisions affecting their general welfare, and to promote new sets of attitudes and culture for the attainment of the goals and objectives of the Nigerian State.
53. Jacob and Teune, "The Integrative Process," 27.
54. It should be noted that the distribution of the characteristics of the sample of study cannot be compared with census estimates because of the dearth of such information.

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Military Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria

Larry Diamond
Oyeleye Oyediran

Hoover Institution,
Stanford University
University of Lagos, Nigeria
and East Carolina University

Nigeria is now about to complete its second elaborately crafted program of transition from military to civilian, democratic rule. Both previous attempts at democratic government, one under parliamentary rule following independence from Britain in 1960, the other a presidential system inaugurated in 1979, ended in military coups. In each case, military intervention was preceded by a broad loss of political legitimacy due to widespread corruption, poor economic performance, electoral fraud, political violence, and rising ethnic, regional, and religious conflict deliberately mobilized for political ends.[1] As a result of these democratic breakdowns—widely attributed throughout Nigeria to the irresponsible behavior of politicians and public servants at all levels—Nigeria has been governed by military regimes for about twenty-two of its thirty-two years of independence. And yet, Nigerians remain unhappy with military rule and fiercely committed to democratic principles and aspirations. Military rule continues to be regarded by the bulk of the people, especially the educated elites—and even by most military officers themselves—as an aberration, and no military regime that has not committed itself to a clear program of redemocratization has been able to survive.

This chapter consists of three parts. In part 1, we offer an overview of the political transition that has been underway in Nigeria since 1985, and the economic adjustment and social strain that have been accompanying it. In

part 2, we compare the current transition with that instituted by the military during 1975 to 1979, which gave birth to the ill-fated Second Republic. In part 3, we analyze the prospects for the emerging Third Republic, given the character of the transition so far and the country's previous two experiences with civilian, electoral regimes.

The Current Transition

Immediately after seizing power in August 1985 from the harsh and unpopular military regime of Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon (who took power with the overthrow of the Second Republic on 31 December 1983), Major-General Ibrahim Babangida took a number of steps toward political liberalization and promised a program of political transition. At the beginning of 1986, Babangida announced a return to civilian, democratic rule in 1990 and appointed a seventeen-member Political Bureau to initiate and lead what he termed the "collective search for a new political order." In the subsequent nine months, the "Politburo," as it came to be known, crisscrossed the country during a vigorous national debate that elicited a broad outpouring of popular and elite opinions on the design of a new democratic government.[2] The result of the Politburo report and the military government's review of it was an extension of the transition program to 1992, in order to permit, in President Babangida's words, "a broadly spaced transition in which democratic government can proceed with political learning, institutional adjustment and re-orientation of political culture, at sequential levels of politics and governance beginning with local government and ending at the federal level."[3]

The resulting plan was virtually unprecedented in the annals of democratic transitions in developing countries for its complexity and carefully crafted sequencing. The plan began with the establishment of regulatory commissions, such as the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the convening of a Constituent Assembly, and the holding of (nonpartisan) local government elections in 1987 and 1988. Prior to the 1987 voter registration exercise, the government sought to settle the years-long mobilization for the creation of new states with the decision to create two new states (Akwa Ibom out of Cross River and Katsina out of Kaduna), and to bar any further consideration of new states during the transition process. The subsequent four years entail the return of party politics and the staging of five more elections, with the crucial innovation of phasing in the renewed electoral struggle at successively higher levels of power, culminating with the presidential election and final military withdrawal. As initially announced, these subsequent stages were:

- 2nd quarter, 1989: lifting of the ban on party politics
- 3rd quarter, 1989: recognition of two political parties
- 4th quarter, 1989: partisan local government elections
- 1st-2nd quarters, 1990: election of state legislatures and governors

- 3rd quarter, 1990: convening of state legislatures
- 4th quarter, 1990: swearing-in of state governors
- 1st-3rd quarters, 1991: new census
- 4th quarter, 1991: local government elections
- 1st-2nd quarters, 1992: National Assembly elections and convening
- 3rd-4th quarters, 1992: presidential election and inauguration

This timetable was revised three times, first in 1989, then in 1990, after surprise government moves forced delays in the inauguration of parties and the holding of state and federal elections. The third revision—which greatly intensified public cynicism about Babangida's intentions—came in November 1992, when the regime seized upon the chaos and rampant fraud in the September presidential primary elections of both parties to disqualify all 23 presidential candidates, dissolve the two-party executives, and reorganize the entire process again. Presidential elections were deferred from December 1992 to June 1993 and the handover of power was postponed a third time, from January 2 to August 8, 1993. The military regime still seemed resolved to depart voluntarily, no doubt keenly aware of the political convulsion that would result if it failed to complete the transition. Rising public unease about this possibility helped to produce the traumatic coup attempt of 22 April 1990 (the bloodiest in Nigeria's history), and General Yabuku Gowon was overthrown in 1974, some months after he indefinitely postponed his promised transition to democracy. But even if the transition is completed peacefully, Babangida's repeated delays and interventions in the process contrast sharply with the 1975–1979 transition under Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo, as we detail below.

The Constituent Assembly submitted its draft constitution to President Babangida in Abuja on 5 April 1989. This was somewhat late, and might have been much later had not the politicians in that body finally realized that the military was prepared to proceed, with or without their constitutional recommendations. The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) wasted little time in getting down to work on the draft Constitution, "editing" the Assembly's recommendations in a three-day, closed-door meeting that began on 26 April 1989. In his speech on 3 May lifting the ban on party politics, the president also announced the AFRC's final decisions on the Constitution, altering some important draft provisions,[4] while trusting that the pent-up eagerness of the political class to get on with the business of politics would dampen the public outcry against the AFRC's rather brazen abridgements of the principle of popular sovereignty in constitution-making.

One of the most important features of the new political framework is a *mandatory* two-party system, recommended by the Political Bureau (and accepted by the military) as a way of retaining democratic electoral competition while consolidating some of the past chaos of party politics and ensuring that political parties will crosscut and transcend the country's deep, complex,

and volatile ethnic and regional cleavages. The period between May and July 1989 saw dozens of political associations canvassing support, but in the end only thirteen met the deadline and the substantial expense required to file a formal application with the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Of these, NEC rated six (and especially three or four) as having approached the standards for recognition more impressively than the others, but found all of them wanting.[5] In a stunning speech on 7 October that has come to be known as the "Abuja Declaration," President Babangida announced the AFRC had rejected all six of the political associations recommended by NEC for its consideration and indicated that the military government would itself create two new political parties, the Social Democratic party and the National Republican Convention, one "a little to the left" and the other "a little to the right."[6]

The transition proceeded with two political parties, created by the government, with manifestos and constitutions drafted by the government (synthesized from the documents of the preexisting associations). Despite this jolt to the old politicians and wealthy newcomers who had asserted control over the aspiring parties, and despite the fact that the two new parties were initially administered by government-appointed civil servants, the politicians quickly sorted themselves out in largely predictable patterns and coalitions into the two new structures. During 1990, a succession of party meetings from the ward through the local government to the state and finally the national level in July elected party officers from the ranks and completed the transfer of party control from the government to the emergent (largely re-emergent) political class. It is these two parties, interesting blends of old cleavages and coalitions and new faces, that provide the partisan framework for the transition and whatever life the Third Republic will enjoy beyond that.

The record of party formation, internal and partisan competition to date makes clear that the old norms and practices are reasserting themselves. This was made clear during the partisan local government elections of December 1990, the elections for state assemblies and governors one year later, and the elections to the National Assembly—the House of Representatives and Senate—in July 1992. Though these elections were accepted by the NEC and the political parties as successful and clear winners are less disputable than before, serious issues, particularly concerning the voting system, have arisen. The open as opposed to secret ballot system adopted at these elections has reduced to the lowest level ever the number of registered voters that went to the polls. In addition, open queuing behind candidates or their photographs during the voting in these elections (as well as the party primaries that preceded them) has not eliminated fraud and abuse. Electoral fraud in the voters' register, extensive bribery of electoral officials, and gross vote-buying and intimidation have all been evident, and have no doubt affected the outcome of some races (especially in the less carefully scrutinized primary elections).[7] It must be remembered that the military coups that toppled the First and Second Republics occurred soon after rigged elections. This is why it is imperative for the Babangida administration to leave behind a more vigorous, impartial, and effective electoral administration, and not merely a NEC whose powers (including the ability to disqualify candidates on short notice without explanation) have been vastly strengthened.

In 1987 a promise was made to bar further consideration of new states. On 27 August 1991, Babangida reneged on that promise and created nine more states, thus increasing the number to 30, while adding 47 more local government areas. On 23 September, the fragmentation continued with the creation of another 89 additional local government areas, bringing the total to 589 (and the total increase to 136). These moves, however, did not stop further mobilization for more, as disaffected communities reacted each time with violence. Sharp conflicts were spawned over the division of existing state assets, and state governments have been left much weaker and more impoverished than ever before.

Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment

Concurrent with the political program has been a bold and far-reaching structural adjustment program begun by the Babangida government in October 1985. Through a sharp devaluation of the exchange rate, cutbacks in petroleum and other consumer subsidies, decreases in government spending and employment, and elimination of import licensing and controls, Babangida sought to open up the economy to competition, to reduce state interference, and to get the country to begin to live within its means. The leading element of this adjustment program was an effective devaluation of the naira by about two-thirds through the creation of the "Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market" (SFEM), later unified into a single Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). In addition to reorganizing the economy to stimulate productivity and growth and to reduce corruption and waste, it was also hoped that these reforms—which closely followed and in some respects even exceeded the requirements of the International Monetary Fund (although the government, bowing to immense popular resistance, declined to reach a formal agreement with the IMF)—would bring forth new international credit and a generous restructuring of the more than $20 billion in foreign debt that the civilian regime had left behind as part of its legacy of colossal economic mismanagement.

A shrewd and skillful political tactician, President Babangida succeeded initially in winning popular support for these painful economic measures, which did reduce government deficits and increase agricultural output and exports. However, as austerity measures persisted and proliferated and living standards continued to decline, while concerns over official corruption also grew anew, public patience with the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) waned dramatically. This was evidenced in April 1988 when the government's decision to lift the remaining subsidies on petroleum products, causing modest increases in consumer prices, led to widespread labor and student protests (prompting the government to close temporarily thirty-two institutions of higher learning). The contrast with the moderate public response to the near doubling of fuel prices in 1986 suggested growing popular frustration with the mounting inflation and declining value of the naira.

Public disenchantment with the SAP continued to escalate, merging with resentment over continuing high-level corruption to produce a broad grievance of extraordinary political explosiveness. This escalating frustration

erupted in late May 1989, when students took to the streets in a number of southern cities to protest SAP, as well as an assortment of local grievances (e.g., the N20 school fees imposed by the military government in Lagos State at a time when many families cannot even feed their children adequately). Chanting "Babangida must go!" and "SAP must go!" university students in Lagos, joined by many other urban dwellers, unleashed an orgy of violence. Issue-motivated protest exploded into furies of random violence, with protesters attacking and torching not just official buildings and vehicles but anyone not expressing signs of solidarity, and at times, anything combustible. Three years later, in May 1992, student protest marches over escalating living costs, fuel shortages, and other economic and political grievances were transformed into "a carnival of looting and burning" as mobs of hoodlums and angry, unemployed youths hijacked the protests and vented their rage.[8] The violence, which spread to several cities and caused extensive damage, showed anew how deeply threatening to political stability are the widespread economic suffering and popular unease with the regime's structural adjustment measures.

It is important to appreciate that the transition to democracy is unfolding in the midst of the most profound and prolonged economic depression in Nigeria's three decades of independence. Income from petroleum exports continued to decline to $6 billion in 1987, from a high of $26 billion in 1981. It increased to over $13 billion in 1990 but fell back to slightly over $10 billion in 1991. Despite six years of structural adjustment aimed at diversifying the economy, a single primary commodity with volatile prices on world markets—oil—continues to account for 96 percent of export earnings. And despite several years of austere fiscal management, foreign debt has grown under military rule from about $20 billion to more than $33 billion.[9] Per capita income fell from $800 in 1985 to $380 in 1987. By 1991, it was estimated to have plunged to $280—although the figure would be about $360 if the population is indeed in the neighborhood of the recent official count (88.5 million) rather than the previous estimate of about 110 million.[10] External debt now slightly exceeds the GNP and the debt service ratio, 36 percent, is one of the highest in the world.[11] The naira has continued its descent in the now unified foreign exchange market, from an exchange rate of roughly four to five naira to the dollar in 1987 to more than eighteen naira to the dollar today, and even less value on the parallel market.[12]

As the purchasing power of the naira continues to decline, the salaried middle class has been plunged back to subsistence living. The top professor's salary of N27,000, worth roughly $30,000 at the official exchange rate when Babangida assumed power in 1985, sank to less than $1,500 in value. Even with the huge increases in salary and benefits announced in 1992, a typical professor's total compensation remains less than $3,000, while that for the highest-ranking professors is less than $5,000. Civil servants have suffered similarly. From their heady gains of the oil boom era, workers are back to earning the equivalent of a few hundred dollars a year, with prices of basic commodities much higher. Annual inflation has ranged as high as 40 percent.[13] With fiscal restraints preventing the government from raising salaries and wages sufficiently to recover the lost consumption power, workers have become restive and salaried professionals—doctors, engineers, pilots, professors, etc.—have been leaving the country in large numbers. The universities

have been so stripped of faculty that many departments are defunct or barely functioning.

Nigerians who are not rich (especially the politically strategic middle classes) have seen their hopes—of cars, refrigerators, and other consumer durables, of foreign travel and education, and anything else requiring foreign exchange—evaporate and the lower classes are suffering serious absolute deprivation. Hunger and malnutrition have become serious problems; there are reports of significant increases in kwashiorkor. On most university campuses, students live in appalling conditions, grossly overcrowded and undersupplied, surviving essentially on one meal a day. Urban, wage-earning families are also skipping meals and doing almost completely without meat and other proteins. One finds increasing references by professors to students who seem too poorly nourished, too listless, to absorb their lectures, or even stay awake in class, much less get serious study done. And in any case, universities in such circumstances can hardly afford to import new books and journals from abroad. Clearly, the increasing difficulty and even depravity of their own immediate situation has contributed to the deepening anger and alienation of the students, traditionally the most politically volatile group in the country, and one of the most articulate.

More generally, the cities in Nigeria, as in most Third World countries, are the primary site of potential unrest, and it is there that the economic pain and deterioration is most obvious. Since urban residents cannot grow their own food and are more dependent on the cash economy, they have been most affected by the rising prices, especially of food and fuel. At the same time, services and infrastructure are deteriorating. Lagos commuters now trek as much as twelve miles a day to and from their workplace because of rampant breakdowns and inflation in public and private transport.[14]

Corruption, Alienation, and Protest

The situation is further aggravated—profoundly—by the widespread rumors and obvious signs of continuing corruption in high places. There remains in Nigeria a strange schizophrenia in public attitudes toward corruption. Most Nigerians, especially those with less education, continue to admire local patrons and politicians, and to beseech them and depend on them for money, food, jobs, and a host of favored interventions with government at all levels ("long legs"). Thus, to the surprise of many observers, when the Babangida government terminated the long prison sentences meted out to the corrupt politicians by the rough justice of the Buhari government, many of them were greeted as conquering heros by huge throngs of well-wishers. Yet the same peasant or trader who cheers the return of his discredited political patron and champion also denounces and resents the widespread corruption in the country. Further, there is a sizable and growing body of public opinion, especially among the students and educated middle class, that understands the costs to society of even limited political corruption and is becoming increasingly intolerant of it.

The depth of anger and bitterness that has repeatedly exploded in riots, and the widespread participation in and sympathy for them offered from many quarters of the urban population, cannot be understood simply by the

frustration with SAP and the economic misery it is perceived to have caused. Resentment over rising official corruption has also been a major contributing factor. A Lagos reverend expressed a broadly felt sentiment when in a church service launching the week-long independence celebrations a few years ago, he declared before an audience of top government officials (including a no-doubt stunned Minister of Defense):

> The only people who have a present and a future are the children of the military men, the politicians and all who are within the bandwagon of the corrupt aristocratic society. Nothing has changed. Nothing. There is so much fraud, corruption and the looting of the national treasury. We now have good rhetorics of leadership without the necessary "do as I do." To say "do as I do" would amount to "plunder as I plunder, steal as I steal, or amass wealth as I do." Nigeria is in a valley of decision. Nigeria needs men. O God, give us men.[15]

President Babangida was immensely popular when he first seized power in August of 1985, denouncing the uncharacteristically harsh repression of the Buhari-Idiagbon government and repealing many of its worst decrees. He won broad public support for his strong expression of commitment to human rights, his release of political detainees, and his deft handling of economic issues (opening the question of an IMF loan to public debate, and then, when public opinion solidified against it, declining the loan while adopting most of the IMF's conditions as if they were his own). Initially, his skillful political maneuvering and image of tolerance and responsiveness won him admiration and respect, even from opponents.

However, support for the regime has waned since its initial "honeymoon" period. Lacking the resources to coopt all sources of opposition, the regime has turned increasingly to repression and intimidation. These tactics, which have fallen heavily upon the press, trade unions, students associations, human rights advocates, and other independent interests in civil society, have accentuated political and social tension while contradicting the self-proclaimed liberal intentions and democratizing goals of the regime.

The Two Transitions Compared

In an earlier study, Oyediran concluded "that the Nigerian military has shown itself not only as a conservative unprogressive force, but also as one that is incapable of building lasting political institutions. As a result of leaving its first calling—which is national defense—and making incursions into national politics and governance, it has deprived Nigeria and Africa, the unique opportunity of building what Sklar called a 'developmental democracy.'"[16] In arriving at this conclusion, he examined the performance of the various military administrations in initiating and implementing a variety of public policies. Here our approach is different, focusing only on the design and implementation of political transitions, and only on those two military regimes in Nigeria that have instituted transitions.

The first transition from authoritarian rule to representative government was carried out during the administration of General Murtala Mohammed between 1975 and 1979. When that administration came to power on 29 July 1975, it took less than three months to announce a program of transition to

representative government. Within six months that decision to transfer power was seriously tested when Mohammed, the head of the administration, was assassinated in an unsuccessful military coup led by disgruntled elements within the military. When General Olusegun Obasanjo took over as the new head of the military and government, an opportunity was provided to jettison the earlier promise made by Mohammed that within four years the military would return power to the elected representatives of the Nigerian people. There were pressures from within the military, within the nation, within the continent, and from outside to do so, as Obasanjo himself has claimed on many occasions. The administration was of the view that the Nigerian political scene is unique in many ways and that what obtains in some other countries with virtually uninterrupted authoritarian rule of one kind or another cannot and should not be transferred to Nigeria. Put differently, we suggest that there is a link between the failure of authoritarianism in Nigeria and the belief or philosophy of the leaders of the two transitions. We suggest that Mohammed/Obasanjo and Babangida "belong to the military tradition that sees military intervention in national politics as nothing more than a purely temporary incursion into a civilian sphere in order to save the political system and prevent the breakdown of law and order."[17] As we will show, however, Babangida has interpreted the purposes of that incursion much more broadly.

Obasanjo suggested recently why it was not possible for him to abandon the promise Mohammed made to the Nigerian people to return the country to representative government. For him, the promise was made on behalf of the Nigerian military. He said, "For those of us who count on institutional integrity and credibility for the military as the last bastion of hope and defence for the unity and integrity of Nigeria our words on behalf of that institution must be matched by our actions."[18]

In a most unusual speech, Babangida accepted that military incursions into politics and governance had affected not only its internal durability as an institution but also the very survival of Nigeria as a nation. He then asked what the grand strategic problem is. He answered, "For me, it is now that we can systematically shed the public policy loads which had taken attention of the military away from the main task of defending society's peace against enemies both internal and external. We need to take measures to correct the defects of the armed forces organizations . . . the issue is internally that of load shedding.[19] Three years earlier Babangida had told his senior armed forces officers that "we inherited a western liberal model of civil-military relations from the British. This model of civil-military relations exhorted civilian supremacy. It provided for an apolitical professional military whose place was in the barracks, protecting and defending the integrity of the nation and its people."[20]

Two other military administrations in Nigeria had identical opportunities to lay out a transition program, but failed to do so. These were the Gowon administration of 1966–1975 and the Buhari/Idiagbon administration of 1983–1985. They belong to a different school of thought on civil-military relations. In their own different ways, each saw the military in society as essentially the most reliable managers of social change. As a result, transition from military authoritarianism to civilian, representative government was regarded as a low priority, meriting consideration only after the military—the

best organized institution in the society—had, through its long stay in power, guaranteed the political stability necessary for economic development.

The Mohammed/Obasanjo and Babangida Administrations

Unlike the Gowon or Buhari/Idiagbon military administrations, the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration took control of power in July 1975 in an atmosphere of very earnest debate on the nation's political future. General Gowon had declared in October 1974 that the promised handover to civilian administration in July 1976 was unrealistic, without giving a realistic date. Just before that, he had given a bonanza of nine months' arrears of salary to workers in both public and private sectors. However, the massive salary and wage increases provoked angry reactions rather than enormous support. The last quarter of 1974 saw widely publicized revelations about the corruption of highly placed members of government and vehement criticism of Gowon's indefinite postponement of the transition. This was the backdrop for the coup of July 1975 (engineered by junior officers) that brought into power the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration.

The takeovers of power by Mohammed/Obasanjo and by Babangida were similar in many respects. Just as the Gowon administration had shown clearly that it had failed in its mission, the Buhari/Idiagbon administration ten years later proved rather quickly that it could not deal with the fundamental problems facing Nigeria (especially the deteriorating economy) and had no plan for returning the country to civilian, constitutional rule. Both of the military takeovers were models of quiet and bloodless efficiency. However, by the time Babangida staged the fifth successful coup in the country's history, public reaction was guarded and cautious. As a weekly magazine put it when Babangida came to power, "If Nigerians have not been notably exuberant in welcoming the Babangida government, it . . . can only be an expression of their disappointment with successive governments that Nigerians had presented with a bouquet of flowers only to be given a scorpion in return."[21]

Transition programs by authoritarian regimes are embarked upon for a variety of reasons. The Mohammed/Obasanjo and Babangida administrations' transition programs were not the result of impending regime breakdown after many years of authoritarian rule, and neither were they the result of mass uprisings, nor of pressures from foreign interests. Both arose from the need for the military to withdraw in order to preserve its institutional and professional integrity, cohesion, and discipline. The two administrations publicly expressed identical views on the role of the military in politics—that if the military has to intervene in politics it must be for a temporary period to save the political system from collapse. Yet beyond this broadly similar view were considerable differences in the explicit and implicit motives and modus operandi of the two transitions.

The two transition regimes differed significantly in the scope of their objectives. In his first broadcast, on 30 July 1975, Murtala Mohammed announced major policy initiatives, including the forced retirement of numerous top functionaries of the Gowon government and the cancellation of the 1973 population census. In his 1 October 1975 independence day

speech, Murtala spelled out in detail the transition program for civil rule. This five-stage program began by setting up a committee to examine the issue of the creation of more states, the appointment of a constitution drafting committee, the investigation of the assets of certain categories of public officers who were removed from office, and the introduction of a public complaints commission. This first stage terminated with the restructuring of Nigeria from twelve into nineteen states. The second stage involved local government reorganization and the consolidation of new states. The evolving local government units were planned to act as an electoral college to the Constituent Assembly, which was given until October 1978 to complete its work. Stage three comprised the lifting of the ban on party politics, preparation for elections, and formation of political parties. Elections into state and federal levels of government constituted the fourth and fifth stages with the handing over of power to a democratically elected government on 1 October 1979.

Babangida's determined program of action initially consisted of the following, as laid out in his maiden speech of 27 August 1985: (a) the issue of political detainees or convictions of special military tribunals, which had not taken recognition of "our sense of natural justice"; (b) the national economy, which had continued to deteriorate in the previous twenty months, inflicting "intolerable" suffering on ordinary Nigerians; (c) foreign policy, which had been characterized by "inconsistency and incoherence"; and (d) fundamental human rights and civil liberties. In his first budget speech, four months later, Babangida dealt with the need for a political program and his plan to set up a political bureau.

In his inaugural address to the Political Bureau on 13 January 1986 Babangida delineated its tasks as follows: (a) review Nigeria's political history, identify the problems that had led to past failures, and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems; (b) identify a basic philosophy of government; (c) collect relevant information and data for the government with respect to a new political design; and (d) gather, collate, and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future, and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives. He ended the speech vowing that "this administration will not stay a day longer than is absolutely necessary. Your assignment must therefore provide time sequences for the transition to be achieved by October 1, 1990."[22]

The Mohammed/Obasanjo administration restricted itself to a political transition program. Chief Obafemi Awolowo had warned that administration as soon as it came to power against attempting to undertake what he called "the massive and never-ending task of rebuilding or reconstructing our body politic." That, he said, "would be too much of a risk because the army would then be embarking on a venture for which it is not by tradition and training equipped and which by its very nature is an ever-recurring phenomenon in any healthy, progressive state."[23] It is doubtful that this influenced the October speech of Mohammed. We argue that the restricted nature of the program arose from the political philosophy of the administration that military rule is an aberration, and that it is necessary only to correct specific problems and should be limited in scope and time. In addition, the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration came to power at a time when the country was manifestly tired of nine years of military rule. The program, despite the assassination of Mohammed, was undertaken with precision.

Evaluations of the implementation of the program from within and outside Nigeria were highly favorable. A leading Nigerian political scientist called it "an unequalled case of a ruling military faithfully presiding, in accordance with a masterpiece formula of detail and method, over the peaceful self-liquidation of their acquired power."[24]

For the Babangida administration, the transition program was only a part of the mission to be achieved, and the use and abuse of power took precedence over its self-liquidation. Initially, as we have shown, he cited problems of the economy, foreign policy, human rights, and justice for past misdeeds as well. These objectives were later expanded to encompass a sweeping effort at social mobilization and cultural change as well.[25]

The difference in scope of objectives led to institutional and programmatic differences between the two transition programs. Obasanjo relied on a constitution drafting committee, constituent assembly, low-profile programs, Operation Feed the Nation, and Universal Primary Education, to court popular support and legitimacy for his program. On the other hand, Babangida employed the tactic of mass participation and mass mobilization as a modality of courting popular support for his programs. Thus, while Obasanjo relied on bureaucratic government institutions run mainly by civil servants, state-directed populism has been the main instrumentality of Babangida. Such bodies as Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), National Directorate of Employment (NDE), Better Life for Rural Women, National Commission for Women Affairs, and the Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), have been the major instruments. Again, these sought a broader (but more controlled) mobilization of society, and a more far-reaching social, cultural, and economic transformation, but through instruments of state cooptation and domination that threatened or contradicted the basic aim of a democratic transition—to allow for the transfer of power back to the people.

Because it has been much more far-reaching in its objectives, and was conceived and implemented not during the economic boom of the Obasanjo years but during the deepest and most prolonged economic depression Nigeria has suffered since independence, the Babangida transition has been more prone to danger and failure. This is a major reason why it has been implemented with greater attempt at control from above, and yet, ironically, also with greater uncertainty. As Fred Onyeoziri put it in the *Guardian:* "The entire transition process is being managed as benevolence from the military government. That is why the people are told when to participate and how to participate. None of this is theirs by rights, everything is by the grace of the present leadership."[26]

He was referring here to the government's creation of the two new political parties, its drafting of the two party manifestos and constitutions before any of the human beings whose interests should constitute the life of any political party had joined, and the growing trend from decentralized power to personality cult of the top leader.

While the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration wanted "to forge a viable political system" that would "be stable and responsive enough to the needs and realities of this country,"[27] the Babangida administration wanted what presidential advisors Oyovbaire and Olagunju termed rather effusively "a revolutionary change" in Nigeria.[28] In contrast to Mohammed/Obasanjo,

Babangida sought to restructure the relationship between the state and society, but in somewhat contradictory ways: explicitly, to liberalize both the economy and the polity, but implicitly to impose a new degree of control over Nigeria's highly pluralistic and dynamic civil society. To achieve these complex and ambitious aims, the administration had to resort to unusual measures.

James Malloy has observed that a critical weakness of military governments is that they either do not or cannot "build institutional linkages to the rest of society—ties that could underwrite and sustain authoritarian rule over time. Hence as problems [mount] and as frustrated demands [build] up in society, an increasingly antagonistic polarization between state and society [develops]."[29] This sets the armed forces against society as a whole. In the implementation of the two administrations' transitions, this situation became increasingly evident. It led to the repeated closure of newspapers and institutions of higher learning, the banning of various associational groups, the imprisonment of citizens (especially critics and human rights activists) for no legally justifiable reason, and general contempt for the judiciary and the rule of law when challenged in court on these acts of repression.[30] This situation, as we observed in the first section of this chapter, has become especially acute and stressful in the Babangida administration, threatening both the stability of the transition process (as reflected in the 22 April 1990 coup attempt) and the quality and stability of democracy in the Third Republic.

There has also been an important difference in the implicit or inferred motives of the two administrations, as reflected in the implementation of the transition timetable. As we have indicated, General Obasanjo never wavered from the original implementation timetable, and completed it on schedule. The Babangida administration thrice deferred the date for a handover of power and repeatedly restructured numerous aspects of the transition timetable and structure (e.g., the dates for state and federal elections, the lifting of the ban on the old politicians, the creation of additional states and local governments). More seriously, Babangida gave—or permitted to be generated—many signals that he would not be averse to remaining in power beyond the scheduled completion of the transition. Part of this developed from a style of personalizing political power quite different from the Obasanjo regime and unprecedented in the history of Nigerian military governments. Twice in 1989 he dissolved the Armed Forces Ruling Council and reshuffled his government without consulting his fellow top officers. Before and since then he has shuffled military officers in and out of state governorships at a rate also without precedent in Nigeria's previous military governments. Beginning late in 1989, there began to appear a drumbeat of appeals in the press by shadowy groups and "patriotic citizens" for Babangida to remain in power beyond 1992. The growing resentment of his personalization of power and public fear that he meant to stay indefinitely apparently contributed to the bloody coup attempt of 22 April 1990, which took many lives and came perilously close to killing Babangida himself. Even after the coup attempt tempered this drumbeat, doubts about Babangida's intentions persisted, as did indications of the regime's continuing intent to control the unfolding political process much more tightly than did the Mohammed/Obasanjo administration.

Prospects and Implications for the Third Republic

Nigerians are fortunate to have in their country, counterpoised against the powerful statist and authoritarian tendencies, strong pluralist values and structures that keep propelling the country back to democracy. Nigerians value personal freedom, and with the expansion of education, the mass media, and political participation in the past quarter century, this commitment has heightened. Because of the relatively liberal character of British colonial rule, a vigorous press and a vibrant associational life were able to develop with modernization, independent of state control. The press played a largely positive role during the Second Republic, both in relentlessly exposing corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of power, and in warning, forcefully and repeatedly, of the dangers of political violence, intolerance, and misconduct. These positive contributions were counterbalanced but not outweighed by some continuing tendency toward irresponsible sensationalism and the proclivity of some newspapers, especially those owned by state governments, to reflect and accentuate the polarization of partisan loyalties. More effectively, but at greater risk to its practitioners, the press has kept alive the commitment to democracy and sought to establish some kind of accountability during periods of authoritarian rule.

Similarly, the prospects for democracy in Nigeria are strengthened by the increasing pluralism of associational life. Although they have not been immune from politicizing pressures, professional and other interest groups, along with more loosely organized networks of intellectuals and opinion leaders, have constituted a significant source of pressure for democratic and accountable government. During periods of authoritarian rule, many of these groups have bravely asserted their interests in the face of intimidating power and sometimes coercive repression. Prominent on this organizational landscape have been the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Medical Association, the Nigerian Labour Congress, the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, the Academic Staff Union of Universities, the National Association of Nigerian Students, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, and several women's organizations. By the time of the first military interregnum, these autonomous interest groups and associations had established sufficiently broad constituencies and deep roots so that they could not have been eliminated without a level of violent repression that no Nigerian military regime—even that of Buhari and Idiagbon—has dared to attempt. In this sense, the Nigerian case supports the classic pluralist argument that autonomous intermediate groups "provide the basis for the limitation of state power" and make society less "likely to be dominated by a centralized power apparatus."[31]

Precisely for this reason, however, successive military authoritarian regimes in Nigeria have tried to limit or undermine the independence, integrity, and political freedoms of the leading autonomous print media and civic associations (as well as of individual leaders and critics in civil society). Under the current administration, this assault on civil society has achieved new forms of subtlety and sophistication (including various means of cooptation) but has also reached new levels of breadth and intensity: Witness, for example, the alarming growth of the state security apparatus, which is

believed to have collaborators and informers widely placed throughout the society; the still-unsolved 1986 assassination of Dele Giwa, a courageous leader in investigative journalism who was questioned on "treason" charges and harassed by both the civilian and military intelligence agencies shortly before his death; the repeated closings of critical publications and detentions of journalists and dissidents; the harassment or banning of key, popular-sector interest groups; the repeated open defiance of court orders; and the extensive crackdown on regime critics following the coup attempt of 22 April 1990. Between 1987, when Giwa's muckraking *Newswatch* magazine was shut down by the government for several months, and 1992, "almost all the privately owned newspaper houses have suffered closure for a certain period of time." In virtually every instance, the government has cited sweeping and deliberately vague reasons of "national security and national interest" to justify its actions. After the powerful *Concord* newspaper house was shut down for a time in April 1992, the attorney-general declared, "Any malignant tumor requires a surgical operation."[32] All this despite the president's pledge, on assuming office in August 1985, to make respect for pluralism and human rights a high priority of his regime.

This legacy of repression and subversion of civil society would seem to have damaged the pluralist foundation for democracy in Nigeria, and yet civil society has shown a certain remarkable resilience in these past nine trying years of military rule, as reflected in the rise and rapid maturation of new independent publications (especially periodicals) and several energetic and courageous human rights associations. Through the final phase of the transition, independent groups have continued to protest government policies—and to pay the price. In June 1992 four leading human rights activists were arrested on charges of "conspiracy and treason" (the typically vague but ominous counts used to intimidate government critics).

Ironically, Nigeria's volatile ethnic and religious diversity has also made it difficult to institutionalize authoritarian rule. It is very difficult to manage this complex cultural cleavage by authoritarian means because of the tendency for various groups to view any regime, and particularly a nonparticipatory one, as weighted against them. When there are institutional means for rotating national leaders, changing the composition of the federal government, and electing local and state leaders and representatives, each group can develop some degree of security and retain some hope of improving its position. But in an authoritarian regime, the ethnic identity of the few top leaders assumes exaggerated importance, which makes it much more fundamentally threatening to groups that feel excluded or inadequately included.

Arrayed against these liberal and pluralist pressures for democracy, however, are a number of powerful cultural and structural factors that have twice disfigured and destroyed democracy in Nigeria and will almost surely do so again unless they are bluntly recognized and imaginatively altered.

Ethnic, Regional, and Religious Conflict

To begin with, the same ethnic pluralism that makes the country very difficult to govern under authoritarian rule also presents stiff challenges to

democratic governance. We have argued that, of the two central flaws of the First Republic, the problem of ethnic polarization and imbalance was the one that the constitutional engineers of the Second Republic took creative, laudable, and to a considerable extent, effective steps toward managing. It is now a cornerstone of Nigerian political faith that federalism in all its dimensions is indispensable to the maintenance of ethnic peace and national unity in Nigeria, and therefore must be practiced, even under military rule.[33] This means that power and resources must be genuinely distributed not only among the central, state, and local levels of government but also among the various regional and ethnic groups in a fair and balanced way. It means, therefore, that appointments at all levels of government and especially the top must continue to "reflect the federal character" of Nigeria. And it means that electoral laws must press the party system to cut across ethnic and regional cleavages, while parties themselves (and other large national organizations) innovate and refine the practice of zoning as an institutional guarantee of ethnic balance in their own structures of power.

Many observers have found cause for concern in the mandatory two-party structure of the Third Republic, which risks dissolving too neatly into the bipolar cleavage of North versus South, and somewhat by extension, Muslim versus Christian—now the great polarizing sectional threat to the future of Nigeria. We share this concern, but we do not share the conviction of some that the new two-party system will necessarily wind up assuming this character. There are at least two reasons why. First, there are a great many other ethnic and subethnic fault lines in the country that the new party system will expose and stimulate. These more local lines of communal and subethnic cleavage began to produce much more vigorous party competition in states like Ondo, Oyo, and Anambra during the last elections of the Second Republic (even when the last two political titans of the First Republic, Awolowo and Azikiwe, were still on the ballot to rally their folk). There is plenty of evidence from the state election results that they are doing so even more vigorously now that Awo and Zik are gone from politics.

Second, the political/electoral structure now requires an unprecedentedly national character and base of each party, if it does not wish to be swamped by the other. If either one becomes too much the captive of one ethnic or regional group, and the other exploits this fact with even moderate effectiveness, the latter, broader party will stand to become the clearly dominant one in the country for some time to come. *This*, one might argue, is the hidden genius of the mandatory two-party system. Not only does it formally require each party to be broadly national in composition, as the Second Republic did, but it presses each party to construct and maintain a truly national ethnic base out of sheer competitive need.

This is not to say that the north versus south and Christian versus Muslim tension will not plague the Third Republic, but that, crucially, these potentially devastating cleavages in Nigeria will enter into democratic politics more *within* the two parties than *between* them. This may lead to fierce, bitter conflict within either or both of the parties along ethnic and regional lines, but there will be a powerful incentive ultimately to accommodate and resolve that conflict: the quest for political power that is the ultimate goal of any party. Only if *both* parties were to be seized by blatant sectional interests would the centripetal logic of the system metamorphose into a centrifugal one. In that

case however, the second party to so fall victim would be surrendering a tremendous electoral advantage. In this sense, ironically, the high premium on political power in Nigeria may, in the new Third Republic, provide a limited inducement to political sense and caution on the part of the politicians.[34]

It must also be conceded that the broad conditions for polarization of the party system along regional lines were laid at the inaugural national conventions of the two parties at Abuja in July 1990. It has been now widely assumed (despite official protestations of both parties to the contrary) that, given the explicit and implicit zoning conventions, the NRC, having chosen a southerner as party chairman, will nominate a northern presidential candidate in 1992, while the SDP, having chosen a northerner as party chairman, will choose a southern presidential candidate.[35] If the two parties do ultimately nominate as expected, this will highlight regional, and perhaps religious cleavage in the presidential campaign, but only to a point. Within the south and the north, and among Christians and Muslims, there are multiple other cleavages. And there are not enough spots on the presidential ticket to even begin to represent all the major groups. Even among northern Muslims, there is not only some ethnic cleavage but a major class cleavage that will shape voting decisions. Whether the presidential election deteriorates into a north-south or Christian-Muslim struggle for power will depend on the larger political context at the time, and how the campaign is framed and articulated on each side. Particularly with the military watching over, it is not likely to be in the interest of either candidate to frame his presidential campaign in sectional terms.

On balance then, we conclude that the institutions of the Third Republic offer hope of continued progress in managing ethnic, regional, and religious conflict in Nigeria. Such conflict will continue. It will be fierce and could even again erupt into serious violence. But it is unlikely to polarize along political party lines. And the two new parties may even emerge as effective buffers and shock absorbers of much of that conflict.

The Problem of Prebendalism

We come then to what will be the central threat to the Third Republic, what Joseph and others (albeit with somewhat different language and less structured theory) have identified as the central cause of the failure of the Second Republic: the prebendal character of politics in Nigeria, and its immensely destructive consequences—corruption, violence, the zero-sum struggle for power.[36] At the heart of the phenomenon, it must be stressed, lies political corruption, the illegal but widely tolerated and indeed expected use of state office for the enrichment and benefit of one's self, family, and circle of supporters, cronies, clients, and kinsmen. It is important to understand here what Joseph has taken pains to emphasize but some others have missed: that the system is driven by demands and expectations both from the top and the bottom of society, that incumbents of state office not only seek it out for corrupt gain but are besieged by friends, clients, and kinsmen for some corrupt largess or special assistance. The expectation that state office can and will be used for corrupt gain has become the driving force behind the chief

features of the political culture, at both the elite and mass levels: not only the violent, fraudulent nature of politics, but the strange schizophrenic attitude of the Nigerian people, their profound cynicism and alienation from electoral politics,[37] and yet their ready, anxious mobilization and involvement in the heat of a scramble for whatever morsels the masses can scavenge from a system that has otherwise largely excluded them. This schizophrenic attitude is particularly dangerous for democracy because it produces all of the intensity and passion of mass participation in party politics but none of the deep, substantive attachment to the system that would deter a military coup. Thus, the Third Republic figures to experience, as did the Second, an abundance of electoral activity but a scarcity of legitimacy. Being both cynical *and* involved, politicians and their supporters will grab whatever they can from the system before it collapses again.[38]

One of the most reliable ways to alter the prebendal character of politics is to expose, bring to trial, punish and disgrace corrupt public officials in large numbers. Punishment must involve both substantial prison terms and thorough seizure of ill-gotten assets, if it is to have more of a socializing and deterring impact on individuals and society than did the half-serious and prematurely terminated imprisonments of the Second Republic politicians from 1984 to 1986. This will require a code of conduct apparatus on a scale much larger (perhaps by a factor of ten) than that of the Second Republic or even the newly reconstituted body. A serious effort would seem to require 100 or more dedicated and well-trained criminal investigators, lawyers, and accountants (backed up by adequate equipment and support staff) to keep track of several thousand elected officials at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as ministers, commissioners, and other top appointed officials. Even a staff of that size might be hard-pressed to monitor adequately the entire civil service, but a cardinal principle of any anticorruption effort should be to start at the top. If the ethic can be established at the top levels, and dramatic examples exposed and punished there, the message will seep down, and there will come into the top layers of public life officials determined to enforce accountability within their own institutions.[39]

In short, if the settled, routinized, widely expected pattern of political corruption is to be altered, the legal apparatuses for attacking it will have to be daringly charged, massively enlarged, and elaborately insulated from possible political interference and neutralization. One of the most unfortunate features of the new constitution is that it does little to put the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal beyond the reach of partisan politicians. To be sure, one may join with Martin Dent in applauding the Armed Forces Ruling Council for having gotten these structures set up and funded *before* the politicians return to power (in contrast to the Second Republic, in which their initiation was delayed interminably by the National Assembly). And Dent notes important other improvements as well (in particular, mandatory declaration of assets *before* taking office).[40] But the key, as always, lies in the implementation. It will do little good to have tighter procedures or standards (e.g., that a public officer shall not "live above his legitimate income") if the bureau proves no more aggressive in enforcing them. And in this regard, it would seem, constitutional innovation has fallen short.

Now, as previously, appointment of the chairman and members of the bureau (and other federal bodies like the NEC and the Judicial Service

Commission) is vested in the civilian president, who will be a partisan politician.[41] Appointment of the three members of the tribunal also rests with the president, "in accordance with the recommendation of the Federal Judicial Service Commission."[42] Although a new provision of the Constitution (section 156) extends to the bureau and other bodies an assurance of independence in appointing and disciplining staff previously granted only to the Federal Civil Service, Judicial Service, and Electoral Commissions in the Second Republic, the specific schedule for the bureau gives it this power "in accordance with the provisions of an Act of the National Assembly," and once again gives to the Assembly the ability to set the "terms and conditions" (including presumably none) under which citizens (including the press) would be able to inspect public officials' declarations of assets.[43] Although, as in the Second Republic, members of the Code of Conduct Bureau (and NEC and other sensitive bodies) can only be removed by the president for cause, with support of a two-thirds majority in the Senate,[44] who can be confident that even a president and Senate at odds with one another would not conspire to intimidate or remove an overly ambitious Code of Conduct Bureau?

As Diamond has argued elsewhere, and as former head of state Olusegun Obasanjo has recommended in an important venture in constitutional thinking that has received too little attention, crucial regulatory bodies like the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal and the Judicial Service Commission need to be removed completely from executive and legislative control and entrusted with some more neutral, less partisan body.[45] It is unlikely that they will acquire the leadership, resources, and courage to tackle the problem seriously unless their independence is institutionally ensured in this way.

Leadership is also crucial. The Code of Conduct Bureau and tribunal need at their command able, aggressive, fiercely independent administrators whose integrity and commitment to democracy and accountability are beyond reproach. In resurrecting this apparatus in 1989, Babangida chose weak and superannuated figures who will retire after 1992. Such a striking change in culture and behavior as a reversal of prebendalism also requires forceful and exemplary political leadership—beginning at the top with a president who not only eschews corruption himself but ruthlessly demands probity of every one of his ministers and aides. Of course, some will argue that Nigeria is caught in a Catch-22 situation wherein the very prebendal structures and culture that generate the desperate need for such leadership also prevent it from arising. Only a politician (civilian or military) who plays the prebendal game can assemble the coalition of supporters necessary to take and keep power, it is argued. This may be true, but the concentration of power in the presidency does provide the possibility for one forceful individual leader at the top to make an enormous difference in the character of government. Imagine the impact on Nigeria of a new president not only uttering but executing relentlessly a vision such as General Obasanjo's:

> New values must be inculcated that extol virtues of hard work, thrift, modesty, honesty, integrity, respect, concern for others, moderation, and selflessness. Wealth creation must be condemned as criminal and economic sabotage. The masses must then see it as their own avowed civic responsibility, political duty, and an irrevocable, uncompromisable, and non-negotiable right and duty to

> expose without compunction such corrupt individuals. It is only when this is done that resources would be available to minimize the vagaries of collective poverty. We must develop a clear and unambiguous attitude of condemnation of doubtful sources of wealth and ostentatious and selfish use of wealth.[46]

It is unfortunate and for many Nigerians infuriating that the current military government has failed to use the crucial years of the transition to establish a new ethic and pattern of conduct in public life by allowing *itself* to be held accountable by independent structures of accountability. That important opportunity is now past, as the military has not only removed itself from any public scrutiny but has established a record of corruption in office more extensive and systematic than any Nigerian military regime before it.

With the official structures lacking in vigor and serious intent, the last line of defense against abuse will lie once again in civil society, among independent publications and monitoring groups. It is impossible to imagine that political corruption can be effectively combated in Nigeria (or anywhere else, for that matter) without a free, vigorous, and effective press. Even if official structures were vigorous, the press would constitute an independent stimulus to, check on, and assessment of the Code of Conduct apparatus, as well as a supplement to the bureau's own investigative resources. No government that attempts to intimidate or shackle the press, or deny it access to relevant information, can claim to be serious about public accountability. This is why most democratic groups in Nigeria believe it is essential for the *public* to have access to all declarations of assets by all elected officials (which it does not now). Similarly, the continuing organizational strength and innovation in civil society offer opportunities for new and existing citizens' groups both to join in seeking to hold public officials accountable for their conduct and to socialize citizens to new political norms and ethics—to a view of government as service to the collective good.

The odds are stacked steeply against any serious assault on the prebendal character of politics in Nigeria. But structural adjustment measures have diminished some of the scope for rent-seeking by government officials. Even given the limits to which this can be done in an oil economy, it is possible for legal and political institutions to mount such an assault if there is sufficient political will and imagination.

Conclusion

The above review does not exhaust the serious threats that will confront the Third Republic. The problem of corruption apart, the new republic will have to weave a difficult course between the imperatives of structural adjustment and the pent-up demands of a long-suffering, cheated, and deprived populace. It will have to implement a mix of policies, pursued with some consistency and backed by a bipartisan consensus, capable of producing not merely a spurt of economic growth but sustained development that will lift people out of degrading poverty into dignified and productive lives. Continued economic stagnation and destitution will surely feed the escalating religious extremism and growing rates of criminal, communal, and religious violence that threaten to tear apart the fabric of Nigerian society. On these

basic questions of economic growth and social justice the legitimacy of the Third Republic—and the very future of Nigeria as a nation—will heavily ride.

New political institutions will again have to find their way to coherence and effectiveness. Part of the tragedy of repeated democratic failures is that it robs such institutions—parties, legislatures, and local government councils, especially—of the continuity of experience necessary to become effective and mature. This challenge is steeper because the two parties are artificial creations, with deep internal divisions. The very logic of a mandatory two-party system may need to be reconsidered, along with other basic constitutional questions, early in the life of the new republic.

Finally, there will be the problem of dealing with the cultural and institutional legacies of authoritarian rule. As Agbaje observes, one of the most prominent and unfortunate legacies of this and previous authoritarian regimes is the cumulative cultural heritage of intolerance of dissent and protest. These experiences of military rule have established a record of "largely undemocratic and illiberal political practice"[47] that tempts subsequent civilian regimes into similar behavior and seduces them into regarding such behavior as necessary and legitimate.

More ominously, the state security apparatus (including both the State Security Service and the Directorate of Military Intelligence) has increased quite significantly in size, resources, autonomy, and scope of activity since the military returned to power at the end of 1983. This apparatus may become available to a new civilian administration with repressive intent, and in any case will constitute serious threats to popular control and political liberty, even under formal democratic structures. If the experience of Latin America is any guide, rolling back the scope of intelligence activities to concern with genuine threats to national security, and bringing the various intelligence agencies under civilian control, will require from the new civilian leadership considerable shrewdness, tenacity, professionalism, and determination.[48] Such leadership will be difficult to mobilize in a new administration that will be consumed with distributional questions and probably compromised by its own corruption.

The same will be true for the larger task of bringing the military once again under civilian control. Since the military will have no guaranteed place in the cabinet or direct control over economic resources, as in Latin America, the most obvious and direct challenge will be bringing military intelligence under civilian authority and removing it from the considerable role it has acquired in surveillance and control of civilian politics and civic action.

The larger challenge—preventing another military coup—is one beyond any agenda for the restructuring of civilian-military relations. The military role in internal politics has expanded quite dramatically in Nigeria, as it has in so many other developing countries. With each coup, the moral and psychological barrier against the next one is lowered. Military coups succeed in Nigeria, as elsewhere, because civilian regimes have lost popular legitimacy and proven themselves unable to govern effectively. The relatively low legitimacy and widespread cynicism with which the Third Republic will begin its life, in the public mind, may give it rather little time to prove its worth, and almost certainly no more time than the Second Republic enjoyed.

Notes

1. Richard L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2: 209; Larry Diamond, *Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic* (London: Macmillan, 1988); K.W.J.0 Post and Michael Vickers, *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria* (London: Heinemann, 1973); John Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966); Frederick A. O. Schwarz, *Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation or the Race—The Politics of Independence* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
2. For the Politburo's mode of work, the extent of the debate and the breadth of popular involvement, see the *Report of the Political Bureau* (Lagos: Federal Government Printer, 1987), 7–12.
3. Address by Major-General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida to the Nation, "On Political Programme for the Country," 1 July 1987, p. 5.
4. For example, the Constituent Assembly's draft constitution provided for a single six-year presidential term, which the AFRC switched back to the 1979 formula of a maximum of two four-year terms (for governors as well). Provisions declaring Nigeria "a welfare state," making military coups a punishable crime, creating a post of head of the civil service, and establishing a separate account for the judiciary and an Armed Forces Service Commission were all expunged by the AFRC.
5. N.E.C. "Report and Recommendations on Verification Exercise for the Registration of Two Political Parties," September 1989, (mimeo). For analysis of NEC's report and its reasoning, see Femi Badejo, "Party Formation and Competition" (Paper prepared for the Conference on Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Hoover Institution, 27–29 August 1990), and *Newswatch*, 23 October 1989, pp. 16–17.
6. General I. B. Babangida, "The Dawn of a New Socio-Political Order," (Address to the Nation on Saturday, 7 October 1989); and *Newswatch*, 23 October 1989, pp. 13–26.
7. *Newswatch*, 11 November 1991, p. 16.
8. *Newswatch Magazine*, May 1992.
9. World Bank, *World Debt Tables, 1989–90* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1990), 172. The World Bank lists Nigeria's total external debt in 1988 as $30.7 billion, projected to rise to $35 billion by 1990.
10. *Financial Times* (London), 16 March 1992, sect. 3, p. 2. There is reason to suspect that the current population figure may represent an undercount of several million people or more, if the population growth rate during the 1980s was 3.5 percent (as sample surveys have shown). In addition, the reconfirmation by the new census of a population majority for the northern states enjoys rather little credibility in the southern states.
11. Ibid.
12. The official rate on 26 June 1992 was 18.25 naira to the dollar. *West Africa*, 6–12 July 1992, 1137.
13. This may seem low by Third World standards, but for Nigeria it is painfully high, especially when incomes are stagnant even in nominal terms.
14. *Newswatch*, 3 July 1989.
15. *Newswatch*, 10 October 1988, p.31.
16. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Background to Nationalism Thirty Years After," (James Smoot Coleman Second Memorial Lecture, University of California at Los Angeles, Thursday, 11 May 1989), 14.
17. Oyeleye Oyediran, "The Gospel of the Second Chance: A Comparison of Obasanjo and Babangida Military Disengagement in Nigeria," *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, 23, 1 & 2 (October 1988/January 1989): 2.
18. Quoted in ibid.

19. President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, (Address delivered on the occasion of the 12th graduation ceremony of the students of Command and Staff College, Jaji, 29 June 1990).
20. Quoted in Oyediran, "The Gospel of the Second Chance."
21. *Newswatch*, 9 September 1985, p. 9.
22. *Portrait of a New Nigeria: Selected Speeches of IBB* (Enugu: Precision Press, 1989), 32–33.
23. See *Daily Times*, 21–22 August 1975, for a full text of Awolowo's press statement on the new administration.
24. J. Bayo "Adekson," "Dilemma of Military Disengagement," in *Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule 1966–1979*, ed., Oyeleye Oyediran (Lagos: Friends Foundation Publishers, 1988), 31.
25. Significantly, Babangida, as a principal force in the December 1983 coup that brought Buhari and Idiagbon to power, and third in rank behind them in the regime, must have been involved in the design of the Buhari/Idiagbon objectives. For all his criticisms of them upon seizing power, their failure to plan for military withdrawal was not one of them; rather he focused on the highly authoritarian and personalistic leadership style of Buhari and Idiagbon, a criticism that, ironically, would later come to haunt Babangida himself.
26. *The Guardian*, Friday, 13 April 1990.
27. See Oyeleye Oyediran, ed., *Survey of Nigerian Affairs, 1975* (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, for the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1978).
28. Sam Oyovbaire and Tunji Olagunju, eds., *Foundations of a New Nigeria: IBB Era* (Enugu: Precision Press, 1989), 2.
29. James Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America" in *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin America*, ed. James Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1987), 247.
30. These extensive violations of human rights and the rule of law are detailed in a number of human rights reports and publications. See for example "Nigeria Contradicting Itself: An Undemocratic Transition Seeks to Bring Democracy Nearer," *Africa Watch*, 4, 5, (21 April 1992); and the quarterly publications of the Civil Liberties Organization (*Liberty*) and the Constitutional Rights Project (*Constitutional Rights Journal*). See also Clement Nwankwo, "The Judicial System and Human Rights," in *Democratic Transition in Nigeria: Politics, Governance, and Civil Society, 1986–1992*, ed. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran (forthcoming).
31. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 99, 2 (1984): 203.
32. *West Africa*, 6–12 July 1992, p. 1123.
33. J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Nigerian Federalism under Civilian and Military Regimes," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18 (Winter 1988): 173–88.
34. Races below the national level (especially once the military is gone from the scene as political umpire) can, however, be expected to mobilize ethnic and religious prejudice because such officials are elected by a local and not a national constituency. On this point, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 638.
35. Indeed, it was precisely this widely shared expectation that led to the rather bizarre spectacle at the NRC convention of northern power brokers shopping for and then heavily backing a southern candidate for party chairman while the key southern power brokers backed a northern candidate (*Newswatch*, 6 August 1990, pp. 16–17). Although this struggle polarized along regional lines to a considerable extent, it is interesting and significant that the zoning system forced each group to forge transregional alliances. Having achieved in advance of its convention a consensus that the party chairmanship would be zoned to the north (and hence, crucially, the presidential nomination to the south), the SDP left Abuja with a significantly greater internal coherence than the NRC.

36. Richard Joseph. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
37. For recent evidence and analysis of this, see Adigun Agbaje, *Mobilization for a New Political Culture,* (Paper presented to the Hoover Institution Conference : on "Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria," Stanford, CA: 27–29 August 1990), 24–29.
38. For a more extended analysis of the history, dynamics, and implications of political corruption in Nigeria, see Larry Diamond, "Political Corruption: Nigeria's Perennial Struggle," *Journal of Democracy,* 2, 4 (Fall 1991): 73–85.
39. For a theoretical and comparative analysis of this logic, see Robert Klitgaard, "Political Corruption: Strategies for Reform," *Journal of Democracy,* 2, 4 (Fall 1991): 86–101, and *Controlling Corruption,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
40. Martin Dent, *Operation of the Constitution: Consequences of the Changes Made to the Text and of the Lessons of the Second Republic,* (Paper for the Hoover Institution Conference on "Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria," Stanford, CA: 27–29 August 1990), 4–5.
41. *The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Promulgation (Decree No. 12, 1989),* Supplement to Official Gazette Extraordinary, No. 29, Vol. 76, 3 May 1989-Part A, Section 151, p. 62.
42. Ibid., Fifth Schedule, Part I, Section 16, p. 147.
43. Ibid., Third Schedule, Part I, Section 3, p. 132.
44. Ibid., Section 155, p. 63.
45. General Obasanjo proposes that the Census, National Electoral Commission, Code of Conduct Bureau, Judicial Service Commission, and certain other functions be placed under the exclusive control of a National Council of State, and suggests a method for elaborating the membership of the council to enhance its independence. He argues that the Code of Conduct Bureau "should be answerable only to the Council," and that declarations of assets should not only be published in a government gazette but should also be available for publication "in newspapers with wide circulation throughout the country." Olusegun Obasanjo, *Constitution for National Integration and Development in Nigeria* (Lagos: Friends Foundation Publishers, Ltd., 1989), 89–92. Larry Diamond's ideas were initially spelled out in "Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic," *African Affairs,* April 1987.
46. Obasanjo, *Constitution for National Integration,* 93.
47. Adigun Agbaje, *Mobilization for a New Political Culture,* 39.
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Apartheid in Retreat: Economic Sanctions and Political Reform

Mfanya Donald Tryman
Saba Jallow

Mississippi State University
Georgia Southern University

In February 1990, Nelson Mandela, one of the most revered political prisoners of the twentieth century, was released from Robben Island, with the full attention of the media of the world. The emphasis in this chapter is on why the South African regime has shown a tendency to change. We do not here analyze the dynamics and consequences of change in the three-and-one half years since Mandela was released. That very important issue awaits a separate treatment. As to why, the essence of our argument is this. Endogenous economic factors influenced by the worldwide economic recession in the 1980s, international sanctions, and internal political pressure groups are the causal factors for change in South Africa.

Mandela's release, following the earlier releases of others of the elder leaders of black South Africa, generated euphoria, throughout South Africa and around the world. But such an action by the state president of South Africa seems in bold contrast to all that had gone on in the previous forty years. It could be argued that the South African regime had recognized the unworkability of apartheid in the economy, and that this was seen, arguably, back to the years of Prime Minister John Vorster (1966–1978) and his successor P.W. Botha (1978–1989). But the release of Mandela and his colleagues was a qualitatively different action, a bold step. It implied that the South African government was accommodating, albeit reluctantly, to forces determined to see the end of apartheid. Why did the state president, de Klerk, a hitherto conventional Afrikaner politician, decide to release Mandela and his colleagues at this time? In order to understand the more altruistic image that South Africa is now attempting to project, political scientists should inquire into the pressures that have produced change in South Africa, beginning with an investigation of apartheid itself.

The Meaning of Apartheid

Apartheid is a unique form of racism that has characterized the way that 7 million whites control 28 million black Africans, 3 million coloreds, and 1 million Indians, who have few political rights and legal avenues for redress of grievances. Literally, *apartheid* means "apartness" or "separate development." In practice, apartheid is a crude yet sophisticated form of *baaskap* "white supremacy" expressed in more than 300 statutes that segregated blacks from whites and subjugated blacks to an inferior status in every facet of life. The apartheid system also permitted a remarkable degree of administrative discretion by officials under these many laws. One of the most dramatic illustrations was the pass system. Every black was forced to carry a passbook. These passbooks stated the identity of the person, where he or she could travel, his or her employer's name, and how long or whether the person could stay in a white area. Passbooks had to be shown on demand and violators were subjected to arrest. (As we will note later, protest against the pass system was one of the crucial issues for South African blacks.) Under this system, there were still other extreme forms of administrative discretion. Provisions of the emergency included virtually unlimited police power to shoot or arrest protestors, incarceration without a lawyer or preliminary hearing, detention for long periods of time without trial, a media ban on photos, tape recordings of violence and all types of police action without official permission, a ban on reporting of all security activities without approval of the local police commissioner, and the banning of journalists from areas of unrest and apprising them of the danger of reporting or transmitting "subversive statements."[1]

Apartheid is the product of more than forty years rule by the National party, once the Nationalist party. The core of the party is in the Afrikaner population, a community whose ancestors came from Holland in 1672. South Africa's history is filled with violence and war. Much of that violence was between the Afrikaners and the British, as well as between Europeans and different Black ethnic groups. When the British took over the Cape, many Afrikaners migrated to the north, where the Transvaal and the Orange Free State developed as separate republics. The South African War (1899–1902) ended with the final military defeat of the Afrikaner republics by the British Empire. The Union of South Africa was created from the merger of the Cape Colony, Natal, the English province of Natal, and the two republics. For most of the time between 1910 and 1948, the Union was governed by a coalition of the English speaking and those Afrikaners prepared to cooperate with them. This Afrikaner-British coalition, dedicated to the Commonwealth and aligned with the interests of the business community, was embodied in the United party.

But there was an alternative to white bilingual coalitions. In the Afrikaner community, in the Nationalist party (now the National party), centered upon the *Broederbond*. This seventy-three year-old organization is estimated to have 12,000 members. High rank in the Broederbond is a prerequisite for becoming president of South Africa.[2] Apartheid was crafted by the Broederbond, who harnessed political, economic, and social forces to its mission of ultimate Afrikaner domination. The most prominent leaders, the policy formulators

and implementors of the apartheid regime, belong to the *Broederbond*. The Nationalist party won in the 1948 elections and has been in power ever since. From that victory has come the apartheid regime.

Apartheid is not only a set of legal and administrative arrangements, it is also a set of social and economic policies and results. Because of apartheid, in South Africa there are two worlds of development. Many white people enjoy a "first" world, which is symbolized by the following vignette,

> (Johannesburg) has high-rise office buildings, more than a hundred carefully tended parks, and Beverly Hills-like suburbs that contain more swimming pools and tennis courts than I've seen in one place. Johannesburg. . . is also the starting point of the world's most elegant passenger train, the Blue train, which makes the twenty-four hour trip to Cape Town three times a week, usually arriving within the appointed minute.[3]

Black Africans live, on the other hand, in a "third" world of preventable diseases that kill thousands of people yearly; dehumanizing and menial jobs; and shanty towns without indoor plumbing, running water, or electricity as described by the author just quoted above:

> What you don't see . . . and what you can't see without government permission . . . is Soweto . . . thirty minutes from Johannesburg on the black-only commuter train. It is a teeming, clamorous township of 2 million blacks, an enclave where horse-drawn coal carts creak along the dirt roads between box-shaped houses with outhouses and no electricity, . . . where gangs of young toughs . . . roam the streets with pistols stolen from white homes, where on any given day, there are three murders.[4]

The dichotomy of the two worlds is the necessary consequence of apartheid, and apartheid can be regarded as a policy to overcome the "poor white" problem that afflicted white political life in the 1930s. This is one reason the bureaucracy of the regime is quite large. The government employs one civil servant for every twenty-seven people. Forty percent of employable Afrikaner adults work for the government. As a rough comparison, in the United States, one civil servant works for the government out of every eighty Americans.[5]

The Scope of Sanctions

Governments around the world have made it clear to the regime in South Africa that they would not stand idly by while the South African regime continued to commit atrocities and to maintain a police state in the name of baaskap. India, the first country to implement sanctions against South Africa, did so in 1946, when the old United party was still in office. India placed "a ban on all goods consigned from, grown or manufactured in South Africa, and closed its High Commission office in 1954."[6]

Economic sanctions against South Africa have resulted in divestment (withdrawing stocks from companies doing business or having investments in South Africa) and disinvestment (companies and corporations leaving South Africa) by many Western nations. Sweden and the former USSR had a total trade embargo on South Africa. Almost all members of the European

Community, Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden), African nations through the Organization of African Unity, and other states such as Austria, Japan, and the United States had some combinations of sanctions against South Africa as of 1990.

Four major rounds of official sanctions have been directly tied to apartheid and incidents of violence on the part of the regime. The first round came in response to the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. As noted before, there was an intensive and extensive pass control system. The pass laws were hated. From 1916 until the recent years, more than 16 million Blacks had been arrested for pass law offenses.[7] In 1960 Africans gathered in front of a police station at Sharpeville to protest. Police opened fire, killing sixty-nine people and wounding hundreds more. This incident became known as the Sharpeville Massacre and touched off a round of Western government sanctions. The United Nations initiated the first voluntary arms ban resolutions in 1963, with the United States as well as the United Kingdom supporting the resolutions.[8] Antiapartheid activities and economic sanctions continued into the 1970s, going from isolated political and economic protests to global economic boycotts and pressures for companies and corporations to divest their holdings in South Africa.[9]

The second round of sanctions was inaugurated as the result of the Soweto uprising in 1976, which occurred when the regime attempted to institute Afrikaans in Black schools and Blacks resisted this effort. The Soweto uprising provided an unhealthy business climate for outside investors as well as a period of instability for businesses in South Africa that continued into the 1980s. The tactics of the police and military brought about world condemnation. In contrast to the Sharpeville Massacre, which the police were successful in putting down quickly, the Soweto uprising lasted well into the next year. Sanctions increased, foreign investments dropped, and Pretoria decided "to reduce imports, maximize exports and limit growth."[10]

In 1983 the regime attempted, *inter alia*, to restructure political representation on ethnic lines. The government instituted a tricameral parliament, with one house for whites, one for Asians, and one for coloreds. This yielded another round of political protests. An attempt was made to legitimize the new system by a referendum in which whites, coloreds, and Asians went to the polls, though a boycott amongst the latter two groups resulted in a low voter turnout. The black majority (68 percent of the total population) still had no voice in national matters. The United Nations, by a vote of 141–0 with 7 abstentions (the U.S. abstaining), rejected the constitutional reforms as invalid and predicted that attempts to enforce the new structure would only aggravate an explosive situation.[11] The prediction was correct. The 1983 restructuring eventually led to Botha, in July 1985, declaring a state of emergency for certain parts of the country that restricted the rights of the mass media and blacks. As a result of the political rebellion against the new constitution, more than 1600 blacks were killed over a period of four years, mostly by South African police, before this state of emergency was declared by Pretoria.

Further, sanctions by Western nations were evoked by the state of emergency and police violence associated with the emergency. A second state of emergency in 1986 covered the whole country. This emergency yielded numerous and continuous reports of police beatings and torture of detainees,

including children. This prompted, for the first time, comprehensive sanctions legislation on the part of the U.S. Congress.

By mid-1986, as black South Africans commemorated the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising, the number of people killed rose to 2,100 since the emergency went into effect, with two-thirds of the deaths attributed to South African security forces, and approximately 150 dying each month, according to official South African figures. Thousands of Blacks, including children as young as fourteen, were detained and jailed for periods of time longer than six months as a result of the state of emergency.

The new sanctions approved by the U.S. Congress include bans on new investments; on loans to companies, loans to the South African regime; on general trade; on credits and promotions; and on imports of coal, iron, and steel. The 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act includes a ban on the following: most public-and private-sector loans, investments, and credit extensions; on the importation of uranium, coal, iron, steel, and textiles; on the exportation of arms and ammunition and military vehicles; on all agricultural products; and on imports from state-owned companies. It also included a permanent ban on the krugerrand; on the export of crude oil; on petroleum products, munitions, nuclear-related parts and materials; on computer services and products to South African agencies engaged in apartheid. It terminates air services for South African Airways in the United States. The Congress of the United States has considered additional sanctions since 1986.

Sanctions and the Economic Context in South Africa

Proposition 1: The downswing of the global economy in the 1980s had a negative impact on the South African economy.

There are conflicting arguments over how great an impact sanctions have had on the South African economy. We concede that our analysis here is not definitive, as we discuss only three sets of data in any detail, namely, the structure of merchandise exports (table 1), the structure of demand (table 2), and the structure of consumption (table 3) Our analysis cannot establish a direct cause-effect relationship between sanctions and the declining apartheid economy. However, the indexes discussed here show a definite relationship to the continuing decline since sanctions have been put into effect.

We hold that the South African economy was already in trouble long before comprehensive sanctions were put into effect. Sanctions exacerbated the situation. South Africa is an upper-middle-income economy with a GNP per capita of $2,470 in 1989,[12] one of seventeen nations in this category. Utilization of GNP per capita can be misleading, as it does not tell us about the disparities that exists in a society. (Of course, measures of central tendency never automatically inform about measures of dispersion.) In the South African apartheid case, with its two worlds of development, per capita income is skewed in favor of whites. Nonetheless, the GNP per capita is a reasonable basis for comparing South Africa with similar upper-middle-income economies. But, on the basis of available data, we can assert some working conclusions. We have examined some data that, by a series of indicators, lead to the conclusion that the South African economy is, and for some time has

been, basically weak. South Africa has fared worse than her other upper-middle-income country counterparts in the aggregate.

Among other criteria not discussed in detail here are the following:

- The percent average annual growth rate has continued to decline beginning in the 1965–1973 period when it was 5.1 percent to the 1980–1989 period when it was only 1.3 percent (*source:* The World Bank, World Development Reports, 1986: 183; 1991: 207).

- Taxes on international trade and other transactions as well as nontax sources of revenue have declined since 1973 as a percent of the total current revenue (*source:* The World Bank, World Development Reports, 1986: 189; 1990; 163; 1991; 221).

- Finally, the annual GNP per capita growth rate percent has dramatically fallen in South Africa compared to similar countries. The change was approximately 32 percent during the 1965–1980 period to a deficit of -1.3 percent from 1980–1987, with an overall budget deficit of -4.4 as a percent of the GNP (*source:* United Nations Development Programme, Human development Report, 1990: 170–71).

In 1986, the purchasing power of white wage earners was $900, but their real purchasing power at 1980 rates was less than $400.

The average annual gross domestic investment grew by 4.1 percent between 1965 and 1980, but declined dramatically by 4.5 percent between 1980 and 1989.[13]

1. The Export Indicator

The first piece of evidence refers to South African exports. Most of the South African products, classified as other primary commodities by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), experienced a steady decline in their share of merchandise exports from 1965 to 1988 (table 1). These include crude materials, excluding fuels, food, and live animals; beverages; and tobacco. The primary products are fuels, minerals, and metals. Other commodities that comprise a substantial share of South African exports include textiles, yarns, fabrics, and clothing.

Sanctions affected most of the export products, but especially primary commodities. Other manufacturing has increased, accordingly, from 29 percent of the market share in 1965 to 77 percent in 1988. It has thus offset the decline in primary commodities exports. While the comparable countries (bold numerals) also experienced a decline in fuels, minerals, and metals, their decline was not as drastic in other primary commodities. At the same time, these countries as a whole have averaged an eightfold increase in their percentage share of machinery and transportation equipment, with other manufactures more than doubling.

A similar picture can be painted when one examines the growth of merchandise trade in millions of dollars and percent growth. Exports increased

by $2 billion from 1984 to 1988 while imports experienced only a slight increase of $300 million during this same time period.[14] Perhaps what is more telling is the rise and fall of merchandise growth from 1980 to 1989. Exports dropped from $19.7 billion in 1988 to $13.5 billion in 1989, a 31 percent decline in one year. Imports generally remained steady from 1984 to 1989 but a 6.6 percent decline is observed from 1980 to 1989, suggesting that sanctions had an impact on imports. For sixteen years there was an annual expansion in exports (1965–1980). The situation turned into a sharp decline from 1980 to 1989. In essence, exports increased by 7.8 percent annually from 1965to 1980, but declined 8 percent annually from 1980 to 1989.

Table 1
Structure of Merchandise Exports*
(% Share of Merchandise Exports)

Fuels, Minerals and Metals			Other Primary Commodities			Machinery & Transport Equipment			Other Manufactories		
1965	1983	1989	1965	1983	1989	1965	1983	1989	19865	1983	1989
24	14	12	44	12	9	3	3	3	29	31	77
32	26	25	28	19	13	3	18	25	18	27	37

Source: The World Bank, *World Development Reports* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 199; 1990: 209; 1991: 249.
* Includes South Africa, Nambia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swazland.

In comparison with other upper-middle-income countries, South African imports also show a negative growth rate, while other upper-middle-income countries reveal a 1.4 percent growth rate. These trends have affected the domestic economy of South Africa in the annual growth rate of earnings per employee and net direct private investment. Between 1970 and 1980 the annual growth rate of earnings per employee in agriculture, industry, and services was 2.7 percent. However, from 1980 to 1986, earnings per employee in these categories had a growth of only 0.4 percent.[15] At the same time, net direct private investment has dropped precipitously between the years 1970, when $318 million was invested, and when a paltry $4 million was invested in 1988. In short, net direct private investment has almost disappeared.

2. The Structure of Demand Indicator

The weakness of the economy is also shown in the structure of demand and the percent distribution of the GDP between the government and the private sector. General government consumption in South Africa, as a percent of gross domestic product, has steadily increased while private consumption and the gross domestic investment continuously decreased (data for the three reporting years of 1965, 1984, and 1989). The gross domestic savings reached a high of 29 percent in 1984 and fell below the 1965 level of 27 percent in 1989, when 26 percent of the gross domestic product was in savings.

General government consumption among South Africa's upper-middle-income counterparts remained fairly steady from 1965 to 1989, while a

substantial increase in government consumption is observed for South Africa. The increased government consumption data may reflect the relatively large South African bureaucracy that employs about 40 percent of Afrikaners in one capacity or another. Upper- middle- income countries as a whole have experienced an increase in private consumption from 1984 to 1989, while South Africa continued to show a decline in private consumption starting in 1965. Upper- middle- income countries have also experienced a slight increase of 3 percent in gross domestic investment from 1965 to 1989, in South Africa for these same years, a decrease of 7 percent took place. And while gross domestic savings for South Africa peaked in 1984 at 29 percent and dropped in 1989 to 26 percent, upper-middle-income countries in the aggregate have had a slight increase of 5 percent in the percent of gross domestic savings from 1965 to 1989.

Table 2
Structure of Demand
(% Distribution of Gross Domestic Product)

General Govt. Consumption			Private Consumption			Gross Domestic Investment			Gross Domestic Savings		
1965	1984	1989	1965	1984	1989	1965	1984	1989	1965	1984	1989
11	16	20	62	55	54	28	25	21	27	29	26
12	11	12	61	56	59	24	25	27	25	26	30

Source: World Development Reports, 1986, p. 189; 1990, p. 163; 1991, p. 221.

3. Growth of Consumption and Investment as Indicator.

There has been a fairly significant decline. As noted in table 3, the percent average annual growth rate in government consumption, private consumption, and gross domestic investment declined. From 1965 to 1989, growth of general government consumption dropped almost 2 percent annually; growth of private consumption dropped 3.3 percent; and gross domestic investment revealed the largest decline of 9 percent. Upper middle income countries as a whole have been similar to South Africa in the decline of private consumption, gross domestic investment, and general government consumption. However, the drop for the apartheid economy has been steeper in the percent average annual growth in gross domestic investment.

Table 3
Growth of Consumption/Investment
(% Average Annual Growth Rate)

General Govt. Consumption			Private Consumption, Etc.			Gross Domestic Investment		
65-73	65-80	80-89	65-73	65-80	80-89	65-80	73-80	80-89
5.5	5.3	3.7	5.5	3.3	2.2	6.4	4.1	-4.5
8.0	7.5	2.6	7.7	6.8	3.2	9.1	9.4	0.6

Source: World Development Reports, 1986, p. 187; 1991, p. 219.

In the early 1980s the economy experienced a severe recession in the midst of a larger world recession. South Africa was severely influenced "As a primary commodity exporter who needs to import capital equipment, and one who trades internationally a high percentage of what she produces, South Africa was severely affected by such trends."[16] The price of gold did not serve as a cushion for the regime, either. Consequently, for the first time since world war II, in 1982 the GDP declined 1.2 percent followed by a further drop (close to 3 percent) in 1983.

Lemon states that this decline was "equivalent to a 5.0 per cent decline in per capita GDP with clear implications for growing black unemployment." Moreover, "recovery in 1984 proved short-lived, and growth of only 1 percent was envisaged for 1985 even before the widespread and prolonged outbreak of unrest."[17]

In 1985, there was the first indication that the regime in South Africa was having trouble repaying loans. A request was made to reschedule repayment of these loans. Since then, the regime has only been able to reduce the debt from $27.5 billion to $21.5 billion. A recent decline in the price of gold has further reduced the apartheid regime's ability to repay.[18] U.S. bank loans to South Africa dropped from $4.5 billion in 1984 by about 40 percent to a volume of $2.78 billion in February 1989. By 1990 almost all U.S. banks had policies prohibiting new loans of any type to South Africa.

As inflation continued at the high level of 17 percent in the midst of a recession, bankruptcies "were running at 86% higher than 1984 with over 2,000 companies going into liquidation in the first eight months of 1985."[19] The massive depreciation of the rand and a 131 percent increase in unemployment among all races put further strain on the apartheid economy in the mid 1980s.

Sanctions by the EEC in 1986 were estimated to reduce South African exports by some $1.2 billion a year. U.S. sanctions as the result of the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act are calculated to reduce the export of South African goods to the United States by over $700 million a year. International investments in South Africa have come predominantly from these two entities. In the case of the EEC, R22.9 billion was invested in 1983 and the U.S. investment stood at R26.5 billion. Furthermore, as the South African economy grew, its level of exports to the United States, Japan, West Germany, and the UK increased, thus making South Africa increasingly reliant on these four countries for her exports in recent years.[20]

Internal Sanctions

Proposition 2: The higher the level of political dissent among the majority African population, the more the South African government recognized change as inevitable, and thus accepted the idea that negotiations were necessary to end the apartheid system.

We may think, thus, of influential "internal sanctions" or *internal* political pressures by groups trying to change apartheid. Such internal "sanctions" took the form of strikes and boycotts by the majority-Black labor force. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) led some 330 strikes in the first nine months of 1988. A twenty-one- day strike at a manganese mine

cost the economy an estimated $78.7 million and 6 million man days lost, while a two-month strike at a Mercedes Benz plant involving 2,800 workers cost an estimated $99 million. Similarly, strikes by South African Railway and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU) and Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA) at a rail depot costs 1 million man days, according to trade unionists. As the strike spread to other depots, it eventually drew in 16,000 to 20,000 workers. The regime-owned South African Transport Services (SATS) "admitted losing $157,00 a day at one of its depots where 600 workers had downed tools for almost 90 days." The full economic impact of this strike on the parastatal was a $363 million loss in foreign exchange earnings.[21] Manga, writing in 1987, states the following:

> The full impact on economic growth will only be calculated later this year. But provisional figures released by the Reserve Bank show a marked slow-down in economic growth from 3.5 percent in the second half of 1986 to 2 percent in the first quarter of this year, followed by 1.5 percent in the second quarter, attributed in part to this year's numerous strikes.[22]

The apartheid regime was scheduled to repay some $9 billion in loans during the summer of 1990. The announcement on 9 July 1991 by President George Bush that sanctions were to be lifted against South Africa gave the apartheid regime more time to renegotiate their debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other financial institutions.

The Impact of Sanctions on Political Reforms and the Abolishment of Apartheid

Proposition 3: The more stringent international sanctions became, the more flexible and pliable the South African government became in moving toward ending apartheid, due to the economic impact of sanctions.

The impact of the sanctions can be appraised in terms of the immediate political outcomes, of the economic results, and of the next-step political outcomes that may be derived from those economic results. For example, the U.S. Congress provided that, in order for sanctions to be lifted, the regime must (1) release all political prisoners (of which there were some 3,000) held in jails, (2) repeal the state of emergency, (3) allow democratic political participation without regard to race, and (4) repeal key apartheid laws. Other key provisions included negotiations with the black majority and ending the illegal occupation of Namibia. Overall, the apartheid regime has now complied with most of these provisions, except for allowing democratic political participation for all people without regard to race.

South Africa has also complied with the ANC's Harare Declaration, which laid out steps that would create a climate for negotiations. These included the following: the "unconditional" release of Mandela and other political prisoners, the unbanning of outlawed organizations, the removal of all troops from the townships, a halt in executions, the scrapping of security legislation, and the lifting of the state of emergency.[23]

When, by 1990, the economic sanctions were more comprehensive than ever, with more Western governments involved, the regime adopted an aggressive campaign to polish its image abroad. It is in this context that we

interpret the recent incremental policy changes on the part of the government that give the appearance of liberalizing apartheid. The release of Mandela and a number of political prisoners over the last few years is high-visibility action. The integration of beaches, the tricameral legislature, repeal of the pass laws, the establishment of local township councils, repeal of the influx control laws, and repeal of the immorality and interracial marriages acts (known as the Heartbreak laws), have all received wide attention in the press. These changes are steps in the right direction in the ultimate dismantling of the apartheid policies, that had marginalized blacks, Asians and coloreds for the benefit of whites.

The measures can be evaluated differently, one by one. The gross deficiency with the tricameral legislature was noted elsewhere in this chapter. Similar problems exist with the other reforms. For example, the township councils are weak and exert no real power, which is still maintained at the national level, as with all police states. When the Heartbreak laws were repealed, it could be argued that they were irrelevant to the majority of South Africans, but moreover were nullified by the Group Areas Act, which confined the different races of people to different geographic locations. Similarly, the repeal of the thirty-four influx control laws is neutralized with the Illegal Squatting Act, in which there can be no citizenship in South Africa for people living in the "homelands" without a job and legal residence in South Africa "proper," which by definition they cannot have because they live in the homelands. With all of the euphoria over the release of Nelson Mandela, it is easy to forget that there are still some 3,000 political prisoners in jails in South Africa. That release, in itself, in 1990 has not changed the fundamental goals Africans want to achieve in South Africa. These fundamental goals include the right to vote and the right to share in the economic prosperity of the country.

However, it could also be argued that while some of the above changes were slow, they may have brought about irreversible changes. As Nelan notes,

> most observers dismissed Botha's slow and narrow reform program as a series of cosmetic changes, implying that the measures only made the face of apartheid more presentable. That is true in part, but some of his reform reitifed major and irreversible transformations in the society. As "grand apartheid," the vision of racial partition designed by Hendrik Verwoerd, proved unworkable, and as "petty apartheid" faded away on city streets and beaches, it became clear that apartheid itself was no longer the issue between the black majority and the white minority. The issue now was political power.[24]

In fact, reforms have actually been underway for some time, for apartheid has not been a workable reality in the South African economy. Job reservation laws that allowed only whites to fill certain occupations were scrapped with the last provision removed in 1983. In 1978 some blacks were given the right to have ninety-nine year leaseholds outside of their homelands. In 1979 black trade unions received official status. In 1986 qualified blacks were given freehold rights at the same time that influx-control laws were scrapped.[25]

The ongoing negotiations were marred by violence between the South African police and Africans, and between different African political groups

acting against each other. The slow economic and political transition the South African government has undertaken, during the two years since Mandela's release, resulted in stalled talks between the ANC and the de Klerk government, and in a massive stayaway strike on 3–5 August 1992. According to the ANC, as cited in the article, the strike was highly effective, with 90 percent of the work force in the Johannesburg region staying away. In other regions, more than 50 percent of the work force did not report to work. The worker strike was augmented by successful school boycotts. Currently, the de Klerk administration is engaged in on-again, off-again negotiations with the African National Congress to determine what shape a new South Africa will take. The negotiations are very fragile and the recent killings in the Ciskei homeland and Boipatong reveal the instability in the process between the de Klerk regime, the ANC, Inkatha, and other important political groups involved in the negotiations. The ANC temporarily suspended talks with the de Klerk regime and accused the government of responsibility for the killings.

Summary and Conclusions

The data upon which this study is based confirm the declining economic trends that began in the 1970s in South Africa and the worsening of this situation as the result of sanctions, political violence, labor strikes, and police and military atrocities against the uprisings. In attempting to make an evaluation of the reforms in South Africa, many factors must be taken into account, as noted earlier. In assessing the impact of sanctions, we have limited our evaluation to data derived mainly from a period that extends mostly through 1989. It could be argued that the economy is in worse shape now than in 1989, since the sanctions have had a chance to have their full affect. Only reforms as mandated by the United Nations, the United States, and the world community can reverse course for the Afrikaner regime and provide it with a climate for an economic shot in the arm that is so badly needed. As a result of the reforms in South Africa, the World Bank and the European Community have now called for an end to sanctions and are considering economic aid. This call is based on a 1989 UN resolution that ties the end of sanctions to signs of "irreversible progress" in ending apartheid as opposed to the actual transfer of power to the Black majority. Until South Africa receives the appropriate economic assistance from the World Bank and their traditional Western allies, "disinvestment, boycott of goods, exclusion from the international capital market and thus from technology transfers, net outflow of capital, falling exchange rate, high inflation rate, loss of professionals and extremely high unemployment"[26] can be expected to continue.

However, one of the primary factors, in addition to world sanctions, for divestment and disinvestment is the unhealthy political and economic climate that remains in South Africa for business and economic development.[27] Sanctions, along with this unhealthy climate, distinguish South Africa from most upper- middle- income countries. Beginning with the Soweto uprising in 1976, continuing with the state of emergency starting in 1984, and the current political upheaval between the regime, ANC, Inkatha, and other groups does not bode well for economic stability and a sound financial and investment environment.

Banks, industrial corporations, and other types of firms are always reluctant to invest time, money, and other resources in an unpredictable environment. It is no wonder, then, that the business sector in South Africa has consistently urged the regime to negotiate with the ANC in the past. The private sector has been hard hit by boycotts, labor strikes, and other forms of political and economic protest.

The South African government is now aware that change is inevitable and negotiations are the only way to transform the political system to a nonracial democratic society. Change in political systems is an incremental process. However, international sanctions and internal political action have forever changed the direction of political life in South Africa, thus setting the stage for a new government committed to improving the conditions of all South African citizens. If the South African majority does not benefit economically and politically from the end of apartheid, violence is likely to increase. Ironically, there could still be factional violence in a new South Africa if one or more of the major interest groups feel that there are political inequities or that change is occurring too slowly.

Consequently, the negotiations with the ANC and the regime must not only come up with a viable formula for power sharing, it must also end the political violence between the regime, the ANC, and Inkatha. Otherwise, continued political instability will adversely affect the post-de Klerk regime and chances for economic recovery as well.[28]

Notes

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2. For a thorough examination of the Broederbond, see Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom, *The Broederbond* (New York and London: Paddington Press Ltd., 1979). The book gives a complete list of all Broederbond members, their addresses, and occupations. For a historical background, see Dan O'Meara, "The Afrikaner Broederbond 1948–1972: Class Vanguards of Afrikaner Nationalism," *Journal of Southern African Studies,* 3 (1977).
3. David Lamb, *The Africans,* (New York: Random House Vintage Books), 1984). 318–19, *passim.*
4. Lamb, *The Africans,* 319.
5. Pauline H. Baker, "South Africa: The Afrikaner Angst," *Foreign Policy,* 69 (Winter 1987–1988): 67.
6. George W. Shepherd, Jr., "Sanctions: South Africa's Choice Is Negotiation or Economic Destruction," *Africa Today,* 36, 1 (March 1989): 62.
7. Bindman, *South Africa,* 12.
8. Shepherd, "Sanctions," 62.
9. Ibid.
10. Anthony Lemon, *Apartheid in Transition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987): 359.
11. Peter C. Nwachkwu and Mfanya D. Tryman, "Constructive Engagement and South Africa: A Critical Assessment—1981–1985," in *Apartheid South Africa and American foreign Policy,* ed. Mfanya D. Tryman and Zuberi I. Mwamba (Dubuque, IA; Kendall Hunt Publishing Co., 1987), 121.
12. The World Bank, *World Development Report, 1991: The Challenge of Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 205.

13. The World Bank, *World Development Report, 1991,* p. 219. Gross domestic investments are additional outlays to the fixed assets of the economy and net changes in the level of inventories.
14. World Bank, *World Development Reports, 1986,* p. 197; *1990,* p.1005; and *1991,* p. 231.
15. The World Bank, *World Development Reports, 1990,* p. 157.
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17. Ibid.
18. "Citibank Extends Loans," *Africa News,* 31, 4 (February 1989): 9.
19. "South Africa," *New Africa Yearbook,* 8th ed., (1987–1988), 317.
20. The World bank, *World Development Reports, 1990,* p. 157.
21. Armit Manga, "Flexing Labor's Muscle," *Africa Report,* 32, 6, (November-December 1987): 67.
22. Ibid. 67.
23. Steven Mufson, "South Africa 1990," *Foreign Affairs,* 70, 1 (1990–1991): 125.
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25. George Szamuely, "It's Black or White in South Africa," *Orbis,* 34, 3, (Summer 19990): 329.
26. Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "The Return of Diplomacy in Southern Africa," *Aussen Politik,* 41, 1, (January 1990): 94.
27. For a comprehensive examination of business practices by U.S. firms in South Africa and their relationship with labor groups, see Jonathan Leape, Bo Baskin, and Stefan Underhill, eds., *Business in the Shadow of Apartheid: U.S. Firms in South Africa* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985).
28. See Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey butler, eds. *Change in Contemporary South Africa,* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975); Richard Bissell and Chester Crocker, eds., *South Africa into the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); Robert I. Rotberg, *Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); *Survey of Race relations in South Africa, Annual Reports 1980–1990* (Johannesburg: South African Institute on Race Relations, 1990).

Approaching the Twenty-First Century: A World Society Model of International Politics

Franke Wilmer

Montana State University

For most of the twentieth century, foreign policy-making, as well as the study of its outcomes—"international relations"—has occurred within a tradition of discourse commonly referred to as "realism." According to this discourse, nation-states and "statesmen" are the principal actors in international relations; diplomacy, trade, and war their primary international occupations; and national security their paramount interest motivated by the necessity of defending territorial and resource boundaries. The only values perceptible in the global arena are particularistic and nationalistic; and the absolute sovereignty of the state is the organizing principle of world order, to the extent that world order is recognized at all.[1]

While some international events and actors today can be understood in these terms, the most dramatic developments during the second half of the twentieth century necessitate a more inclusive and complex conception of the context of world politics. In this chapter I will offer a "world society" model as a contender. Because this is an evolutionary model, I will begin by tracing the path of foreign policy and international relations discourse leading us in the direction of such a revision, and then outline the model I propose. From a world society perspective, the state is a management system, and nonstate actors function both as "interests" (OPEC, Amnesty International, International Labour Organization) and intermediary institutions (European Economic Community, Arab League, Non-aligned Movement) in relation to individuals, states and the world system. State and nonstate actors engage in patterns of relationship that are associative and incorporative; international security, global resource management and international rights are all important issues; an increasingly well-defined set of global values—peace, human rights and ecology—are emerging; actors are motivated by human needs, including the need for participation, recognition, and identity; and cultural

pluralism in a context of normative consensus on a global scale provides a new organizing principle for world order. Elites, whose common interest (primarily in the creation of economic surplus value) and common world view generated a core of interstate political community, are politically and economically dominant at both the state and world system levels.

A world society model of world politics points to the normative foundation of an international political community and the way in which it reinforces certain attributes of the state as a unit of world political order. Employing a sociological approach broadens our perspective to the level of social mobilization and reveals that international relations occur within a context of global civic discourse that reflects the process of community building.[2]

Idealism—Birth of the "Community of (Civilized) Nations"

Taking a broader view of three themes—idealism, realism, and complex interdependence—uncovers a cumulative pattern of dominant relationships during three overlapping, but progressively complex phases of international community formation. International relations theory, as well as the political reality it attempts to describe, is primarily the product of the activities and the discourse of Western societies, and as such reflects the evolution of normative consensus regarding the sources and uses of political power among Western political elites.

Idealism, and the nineteenth-century developments it aimed to account for, points to the mutual recognition of a normative basis for an overarching European self-consciousness arising out of three converging historical forces: the mobilization of the bureaucratic state, the industrialization of European economies, and the spread of European dominance through colonization. The following passage from the concluding remarks of the Hague Conference in 1907 typifies idealists thinking:

> It was a thrilling moment when, as the representatives of all the organized and civilized countries of the world, for the first time in human history, we assembled from all quarters of the globe, speaking all the languages, personating all the races, religions, creeds and customs, to work together for the cause of Peace, and . . . with resolute purpose on all hands to advance the cause of civilization and peace.

Idealists correctly identified the process of normative consensus building and the community building taking place in conjunction with it, from a *Eurocentric* point of view. Their error, of course, was in extrapolating from that experience the conclusion that peace—or in Karl Deutsch's postwar terminology, the emergence of a "minimum security community" where actors expect disputes to be resolved peacefully—would automatically follow. In fact, the era of peace in Europe and relatively peaceful competition for colonies abroad, (1815–1912) might be portrayed a period of presecurity community consensus building. Consensus building was not undertaken deliberately nor was it undertaken as an end in itself. Rather, it was a consequence of a progressively expanding scope of interaction and, consequently, shared meaning, among European elites, reinforced by their "civilizing mission" abroad. The rhetoric characteristic of the period from 1815 through World War I refers repeatedly to "the law of civilized nations." The

colonial period thus marks the emergence of a distinctively Eurocentric self-consciousness in relation to, as participants in the Hague conference put it, "all the quarters of the world."

The building of a normative consensus is not the only explanation for the absence of war in Europe during this period. European military resources were directed toward colonization abroad rather than competition in Europe. Nationalistic emotions—necessary to state building since it involved the creation of a new "layer" of identity on which to lay claim to loyalty—were aroused through imperialism and its mercantilist philosophy. The defeat of Napoleon set in motion what would later become international norms prohibiting the aggressive use of force *among European powers*, or, as in the case of the 1991 Gulf War, *in relation to European interests*—but not until over a century later. It was during this period that the idea of an "international law of conquest," rooted in interpretations of the history of Roman expansionism, gained widespread acceptance among European leaders as applied to *non-European* peoples. The persistence of this bias is reflected in the fact that in response to charges raised by the Hopi Indians, an attorney for the United States State Department recently presented an argument to the UN Human Rights Commission citing the law of conquest as operative at the time of the American expansion that brought the Hopi under United States jurisdiction.[3]

Idealism reflects the degree to which this period produced a basis for normative agreement among European leaders. Referring to themselves as "civilized," they believed they were morally superior to "uncivilized" non-Europeans. This kind of rhetoric points directly to a sense of shared civic community (albeit a discriminatory, ethnocentric, and even racist one) and shared beliefs about governance and law, about the basis of knowledge and its purposes, and about the value of economic surplus activity. In fact, international law was said to apply to "civilized" nations, which were, of course, the European states or the independent states once colonized by Europeans and dominated by people of European descent.

Idealism—the idea that good political institutions could be built among European powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century—contains an important and implicit insight into the formation of political community: normative agreement among elites is a prerequisite to the establishment of a new political system. Since political institutions allocate values, a prerequisite to the building of political institutions is an agreement as to which values, and in what order of priority, ought to be allocated. The values agreed upon by European powers in the nineteenth century centered on the sovereignty of the bureaucratic state and the primacy of industrial development as a means of creating economic surplus.

These values represent the lowest common denominator of normative agreement. A second tier of values, which were less enthusiastically and less universally supported within Europe at that time, might be added. Support for these values has since crystallized and spread throughout the system. These are values associated with individual human rights and majoritarian democracy. As I will argue, in order for values to be allocated by institutions created by core elites, those values must be shared by all major powers. The lack of support for the protection of individual human rights and rule by majoritarian democracy in Eastern Europe and the rulers of the Soviet

Republics delayed the inclusion of these values in the core of the global political community.

There is an important truth contained in idealism. Normative agreement is a precondition of political community. It does not follow, however, that achieving this precondition automatically resolves all future problems of stability, legitimacy, and continuity. Crises involving legitimacy can and do arise as the normative basis for community is reshaped over such substantive issues as inclusiveness (and exclusiveness), the boundaries between public and private activities, and procedural matters such as the method of choosing leadership or changing regimes. The most serious failure of idealism, however, from the point of view of political communitybuilding, was the assumption that the minimum level of normative agreement articulated among European powers would in itself preclude further systemic violence.

So powerful was the view of political idealism among scholars and policymakers that the First World War was explained in terms of the failure to build the good institutions that would have been capable of steering conflicts into peaceful, negotiated solutions. To remedy this deficiency, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was designed to outlaw wars of aggression. (These efforts would be revived as the United Nations General Assembly in the 1970s tried to define aggression.) Importantly, even while the alternative view of realism was gaining acceptance and challenging idealism, the institution-building initiatives undertaken pursuant to the idealists' vision survived not only the realists' critique, but a second world war and numerous conflicts since.

Idealism, then, yields the following proposition about the nature of preconditions for the formation of a new political community:

> *Hypothesis derived from idealism:* Normative consensus regarding the values from which mutual interests derive is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition to the formation of a new political community.

On reflection, this proposition is also consistent with the widely accepted notion that political institutions provide the framework and procedures for the authoritative allocation of values. Agreement regarding values, therefore, precedes institution building.

Realism and the Distribution of Power—Coercive and Political

While realism in many ways represents a reaction to the failure of idealism, it also provides another important insight into the process through which new levels or new kinds of community systems develop. Idealism correctly points to the central role of normative agreement, but fails to take into account the uneven distribution of that agreement. Realism discounts the role of normative agreement, but casts the role of power elites as central to the configuration of international stability. Violence will not disappear, realism suggests, but can be held in abeyance by a balance among adversaries. The failure here is the assumption that adversarial relations among power elites are a permanent feature of world politics and will prohibit the building of effective international political community institutions. The important insight gained through realism is that normative agreement must *first be achieved among power elites*—all whose participation is essential to the forma-

tion of a core. Another way of stating this is that the formation of a core necessitates the cooperation, or at least the absence of opposition from, any actor or alliance of actors whose power is sufficient to obstruct the formation and stabilization of a core. This is reflected in the Security Council where "enforcement" resolutions have recently been passed with the abstention of China, but were altogether blocked during the Cold War. Realism thus also yields a proposition regarding the formation of political community:

> *Hypothesis derived from realism:* In addition to a minimum level of normative agreement, political community formation requires the building and maintenance of power-regulating institutions by all actors possessed of sufficient power to obstruct the building and maintenance of those institutions.

The stability and effectiveness of institutions built as a result of core collaboration depends on whether or not the distribution of "decision power" accurately reflects the distribution of "coercive" power within the system. Institutional coercion is necessary to obtain compliance only to the extent that actors within the system who possess sufficient coercive power to disrupt or oppose system development, fail to comply with decisions.

In the absence of sufficient normative agreement among elites, under conditions of adversarial relations among elites for example, a perpetual struggle over the distribution of decision power will inhibit or retard the process of institution building. However, once a minimum level of agreement—a "lowest common denominator"—is discovered, institution building and stabilization is at least possible, by providing the basis for agreement regarding the allocation of values. In the case of world politics in the twentieth century, this kind of agreement occurs in at least two areas: (1) economic development through industrialization, and (2) a willingness to forego the aggressive uses of force *among system elites.*

The classic example of institutional breakdown due to an incompatible distribution between decision power and coercive power is the failure of the League of Nations, which is often attributed to the absence of support by the United States' decision and coercive power. Conversely, the UN Security Council, by guaranteeing veto power to all states with sufficient coercive capacity to disrupt the system, created a minimal system to prevent institutional degeneration. Since the decline of adversarial relations among members—primarily the United States and Soviet Union—it has become a more "decision-effective" institution.

Realism correctly points to the central role of power in community formation and the necessity of creating political institutions that accurately reflect the distribution of coercive capacity. This is a minimal condition. A corollary is the necessity of incorporating the distribution of economic power, although it is also the case that coercive and economic distributions are never very far apart. In the colonial United States, power elites—"founding fathers"—were "white male property owners." In international relations, power elites are "bureaucratic industrial states."[4]

Mutual Interests, Mutual Problems, and Complex Interdependence

Complex interdependence offers a third insight into the process of community formation by emphasizing the role and impact of *transactions.* The

level of transaction activity, (in terms of both intensity devoted to an issue as well as the number of issues of mutual concern) among European societies—or more precisely, among European elites—has progressed steadily from the Peace of Westphalia to the present. Transaction intensity is illustrated by the evolution of the Law of the Sea or trade regimes to move toward progressive complexity, while transaction quantity is reflected in the proliferation of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

In his model of security community formation, Karl Deutsch provides a sort of bridge between the realists' focus on security issues and the emergence of complex interdependence, while noting the increasing importance of transactional patterns that play a central role in the formulation of complex interdependence. Here, the idea of a security community presumes agreement regarding the nature of the values that are to be protected by the security community as well as *value agreement regarding the basis for shared expectations for dispute resolution.* These shared values were "discovered" through the increasing frequency and scope of transactions among Western, industrialized democratic societies, particularly those in Western Europe.

Complex interdependence satisfies the requirements for a new paradigm by explaining everything included in the old paradigm as well as the most compelling subsequent anomalous developments. It adds to the calculus of power politics the power of economic coercion, taking into account the growing influence of nonstate actors (particularly those involved in economic transactions), and provides a model through which the flow of actions by state and nonstate actors can be taken into account. It is, finally, neutral with respect to the issue of conflict, except it is now possible to develop models of collusive behavior without getting entangled in the morass of debate about the possible existence of, for example, "shared meaning" as was suggested by Deutsch's model.

Complex interdependence also suggests a hypothesis regarding the formation of political community:

> *Hypothesis derived from complex interdependence:* Increasingly complex transactions lead actors to develop institutional contexts in which cooperative relationships and coordinated actions further the interests of those actors; this may also lead to an increase in the number of occasions for conflict.

Criticisms of complex interdependence have led to a refinement of its assumptions. First, as a condition of international relations, interdependence is uneven. Interdependence is highest among European states; relatively high among the broader category of industrialized states; high (but accompanied by uneven distributions of power favoring industrialized states) in relations between regional and/or often formerly colonial hegemons and peripheral states; and in some areas low, particularly among peripheral states (within Central America or Sub-Saharan Africa it is much lower).

Second, in some instances where complex interdependence is relatively low, realism still seems to provide the better map to understanding international relations. In the Middle East, for example, the idea of a "balance of power" is much more applicable than in South America. Realism, therefore, can be said to characterize relations under the following conditions:

1. the level of interdependence among actors is low;

2. the legitimacy of boundaries remains subject to challenge;

3. there is either a low level of normative agreement, or an element of normative antagonism among actors.

Realism provides a more useful context in which an international "problem" can be characterized by these conditions. U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, for example, strove for a balance of power—the realists' solution to conflict; normative (ideological) antagonism; contention over the status of German boundaries; and, until the 1970s, a relatively low level of interdependence. "Linkage politics" was, in fact, an attempt to increase the level of interdependence as a means of enhancing incentives for cooperative relations. The abatement of these conditions diminished the usefulness of realist thinking in U.S.-Soviet relations. Similarly, the normative antagonism between Israel and the Arab world (and to a lesser extent within the Arab world—due to Islamic factionalism), as well as to problems relating to boundary disputes, all contribute to the characterization of many aspects of Middle Eastern politics according to the realist perspective.

The condition of complex interdependence in itself does not ameliorate the tensions of power rivalry and ideological or normative antagonism. It may simply add to the number of occasions giving rise to the potential for conflict, or it may fuel the escalation and the spread of a conflict amongst a larger number of actors.

World Society: Approaching the Twenty-First Century

The idea that a number of problems—political, social, economic, and moral—can best be understood by placing them in the global context of a "world society" is not new. Luard (1976), for instance, thought in terms of a global sociology with an emphasis on the idea of an evolving legal structure by defining a society as

> [an association of] groups, and individuals in regular communication with each other, engaging in formal and official relationships as well as unofficial contacts, having economic, cultural and social as well as military interrelationships within its own traditions of intercourse, expected norms of behavior, and its own institutions for mutual discussion of common problems. (1976:49)

A related theme appears in the work of Kelsen (1952, 1973), Falk (1959), Masters (1964), and Barkun (1968), all of whom have drawn a parallel between primitive social conditions and the present world system. Wallerstein (1960) and other sociologists have dealt extensively with the propensity for combining smaller, simpler forms of social organization into larger more complex ones as a function of modernization through the process of "incorporation." A "world society" model addressed to the issue of political problem solving has been offered by John Burton as an alternative paradigm to prevailing social systems theories. (Burton, 1979)

The argument regarding the mobilization of the international political

community thus far is consistent with two widely accepted views of politics: (1) politics involves the use of power to influence; (2) politics involves the authoritative allocation of values. Understanding the process of political community formation as it unfolds at the international level provides insights into similar processes occurring in other pluralistic political contexts. Politics is about *both* power and values. But what is the relationship between the two?

One way to approach this question is by examining the differences in the three views, keeping in mind that these differences also represent *changes in the context of world politics* over the past few centuries.

Realism is a security-focused world view. It provides a useful context when certain conditions apply: insecure boundaries, antagonism concerning normative agreement, and a low degree of interdependence.

Because interdependence alters the utility of coercion, conditions of interdependence complicate the "decision calculus" employed to evaluate alternative responses to foreign policy problems: a "show" of force, unilateral use of force, support for United Nations intervention, arms control, security assistance to governments, military assistance to insurgents, development aid, aid tied to human rights, and so on. During the early postwar years, as the number of international problems accumulated as a result of interdependent complexity reached a kind of critical mass, a new contextual paradigm (a new way of interpreting international political reality) became necessary and complex interdependence did the trick. But something else has happened since then. The influence of international institutions, particularly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the effectiveness of their decision making has increased substantially. During the postwar period the degree and pace of value-allocating activity has accelerated tremendously.

Conditions of interdependence did not suddenly appear in the postwar period, but rather grew steadily throughout most of the twentieth century. Two world wars and worldwide economic depression—the major historical events of the first half of the century—occurred in part as a direct consequence of the spread of interdependence and the failure of policymakers to recognize or to accurately perceive the context of change. The very idea of a "world" war implies enormous pressure on all system participants to "take sides" in a clash involving elite power struggles or interests. All states were linked either through elite interests or core-peripheral relations. The same phenomenon was again at work in the 1991 Gulf War "alliance," albeit a struggle between elites as a whole on the one side, and a peripheral state threatening interests characterized by uneven, but system-wide interdependence ("the world's oil"). The "Great Depression" was, of course, a "synchronized international business cycle," precipitated in part by "realist" behavior emphasizing particularistic values in the form of protectionism.

The fact is that institutions built after the war, reflecting or adjusting to the global distribution of coercive power, have allocated values on an international level for nearly a half century. Not only the United Nations, but the World Court, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to name a few, have all been making decisions to allocate values in international relations. And while values are being allocated by these institutions according to the shared vision of elites, *nonelites act directly to influence these institutions in an effort to affect the value-allocating process.* Indigenous peoples' organizations, for instance, appeal

directly to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for a hearing of their grievances against powerful nation-states. Powerful states, as well as the institutions they dominate, are also beginning to respond to such efforts.[5]

It is not difficult to explain elite collusion in areas where mutual benefits or mutual threats to elite interests are concerned. It is also not difficult to explain why bargaining occurs among actors who share power. Much of regime analysis accomplishes this. Critiques of regime analysis are directed mainly at cases where collusion *ought* to occur, but does not. What *is* difficult to explain is why powerful elites (or elite institutions) are responsive to demands by nonelites that do not command coercive power, but whose appeals rest on a platform of moral suasion. International relations conflicts can be increasingly characterized as struggles over normative issues.

The basis for exercising power in world politics has once again shifted from European dominance (age of imperialism and idealism) to conflicts among elites (World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and realism) to complex conflicts over and collusive solutions to economic and functional interests (complex interdependence). Dominant international problems in the present period are derived from fundamental struggles over values in relation to the fulfillment of human needs. The broader patterns of a changing context over the past several centuries articulated through the interpretive paradigms of "idealism," "realism," and "interdependence," reflect systemic movement along a path of increasing complexity.

The world system now comprises a unified and interdependent society in which the fulfillment or obstruction of human needs is directly affected by events, institutions, and norms emanating from the level of the world system. Environmental issues, for example, are the most conspicuous; however, the range of problems and decisions affecting fundamental human needs that emanate from the international level are much broader. Famine and hunger are matters of global economics, world politics, and possibly environmental damage originating outside of the famine region. Economic development in the Third World is linked with economic stagnation in the First; international norms supporting the "coercive state" conflict with international norms prohibiting aggression, leaving Bosnians, Kurds, and Chinese and Burmese advocates of democracy vulnerable to state terrorism. Nuclear proliferation and nonstate terrorism have the potential to obstruct the basic need for security of everyone and anyone on the entire planet.

The context of international politics according to a world society model indicates the following:

Metaphor. Politics, or more precisely, political power, derives from the ability to solve or to create problems which impact attempts to fulfill human needs. (Burton, 1979)

The world system now approximates a unified and interdependent society complete with elites as well as groups experiencing different degrees of marginalization, problem-solving and value-allocating institutions, intergroup conflict, interest group activity, an integrated economy, and a tradition of global civic discourse.

Activities directed toward the fulfillment of human needs proceed according to collectively shared values—or, more precisely, values shared by power elites. Shared values are "discovered" and articulated through civic discourse. The initial discourse involves only power elites and thus values are

distributed unevenly across sectors of nonelites. Values emerge within the context of civic culture and the ability to influence the content of culture is also unevenly distributed. Peripheral actors will make demands for participation in civic discourse. Family and ethnicity represent local contexts for the creation of culture. More recently, cultural content has been affected by national and international contexts.

Culture defines the context in which values are articulated, which, in turn, provides the normative agreement necessary to build institutions. As international institutions play a larger role in the fulfillment (or denial) of human needs, local forms of culture are displaced by internationally transmitted values. Increasingly, people have no choice—if they want to eat, they will not be able to provide for their needs through traditional subsistence economies, but must interact within a world capitalist system. Indigenous leader Davi Kopenawa Yanomami speaks of the effect of "economic development" on his people in Brazil:

> [the government] says we will die of hunger if they close the gold mines. But I say if they don't stop gold-panning, then we will die of hunger. If the government stops the gold-panning, we will plant sweet potatoes, bananas, yams, taro, papaya, sugar cane, punpuha fruit, and then no one will die of hunger. . . . The Yanomami do not die of hunger, they only die of diseases; they have everything to survive on, where there are no gold-panners. My kin do not beg for food from the whites, they only ask for food where there is a gold mine which usually does away with everything . . . we already have tapirs, peccary, curassow, wild boar, we plant bananas, we have everything in our forest.[6]

There are three basic categories of human needs. While I am not suggesting that they are hierarchical, I will outline them from the most to the least tangible.

> *Physical Needs:* All needs relating to the security of physical existence, including safety needs—the expectation of being free from physical threats; and physiological needs—food and access to the means of acquiring food, protection against vulnerability to the elements (clothing and shelter), health care (treatment for disease and injury). *Emotional Needs:* Affection, self-esteem, identity, recognition, and participation. *Spiritual or Cognitive Needs:* Meaning and context; for inspiration derived from being a part of something including, but larger than the self.

These human needs have traditionally been pursued through a variety of institutional as well as personal relationships—the family, neighborhood, professional development, the economic system, and religious or spiritual affiliations are some of the agencies through which needs are pursued. The ability to pursue needs in personal and local spheres has been steadily diminished by the emergence of the bureaucratic, incorporative, and coercive modern state.

In the world system, the state has become an agency for the allocation of values that are legitimated by the normative core of a world society. It has intervened in every aspect of human needs fulfillment. The state is provider and protector of physical safety (internal and external "national" security) and manager of the economic system. The world capitalist system is managed through the political institutions of nation-states.

The "modern nation-state" is actually a construct arising out of the European cultural context. It is hierarchical and class-oriented, bureaucratic, industrial, instrumental, "scientifically rational," and generally attended by religious pluralism or at least a separation of religion and politics. The state's legitimacy as provider of human needs is predicated on the myth, rooted in the experience of some European societies, that the boundaries of ethnicity are coterminous with the political boundaries of the state, hence the term *nation-state*. To the extent that it is hierarchical, it sanctions "top-down" or coercive uses of power, or in the Austinian terminology, "law as the command of the sovereign."

Religion, language, and other means of articulating and transmitting culture provide meaning and context. The deliberate destruction of culture, which was undertaken through public and private channels by white Americans with respect to Africans and the indigenous peoples of the Americas, contributes to the frustration and obstruction of emotional as well as spiritual or cognitive needs, resulting in what Durkheim identified as *anomie* (MacShane, 1987).

Through nationalism and patriotism, in an effort to engender loyalty and, in turn, extract economic and military resources from "citizens," the state makes a prior claim on identity and rewards patriotic individuals with enhanced self-esteem and recognition ("be all you can be . . . "). By regulating culture-bearing symbols, rituals and activities, language and official "holidays," the state, in effect, controls the context in which the self (image) is created. Some images of the self are, according to symbols of power elites, held in higher esteem than others—holidays are readily declared to celebrate the birthdays of (white) "founding fathers," while political debates drag out over recognition of civil rights, women's rights, and Native American leaders.

By virtue of the international doctrine of sovereignty, the state is "authorized" by international norms to carry out such cultural homogenization campaigns. In actions frighteningly reminiscent of Hitler's campaign to establish a "master race," the Serbian army in 1992 engaged in a brutal policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzogovina. Harff and Gurr (1990) have identified fourty-four cases of genocides and politicides involving national minorities since 1945.

Clearly, the mobilization of a world society has been characterized by a process of incorporation at both the state and interstate levels of analysis. The "creation"—and in a larger number of cases, the imposition—of larger national political systems in place of more localized communities in which human needs were pursued has been neither a peaceful nor benign process. The "emergence" of the "modern" state is presumed to have a followed a path of evolutionary progression from local community, to nation, to statehood. Even in Europe, the point of origin for the model of the nation-state, the "emergence" of states was, and continues to this day, to be revolutionary, violent, and destructive of local forms of association and identity. Of all military deaths in international wars between 1816 and 1980, 71.5 percent occurred in Europe (Singer and Small, 1982).

Cooperation, Conflict, and the Coercive State in World Society

The world society perspective in no way suggests that the emergence of a basis for normative agreement automatically enhances the role of cooperation, although it certainly emphasizes the need for it. The mobilization of global political order does not in itself lead to the development of effective institutional arrangements for the management of conflict. Indeed, the level of overall system conflict may increase in part due to the dynamics of social mobilization.

Chief among the attributes of the state legitimated through international norms are those relating to the power of coercion. Normative limits on uses of coercive power are evident throughout the history of global civic discourse, beginning during the first wave of European colonization in the fifteenth century. Bartolomew de las Casas wrote on the rights of native peoples; the laws of warfare were discussed at the Hague; prohibitions on aggression and the protection of human rights have remained high on the United Nations agenda in the postwar period. Yet only in the second half of the twentieth century have a sufficient number of world society power elites come to an agreement sufficient to undertake "humanitarian" interventions, and even now such interventions are tenuous, inconsistent, and prioritized according to the political and economic interests of world society elites.

Institutionalized distributions of power reflect the core of values shared by power elites. This is true at the level of state building as well as in arenas of interstate institution building in world society. Political community formation, and the institution building following from it, is predicated on a minimum degree of shared civic culture manifested in the larger symbolic system within which values are articulated and pursued. The cultural values providing a core for the institutionalization of global political elites are those emanating from the European experience—bureaucratized social order and capitalist industrialization in the first tier, majoritarian democracy and individual human rights in the second.

The world society perspective suggests that the organizing principle of world order at this juncture is cultural pluralism. Culture represents a basic agency and context for the fulfillment of a number of human needs, particularly those related to identity, context and meaning. Majoritarian-based democracy coupled with international sanction of the coercive power of the state have proven a volatile combination for ethnic "minorities" (whose "minority" status itself is often created by state boundaries) subjected to the incorporative state policies. The struggle for cultural integrity, driven by the pursuit of basic human needs is fundamentally and intrinsically in conflict with the coercive state. There is a dire need for the articulation of norms to legitimate a new structural relationship between the state and substate nationalities.

Summary and Implications for Future Research

The present context of international relations can best be portrayed as a world society because it is characterized by features and processes generally applicable to the analysis of a dynamic social organization. The presence of

elites and a degree of normative consensus among them makes it possible to build institutions through which global values are authoritatively allocated. The primary features of the normative core are industrialized capitalism (is good); bureaucratic social organization (is progressive); and majoritarian democracy (is fair).

Although arising out of the Eurocentric experience and the spread of European cultural influence, the present global civic culture must adapt to the reality of global cultural pluralism in order to remain stable. The state is the primary political institution through which international values are allocated. The extent and scope of international cooperation depends on the degree of normative agreement among power elites.

If the development of normative consensus among elites is a necessary condition for the establishment of a stable political community, then the propensity for patterns of ethnic domination and subjection in the process of state formation, and in the world system as reflected during the era of imperialism, is more understandable, though not, certainly, desirable. In fact, I would question the extent to which a political community will enjoy long-term institutional stability without addressing the need to rectify past policies of ethnic discrimination and forced assimilation. In both cases, equal opportunity is insufficient, particularly in light of the dynamics of majoritarian rules that have the potential to relegate an ethnic minority to permanent and structural minority status. Moreover, from the perspective of human needs for identity and self-esteem, it is important that ethnic minorities enjoy *both* the opportunity to participate in "majority" educational institutions *as well as* to retain or develop institutions in which they constitute a majority. The multiethnic state must be adapted to the principle of cultural pluralism.

The degree of social integration on a global scale is also unevenly distributed. Some societies and sectors of societies are more "remote" from the core of world order than others. Remoteness depends on the extent of incorporation through economic interdependence and the ability to participate in events—the activities of intergovernmental and nongovernmental international conferences—through which shared meaning is transmitted. Economic incorporation and participation in international conferences, conversely, draw actors into the process of institution building through which they are encouraged to adopt core values. Their participation, in turn, brings pressure to bear on the core to adapt to the new values or modifications noncore groups bring into the process. The content of normative consensus is therefore continually transformed.

Several areas of research are suggested by the world society model. First, if the world system is viewed as an emerging political community, then it can be compared to other political communities sharing similar characteristics: culturally diversified; unevenly developed; a large number of interest groups; and complex sets of intersecting vertical as well as horizontal institutional relationships. For example, the idea of "shared" or "concurrent," "inherent" and "reserved" powers used to analyze American federalism might be applicable to world politics. Further comparative studies of pluralism, particularly where a confederation moved toward federation, such as the United States and Switzerland, would provide insight into the process of the creation of civic culture.[7] The experience of New Zealand offers an

example of a different approach to pluralism, in which the Maori people are guaranteed permanent seats in the Parliament. The concept of a normative core as a "lowest common denominator" of normative consensus can also be developed and applied to the field of conflict resolution in mediating national and regional disputes.

A second area of further study would involve a reexamination of the Minorities Protection System established in the League of Nations during the interwar period. Can the United Nations, or regional organizations like the European Community or the Organization of American States facilitate the peaceful adjustment and adaptation of the state to the principle of cultural pluralism? Which manifestations of culture can be retained without impairing the "management" function of the state? Would it be helpful to make a distinction between internal and external sovereignty? What would be the consequences of "allowing" substate nationalities direct access to the world system, for example, the World Court, instead of relying on the state for representation?

A final area of inquiry involves a more rigorous study of the relationship between human needs and varieties of social, political, and economic institutions along the lines of Lucy Mair's *Primitive Government* (1962) or Ada Bozeman's *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World* (1971). What kinds of institutions best serve the fulfillment of which needs? For example, it appears that some local forms of culture and religion that serve as agencies for meaning and context (indigenous peoples, for instance) cannot or ought not be displaced by statist cultures. How can cultural integrity be preserved without impairing the state's "interest" in unity? How, in other words, can diversity be preserved within a context of unity? Unity does not necessitate *uniformity*. In light of the fact that the global capitalist system is clearly here to stay, how can local cultures, and, therefore, local economies be adapted to the world system?

In conclusion, it should be noted that within the past few centuries the Euro-American political tradition, in spite of its assumption of moral superiority throughout most of the past five centuries, has also reflected a belief in the need to restrain political power in relation to the preservation of human dignity. This is reflected not only in the provision of due process in national contexts, but in human rights on an international scale. The humanistic element of Western culture has also found expression in a host of "grass roots" humanitarian and "citizen to citizen" movements. This feature is, however, inherently at odds with the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic organization as well as the dehumanizing tendency of capitalist conceptions of "interests." The global impact of the women's movement, the civil rights movement, and recent demands for cultural autonomy (freedom from forced assimilation) and self-determination by indigenous peoples underscore this conflict. That these movements exist is a testament to the power of human needs; that they have affected the world system indicates that human dignity is valued in world order.

Notes

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, *International Conflict and International Anarchy*; Hedley Bull,

Society and Anarchy in International Relations; and Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol," in *International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Imperialism*, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).

2. Richard Harvey Brown, *Social Science as Civic Discourse: Essays on the Invention, Legitimation and Uses of Social Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
3. UN Document E/CN.4/GR.1987/7/Add.12 of 30 September 1987.
4. As Matthew Holden pointed out to me, for this reason realism seems less racist than idealism. The "bureaucratic industrialized" criteria has been met by Japan, and to a lesser degree by China which is also elevated to elite status by its coercive power.
5. Julian Burger, *Report from the Frontier: The State of the World's Indigenous Peoples* (London: Zed Books, 1987); also see Steve Turner and Todd Nachowitz, "The Damming of Native Lands," in *The Nation*, 21 October 1991.
6. *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Summer 1991.
7. Richard L. Merritt did something like this in his study of the growth of "American" consciousness from 1735 to 1775. See Merritt, *Symbols of American Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

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National Conference of Black Political Scientists: NCOBPS at the Crossroads—An Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (Presidential Address, March 1992)

Joseph H. Silver, Sr.

Georgia Board of Regents

Greetings.

I am honored and humbled to once again have this opportunity to address you. First of all, I would like to thank each of you for the trust you have placed in me to serve as president of NCOBPS for the last two years. Being your president has been both challenging and rewarding. Challenging in the sense of the many issues we have had to deal with and rewarding in the sense that this organization means so much to me and to be a servant is a great honor indeed.

Upon assuming the presidency, I made a few promises, all of which I think I have kept. The "umbrella" promise I made was to leave the organization better than I found it. By building upon the foundation laid by my predecessors, such as Professors McClain, Pinderhughes, Combs, Barker, and others, NCOBPS is in better shape than it has ever been before, financially, structurally, and substantially. We are getting inquiries about membership on a weekly basis. I trust that my leadership has played a part in this overall progress, but I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the tremendous assistance of our executive director, Professor Lois Hollis, the Executive Council, and other officers of NCOBPS. I am also appreciative of Kennesaw State College for the unwavering support it has given me personally, as well as the support the college has given our organization. Certainly a prime example of this support is the publishing and redesigning of our newsletter. Now, I would like to spend a few minutes speaking about several initiatives.

Two years ago, I embarked upon a two-pronged aggressive agenda that was to be actualized through the establishment of two committees. The first

committee was the High School Articulation Committee whose purpose would be

- to develop strategies to increase articulation between NCOBPS and political/social science teachers at the secondary level;
- to develop a curriculum that would be inclusive as it relates to race, gender, and class;
- to develop a method of evaluating secondary school curriculums; and
- to develop strategies to assist young people in thinking about a political science career;

The other committee I established was the International Linkage Committee, whose purpose would be to explore ways in which NCOBPS can develop international linkages giving specific attention to geographical factors, fiscal factors, and the organizational structure needed to facilitate such activities. I named Professor Marvin Haire and Professor Kathie Golden chairs, respectively, of these committees. I am pleased to report that significant progress has been made in both of these committees. First, the High School Articulation Committee, under the leadership of Professor Marvin Haire, has made significant contributions. One prime example of this is the multiculture workshop conducted for the Dayton Public Schools.

Several members of NCOBPS served at this workshop, including Frederick Hutchinson, Shelby Faye Lewis, Alvin Thornton, Marvin Haire, and myself. The feedback to date has been excellent. I would like to note the significant contribution that Professor Frederick Hutchinson is making in the Prince George's County area, not only as a member of the school board, but also in terms of providing significant leadership in the area of curriculum reform, addressing critical issues as they relate to African American students, and overall role modeling. Also worthy of note is the individual work of Professor Joe McCormick in the Washington, DC school system and Prince George's County Schools. I am doing similar work in the Atlanta public schools, specifically serving on the Task Force on Violence and having developed a program to assist the black males at Peyton Forest Elementary School navigate the educational, civic, and social maze.

Under the able leadership of Professor Kathie Golden, the International Linkage Committee has an equally impressive record. For several years we have had the pleasure of cosponsorship of several of our conference panels with the African Political Science Association. The chairperson of the International Linkages Committee has also made significant linkage with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Last year, Professor Golden traveled to the Republic of China on Taiwan to attend an international conference sponsored by Tamkang University. While there, she was able to forge relationships with the University of Tamkang and specifically with the director of American studies, Professor Thomas Lee. That visit also paved the way for me to make a week-long sojourn to the Republic of China on Taiwan to visit with the director of North American affairs for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, repre-

sentatives from the Ministries of Education and Cultural Development and Planning. While in the Republic of China on Taiwan, I had the distinct honor of delivering two lectures, one at Tamkang University and one on national television. The door is now open for reciprocal scholarship study and other relationships, such as the possibility of one of NCOBPS' members receiving a study grant in the Republic of China on Taiwan. It is hoped that our organization will follow up in an appropriate manner.

Professor Shelby Faye Lewis, a member of the International Linkage Committee, has traveled extensively throughout the continent of Africa on business for Clark Atlanta University and it is to be hoped that the contacts she has made can benefit our organization. At the request of Professor Lewis, Professor Jacqueline Howard Matthews was added to the committee and advocated for us during her trip to the Caribbean. Additionally, Professor Marvin Haire spent the summer of 1991 doing research in Jamaica and made useful contacts that will yield great benefits as we gear up for even more activity in that particular area. The committee has taken steps to gain Observer Status in the United Nations. I am sure that there are even more individual efforts that could be cited and tied into the whole process, but these are the ones that come to mind at this particular point. My expressed hope is that in every corner of the world, NCOBPS will have a presence; thereby, expanding thoughts and analysis as well as providing alternatives to looking at the world order.

Primarily my attention thus far has been on the internal work of NCOBPS. Now, I would like to spend a few moments on issues outside our organization, but issues that our organization can have a tremendous impact upon both nationally and internationally speaking. The world events in the last eighteen to twenty months have been monumental indeed. In these eighteen to twenty months, we saw, rightly or wrongly, a world coming together to bring "under control" a person who some say was "out of control" in the Middle East. We saw the so-called abolition of communism in Eastern Europe. We saw the demise of the Soviet Union as we knew it, and the emergence of a Commonwealth of Independent Republics. We saw countries in Western Europe coming together in a more highly structured common market with the potential of having a profound impact on the international economic and political order. We saw that the American hostages were released from Lebanon. And, somehow there are those who think that we will someday see the end of the Israel/Arab conflict. We have seen in the not so distant past the release of Nelson Mandella and the beginning of new hope for political change in South Africa. We have seen in our not too distant past the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and steps toward reconstruction of one Germany. These are things that many political scientists, social scientists, and others around the country and around the world felt they would never see in their lifetimes, but these things have occurred.

There is ample room for NCOBPS to bring some sense and proper analyses to all of this. There is also room for NCOBPS to shape public opinion on these and other topics. I say this because we all know that while the Western world celebrates the so-called demise of the communist world as we once knew it, they are still turning their backs on the situation in South Africa, allowing de Klerk to have his referendum in regard to the participation of the majority while at the same time not allowing the majority to participate in the referen-

dum. While the world celebrates the historical policy of the United States of accepting the "tired and the humbled masses," we have allowed to go unchallenged the racist immigration policy that the United States has maintained for some time.

I guess we can use the title of the popular soap opera, "As the World Turns," to place the United States vis-a-vis minorities in the United States and regions of the world inhabited by people of color into a proper context. Given the events that have taken place in the last eighteen to twenty months, we know that indeed the world has turned. But as the world turns, seemingly the United States remains the same. As the world turns, the United States maintains a racist immigration policy. As the world turns, the income gap between Blacks and whites in the United States continues to increase. As the world turns, in the United States unemployment of blacks doubles that of whites. As the world turns, racism in the United States is again raising its ugly head, whether we reference the L.A. police beating or the David Duke phenomenon. As the world turns, the United States continues to perpetuate the feminization of poverty. As the world turns, black males become the target of a great deal of violence, both violence from themselves as well as violence from outside forces. As the world turns, we seemingly have no alternative as a country but to accept Bush as president once again, even though for the last four years he has done irreversible harm to this country in general and to African-American people in particular.

As this country tries to find itself and as it tries to address its social, economic, and moral shortcomings, I see a significant role for NCOBPS. Even though this organization has come a long way, one might say that it has come full circle, because we are still knocking at the same door that caused this organization to be created some twenty-three years ago. Both individually and as an organization, we must extend ourselves into the community in which we live. We cannot afford to theorize at the expense of practice or engage in practice at the expense of theory. The very same issues that caused the founders of this organization to organize are still very real issues today. We cannot turn our backs on the masses while we try to be "one of the boys." Whether our domain is on the picket line, in the classroom, the community, or the corporate boardroom, our resolve to maintain the "fighting spirit" should be the same. Our challenge is before us. Our work is not finished. The question is will we as an organization meet the challenge and work ceaselessly or address the many concerns facing our people.

I am a believer in this organization and the real potential that is has to become a major player in shaping policy, both locally, nationally, and internationally. To do so we must be very vigilant and we must do as the poet who wrote the poem "The Ebony Soul" suggests, we must "sleep with one eye open." I say that the ebony soul must sleep with one eye open because it seems as if when we look at all the struggles of the past, whether we reference the eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth century, and look at how all the gains have seemingly eroded, it seems as if someone has fallen asleep at the wheel. While students were taking to the streets in China to obtain democracy, people in the United States were staying home from the voting booths in greater numbers that I care to think about. While people in East Germany chipped away at the Berlin wall, people in the southeastern United States were blowing walls down with mail bombs. While children in Asia are

encouraged to go to school, and the best schools, we have schools in the United States that are harassing students to the point that they decide to leave these institutions. While communist nations challenged their ruling party, so called progressive groups in the United States sat idly by as if we did not know what democracy was all about.

My friends, what does all of this tell you. I don't know what it tells you, but it tells me that we as a people have become comfortably complacent. So complacent that we are allowing the hands of time to be turned back. We have allowed the illusions of integration to further segregate us as a people. We have allowed the few who slipped through the cracks to continue down the road without turning back to make sure that the crack is wide enough to provide a door or window of opportunity for the masses. We have allowed what Professor Mack Jones called the "Black Caretakers of the White Experience" to speak for us and define us in a manner that hurts us and is not in our best interest. All of these truisms suggest to me that we do indeed have to go back to the basics. We have to go back to the basics to help our people understand why equality is so important; why economics are so important; why discussions of gender and class are so important; and why an education is so important.

I know that within this room we have individuals who have etched in their minds the words of Douglas that "there is no progress without struggle"; hence, they are committed to the struggle. And, I know that there are those in this room who have dedicated themselves to challenging racism, sexism, and imperialism wherever it exists. Yet, we also know that there are those people on the outside of this room who ask the question "what is all the fuss about?" There are those who say that the African-American people have arrived, that African American people have freedom, equality, and that they have the opportunity for education. There are those who say that there is no discrimination and that racism is a thing of the past. Yet, I remind you of the words of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. who stated that "a threat to peace anywhere is a threat to peace everywhere." Therefore everyone's freedom is threatened as long as there are more African males in prison than in college. Therefore, everyone's freedom is threatened as long as there are glass ceilings in the workplace for men and women of color. Therefore, everyone's freedom is threatened as long as Apartheid exists in South Africa. Therefore, everyone's freedom is threatened as long as students in China are shot down because of voicing their opinions for democracy while the world viewed this on TV and sat idly by. Therefore, everyone's freedom is threatened as long as we have not eliminated poverty and illiteracy.

Yet, as we begin to point the finger of accusation, we must take a good look at ourselves as African people. We can no longer say that we do not have economics in our community to support those things that belong to us. We all know the fact that the combined total wealth of African-American people equals or exceeds the gross national product of many countries of this world and our combined economic power would render us one of the top ten nations in the world. But, maybe we need to go back to the basics in helping people understand the power of building and pulling together. We must, together, ask for a new political and economic order. We must ask why is it that our people can go and stand in the frontlines of the battlefields and protect this country in Desert Storm and have to wait in line for employment

opportunities once they return back. Even though we are very fortunate in that many of those individuals who served in the recent war survived and came back home to a somewhat sadistic heroic welcome, we must also be cognizant of the fact that there was a prime possibility that if things had not gone according to the plan, a significant number of African-American people would have been buried in the sands of the Middle East. We need to help America understand that if African Americans are willing to put their lives on the line for this country in such a manner as they did in the Persian Gulf, then America should be willing to back them at home.

Yet in closing, I must once again ask those of us assembled here and those brothers and sisters around this country and the world to look into the mirror of realism and understand that while we are trying to tell America and the world to stop oppression and imperialism, that we as a people must also tell our brothers and sisters to stop murdering and killing each other. We must tell our brothers and sisters to stop peddling drugs to our young people. And, we must tell them to stop terrorizing our communities in gang warfare. We as a people must assist in finding ways to heal the African-American family and return to its strengths of ages past. If we want to liberate our people from the shackles of dependency, racism, and economic exploitation, then it must be a daily theme song. We cannot put it on the shelf only to retrieve it when things get hot. We need to have it in the forefront every day. We can not pick our places to be liberators. We must be liberators whenever the time and circumstances dictate. I see NCOBPS as a liberating organization and I trust that for the sake of your children and my children and other people's children that we will take this job and this responsibility very seriously.

Again, thank you for allowing me this time and, more importantly, for allowing me to serve as your president for the last two years.

African-American Women and Politics: Research Trends and Directions

Gloria J. Braxton

Southern University-Baton Rouge

Over the past several decades the most significant research on African American women has dealt with the historical development of their struggle from their arrival from the shores of Africa through the civil rights era. The most penetrating accounts are those by Paula Giddings (1984), Jeanne Noble (1978), and Gerda Lerner (1973). Other historical literature on the African American woman emphasizes her role in relation to the family. These works include Robert Staples (1973), Bonnie Thornton Dill (1979), Delores Aldridge (1989), E. Franklin Frazier (1966), Herbert Gutman (1976), Andrew Billingsley (1968), Joyce Ladner (1972), Angela Davis (1971), La Frances Rodgers-Rose (1980), and Niara Sudarkasa (1981; 1982).

The most dominant theme permeating all of these works is the extent to which African American women effectively understood the relationship between their own status and the growth and development of the African race now living in America. A central aspect of the theme revolves around their role in the struggle for economic survival in a racist society. Also, the works of Jewel L. Prestage (1980; 1991), Angela Davis (1971), John Blasingame (1972), and Inez Reid (1972) have probed the legacy of African American women's exceptional activism as they attempted to transcend the myriad of disadvantages, including race, sex, class, and cultural discrimination and "the price they were forced to pay for the achievement" (Giddings, 1984: 7).

While these studies have provided critical historical and social analyses, absent in these works has been an in-depth analysis of the nontraditional and traditional aspects of the political participation of the African American woman. Prestage (1991) states, "Because African American women have been only recently granted access to the political arena as voters and officeholders in significant numbers, there is a paucity of information on them in these roles and even less about their nontraditional actions that predated these roles" (1991:89).

Much of the literature that does exist presents the African American woman as an appendage to white women and, thus, has depicted an image of the African American woman that is mythical and misguided (King,1977). I am reminded of an interaction with a white female political scientist who was editing a new volume on women and politics and planning to include essays on women from Africa, Latin America, and Asia. When I asked why no chapter would be included on the African-American woman, she replied, "only one chapter would be done on women in the United States and that chapter would deal with all American women." This attitude is shared by many social science researchers, thus omitting African American women from the research process.

However, the pioneering works of Jewel L. Prestage have begun to probe the historical significance of nontraditional and traditional political participation of African American women. In a recent article, she highlights four major historical periods, pre-Emancipation; Reconstruction; post-Reconstruction to World War II; and second Reconstruction, and advances three contentions: (1) that African-American women have always engaged in political activity, the nature of which was determined by prevailing legal and cultural circumstances at the time; (2) that these political activities have been directed toward altering their disadvantaged status both as African Americans and as women; and (3) that historically, African-American women have escalated their political activity progressively, moving from a predominance of nontraditional activity to a predominance of traditional activity, and have emerged as the prime users of these traditional avenues in contemporary politics (Prestage, 1991:89).

It is precisely this third contention that will provide the focus of this chapter. Registration and voter turnout grew significantly between 1980 and 1984 among all African Americans, but more black women registered and voted in 1984 than black males, and a higher proportion of black women registered than white men (Williams, 1986). Since the 1970s, much of the research on African-American women has focused on this increased participation and attempted to determine varying ways their political participation differs from white women, white men, and black men.

The central questions have been: How should African American women perceive their relationship to power? What is the nature of the African-American woman's powerlessness? Do African American women embrace feminism more than white women? Is coalition politics a viable strategy for empowerment of African American women? Why do they not fit within the voting patterns established for other groups in America? Why have they been more successful in officeholding than their white counterparts? This chapter will discuss these and other such questions addressed by research on African American women and politics and highlight implications for future directions for research.

Perspectives on Power

Should African American women view their relationship to politics as other groups in America? What is the nature of their oppression? What is the best strategy for achieving maximum power? Bell Hooks, in her seminal

work, *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* (1984), argues that women must change perspectives on power in order to be liberated. Power must cease to be equated with domination and control over people or things. Women, though assigned different roles to play in society based on sex, are not taught a different value system. Therefore, they do not conceptualize power differently. She continues,

> Like most men, most women are taught from childhood on that dominating and controlling others is the basic expression of power. Even though women do not yet kill in wars, do not shape government policy equally with men, they, along with male ruling groups and most men, believe in the dominant ideology of the culture. Were they to rule, society would not be organized that differently from the way it is currently organized. They would organize it differently only if they had a different value system. The issues around which women and men feel differently, illustrated recently by the "gender gap," do not constitute a different set of values. (p. 85)

Bell Hooks believes that before women can work to reconstruct society, the notion that obtaining power in the existing social structure will necessarily advance the feminist struggle to end sexist oppression must be rejected. "As long as the United States is an imperialist, capitalist, patriarchal society, no large female majority can enter the existing ranks of the powerful" (p. 92).

While emphasizing a liberationist ideology as a necessity for empowerment, Shelby Lewis (1988) posits that a global approach to the question of liberation must be sought for related segments or groups bound together by history. Thus, black women are subjected to political, economic, and cultural imperialism because the oppression of women is a manifestation of global ethnocentricity, patriarchy, and class bias.

In her attempt to provide a framework for black women to formulate goals, objectives, and strategies for changing their powerless condition, Lewis maintains that the oppression of black women is grounded in an ideological position and material reality reflective of unequal social relations between them and other groupings in society. Arguing that black women are unique and form a distinct group in American society, Lewis discusses three basic points that undergird and shape this ideology: (1) black women's struggle is multidimensional, convoluted, and international; (2) the significance of the underclass position of black women is not acknowledged by other groups in society because to do so would require them to confront their own complicity in establishing and maintaining that status; and (3) black women must free themselves (p.40). Lewis wishes to see black women launch an attack against oppression from a coherent and holistic context defined by black women instead of responding and reacting to unjust laws and actions within a series of struggles defined from a nonblack female perspective.

Lewis's liberationist theory is revolutionary, seeking total transformation of systems, institutions, and attitudes that cause and maintain oppression in society. She concludes that the need for total transformation of society and the development of a liberationist ideology for black women could lead to the setting up of alternative systems, systems that are fair and equitable for all.

While little research has focused on power relationships, the bulk of the research on questions of power has focused on whether the nature of the

African American woman's oppression has racist or sexist origins. Mae C. King (1975), who like Lewis, addressed the question of oppression and power in terms of the unique status of the black woman in the American political system, has argued that the roots of her oppression is based on race. She writes,

> While racism was institutionalized by the slave system, this ideology assumed a value independent of the particular system under which it flourished. Consequently, when the plantation slave structures were destroyed, the oppression of the black woman and other blacks, which was now justified on a racial basis, continued in other institutional forms. . . . Thus, the permanency of their color would incur the continuation of subjugation even in the absence of slavery. As a result, the emergence of new economic, social and political structures in the aftermath of slavery perpetuated the fundamental functional power relationship between blacks and whites. (p. 116)

Arguing that the confluence of a slave heritage, racial oppression, and sex discrimination make for the uniqueness of black women's position in the American political system, King maintains that black women are members of the lower caste and whites are members of the upper caste. Each female group is discriminated against by the male members of their respective castes, and whites, because of their power position, exercise discriminatory powers over black females as well. Agreeing with Lewis and Hooks, she posits that a massive, aggressive attack on the caste structure is not likely to be carried out by those who benefit from the status quo. African American women must engage this struggle themselves.

In an attempt to prove that African-American women are more victims of sexist oppression than racist oppression, while utilizing a model devised to identify racial and sexual components in black women's lower earnings, Elizabeth Almquist (1975) concluded that in most situations selected, white males enjoy the most advantaged position, black females have the least and black males and white females are arrayed in between. Her analysis revealed that gaps between groups paired on the basis of sex are larger than those between the groups compared on the basis of race. Hence, she argued that sexual segregation exceeds racial segregation. Therefore, contradicting the assertion by King, Almquist maintains that females of all races compose a caste with disadvantages similar to the black female.

Feminist Consciousness

Do African American women have a feminine consciousness similar to white women? This question has constituted an ongoing concern of social scientists. Pauline Terrelonge (1984) challenged the view that sexism is a factor of minimal importance in the overall oppression of black women. She believes that this myth has negatively affected solutions to the problem, such as correcting the imbalance in the black sex ratio or building stronger black families and holds that what has historically differentiated black women from most white women is the peculiar way in which the racial and sexual caste systems have related to one another.

Five factors have contributed to the situation in which black women have not developed a black feminist consciousness: (1) sexism has been viewed as a racially divisive issue; (2) the ideology of racism is so ingrained in American culture, that black females do not believe anything affecting white females could also affect them; (3) the black social movement of the 1960s instructed that the liberation of the black man was more important than their own liberation; (4) the idea of the black matriarch was construed to mean that black females were not in need of liberation; and (5) the church, which has played a preeminent role in validating the patriarchal nature of Western culture, is the most significant social institution in the black community and the one in which black women (in contrast to black men) spend most of their time and energy (pp. 562–63). Not many studies have raised questions with Terrelonge's contentions.

However, Clyde Wilcox (1990) explored the levels and determinants of feminism among black women. His research, based on data from the National Survey of Black Americans, showed strong support for feminists among black women, particularly among younger, well-educated women who have experienced sex discrimination and who have close women friends. His findings challenged the view by King and others who have argued that black women see white women less as allies than as oppressors.

Wilcox maintains that the determinants of feminism among black women are similar to those reported elsewhere among white women: education and sex discrimination on the job. Black women who identify the social and political system as the source of black disadvantage are also more likely to be feminists and favor collective action to redress racial discrimination. Wilcox suggests that black consciousness facilitates feminist consciousness.

Coalition Politics

Should African American women's strategy for political empowerment include coalescing with white feminist groups or other dominant groups in the American political system? Clyde Wilcox found that although most black feminists favor a racially inclusive feminist coalition, those who have high levels of black identification and low levels of racial trust are more likely to favor a feminist movement exclusively within a black context. Black feminists who prefer an exclusively black movement are better educated, and less likely to live in the South than those who favor inclusive coalitions. Moreover, although identification of the system as the source of black disadvantage is weakly associated with a preference for a separate black feminine movement, support for racial collective action is weakly associated with support for a racially inclusive movement.

Like other studies, Wilcox's found that black feminists believe that racism and sexism are equally important problems. Feminists with high levels of education, low levels of racial trust, and high levels of black identification and system blaming are more likely to believe that racism is more important. Older black feminists, those with close female friends, and those with no male in the household are more likely to focus on sexism. Therefore, Wilcox found that there is widespread feminist consciousness among black women and a

strong consensus in favor of joining with white women in eradicating gender discrimination.

Bonnie Thornton Dill (1983), who discusses the prospects for an all-inclusive sisterhood, stresses the importance of women's perceptions of themselves and their place in society as a way of understanding the differences and similarities between black and white women. Understanding how race, gender, and class intersect in the lives of black women and the women's perceptions of the impact of these structures on their lives may improve prospects for sisterhood and the creation of political strategies that may provide a first step toward a more inclusive women's movement. This view is seriously challenged in the works of Lewis, who called for an independent liberation strategy, and King, who has argued that an interracial alliance would have limited viability. King points out that the racial structure of power and status in America virtually rules out the realization of an interracial alliance in which both partners would contribute and benefit equally from achievements of the alliance (p.125).

In sharp contrast with other views, Dill calls for the abandonment of the concept of sisterhood as a global construct based on what she perceives as "unexamined assumptions about our similarities," in favor of a more pluralistic approach that recognizes and accepts the objective differences between women. Such an approach, she alleges, requires that we concentrate our political energies on building coalitions around particular issues of shared interest. She concludes that the women's movement may need to move beyond a limited focus on "women's issues" to ally with groups of women and men who are addressing other aspects of race and class oppression.

Political Behavior and Voting Patterns

What types of voting patterns have African American women established? How do they compare with other groups in the general population? Why do African American women fail to fit the voting patterns of the other majority groups in America? What factors explain their political behavior?

The first study that squarely focused on African American women's political behavior was completed in 1973 (Pierce, Avery, & Carey) and focused on the attitudinal and behavioral differences between black men and black women in New Orleans. The authors hypothesized that black men and black women may exhibit patterns of participation and beliefs different than those found in the more general populations.

Their findings, substantiated by subsequent studies, revealed: (1) only minimal overall differences in the amount of protest and traditional participation of black men and women; (2) a higher association between the two forms of participation among the women; (3) that in both types of political behavior, lower-class women participate more than lower-class men when income is used as the measure of class, but educational and occupational controls for status result in mixed findings; (4) that black women have less positive feelings about the political system than black men; and (5) that beliefs about the political system are more important predictors of levels of participation for women than for the men.

Writing in 1980, Jewel L. Prestage advanced five contentions about black women's political behavior: (1) black women have been the victims of dual oppression, racist and sexist; (2) black women have been centrally involved in the major political struggles in each historical epoch in the development of the American political system; (3) the political activity of black women has varied in accordance with the historical conditions, consequently, efforts to understand the political behavior of black women must take cognizance of changing patterns over time; (4) black women have expanded their political involvement progressively, escalating at unprecedented levels since 1965, especially in voting and officeholding; and (5) political advancement for Black women has paralleled more closely advancement of black men than it has the advancement of white women. This book chapter provides an incisive historical analysis of those activities through which women have participated most frequently, including abolitionist activity, politicization of normally nonpolitical positions, protest demonstrations, electoral participation, and officeholding.

Prestage's most recent research, "In Quest of African American Political Woman (1991), provides additional data on the types and extent of political participation and behavior in which African American women have engaged. Of particular importance is the Prestage discussion of African American women's struggle to enter fields of traditional politics. She argues that African American women played a pivotal role during the civil rights movement in defining issues of sex and race liberation for white women. Within the context of the civil rights movement, African American women experienced and chose to consciously confront the issue of sexism. Through church organizations, women's clubs, sororities, and educational organizations, they provided monetary and moral support for civil rights workers, ranging from those registering voters to those engaged in more revolutionary politics.

Describing African-American women as a minority within a minority in their edited volume, *A Portrait of Marginality—The Political Behavior of the American Woman* (1977), Githens and Prestage present a series of articles that deal with political struggles that accrue to black women as a result of racial and sexist discrimination. This volume addressed special problems of sexism and racism, the extent to which black women and white women are socialized to conflicting norms of femininity, and the extent to which racism militates against the establishment of a coalition among black and white women. The volume also explored common central concepts with frames of references, while offering penetrating analyses of critical elements in the black woman's political status and behavior in the context of American politics.

The Lansing (1977) study on the voting patterns of American black women is representative of most of the literature on the political behavior of black women during the decade of the 1980s. Because voting patterns of American black women run directly counter to the expectations of voting behavior research, Lansing set out to find out why. Basing her assumptions on data received from the Center for Political Studies on the 1972 presidential election, she found black women had the lowest levels of political efficacy and the lowest levels of trust in the federal government, and viewed sex discrimination as sharply affecting them. Thus, based on voting behavior research (Gosnell, 1942; Duverger, 1955; Lane, 1959; Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960) conducted since the 1940s, black women should have a very

low voting record. Yet, these records of black women over the past decade show that the rate of increase in voting by black women has been greater than white males, white females, and black males. Lansing examines the relationships of age, education, region, and occupation and discusses the effects of a possible sex-role reversal by Black Americans in relation to a comparison of female heads of household and professional women.

Her conclusions reveal that black women were voting for president in 1964, 1968, and 1972 at the same rates as black men, doubling the rate since 1956. Thus, in the 1960s black women increased their rate of voting at higher rates than black men, and more than either white sex, for whom turnout has been declining since 1960. Black women in white-collar and manual occupations voted at slightly higher rates than black men in those occupations. This was reversed for service and farm workers. Also, slightly more black women with elementary education voted higher than white women of comparable education. The gap between the sexes by education was smaller for blacks than for whites at lower levels. Lansing's conclusion was instructive, overall: that black Americans, and especially black female Americans, do not fit the voting model developed over several decades.

Linking the increased politicization of black women to the removal of legal and other intimidating restraints on voting, Baxter and Lansing (1983) used baseline data from the Commission on Civil Rights, the Bureau of the Census, and surveys of Matthews and Prothro (1966). They assert that the political behavior of black women is heavily influenced by their activities in the black church (Terrelonge, 1984; Wilcox, 1990). They found support for the double whammy thesis (Epstein, 1973) that black women are voting at higher rates than their socioeconomic status would predict, and voting recently at higher rates than black men as a response to the dual discrimination forced on them by racism and sexism. As in the 1977 Lansing study, black women continued to show less trust in government, less satisfaction with the control over the quality of their lives, lower levels of political efficacy, and greater sympathy for the goals of the women's liberation movement than black men or either white sex.

From all indications research trends and directions on political behavior and voting patterns have been primarily concerned with ways in which these patterns compare and contrast with those of the general population. They have avoided the more substantive questions evoked by their results. For example, if African American women have high levels of cynicism and low levels of efficacy, what accounts for their faith in the ballot box? Why has not the American political system responded to the needs of its most faithful voters? What strategies must African American women pursue in order to acquire power within the system? What realistic benefits might African American women expect as a result of increased voting? How can these benefits be maximized?

Officeholding

As of 1989, some 1814 of the 7,226 African-American elected officials on the Roster of Black Elected Officials, or roughly one-fourth, were women (Prestage, 1991:98). What factors account for the success of African American

women in getting elected? Who are these women and are their role perceptions significantly different from dominant groups? What are the primary obstacles to elective office for African-American females? What accounts for their success in elective officeholding? Does the profile of African-American female officeholders compare positively with that of white female officeholders?

Reporting in 1977, Bryce and Warrick found that the most common elective offices held by black females were those related to education while the second most common offices were those on the municipal level. Blacks were acutely underrepresented at the level where global and national decisions are made (the federal level) and on the county level where men and women make the "nitty-gritty" decisions. Generally, one elective office is a steppingstone to higher office. However, Bryce and Warrick found that there was little upward mobility among black women elected officials. Also, the lack of tenure in office is a significant drawback, since long-term service is often an important element in the acquisition of power. This instability in office is an ominous sign, even if some of these black women have been replaced by other blacks. Black females in county-level offices are the least likely to be building up seniority. The study concluded that black females are underrepresented because of racial and sexual discrimination.

Because the data was acquired directly from black female officeholders, two articles completed by Jewel L. Prestage are of critical importance. Again, in studies on black female state legislators (1975) and judges (1987), Prestage's overriding theme of racial and sexual discrimination as a primary factor in limiting political participation by black women forms the basis for conducting this work. Prestage found that African American women judges display some of the same characteristics as do the state legislators.

Basing her conclusions on a survey of thirty-two black women state legislators, Prestage found that black women's political fortunes have been most marked in those states where black men have also enjoyed some measure of success in their bids for public office. Moderate-size to large cities in the South serve as the region of origin for most of the women. In their elective posts the women were concentrated outside the South, and all represented urban districts. These legislators are comparatively well educated, have followed a number of occupations or professions, with over 90 percent following careers outside the home. Approximately 60 percent indicated that their families had some impact on their interest in politics while about 53 percent stated preadult political interest.

Black female lawmakers are universally religious, mostly above forty years of age, were or are now married, have one or more children mostly over the age of eighteen, did not enter politics in their husbands' footsteps, and in most cases expressed a desire to run again. All are Democrats, most serve in legislative chambers in which theirs is the majority party. They are ambivalent about seeking higher office but optimistic about the future for women and blacks in American politics. Women's liberation is viewed with reservations, not opposed but not given high priority.

Darcy and Hadley's (1988) research on the "puzzle of success" sought to determine why a greater proportion of black than white elected officials are women. Basing their conclusions on assertions gleaned from studies and "canned" data from the 1972–1986 General Social Surveys and interviews

with Democratic state convention delegates, their study revealed that a greater proportion of black than white elected officials are women because of the politicization of black women in the civil rights movement, the expanded political opportunities resulting from reenfranchisement and the structural reforms resulting from reapportionment and redistricting. Darcy and Hadley conclude that the relatively favorable circumstances for black women in politics cannot be accounted for by more generally favorable attitudes among blacks than whites toward women in politics.

Double disadvantage (Baxter & Lansing, 1983: chap. 6; Epstein, 1973) puts black women into a position of choosing, a position not forced onto white women. Darcy and Hadley (1988) hypothesized that this double disadvantage dissipated the political activities of black women in contrast to the focused politics of white women.

However, these conclusions contrast to earlier studies. Stone (1980) found no significant difference in the political ambition of African American male and female officeholders, in spite of the overall lower social status, educational level, and occupational status of women. Comparisons of political ambition between African American women and white women indicated parity in ambition, but white women's ambition is more closely linked to nontraditional sex-role beliefs acquired early, while African American women's ambition is associated more with their current activities (Perkins,1986). This would seem to lessen the possible impact on African American women of the suppressive legal prescriptions and community practices that prevailed in the period before passage and implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Prestage, 1991:102)

Implications for Future Research

Although research on the African-American woman has contributed greatly to a better understanding of certain patterns and trends, there are very serious gaps and critical problems in the research literature on African-American women and politics. The most serious problem, by far, is the lack of focus on developing an ideological paradigm that encompasses the historical and material realities of African-American women within the overarching global system. This is necessitated by the fact that African American women are people of African descent who share common problems with other people of color. Various authors have called for a global liberationist ideology that is based on a total reconstruction of existing social structure and the concomitant institutions, attitudes, and knowledge that must accompany such a revolution.

Would mainstream African-American women subscribe to such an idea or is this an idea that exists only in the minds of intellectuals as another academic exercise? What would the process of educating African-American women about the strengths of such a liberating ideology entail? Do African-American women identify with other women of color throughout the world, particularly those of Africa? How do they really perceive themselves, particularly in relation to the amount of power they exercise in their choice of roles and the manner in which they are free to carry it out? A liberationist ideology would need to successfully address critical research questions.

Filomina Chioma Steady, the editor of *The Black Woman Cross-Culturally,* calls for the development of an African feminist theory that encompasses a worldwide perspective. She, like a few others, argues that this ideology must be developed by African women and African women in the diaspora. This means that (1) African women and African women in the diaspora must dominate the research on black women in politics, and (2) the research must be proactive rather than reactive.

Steady emphasizes, "In Africa, as well as in the diaspora, black women engaged in research on the black woman are involved in a process of liberation, as well as in a scholarly endeavor, since research, being essentially a product of the power structure, has sometimes been used as a tool of domination" (Steady, 1987:4). She believes that increasing the involvement of African women in research can lead to redefinitions and critical examinations of concepts, perspectives, and methodologies used in research and inspire a vital change that will render research activity as a basic human right and a process of liberation for oppressed groups. Consequently, an African feminist ideology would combine racial, sexual, class, and cultural dimensions of oppression to produce a more inclusive brand of feminism through which women are viewed first and foremost as human, rather than sexual beings (Steady, 1987: 4). Steady argues that despite differences in nationality and class among African women on the continent and in the diaspora, the usage of historical and global perspectives would produce a special brand of African feminism. Hence, historical processes and the reality of global racism dictate that important aspects of African feminism would entail values stressing human totality, parallel autonomy, cooperation, self-reliance, adaptation, survival, and liberation.

Second, if a global liberationist ideology is to form the basis for research on African and African women in the diaspora, this will necessitate conducting more studies of a cross-cultural/comparative nature (Lindsay, 1980). Research conducted by scholars from the dominant culture has focused on comparing African American women to white and black men and white women. However, historical realities of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism support the fact that African American women have more in common with African and other women in the nonindustrialized world than they do with those in the dominant culture. For example, research has shown that voting patterns among African American men and women exhibit no significant difference in their political behavior (Pierce, Avery & Carey, 1973; Baxter & Lansing, 1977;) and that no gender gap exists in the black community (Welch & Sigelman, 1989). This conforms to the historical reality that in Africa, the relationship between men and women is more of a complementary than an adversarial nature. Niara Sudarkasa (1987), writing about the status of women in indigenous African societies, points out that the purviews of female and male in African societies were often described as separate and complementary. Her sources depict a "neutral" complementarity, rather than subordination/superordination, which she maintains describes more accurately the relationship between certain female and male roles in various precolonial African societies. This raises speculation that the relationship between African-American men and women and African men and women is very similar. What does this mean in terms of a viable strategy for the empowerment of African-American women?

Third, there is a need for African American women to collaborate more with women conducting research on African women and other African women in the diaspora. For example, during a recent project titled "Liberian Women in Politics," I consulted with Jewel L. Prestage and utilized a version of the survey questionnaire she designed for black female state legislators in the United States. No doubt, we will be able to draw comparative and cross-cultural conclusions that would never have been otherwise possible. Initial observations indicate that there are more similarities than differences (Braxton, 1990).

Fourth, there is a definite need for African American researchers to study and analyze the relationship that existed in precolonial and preindustrial Africa, the impact of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism on that society, and how this changed the traditional role of men and women. Sudarkasa (1987: 36) explains that the effort to recast the study of the statuses and roles of women in indigenous precolonial African societies has important implications for the study of roles that the descendants of these women came to play in the American context. Africans brought with them their beliefs and values, varying degrees of knowledge of their political, economic, technological, religious, artistic, recreational, and familial organizations; and codes governing interpersonal behavior between such societal groupings as chiefs and citizenry, old and young, and female and male.

Given this context, Sudarkasa claims that in order to understand the roles that African American women came to play in America, it is necessary to understand the tradition of female independence and responsibility within the family and wider kin groups in Africa, and the tradition of female productivity and leadership in the extradomestic, or public, domain in African societies (Lebeuf, 1963; Sanday, 1974; Hoffer, 1974; Hay & Stichter, 1984; Parpart & Staudt, 1989).

Fifth, and most important, research on African American women must become more proactive rather than reactive. This is to emphasize that the African American researcher must take the initiative in developing a research agenda that would help to lead to the liberation of Africans born and raised in America as well as people of color throughout the world. Reactive research is research for research's sake and is pursued for the fulfillment of the dominant group's goals and objectives. The questions raised, approaches advanced, and methodologies employed are antithetical to the growth and development of African people. Therefore, African American women have little to gain by allowing the dominant culture to dictate a research agenda.

Proactivity means that as human beings, African Americans are responsible for their own lives. Our behavior must become a function of our decisions and our conditions as described by our African heritage. Reactive research has assumed prominence in the literature because African Americans have been too passive in taking the initiative to develop an alternative research agenda, while others have become caught up in the dominant culture's belief that a pluralist society will permit our inclusion on equal footing.

Victor Frankl, from whom the idea of proactivity is borrowed, suggests that there are three central values in life: the experiential, or that which happens to us; the creative, or that which we bring into existence; and the attitudinal, or our response in difficult circumstances. It has been argued that

the highest of three values is attitudinal; in other words, what matters most is how we respond to what we experience in life (Covey, 1989).

Proactive research, in placing the burden of responsibility on African American women to become leaders in the establishment of a "growth-oriented" research agenda, dictates that African American women must exude positive energy, enlarging and magnifying, causing our circle of influence to increase. Only then can African-American scholars, particularly female scholars, continue the legacy of political activism established by Sojourner Truth, Harriet Tubman, Madam Yoko, Hatshepsut, Nitocis, Mary Church Terrell, Maria W. Stewart, and Mary McLeod Bethune.

The paucity of readily available data, inadequacies of conventional research models and the financial expense often required in conducting cross-cultural or comparative analyses help to explain the small number of truly comparative works focusing on black women in Third World societies (Harley, 1987). Nonetheless, African-American researchers must address mythical and misguided studies of women of color that have emanated as a result of reactive research by cultivating a non-Western feminist perspective to guide research approaches, methodologies, and terminologies. The research agenda must have some utilitarian purpose, a liberating purpose that moves beyond the bounds of the academy and into the lives of African American communities, elected and appointed officials, and the myriad of organizations, groups, and individuals who have concerned themselves with the growth and development of the African race in America and the world.

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Chicanas as Political Actors: Rare Literature, Complex Practice

Christine Marie Sierra
Adaljiza Sosa-Riddell

University of New Mexico
University of California, Davis

Despite increasing scholarly attention to race, ethnicity, and gender in the study of politics, women of color remain conspicuously absent from analyses. On the one hand, studies of racial and ethnic politics neglect the influence of gender or sex, and very few studies feature women of color as their central focus of concern. At the same time, analyses of "women and politics" overwhelmingly focus on white women and ignore racial and ethnic differences in gender politics. Even when the focus of the literature is on women of color and their political involvement, it is referred to rather obliquely. We note that while the more male-focused literature often refers to men as political actors, the term is grammatically incorrect for women. The appropriate feminine counterpart, *actress*, connotes someone who is pretending to be a political person. Women are certainly not pretending to be political activists. We choose to ignore the constraints of the language by ignoring gender agreement and instead emphasize the reality of women of color's political activism by describing them as political actors.

The study of Chicanas—Mexican American women—in the United States is clearly an area of scholarly neglect. A review of scholarship in political science, Chicano studies, and women studies finds relatively few studies on the political experiences of Chicanas. The historical participation of Chicanas in the affairs of the Chicano/Mexicano community, in the Chicano movement, in the women's movement, in feminist organizations, and the parallel development of separate Chicana organizations, Chicana feminism, and a myriad of other Chicana-initiated activities have been almost completely ignored by most scholars. This neglect has been as much the case in the traditional disciplines as in the newer interdisciplines of Chicano studies and women studies. This chapter focuses on the study of Chicana politics in

political science, Chicano studies, and women studies. It includes three major components: literature reviews, an overview of the contemporary practice of Chicana political participation in the American political system, and an analysis of the reasons for the current state of affairs both in theory and practice. The literature reviews include reviews of the political science literature, women studies journals, Chicano studies literature, and the "popular press" literature. The overview of the practice includes definitions and contextual placement in Chicano studies theory, historical analysis, and contemporary events. Finally, the chapter focuses on interpretations and projections for the future of Chicanas as political actors.

Some of the relevant literature includes studies of the Latino population as a whole, inclusive of Latin American-origin groups other than Mexican Americans. Consequently, we will refer to Latino or Latina politics as well. But the analysis centers on the case of Mexican Americans, who comprise the largest Latino-origin[1] group in the United States.

The State of the Literature

Political science generally has been slow to incorporate the study of race, ethnicity, and gender in the discipline (Avalos, 1991; F.C.Garcia et al., 1985). But the lack of attention shown to the study of gender issues in ethnic politics is especially glaring. In an analysis of the contents of articles from four major political science journals from 1964 to 1988, Avalos (1991) found not a single article that combined an analysis of race and gender issues.

Our own review of political science journals uncovered only two articles that focused on the dynamics of gender in Chicano or Latino politics. Howell-Martinez's study of gender roles in the political socialization of Mexican American children appeared in 1982 in *Women & Politics*, a publication that also can be considered a women studies journal. Ten years passed before a second article appeared in the *Western Political Quarterly*, "A Gender Gap Among Hispanics?" by Welch and Sigelman (1992).

Bibliographies on Latino politics (F.C.Garcia *et al.*,1991), Chicanas (Castillo-Speed, 1990; Loeb, 1980), and Mexican Americans (Etulain, 1990) confirm the virtual absence of articles on Latinas in political science journals and the general lack of studies on the political experiences of Chicanas. *Latinos and Politics* (F.C.Garcia *et al.*, 1991) is the most recent major bibliography on Latino politics to date. It includes works published principally from 1965 to 1986 on the Mexican-, Cuban-, and Puerto Rican-origin populations of the continental United States. Topics covered include political values, attitudes, mobilization, leadership, and public policy issues. Citations appear for four categories: (1) scholarly journals;(2) books;(3) doctoral dissertations; and (4) occasional papers, working papers, and government publications. For purposes of this review, all journal article abstracts and book titles from the Garcia bibliography (F.C.Garcia *et al.*, 1991) were examined to determine how many of these works focus principally on Chicanas or address gender issues in a significant way.

Out of a total of 301 journal articles cited in the Garcia bibliography (F.C.Garcia *et al.*, 1991), only thirteen have a primary focus on Latina women. Nine are on the Chicana experience; 1 is on Puerto Rican women; 1 focuses

on women on Mexico's northern border; and 2 involve the study of Chicanas and other Latinas. Only the Howell-Martinez study (1982) represents an article in a political science journal. Almost all citations come from interdisciplinary journals in Chicano studies, women studies, border studies, and Latin American studies.

Articles whose abstract indicates that sex or gender is included as a variable in analysis in addition to ethnicity number only an additional nineteen. None of these articles appear in political science journals. All are in interdisciplinary journals or journals in disciplines other than political science, especially anthropology, psychology, and sociology. Attention to gender issues, however, differs widely among them. In some cases, gender is secondary to ethnicity, serving as a control variable to distinguish ethnic differences across groups (Garza and Ames, 1974; Welch, Comer & Steinman, 1975). Other studies include sex as an independent variable in surveys of Latinos, but find no statistically significant relationships (F.C.Garcia, 1973). A few examine gender differences in some detail (Gecas, 1973; Miller, 1976; Szapocznik et al., 1978).

An example of how women of color "fall through the cracks" of work that addresses both gender and ethnicity is an article that analyzes employment patterns for Hispanics and women in New Mexico state government (J.Z.Garcia, Clark & Clark, 1978). In determining employment rates for Hispanics and women, although not explicitly indicated by the authors, Hispanic women presumably were counted in both social categories—as Hispanics and as women. But their particular case as a distinct social group was not acknowledged nor analyzed in its own right.

In sum, the political experiences of Chicana and Latina women constitute a neglected area of study. To the extent that scholarship exists on these women and their politics, it is an interdisciplinary endeavor. Very little of the literature is written by political scientists. Most authors are social scientists from other disciplines or are journalists, freelance writers, or political activists. An overwhelming number of the authors are also women—and are themselves Chicanas or Latinas.

Chicano Studies Literature

The body of literature that can be described as Chicano studies literature has been developing into a coherent corpus for the past twenty-five years. This literature is highly diverse and interdisciplinary. It includes studies on Latinos and Chicanos and the interrelationships among these heterogeneous groups. Since the Chicano studies literature focuses specifically on Chicanos as an ethnic/racial group, a reasonable expectation is that it would include some focus on women. It has, however, been characterized by an inability to integrate gender issues into the discussion. The most popular and often used book in Chicano Studies, *Occupied America* (Acuña, 1988), devotes three pages to Chicanas, specifically to Chicana feminism. Acuña deals with Chicana political actors as if they were all born in the 1970s and as if their issues were nonexistent or of no consequence until they themselves began to describe their concerns.

Women as a primary topic fare very poorly in books on Latino politics. Only 7 of the 217 books cited in *Latinos and Politics* focus on Latinas. Six address the particular case of Chicanas; one is on Puerto Rican women. None are written or edited by a political scientist. Since the publication of *Latinos and Politics*, we found only two additional entries (MacManus, Bullock & Grothe, 1986; Welch & Sigelman, 1992, cited above) to add to the list of journal articles on gender and Latino politics. In addition, although a number of new books on Latino or Chicano politics have since been published (Barrera, 1988; I.Garcia, 1989; Gomez-Quiñones, 1990; Muñoz, Jr., 1989; Villarreal & Hernandez, 1991), none focus on women or gender issues in a significant way. Most mention women by subsuming them under issues of the family, interracial marriage, or concerns over divisiveness.

In a recent review of research on the politics of the Chicano community, John A. Garcia characterized Chicano political involvement as highly complex and reflecting a diverse population base, having a lengthy and varied history, evidencing a high degree of organizational development directed at structural change and/or participation, and still very much in flux (John A. Garcia, 1989). In this discussion, there is no mention of women's involvement in political developments, no mention of any concern for gender issues, and no focus on public policy relating to Chicanas/Latinas. Similarly, the Chicano studies literature cited in that article is singularly lacking in references to the female counterpart of Chicanos as political actors. The reality of Chicano studies literature is that general theoretical and/or political studies have omitted any reference to women and their issues.

Three of the most recent and significant works specifically on Chicano politics focus on the Chicano movement and on the politics that have emerged from that movement. These three works, *Beyond Aztlan* (Barrera, 1988), *Chicano Politics* (Gomez-Quiñones, 1990), and *Youth, Identity and Power* (Muñoz, 1989), form a body of thought that attempts to define, analyze, and explain Chicano politics in general and the Chicano movement of the 1960s-1970s in particular, placing it in the context of overall Chicano political involvement. These works have several aspects in common. They interpret the Chicano movement as a nationalist, ethnic/racially-based political movement; all three books utilize a paradigm that is derived from nationalist, ethnic, or racial identity; they occasionally include or involve the interaction of class, or materially based experiences. Finally, they ignore or manhandle issues of gender. Barrera and Gomez-Quiñones completely ignore any issues, contributions, or experiences of women, and they fail to integrate gender analysis into their analytic paradigms. Muñoz acknowledges the problems of exclusion and second-class roles faced by women both in organizational and theoretical terms, but he also relegates them to a divisive (traitoress?) role within the Chicano student movement based upon the women's efforts to place issues of sexism on the political agenda. Chicano studies literature, developed out of the Chicano movement, is thus inherently male-identified and male-centered, either ignoring women and gender issues, subsuming them under the "more important" generic issues, or dismissing women either as divisive or treacherous for attempting to address the very issues that define, constrain, and determine their lives. In the following paragraphs we present some reasons for this scholarly neglect, and argue that just as the

literature is male-centered, so too is the analysis and the practice of Chicano politics.

Reasons for the Scholarly Neglect of Chicanas

There are several reasons for the absence of a scholarly focus on Chicana women. Theoretical and methodological biases in political science approaches to the study of politics serve as partial explanations. Feminist scholars have critiqued a number of disciplinary biases that account for the lack of attention given to women and gender issues in the study of politics (Bonder, 1983; Bookman & Morgen, 1988; Bourque & Grossholtz, 1974; Tronto, 1991). Among the critiques are that male authors tend to restrict their attention to male political actors; male patterns of behavior are generalized as universal patterns of political behavior; and data is oftentimes not broken down by gender. These arguments hold for much of the literature in Chicano politics.

Most important and pertinent to the study of Chicanas, however, is the feminist critique regarding the definition of politics and the narrow construction of analytical categories to explain political phenomena. Defining politics primarily as "decision-making regarding public affairs" relegates what is political to "practices with a clearly defined institutional scope" (Bonder, 1983: 569). Since men predominate in public life and decision making in institutional arenas, men are by definition political and women are not.

Women's activities—in the home, within the family, in personal, social, and work networks—tend to be left out of political analysis. As Bonder states, a narrow definition of politics means that "a whole set of social practices...are therefore labelled private and hence nonpolitical" (Bonder, 1983:570). Because Chicana women are not likely to be found in institutional arenas of power and decision making, they are dismissed as unimportant, passive, or apolitical, characterizations that indeed predominate in the early social science literature on Mexican Americans.

Another deeply imbedded bias in political science is the attention given to electoral activities in the study of politics. Sociologist Mary Pardo states that when social scientists define activism, they do so in terms of electoral politics—"a very narrow definition"(Pardo, 1990:1). Again, this criticism has a special bearing on Chicanas and their neglect in the literature. Research has shown Mexican Americans to exhibit relatively low levels of participation in electoral politics when compared to whites and blacks (J.A. Garcia, 1989). Consequently, the scholarly focus on electoral participation has necessarily diminished the significance of Mexican-American political life. At the same time, other types of activism that engage "ordinary people"—and especially working class Chicanas—such as community-based organizations, labor union activity, and grass-roots mobilizations, are entirely overlooked.

In their article on "Chicanas in Politics," Chapa and Gutierrez (1977) extol the classic definition of politics by Harold Lasswell: "Who gets what, when, and how" (or perhaps who doesn't get what) because it is broad, inclusive, and provides for the study of both the results and process of politics. For Chapa and Gutierrez "politics is all-encompassing." Thus, a definition of politics must allow for the recognition that "activities that may seem to be

overtly personal may in fact have important political overtones" (Chapa & Gutierrez, 1977:138).

Scholars of Chicana politics also point to a theoretical bias in feminist scholarship that marginalizes or ignores the experiences of women of color. As Pardo observes, "most feminist research uses an expanded definition [of politics] that moves across the boundaries between public, electoral politics and private, family politics; but feminist research generally focuses on women mobilized around gender-specific issues" (Pardo, 1990:1). Empirical evidence suggests that Chicana women orient much of their activism around the needs of their family, their work situations, and their cultural group (Baca Zinn, 1975; Coyle, Hershatter & Honig, 1980; Ruiz, 1987; Zavella, 1988). Because much of Chicana activism is not gender-specific, their activities tend not to be included in analyses of women's activism.

Finally, the underrepresentation of Chicana scholars in the discipline of political science (Avalos, 1991; Sierra, 1991) also contributes to the lack of scholarly attention to the Chicana experience. Given that most scholarship on Chicanas is written by Chicanas, an increase in the number of Chicana political scientists is likely to spur more studies in this area. As one bibliographer of Chicano studies literature states, "with the emergence of more and more Chicana scholars...Chicana Studies...will emerge as a discipline in its own right" (Castillo-Speed, 1990:66).

Themes in the Literature on Chicanas

Despite the relative paucity of scholarship on Chicanas and their politics, an important literature does exist. But as the bibliography by F.C.Garcia et al.(1991) indicates, this literature appears in a number of disparate places: primarily in interdisciplinary social science journals, in women studies journals, and in Chicano/Latino studies publications. In addition to the work cited by Garcia et al., we also identify chapters in anthologies that have particular relevance to the literature in Chicana politics. Finally, we make reference to articles in Chicano periodicals, magazines, and newsletters, much of which appears as reflective essays and journalistic accounts of Chicana activism. Although this writing does not involve empirical studies in a strict sense, it is through this kind of literature that Chicanas found "their voice," as feminist scholars say, especially during the decade of Chicano movement activism in the 1970s. Consequently, we include this literature in our review because of its special value in assessing and documenting the Chicana experience from Chicana perspectives.

The following discussion summarizes major themes in the literature on Chicanas. The literature is divided into two parts: (1) quantitative studies of Mexican-American political behavior; and (2) a more qualitative and interdisciplinary literature that focuses on Chicana experiences and gender issues as primary topics. We refer to this second body of work as Chicana studies literature.

Political Attitudes and Electoral Behavior

Given political scientists' preoccupation with electoral politics, it is rather ironic that empirical studies of Chicana political attitudes and electoral

behavior are virtually nonexistent. Studies of Mexican-American political behavior have generally ignored gender, while a few have included gender as one of several determinants in their analyses. For the most part, this scholarship has found few significant gender differences among Mexican Americans. Thus, the political orientations and electoral behavior of Chicana women have not commanded much attention.

In general, Chicanas share many political characteristics with their male counterparts. But there are some exceptions. In a study of Mexican Americans in East Los Angeles, California, and San Antonio, Texas, Brischetto and de la Garza (1983) found no significant gender differences on five measures of electoral participation, including voter registration, turnout, and working in a political campaign. However, when they controlled for marital status, married men were more likely to register and vote than married women. The opposite was true for unmarried women and men. On political attitudes, men showed more interest in politics than women, but no gender differences appeared on measures of political alienation. Finally, although a majority of both men and women were supportive of the Democratic party, women were more partisan than men.

In another citywide study (1985), the same authors found Mexican-American males were more likely to vote than females. Overall, however, the authors found more significant differences between ethnic groups than within them. For example, a majority of Anglo men and women voted for Ronald Reagan for president in 1980 while only a small minority of Mexican-American men and women did the same.

Using a multistate survey of Chicanos, John A. Garcia and Arce (1988) found only "modest" gender differences in organizational membership, voting, and participatory attitudes toward politics. National exit poll data in the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential elections showed Latina women to be more liberal and pro-Democratic than Latino men, but the differences were fairly small and somewhat inconsistent. Gender differences among Hispanics, Anglos, and Blacks appeared to be about the same (Welch & Sigelman, 1992).

A few studies have uncovered more significant gender differences. MacManus, Bullock, and Grothe (1986) found Mexican-American women's voter registration and turnout rates to have increased dramatically over a ten-year period—to the extent that their participation levels surpassed those of Mexican-American males. Howell-Martinez (1982) suggests that Mexican-American children engage in gender role stereotyping of men and women in politics. Her experimental study also found important differences between boys and girls in their political socialization experiences.

Further research will no doubt uncover additional dimensions to gender politics among Mexican Americans. Commenting on the lack of significant gender differences in their findings, Garcia and Arce conclude:

> [T]hese differences do not seem to require that we distinguish the Chicano community by gender in terms of voting behavior. However, this does not preclude the possibility that on particular issues or for subgroups of Chicanas (e.g. marital status groupings), gender may be an important variable (Garcia & Arce, 1988:145).

We would argue further that standard concepts and measures of political variables employed in quantitative studies must be evaluated for their usefulness in uncovering multiple dimensions of women's attitudes and behavior in politics. We suggest that theoretical assumptions and quantitative methodologies be challenged and questioned, and quantitative studies be complemented with qualitative research strategies to uncover gender politics that may remain hidden from survey research.

Chicana Studies: A Focus on Politics

The 1970s marked the development of a Chicana studies literature—a literature that emanated from Chicana involvement with both the Chicano movement and women's movement of the time (A.Garcia, 1989). Much of the early writings were theoretical and reflective essays by Chicana scholars, students, political activists, and professionals that defined the parameters of Chicana politics. Over time, the literature has incorporated more scholarly and empirical studies of Chicana women and gender issues. Within that literature there has been a steadily increasing number of works in which Chicanas/Latinas are not only the object of study, but also the critical observer and researcher (Castillo-Speed, 1990).

Several useful bibliographies on Chicanas have been published in the 1980s, in particular one by Castillo-Speed (1990 and 1993 update) based upon Catherine Loeb's 1980 survey published in *Frontiers*. The Castillo-Speed bibliography contains 662 entries specifically on Chicanas, Latinas, Hispanic women, Mexican women, or Mexican-American women dating back to the early 1970s . Despite a strong upsurge of writings on gender-related issues in the 1980s, the paucity of works on Chicanas as political actors is evident. Of the 662 entries, only 15, a miserly 2.2 percent, relate in any way to political activities, political actors, or political agendas of any type. Of these 15 works, 7 are interviews of political figures or opinion pieces on issues appearing in popular magazines (*Nuestro, Hispanic Times, La Luz, Hispanic Business, Vista, Hispanic, Somos*).

During the 1970s and 1980s, Chicana Studies literature generally sought to accomplish the following: (1) critique social science generalizations regarding Chicanas and the Chicano community, (2) present a historical record of Chicana/Mexicana activism, (3) explore the dimensions of Chicanas' political and social identity, (4) assess Chicanas' relationship to the Chicano movement, and (5) critique Chicanas' relationship to the U.S. women's movement.

Two central concerns shaped the critiques of social science literature regarding Chicanas. First, social science characterizations of Mexican-American women as submissive, passive, and apolitical were challenged as stereotypical, simplistic, and inaccurate generalizations (Andrade, 1980, 1982; Baca Zinn, 1982). Second, theories of cultural determinism were judged deficient in explaining Chicanas' subordinate position in U.S. society. In their place, structural analyses of women's social location in pre-Columbian, Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. society on the basis of race, gender, and class assumed major theoretical importance (Apodaca, 1977; Aragon de Valdez, 1980; Baca Zinn, 1982; Cordova *et al.*, 1986; Sanchez & Cruz, 1977; Sosa Riddell, 1974). Characterizations of Chicana women as "twice a minority"

(Melville,1980) or subjected to "triple oppression" found their way into much of the literature (Aragon de Valdez, 1980; Segura, 1986).

A plethora of writing challenged the portrayal of Mexican-American women as apolitical and passive. Clearly demonstrated was a rich history of women's involvement, in Mexico and the United States, in a number of social struggles including revolutionary movements, labor union organizing, civil rights and community-based organizations (see, for example, Mirande & Enriquez, 1979; Mora & Del Castillo, 1980; Ruiz, 1987).

Speeches, essays, and scholarship depicted Mexican-American women in contemporary politics as well (see, for example, Sierra, 1984). Highlighted was their involvement in the Chicano movement, especially in third-party politics through the La Raza Unida party, and in feminist activities, such as Chicana conferences and organizations (Anguiano, 1976; Chapa & Gutierrez, 1977; *La Chicana*, 1981; Saavedra-Vela, 1977a).

Chicanas' social and political identity became a central focus of this literature. Scholarship posited that Chicanas' distinctiveness as a social group—as women and as women of color—could be seen in their political activities, at once rooted in their experiences as Mexican Americans and as Mexican-American women (Baca Zinn, 1975). Chicanas were in the process of redefining themselves and their political agenda, on their own terms, apart from their male counterparts and other women (Aragon de Valdez, 1980:11; Nieto, 1974:42). Baca Zinn called for theoretical approaches to the Chicana experience that recognized "multiple sources of identity" and would examine the "interactive nature" of both gender and ethnicity (Baca Zinn, 1980:21,23).

Finally, the literature assessed Chicanas' participation in and relationship to both the Chicano and U.S. women's movements. Sexism within the Chicano movement was addressed and Chicanas' estrangement from the middle-class politics of white women in the larger women's movement was noted (Cotera, 1977, 1980; Del Castillo, 1980; Gonzales, 1980; Hernandez, 1980; Lopez, 1977; Mirande & Enriquez, 1979: chap. 7; Nieto, 1974; Sosa Riddell, 1974). The case was made that Chicanas and Mexicanas had their own history and tradition of feminism that informed their activism in both movements.

It is interesting to note that while Chicana studies literature identified an active, politically conscious, and feminist sector of Mexican-American women, survey research on ethnic identity and militancy among Mexican Americans offered a different profile of Mexican-American women. According to a handful of studies in the 1970s, Mexican-American women's self-identity revolved around their family role as mother; they were more inclined to eschew ethnic self-labels than their male counterparts; and were less inclined to engage in militant activism in comparison to men (Gecas, 1973; Miller, 1976; Frisbie, 1973).

Many of the essential themes of the Chicana politics literature of the 1970s and 1980s continue in more recent scholarship (Bonilla-Santiago, 1991; Carranza, 1988; Williams, 1988). In addition, the new scholarship on Chicana and Latina women reflects their increasing presence in electoral politics (Cerrudo, 1988a, 1988b; Guerrero, 1988–89) and presents new paradigms for understanding women's activism in grass-roots community and labor organizing (Hardy-Fanta, 1991; Pardo, 1990; Rose, 1990; Zavella, 1988).

Importantly, qualitative research strategies are uncovering gender differences in how Latino and Chicano men and women view politics and act politically (Hardy-Fanta, 1991; Rose, 1990); how women transform traditional social roles into political resources (Pardo, 1990); and the importance of women's social networks in the process of political organization (O'Connor, 1990; Pardo, 1990). A major theme emerging in the new literature on Latinas and Chicanas is that men tend to define politics in terms of positions and status, while women tend to emphasize "grassroots, personal politics—a politics tied to individual, family, friendship networks, and community relationships" (Hardy-Fanta, 1991:32).

Chicanas as Political Actors

> The arrival of Hispanic women in politics was signaled earlier this year by the election of Gloria Molina to the powerful Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. But Molina's election is a stark reminder to Latinos that more important than gender in determining the outcome of a race is their ethnicity. *(May 1991 Report of the Southwest Voter Research Institute).*

On 19 February 1991, Gloria Molina won a seat on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. In doing so, she became the first woman and the first Hispanic ever voted onto the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors in its 116-year history. More important, she won that seat under extraordinary circumstances and against difficult odds. First, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the U.S. Department of Justice, filed a lawsuit against the five-member Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. The suit alleged that the board was in violation of the Voting Rights Act because it intentionally excluded Chicanos/Latinos from electing a community representative to the board by the manner in which the five districts were apportioned in 1981.[2] The lawsuit was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, MALDEF and the ACLU, and thus a new seat was created on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, a seat that could be won by a Hispanic. Molina left her seat on the Los Angeles City Council and ran for the new seat. She won a difficult battle against California State Senator Art Torres, a well-financed, seasoned, well-supported, and popular Chicano politician. Most important, Molina won with the clear support of Chicanas/Latinas,[3] who constitute more than 50 percent of the Chicano/Latino population, and with an agenda developed from her twenty years of experience working with Chicana/Latina issues.

Despite these conditions, the Southwest Voter Research Institute (SVRI) in its report, denied the importance of gender issues to Gloria Molina in her political development and electoral victories. In its brief statement, SVRI exemplifies the problems that Chicanas as political actors have encountered in the literature as well as in the political arena. Moreover, SVRI considers only participation in electoral politics of the United States as political activity for Chicanas. Yet this focus on electoral politics is not the reality for Chicano politics in general and especially not for Chicanas (Navarro, 1974; Garcia & de la Garza, 1977). Since the Southwest became part of the United States at the end of the U.S.-Mexican War, Chicanos and Chicanas have participated

in a wide gamut of political activities. These activities we define as Chicano politics. The literature describes at least six distinct types of activities: (1) rebellion, armed insurrection, and social banditry; (2) ballot box politics; (3) accommodationist organizations; (4) labor union organizing; (5) community organizing; and (6) legal protest (Acuña, 1988; Barrera, 1988; Muñoz, 1989; Gomez-Quiñones, 1990; Navarro, 1974).

The literature also verifies that although one type of activity or another may predominate during certain time periods, at any given time period more than one of these types of political activities may be operating. For example, there were outright rebellions, as in the New Mexico land rights struggles throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, armed insurrection as exemplified by the 1860s Cortina wars along the U.S.-Mexican border, and what has been described as the social banditry of Joaquin Murrieta and Tiburcio Vasquez in California in the 1850s. Secondly, beginning with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, Chicanos were involved in ballot box politics including being delegates to the constitutional conventions of various Southwestern states, winning elected office in the years immediately after 1848, and cooperating with the new governments of the various states.

In the 1920s, avowedly nonpolitical organizations began to emerge. These organizations described themselves as nonpolitical in their charters and usually required their members to be U.S. citizens and to speak English. Navarro describes these as *accommodationist* organizations because they accepted the American political system as it was, and did not attempt to change nor challenge its fundamental structure and nature. The most well-known and long-lived of this type of organization is the League of United Latin American Citizens, LULAC, which continues to be a strong Chicano advocacy organization albeit within a reformist framework. Chicano participation in labor union organizing spans the early years of American labor organizing to the present day and includes participation in a wide range of labor organizations from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) to the United Farm Workers. Community organizing has always been an important aspect of Chicano politics, and many current state and national organizations developed out of community organizations. Finally, although legal protest can be identified as a political type, it can also be described as a tactic or strategy that is often employed by many different groups and different organizational types.

These six types of activities are interrelated because they do occur simultaneously and some organizations may actually utilize several of these activities at once. The Chicano movement of the 1960s and 1970s is one time period that incorporated all six types of political activities. Overall, the six activity types are better understood when grouped into three trends of political activity: (1) activities directed toward "self-determination" or aimed at achieving cultural, political, or economic autonomy from the existing political structure; (2) reformist activities and organizations; and (3) activities and/or organizations that exhibit a mixture of "self-determination" and reformism. Self-determination activities and organizations are evident across time in the rebellions, insurrections, and social banditry of the nineteenth century, the Plan de San Diego and other Chicano involvement in Mexican revolutionary activities of the early 1900s, some aspects of the Chicano

movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and some radical organizations of the past twenty years (Barrera, 1988; Muñoz, 1989). These types of activities share an impetus toward separation from the United States, cultural or national autonomy, or some other form of radical change in the relationship between the Chicano and/or Mexicano population and the United States government. The reformist trend is characterized by statements, actions, and organizations that disavow politics or state a clear nonpolitical purpose such as the actions of social service or educational organizations developed in the 1920s and 1930s. The fact that these organizations continue to function with a high degree of community support and that new, avowedly nonpolitical Chicano advocacy organizations have been created throughout the past twenty years attests to the persistence of this trend in Chicano political activity. These groups and organizations, however, may weave in and out of a clearly reformist stance. Thus there is a need to recognize the trend toward "mixed" activities and organizations.

The politics of the "ballot box" as a strategy have been exceptionally pervasive and attractive to the Chicano community and are utilized by organizations and individuals in all three trends. This strategy weaves its way in and out of all other types of activities and organizations. Chicanas have often been either excluded from leadership positions in these activities or, when they were leaders, their contributions and importance ignored. Chicanas, therefore, have concentrated a great deal of their political activities at the community level, in labor union organizing, and in legal protest, as opposed to becoming involved in ballot box politics.

The SVRI's focus on ethnicity, while quite understandable and legitimate, denies and negates the importance of gender and the intricate interrelationship between gender and ethnicity in the political arena. SVRI's statement assumes that gender and ethnicity function independently of one another, completely ignoring the experiential realities for women of color. The discrimination and oppression that Chicanas experience cannot be completely attributed either to gender or ethnicity, nor to both of these added in a simple "one plus one equals two" game. Rather, Chicana feminist scholars describe an interrelationship among class, race, and gender that explains their experience and is extremely difficult to quantify (Pesquera & Segura, 1993; Zavella, 1987). The harsh reality for Chicanas as political actors is that their participation, when it does not result in election to office in the United States political system, is ignored, denied, or subsumed under someone else's political agenda. When they practice coalition politics or attempt to work within the parameters of other political activities, they are taken for granted or relegated to supportive positions rather than leadership positions. Worst, when their political activities are based upon their self-actualization as women focusing on women's issues, they are dismissed as a special interest group, or as lacking general appeal, or they are accused of divisiveness.

A brief review of the past twenty years of Chicana political activism demonstrates a complexity not discussed, explained, or even glimpsed in the literature (an extensive review of Chicana political activism requires more time and space than available here). There are five main points that need to be understood about the experiences of Chicanas as political actors. First, similar to the experience in Chicano politics, Chicana political involvement can be grouped into the same three trends: a trend toward self-determination

or self-actualization activities and organizations, a strand of reformist activity, and a tendency to mix both self-determination and reformism. Second, Chicanas have had to deal with the politics of the women's movement, as varied and complex a scenario as that represents. Third, Chicanas must deal with the politics of the Chicano community and the Chicano movement,[4] as defined by their male counterparts. Fourth, when Chicanas have joined established organizations or activities they often find themselves having to challenge them in order to introduce or force a recognition of Chicana issues and needs. And finally, Chicanas have developed their own organizations, a sense of their own concerns, needs, and issues.

We are suggesting a theoretical framework that begins to appreciate and incorporate the multiple dimensions of Chicanas as political actors. Here we organize the three trends and the organizational movements that include, practice, or developed from these trends into a three-by-three table. The three rows are divided into the three activity trends (self-determination/self--actualization, a mixture of both self-determination and reformism, and reformist politics); the three columns divide the trends by organizational movement (women's movement, Chicano politics/movement, Chicana politics/movement). When Chicanas are subsumed within the women's movement and the Chicano movement or Chicano politics, they have often been forced to challenge the status quo even when their actions are more reformist than directed at self-determination, as reflected in columns I and II. Some of the most important organizations that Chicanas have tended to join and in which they have made major contributions are listed in the table under their initials, such as NOW, the National Organization for Women, the La Raza Unida party, and MAPA, the Mexican American Political Association. The following table (table 1) illustrates these complexities and interrelationships.

As demonstrated in the Table 1, Chicana political activity has an enormous complexity that is barely hinted at in this chapter. Many Chicana organizations have been formed that cannot be neatly categorized as in the table. Organizations avowedly nonpolitical, by definition "accommodationist," have been springboards for politicization, acquisition of leadership skills, and motivation for additional political achievements. The negative and positive experiences of Chicanas participating in the Chicano movement and in the women's movement led many of them to form separate organizations focused on Chicana, Latina, or Hispanic women's issues. In the arena of electoral politics there have been a few Chicanas holding statewide and/or local political elected and appointed offices.

More recently, beginning in the mid-1980s, Chicanas have discovered a greater need for, and interest in, self-actualization and articulation, and this realization has become visible in the sharp increase in the numbers of Chicanas and Latinas who have sought and gained political office at the local, state, and national level. The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) roster for 1987 cited no Hispanic women elected at the federal level, 15 at the state level for all fifty states, 85 at the county level, 180 at the municipal level, 51 in judicial seats, and 261 in school boards nationwide, for a total of 592 Chicana/Latina elected officials. NALEO's 1989 roster cited 1 Hispanic woman elected at the federal level, 17 at the state level for all fifty states, 104 at the county level, 211 at the municipal

level, 59 in judicial seats, and 327 in school boards nationwide for a total of 744 Chicanas/Latinas in elected office nationwide.

Table 1
Chicanas as Political Actors

Activity Type Activity Trends	Women's Movement (I)	Chicano Politics/ Movement (II)	Chicana Movement (III)
Self-determination	a) Integral part of women's *feminist* organizations b) Chicana or women of color caucuses within those same organizations	Integral part of community/Movement type organizations as determined by males b) Caucuses/ women's auxiliaries within those organizations	Chicana feminist activities or organizations are those that focus on or help articulate Chicana concerns, needs, or issues
Mixed self-determination & Reformism	a) Chicana or women of color caucuses within United States' 2-Party system b) Chicana or women of color caucuses within other major political organizations such as NOW and League of Women Voters	a) Integral part of Raza Unida Party Rainbow Coalitiion or MAPA b) Chicana caucuses or auxiliaries within those organizations	a) Integral part of U.S. 2-party system specifically as representatives of Chicanas b) National Hispanic Leadership Institute c) Separate Chicana, Latina (or other) activities and organizations such as Latina Political Action Committee 1990 d) Mexican American Women's National Association (MANA)
Reformist Politics	a) Integral part of social, educational, or avowedly non-political women's groups b) Integral part of United States 2-party system as women	a) Integral part of Chicano organizations avowedly social, educational, or non-political b) Chicana caucuses or auxiliaries within these organizations	Integral part of avowedly social, educational, or non-political Chicana groups that seek to help Chicanas accommodate to status quo: Comision Femenil; National Hispanic Women's Network

Gloria Molina's victory in California was only one of many such victories throughout the United States, but certainly a most significant victory. In California, Colorado, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico several Chicanas, Latinas, or Hispanic women have held elected statewide and local offices throughout the past two decades. Now we can add to these states Illinois, Florida, and New York where Chicanas, Cubanas, or Puerto Riquenas now hold statewide and local offices. A Cuban American woman, Ileana Ros-Leh-

tinen, became the first Latina to serve in the U.S. Congress when she was elected from Florida to the House of Representatives in 1989. Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican, first served in the Florida State House of Representatives (1982) and the Florida State Senate (1988). As a result of the November 1992 election, three Latinas are now in the U.S. Congress. Joining Ros-Lehtinen in the House are Nydia Velazquez (D-NY) and Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA). Velazquez is the first Puerto Rican woman and Roybal-Allard the first Chicana ever to serve in the U.S. Congress. Once again, the current experience of Chicanas and Latinas in ballot box politics exhibits a complex scenario, having different sources and directed at achieving different and divergent results and agendas.

Summary and Conclusions

This brief review of the literature and current state of Chicana political activity demonstrates a complexity even in the terminology and theory that is used to describe their political activism. Political science literature, women studies literature and Chicano studies literature have largely neglected or stereotyped Chicanas as political actors. Moreover, there are serious shortcomings in the development of paradigms and theories on Chicano politics because of their disregard for gender. Without the integration of gender into an already intricate interplay of class and race, our analysis of the Chicano/Latino experience in the United States will continue to have serious shortcomings and contribute instead to the oppression and patriarchal control of women.

In our own review of Chicana political involvement, we came to five important conclusions. First, we note a complex set of three general trends: self-determination, reformism, and a mixture of these two. Second, we note that these three trends occur within different organizational or political movement contexts. That is, Chicanas participate in the politics of the women's movement, participate in Chicano politics and the Chicano movement, and develop the Chicana movement and their own Chicana-based organizations. Third, within each of these organizational types, there are efforts to challenge the status quo, to challenge the main activities already in existence, or to simply obtain equal treatment. Fourth, Chicanas and Latinas have acted politically consistently over time, although their involvement in the Chicana movement contributed to a distinct change and/or increase in their level of participation. Finally, and most important, Chicanas and Latinas have struggled with their past, their present, and their future as they define their own feminism and as they act to put Chicana feminism into pratice. Future research on Chicanas promises to challenge prevalent assumptions regarding the nature and practice of politics. The study of Chicanas necessarily involves analyses of middle-class and working-class politics, of public and personal power relationships, and conventional as well as unconventional forms of political mobilization. Despite electoral studies that suggest otherwise, we consider gender to be a fundamental feature of American political life and, consequently, integral to the politics of Mexican Americans. The challenge is to uncover the multidimensional nature of gender and ethnic

politics through research that involves a wide array of theoretical and methodological approaches.

Notes

1. For this chapter the terms *Latino* and *Hispanic* are used interchangeably to refer to people currently residing in the United States whose origins are from Mexico, Central and South America, Spain, Portugal, and/or Caribbean countries.
2. *Hispanic*, 12 July 1991, p.3.
3. *Hispanic*, 15 July 1991.
4. The Chicano movement took place during the time period beginning about 1964 to 1974 when young Mexican Americans, Latinos, Mexicans, and others who identified with them joined into several organizations, initiated new activities, and displayed a militancy that brought them to the attention of the news media. It was during this time period that the term *Chicano* came into usage, that the United Farm Workers was organized, that La Raza Unida party was born, and that many other organizations were developed. The Chicano movement is highly complex and has been analyzed in various ways.

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Ralph Bunche Minus African-American Politics

Hanes Walton, Jr.

University of Michigan

Benjamin Rivlin, 1990; *Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers) xxxi + 279 pp. ISBN 0-8419-1145-2 (cloth).

The editor of this volume offers a tripartite conceptualization of the African-American political scientist and scholar Ralph Bunche. This volume is designed "to examine the unique significance of his career and to help convey that rich legacy to the new generation that has grown up since his death" on 9 December 1971 (p. xiv). Kenneth B. Clark, one of the contributors to the volume who was a student when he knew him, writes in the postscript to the volume that the objective of the book is "to help acquaint the generation that has grown up since his death with the significance of Bunche's career, its notable achievements, and enduring legacy" (p. 211). To obtain these basic, fundamental, and laudatory goals, the book offers the reader a view of Bunche as a *scholar activist.* In this section of the book, three essays acquaint us with how a very well trained academician used his skills and intellect in the real world to achieve a future that rested on social justice and a community of interracial peace. The initial essay, written by Rivlin, offers an overview of Bunche's career and his staggering achievements; and highlights Bunche's relationship with the civil rights movement. This is a good way to launch the volume.

John Kirby, a historian, provides in the next essay the historical backdrop for Bunche's life (1930–1970) and offers some keen insights into Bunche's social and political ideas during these years. He shows that many of Bunche's proposals and solutions to the race dilemma had a leftist orientation that stressed class over race. The political scientist Charles P. Henry, in the following essay demonstrates that these left-wing radical ideas of Bunche attracted the attention of the FBI on three separate occasions. There is a hint that some of these investigations may have hindered Bunche in becoming the

ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Kennedy administration. These investigations as Professor Henry reveals, did not halt Bunche's efforts to support the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Professor Henry concludes that civil rights for African Americans were essential for national security.

These three essays conclude the section on Bunche as a scholar activist. However, Part II with its five essays, the largest section in the volume, offers a perspective on Bunche as the Africanist and decolonizer.

The first essay, by historian Nathan Huggins, traces Bunche's rise as an Africanist. He looks very closely at his fieldwork in Africa and points out many of the disturbing things he found in the area of taxation, education and the judicial process. The essay also includes excerpts from notes that Bunche took during a research trip through southern and eastern Africa.

Following Huggins's insights, are those offered by political scientist Martin Kilson. This essay, quite unlike the others, offers a framework for the analysis of Bunche as an Africanist and a rousing evaluation of Bunche within this conceptual scheme. It is interesting but not always valid.

The next essays offers a view of Bunche from the standpoint of an African. This essay finds Bunche wanting; and less of a hero than some of the early essays had portrayed him. To Professor Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "the principle of 'trusteeship,' 'guardianship,' or 'wardship,' to which Bunche subscribed in fact represented an affirmation of the (imperialist's) civilizing mission," (p. xxix).

The next two and final essays in this section debate the impact of Bunche's role and influence as a decolonizer. Lawrence S. Finkelstein argues that Bunche's efforts did not really result in the liberation of Africa from the colonial powers. Herschelle Challenor argues that his efforts did, in a provocative and bold way. These essays are quite stimulating.

Part III describes Bunche as a world statesman. Here we see Bunche as a mediator in the 1947–1948 conflict in the Middle East and later Bunche's role as a force in creating the UN peacekeeping machinery. His actions in these areas made him a world figure, winner of the Nobel Prize, and a shaper and molder of international organizations, such as the UN.

J.C. Hurewitz's essay shows how Bunche came, by happenstance, to be the UN mediator and what he did with that role, literally shaping it as he went along.

Shabtai Rosenne, a participant in those negotiations, offers a critical perspective on Bunche's actions and suggests some weaknesses in his approach.

The next essay, by the man who succeeded Bunche at the UN, Brian Urquhart, provides a different view by focusing on Bunche's role in creating and sustaining the UN peace keeping forces during a period of several turbulent situations in Africa, the Middle East, India-Pakistan, and the Mediterranean. It is a very long and detailed essay that tries to fix the prominent role that Bunche played with this force.

Kenneth B. Clark's postscript centering on Bunche's concern and work for social justice ends the section and the volume by looking at Bunche from the standpoint of a student and, later, a colleague. The volume ends with an Appendix that carries one of Bunche's letters and five of his speeches. The Foreword to the book is written by former UN Ambassador Donald F. McHenry, who replaced Andrew Young.

This tripartite conceptualization of Ralph Bunche, while it offers much, is very rich in substance, debate, insights, and sheer information, but is in the

final analysis incomplete and too narrowly confining. There are methodological shortcomings as well.

Truly Bunche was all of these things claimed in the tripartite perspective: scholar- activist, Africanist, decolonizer, and world statesman, or at least he tried very hard to be. But he was more—and some would argue much, much more. *One major area of his contribution was completely left out of the volume. It is not clear why. Bunche was a pioneer and chief architect of African-American politics or Negro politics as it was called in his era.*

Along with William Nowlin, and Harold Gosnell, Bunche laid the groundwork and foundations for the careful and involved study of Negroes (Africans Americans now) in the American political process. Rivlin himself mentions Bunche's 1938–1939 study for the National Republican Committee focusing on why Negro voters were abandoning the party. Rivlin also mentions Bunche's work for the Myrdal study on Negro politics, but he does not conceptualize or formalize this in any way, he merely notes it in passing.

Kirby's essay talks of Negro politics, describes several political efforts, particularly Bunche's role in creating the National Negro Congress, and also mentions several of Bunche's writings on Negro politics. He fails, as did Rivlin, to structure this in any meaningful way. Henry's essay also notes the memorandum for Myrdal, as well as Bunche's role in the National Negro Congress but leaves it as that. In fact, once the reader gets beyond Part I, Bunche as scholar-activist, little mention is made of Bunche as forming an intellectual foundation and being a force in the empirical analysis of Negro politics (although the bibliography sections do list his political analyses as well as his articles on the subject,—some nine article on politics out of a total of twenty-eight equaling 32.1 percent or nearly one third of all of his publications). However, the volume was not developed to deal with this aspect of Bunche's life and career. Hence, Bunche's role as one of the chief architects of African-American politics, goes unexamined. This is, indeed, a shortcoming of this volume and must be pointed out.

Secondly, there is the problem of the use of the Bunche material in the Myrdal study. In the final analysis little is made of Bunche's analysis of Negro politics. This has to be made clear. The edited volume coming out of the Bunche memorandum is truly a travesty on the original.[1] Today, therefore, little is known about Bunche's research into African-American political life and almost no analysis has been made of this research as it relates to African-American politics. Exactly how this volume overlooked this critical perspective, is difficult to understand and comprehend. But there is more; Bunche's work on African-American politics led also to vivid insights into, if not to the formulation and the rise of, the field of Southern politics.[2] In point of fact, several of the concepts and theories about Southern politics were set forth early in Bunche's writings on African-American politics and would, in time, go on to stimulate the writing of the leading book on the subject by V. O. Key.[3] Key was the intellectual leader in establishing Southern politics as a special area of study in political science. Yet this volume somehow missed these insights and this special contribution of Bunche's life and career. It should not have. Since it did, it detracted from the stature and influence of Bunche in his profession. He was more than a world statesman; he was first and foremost a political science scholar.

Beyond these omissions, there are the methodological problems inherent in this tripartite conceptualization of Bunche. Essentially this work is a documentary analysis of Bunche's efforts. Occasionally, it included some participant observations, but it is fundamentally supposed to develop its conclusion and insights, if not to provide evidence from the documentary record. Yet few of the scholars attempt to do that and those that do, do not always give a comprehensive reading and clear-cut documentary support to their arguments.

For instance, those contributions to this volume that offer contrasting images and evaluations of Bunche and debate his impact and influence do so without offering conclusive proof and evidence for their position based on the documents generated by Bunche's career. There is something missing, and while this volume is interesting, the contrasting arguments amount to little more than a debate, arguments that make some good points, but prove little. The editor solved some of the problems by offering the two points of view in the same section. Another requirement should have been insisted upon; that is, a clear-cut analysis of the documentary record. What does the record support? This, we do not always get from the volume. The reader is left to decide, and with inconclusive source data and materials. This is the second major shortcoming of the volume.

Yet, when weighed together, it is the absence of Bunche's role as a mover and shaker in the evolution of Negro (African-American) politics that simply stands out like a sore thumb and proves to be the greatest weakness and failing of this otherwise quite useful and insightful volume. It is this failing that leaves the reader with an incomplete view of Ralph Bunche's contributions and continuing legacy as an individual scholar.

This is the Bunche that we do not see, hear, understand, and come to appreciate. It is a Bunche devoid of his major, if not his single, contribution. The missing Bunche is a Bunche of profound intellectual insights and creativity in the areas of African-American and Southern politics. These two subfields in the discipline of political science were greatly enriched and enhanced by the intellectual innovation, hard work and dedication of Bunche. These areas, Southern politics first and later Black politics, arose as a direct consequence of the efforts of Ralph Bunche. No analysis of Bunche as a force in his era (and the world) would be complete without some appreciation of the enormous role that he played as intellectual leader and mentor in these matters. Sadly, this book then is a work that abstracts Bunche from one of his greatest contributions, as founding father and chief architect of African-American politics and Southern politics. Thus, any future assessment of Bunche must go beyond this tripartite conceptualization.

Notes

1. Hanes Walton, Jr., Leslie Burl McLemore, and C. Vernon Gray, "The Pioneering Books on Black Politics and the Political Science Community, 1903–1965," *National Political Science Review* (1989): 197–218.
2. Ibid. The same point is elaborated in Hanes Walton, Jr. *Black Politics and Black Political Behavior: A Linkage Analysis,* (New York: Peter Lang, forthcoming, 1994).
3. V.O. Key, *Southern Politics,* (NY: Vintage Books, 1949), 458, n. 29; 570.

Book Reviews

Stephen L. Wasby, ed., *"He Shall Not Pass This Way Again" The Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991) xvii + 338 pp.; ISBN 08229–3644–5 (cloth); 0–8229–5435–4 (paper).

The life of William O. Douglas is among the most fascinating of any justice of the United States Supreme Court. Douglas served on the Court longer than any justice, over a third of a century. Apart from his judicial opinions, Douglas took well-publicized stands on a number of political and social issues and wrote over thirty books and numerous articles on constitutional law, wilderness, the environment, international relations, and history, as well as an autobiography.

In this volume, editor Stephen L. Wasby has collected contributions and responding commentaries from twenty-seven law professors, political scientists, and historians commenting on the many and varied aspects of Douglas's life. The book is organized into five parts, addressing (1) the evolution of Douglas's judicial philosophy and his relationships with other justices; (2) his civil rights and First Amendment judicial opinions and writings; (3) his criminal law and right of privacy judicial opinions and writings; (4) his contributions as an environmentalist; and (5) his views as an internationalist.

Each of the five parts contains a short introduction, no more than two contributions on a particular topic and one or two responses to the contributions. This format promotes discussion and debate of Douglas's life and views, and helps to engage the reader in the work. Despite the number of contributors and various themes treated in the book, Douglas's traits as an individualist and promoter of personal liberty emerge in detail. However, Douglas's role as a primary actor on the Warren Court is not developed. Even though this is a book about Douglas and not the Warren Court, a discussion of Douglas in the context of the significant changes in constitutional law wrought by the Warren Court would have been illuminating.

The contributions to the book's first part, discussing Douglas's life on the court, are both coherent and consistent, and the conclusions drawn are reasonable. For example, Douglas was almost legendary for the amount of work he produced in relatively short periods of time as well as for his lack of patience with others who did not work as fast. At the end of a term, it was not unusual for Douglas to simply announce that his work was done and leave for his home in Washington State, to the consternation of his colleagues, who still had opinions to hand down.

Robert Jerome Glennon suggests that in so doing, Douglas "lost the opportunity to react to opinions of other justices and to influence the disposition in these cases."

Part Two concerns Douglas's views on the First Amendment and civil rights. L.A. Powe, Jr. and Nadine Strossen provide helpful discussions of First Amendment issues. In the area of civil rights, Drew Days notes that although Douglas did not succeed in convincing his brethren to accept expansive views of post-Civil War constitutional amendments as applicable to conduct with limited state involvement, the majority of the court did accept the Douglas view of both the civil and criminal Reconstruction era civil rights statutes. For example, Douglas's dissenting opinion in the 1951 case of *United States v. Williams* took the position that the civil rights criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 241, covered not only conspiracies by private parties but state officials as well. This view was later adopted by the majority in *United States v. Price*, a case arising from the 1964 murders of civil rights workers Goodman, Chaney, and Schwerner in Mississippi.

In his introduction to Part Three, concerning criminal law and privacy, Samuel Walker states that these two areas are "appropriately paired" because they both have been subject to shifting doctrinal winds and arouse political passions. These common characteristics, however, do not overcome the lack of substantive overlap between the two areas. The common thread between the two (governmental intrusiveness) is not developed in the chapter as one that would link the two areas. Given this, as well as the importance of the two subjects, each area should have been treated in a separate chapter.

Two of the articles in Part Three address the "right of privacy" as formulated by Douglas and first explicitly accepted by a majority of the court in 1965 in *Griswold v. Connecticut*. Dorothy Glancy describes the evolution of Douglas's thought in this area, pointing out that his 1942 opinion in *Skinner v. Oklahoma*, striking down a statute providing for the sterilization of certain repeat offenders on equal protection grounds, failed to mention a "right of privacy" at all, but rather spoke of the "basic liberty" involved in marriage and procreation. Such "basic liberty" is included in what is now usually referred to as the "right of privacy." By 1952 Douglas wrote not only of liberty but of the "invasion of privacy against the command of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." By 1957, Douglas publicly spoke of "the right of privacy—sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit in the Constitution.... The penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects human rights which, though not explicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child of God."

Glancy recounts the individual "right of privacy" as the basis for both the *Griswold* and *Roe v. Wade* decisions and the criticism it has received from a number of scholars, both conservative and liberal. Indeed, Glancy states that "[s]ome feminists and others interested in Critical Legal Studies have considered the individual right of privacy to be at odds with more inclusive communitarian values." Glancy notes, however, that for Douglas the right of privacy was never absolute, but that it had "an important political function: to force the government to respect the individual's right to be let alone."

In response to Glancy's article, Elizabeth M. Schneider states that

Douglas's view of privacy included more than the right to be let alone but incorporated "an affirmative concept of liberty." Schneider states that this "affirmative vision" must be seen as having been developed "in the context of women's rights to reproductive control." While *Roe v. Wade* certainly concerned "rights to reproductive control," Schneider's proposition is an overstatement, ignoring the overwhelming importance of wiretapping, search and seizure, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, rights of association, and travel cases in the development of Douglas's views of liberty and privacy.

Part Four of the book examines the relationship between William Douglas the outdoorsman and environmentalist and William Douglas the justice deciding cases on Indian and environmental law. Ralph W. Johnson notes that Douglas suffered from polio as a child and took many hikes in the mountains to build his muscles after the attack. From these experiences Douglas developed a great love for wilderness and the outdoors, a view reflected in judicial votes almost always favoring persons or groups committed to preserving the environment. Probably the best-known statement by Douglas setting forth such a view is his dissent in *Sierra Club v. Morton*. Citing a law review article with the clever title "Should Trees Have Standing?" Douglas advocated "conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation" through those individuals and groups concerned with protecting the environment.

Douglas's thinking evolved in the area of Indian law. Although he initially believed that Indian tribes would and should eventually be assimilated into society at large, Douglas later became a strong advocate of tribal self-determination. But his support of tribal self-determination was limited by his concern for the environment. Thus, although Douglas almost always voted on the side of Indian tribes in cases that came before the court, he did not do so in fishing rights cases, where he believed the actions that the tribes proposed to take would be detrimental to the environment.

The fifth part of the book, "Douglas as Internationalist," is of interest not only to the reader interested in foreign affairs, but also to students of jurisprudence, for Douglas was singularly willing to involve the court in questions of foreign policy and military conduct. Michael J. Glennon notes that, early in his career, Douglas was deferential to presidential power. This changed, however, as over the years Douglas perceived an increasing abuse of executive power and consequent curtailment of personal liberty. Douglas was not afraid to address issues often avoided by the courts under the "political question" doctrine; his view was that if the courts did not restrain executive power and protect liberty, no one else would.

Despite its debate-style format, this book is limited by the editor's selection of contributors. Virtually all of the contributors are sympathetic to Douglas; none of them are comprehensively critical. For example, many of the contributors to this volume comment on the tendency of Justice Douglas to reach the result he desired in his judicial opinions without a zealous regard for consistency in underlying legal philosophy. Some contributors view this as a positive trait resulting from Douglas's adherence to the school of thought known as legal realism, a

precursor to the contemporary school of critical legal studies. As noted by Christopher D. Stone, Douglas will be more remembered "for the positions he took, for what he was, rather than for the persuasiveness of what he said" over a career "marked by flashes of moral judicial brilliance that illuminated the history we were living." Others in the volume view this tendency as a serious flaw in Douglas's judicial writings that weakened his ability to influence others on the court and affect subsequent decisions. However, even those contributors critical of this and other aspects of Douglas's life and writings are generally supportive of his legacy. Including at least one or two true critics of Douglas in this collection would have enlivened the book's debate format and provided the reader with a broader array of opinions.

Surprisingly, efforts throughout the years by various members of Congress to impeach Douglas are only briefly mentioned, and not analyzed at all by any of the contributors to this book. It is not clear whether this neglect is due to the friendly position toward Douglas taken by most of the contributors. Nevertheless, a discussion of the impeachment issue would have shed light on Douglas's fiercely independent personality as well as his extrajudicial writings.

Although space constraints obviously prohibited an in-depth analysis by any single contributor, the book as a whole presents an interesting introduction to the life and thought of Justice Douglas. Despite its lack of a sustained analysis of the contradictions and weaknesses of Douglas's thought, this volume makes an important contribution to the understanding of both William O. Douglas and the Court on which he sat for thirty-six years.

Paul C. Jacobson
University of Virginia

Molefi Kele Asante, *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1991) vii + 214pp; ISBN 0-86543-188-4 (cloth); 0-86543-189-2 (paper).

In his address commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), Mack Jones, the organization's first president, recalled that the founding members committed themselves to developing a new, different political science, a black political science with a distinctive perspective rooted in the particularity of black people (see *National Political Science Review*, 2: 3–12). NCOBPS was organized at the same time that programs in black studies were being established at hundreds of colleges and universities in the United States. These programs were also founded on the principle that they would develop an "Afrocentric" perspective in the study of the human experience as an alternative to the Eurocentric parochialism of the traditional disciplines. The black studies movement of the 1960s generated a sometimes rancorous but intellectually exciting debate on the nature and purposes of scholarship and its relationship to the environments—class, ethnic, and political—in which it is developed.

The fundamental epistemological problem remains—how to construct an Afrocentric perspective in the study of human phenomena in general or the African American ex-

perience in particular. These epistemological logical concerns are linked to the growing and increasingly testy debate in higher education about political correctness, multiculturalism, Eurocentrism, universalism, and ethnic studies. There is also relevance to the current debate about reform in inner city schools. In several school districts around the country experiments are underway or have been proposed in which black students who attend racially separate schools will be taught on the basis of a distinctive Afrocentric curriculum. Proponents argue that these schools will increase self esteem among the students, with the consequence that their educational attainment and personal and collective well-being will be enhanced. Thus, the renewal of interests in an Afrocentric perspective has implications not only for academic research and pedagogy but for educational reform in the nation's largely black urban school systems.

Molefi Kete Asante, perhaps more than any other scholar of the last twenty years, has devoted his career to the development and articulation of a distinctive Afrocentric perspective in the study of the African-American experience. *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* is his most comprehensive statement of the theoretical and methodological foundations of this perspective as it relates to the discipline of African-American studies. Asante, the long time editor of the *Journal of Black Studies* and current chair of the Department of African American Studies at Temple University, received his graduate training in the communication arts but now considers himself an "Africalogist," a specialist in the Afrocentric study of African phenomena. A point of departure for Asante in *Kemet* is that black studies is not just an interdisciplinary collection of courses on the African American experience but rather it is an emergent discipline with its own distinctive epistemology and theoretical and methodological orientations. Given this premise ,he writes "I have consistently argued that African American Studies or the African studies scholar whom I shall call "Africalogist" must begin analysis from the primacy of the classical African civilizations, namely Kemet (Egypt). . . . This simply means that adequate understanding of African phenomena cannot occur without a reference point in the classic and most documented African culture" (p. 14). From this reference point, Asante attempts to lay out the basic concepts and methods for study of the African-American experience. This is the major difficulty with the book. However, before dealing with these problems it should be said that in *Kemet* and in previous works Asante has sought to document the propositions that ancient Egypt is the fundamental source of classical Greek civilization and therefore of Western culture, and that the ancient Egyptians were not only African but black. Traditionalist anthropologists and historians, including many African Americans, dispute these claims (see Mercer, 1991). However, for purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to note the controversy and to observe that if these claims are not sustainable then the epistemological foundations of Africalogy are substantially undermined. This is because to Asante the classical history of a people is indispensable to development of the concepts and methods that structure research on their experiences. As he puts it, the "primacy of Kemet must be

central to all research on the black experience" (p. 57).

Given this primacy, Asante derives several Kemetic concepts and methods that he argues should guide research and analysis on the black experience, from literary movements to "African political power in urban centers" (p. 110). However, these concepts are so vague and ambiguous as to be near useless for purposes of scientific inquiry. To take one example, "Ma'at" is offered as a Kemetically derived conceptual and methodological tool for research on the black experience. What does it mean? Asante writes that it is "synthesis as opposed to analysis" and includes four elementary considerations that establish it as a method of inquiry: (1) The unity of Occasion/Situation, (2) The Elimination of Chaos, (3) The Elevation of Peace among Disparate Voices and (4) The Creation of Harmony and Balance (p. 98). These four "columns of analysis" constitute not a "world view" but a "world voice" upon which the African American experience must be examined. How is this examination to proceed? By what is called the "Soul of Method." What is the soul of method? Asante writes (pp. 108–10):

> There is nothing mysterious. . . . Soul, as a concrete motive force, activates research by engaging the researcher in an effort to explain human functioning by relating it to concrete human conditions and cultural factors. . . . Soul represents a specific intervention in the methodological process. . . . [It] breaks the structural, lineal, monotony by investing research with soul, the rhythm of assessing and synthesizing in order to create understanding and meaning.

Throughout *Kemet* when Asante attempts to give conceptual and operational content to Africalogy he resorts to abstractions of this sort. Whatever one's view of the Kemet controversy in terms of its historical accuracy or as a philosophical stance, as a conceptual and methodological framework for scientific inquiry it is near useless. The concepts are so vague, so fuzzy, so imprecise that there is no way in which they may be rendered operational for purposes of empirical study.

In the preface to *Kemet* Asante writes "I hope I have not complicated matters for my readers" (p. vii). For this reader, unfortunately, he has, not only in his fuzzy discussion of concepts and methods but also in his confusing and interchangeable use of the terms *Afrocentric, Afrocentricity, and Africalogy*. The latter two may be properly understood to mean an attempt to apply the classical principles of Kemet to research on African phenomena, while an Afrocentric perspective may be simply an effort to give centrality to the experiences of Africans in explanation of human phenomena, universally or particularly. For example an Afrocentric scholar may hold that in the United States race and racism is central—more so than class, more so than the Anglo Saxon ethos, more so than the liberal tradition—in explaining the historical development and present and future course of American politics. This narrower approach to the development of an Afrocentric perspective is likely to be more productive of historical and social science scholarship on the African experience in the Americas than abstractions about Ma'at and ruminations about the soul of method.

Such a perspective is also more likely to be useful in efforts to reform urban inner-city school curriculums because it is more directly linked to

the experiences of Africans in America and the prospects for social, economic, and political changes. Such changes require less an understanding of the role of ancient Egypt in the development of Western civilization and more an understanding of the role of racism, past and present, in the structuring of black life chances. This knowledge and the capacity to act on it is more likely to raise the self-esteem of young black people because it should result in changes in the social structure that give rise to the phenomenon. That is, low self-esteem is more a function of the material conditions of young black people than it is of their lack of knowledge of the glories of the ancient African past.

Robert C. Smith
San Francisco State University

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James W. Lamare, ed., *International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s* (New York: Praeger, 1991) viii + 192 pp.; ISBN 0–275–93304–0 (cloth).

The general theme that "when countries become politically entangled with each other, the drama that unfolds upon the international stage will have some effect upon the internal politics of at least one of the disputing parties" is hardly novel: the United States is already bracing for the possible consequences of the recent Gulf conflict on its 1992 general elections, while other nations' regimes or groups that featured in the conflict (Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Turkey, etc) continue to render their own accounts of their particular roles to their peoples; political historians are still piecing together the domestic political lessons of U.S. interventions in Korea and Vietnam; the Soviets are still squabbling internally over their role in lifting the "iron curtain" over Eastern Europe; and scholars of British politics continue to marvel at the consequences of World War II on partisan politics in Britain. What this symposium offers is a much needed (and timely) comparative tilt on the impact of international conflict on domestic politics, at a time when governments are increasingly looking toward international politics to boost their domestic standings. The book adopts as its theoretical underpinning the notion that groups coalesce when they are under external threats to their security and well-being. This model instinctively predicts the classic "rally around the flag response" from the public on such conflicts. Using some of the major disputes of the 1980s, however, the seven essays collected for the volume (five originals and two reprints) make the case, broadly, that such rally-around-the-flag-responses are by no means certain: even where apparent, they could be a "rally without consequence." Ultimately, the combinations of domestic outcomes of any international conflict will depend on (1) the precise nature of the conflict itself (e.g., duration, intensity, casualty toll, resolution, etc); (2) the local political situation (i.e., population

diversity and the economy, political culture and the extent of democratization); (3) the effectiveness of the government in controlling the definition (and degree) of national threat; (4) the government's action/reaction to the dispute; and (5) the public's image of the government of the country on the opposite side of the dispute. A further refinement of these variables produces a four-factor model in which the impact of an international conflict on the domestic politics of country "X" is defined by questions relating to the nature of the conflict itself, country X's local variables, country X's government, and the other country involved.

Following the introduction, Lamare examines the United States during the Reagan years. Using Reagan's decisions to invade Grenada (1983) and to attack Libya (1986), against the backdrop of what he labels the "dark days of the Carter administration," he argues that while the invasion of Grenada improved the public's approval rating of Reagan's job performance as president, and the raid on Libya increased the willingness of the American public to sanction direct military action overseas for the first time since the chill of the Vietnam era, the effect on public orientation toward the more diffuse components of the American political system of Reagan's military "adventurism" is mixed. The public's view of the responsiveness, efficiency, representativeness, and fairness of government remained fluid, even contradictory, throughout the Reagan years.

In chapter 3 Helmut Norpoth explores British response to Argentina's invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) in 1982. If the conflict over the Falklands boosted Margaret Thatcher's government in Britain, as previous research claims, Norpoth asks: Was the boost an expression of sympathy or an approval of the government's handling of the conflict? Did this boost have any staying power? Did it have significant, penetrating consequences? Did the government's resolve to use force to regain the islands deviate from the public's view as to the appropriate response? Did the outcome of the war make any substantive difference? Contrary to the threat thesis, the invasion did not produce a rally effect. Instead, the British public was critical at first about what it saw as the government's miscalculation of Argentina's resolve to take the islands by force. Hostilities were well underway before the Thatcher government got positive public reaction, one that not only was sustained once it came, but also enhanced both the prime minister's and the Conservative party's prospects in the 1983 British general elections.

From the United States and Britain, attention shifts to New Zealand in chapter 4. Here, Keith Jackson and James Lamare focus on the ANZUS antinuclear conflict. Prime Minister David Lange's decision in 1985 to deny port access to USS *Buchanan*, a U.S. destroyer that his government could not certify as being "nuclear-free," invoked sanctions from the United States. Although New Zealanders supported their country's antinuclear policy prior to the conflict, that support attained a rally status during the conflict and virtually catapulted what until then was a partisan minority policy platform to the top of the country's political agenda. Antinuclearism is now a major identity of New Zealand's mainstream political culture.

The fourth essay (chapter 5) by Michal Shamir and John L. Sullivan, "Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, Sometime," is reprinted from the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (1985). The article probes the patterns of political tolerance and intolerance among Israel's Jewish majority and the Arab minority. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the primary source of intolerance between both groups. Within each group, individuals differ in their levels of tolerance based on their ideological orientation toward the conflict. Chapter 6 develops and applies a theoretical model of community conflict processes to the Northern Irish conflict. Gavan Duffy and Nathalie Frensley argue that once community conflict escalates and becomes protracted, extranational actors are drawn in either by self-interest, the appeal of their allies, or both. The British presence in Northern Ireland set into motion a process of domestic mobilization, countermobilization, and demobilization that strengthened an impasse among the groups in the conflict.

The sixth offering examines the Soviet military debacle in Afghanistan. According to T.H. Rigby, the Soviet Union's decisions to invade Afghanistan and to withdraw without achieving the stated goals of the invasion have prompted a rethinking of the decision-making apparatus at the highest levels of governance in Moscow. Similarly, the roles of state-controlled political institutions such as the media and the party machinery, which supported the invasion, have come under closer scrutiny. Above all, the conflict has fueled an upsurge in ethnic nationalism in the historically Muslim Soviet republics, where both antireligious propaganda and harassment of active Muslims by government officials have intensified. The final chapter (8) is devoted to the economic sanctions invoked by the European Community to stem apartheid in South Africa. In it, Martin Holland questions the sincerity of economic sanctions, which, even though they could do so, were not designed to challenge the economic foundations of apartheid. Largely cosmetic, the sanctions fell far short of their desired objectives of affecting South Africa's internal politics.

Overall, the promise of the anthology lies in the centrality of its topic, the numerous theoretical insights and hypotheses that it offers, and the identification of relevant country-specific variables (including conflictual history) that future research will find helpful. My major complaints relate mainly to conceptualization, analytical contributions, and the editor's choice of essays. For the most part, the portrait of the book that the editor advances in the introduction appears somewhat removed from the indiscriminate picture that emerges from the essays. Moreover, the major theoretical idea advanced in the introduction could be better developed and tied to a final chapter (made necessary by the brevity of the introduction) discussing the implications of both the diverse character of the international issues as well as countries examined by the essays. To be sure, economic sanctions by the European Community are both more diffuse and far less obtrusive than, say, Argentina's invasion of the Falklands. In short, the editor's assumption that the introduction also serves a summary purpose reduces the usefulness of the symposium.

Finally, even though Lamare tries more than once in the book to

presage any criticism of methodology (pp. 1–2, and again at p. 24), it is not clear how one can impute causality at the levels that some of the essays do when in fact no effort is made to disentangle systematically the effects of other variables in either space or time. Indeed, the conceptual issues tackled by Norpoth in chapter 3 validate any such methodological concern. Also, a lot of space was devoted to pressing the case for the effect of international conflict on domestic politics. In my judgment, however, the localistic literature has progressed well beyond this threshold point; more effort should have been devoted to developing and linking the comparative question.

Nicholas O. Alozie
Arizona State University

Joseph F. Zimmerman, *Federal Preemption: The Silent Revolution* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1991) ix + 228 pp.; ISBN 0-8138-1933-4 (cloth).

When the U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld Michigan's mandatory sentencing law and a South Bend, Indiana ban on nude dancing, conservatives praised the trend. In a comment typical of states'-rights advocates, Gary McDowell declared approvingly that the court's decisions "rather than rolling back rights or narrowing rights [are] resuscitating the idea of federalism." For states'-rights advocates, federalism represents the right of local majorities to enforce their political wills. This philosophy opposes big national government not because it is big but because it is national. Joseph F. Zimmerman may not concur fully with the above position but he would be comfortable with it. He views the Congress as having handled preemption in a rather free-wheeling manner with few and uncertain limits on its innovative abilities. He admits that it may be difficult to argue against Congress's playing a larger role in the domestic governance system as the economy and society become more national and international in nature. Nevertheless, the federal role should be delimited, primarily on a partnership basis with the states, and with the general-purpose political subdivisions more directly involved in shaping the nature of the attack upon major public problems.

Utilizing survey data compiled from questionnaires and interviews with members of Congress (1986), and state and local officials, Zimmerman has followed federal preemption activity for a number of years, including research for ACIR and published work in *Publius, The Annals,* and other journals prior to his book on the subject.

He asserts that since 1965 an explosion has occurred in the number of preemptive statutes enacted by Congress based on its latent delegated and implied powers. The result of this explosion is a silent revolution in the American federal system that has structured new relationships between the national government and the states. His goal in *Federal Preemption* is to make the federal system more understandable by examining the mechanisms that Congress has employed to structure nation-state relations in the period since 1965.

The author begins with an overview of preemptive statutes and theories, followed by background discussion that includes an examination of the Articles of Confederation, the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution, power distribution

under the Constitution, expansion of national powers, and the intent of the Framers of the fundamental document. His examination of the Articles of Confederation, emphasizing the view that the United States was not simply founded in 1787 but refounded upon a basis that had been laid earlier in this document, prepares the reader for the analysis of informal, total,and partial federal preemption that is to follow.

Conditional grants-in-aid and tax credits are effective devices for informal or de facto federal preemption. The end results may be the same in that the federal government gains influence and/or control over certain aspects of state and local activities, but subnational units are not required to participate in the respective projects. The grants-in-aid approach to preemption is preferred by Zimmerman because he believes that it has been more successful in eliciting state and local government cooperation than the arrogant federal assumption of complete responsibility for the regulated function.

Total federal preemption removes the states' discretionary authority in a given regulatory area and many federal laws contain an express provision to this effect. Other acts of Congress do not contain an explicit partial—or total—preemption provision, yet have been held by courts to be preemptive. With regard to the former, the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968 forbids state and local governments "to establish . . . any standard which is applicable to the same aspect of the performance of such product and which is not identical to the federal standard." To illustrate the extent of total federal preemption, Zimmerman presents a typology of fourteen varieties of total preemption along with two case studies that show degrees of federal responsiveness to the concerns of state and local governmental officials relative to two totally preempted regulatory functions. The fourteen varieties range all the way from bankruptcy cases and automobile emission standards to federal promotion of interstate compact formation. The two case studies involved evacuation plans for areas around nuclear power plants, where Congress failed to respond to the complaints of concerned subnational government officials; and the problems involved in the regulation of truck size and weight (Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982), where Congress took remedial action in response to the subnational governments.

While one could assume that the exercise by Congress of total preemptive powers would result in Congress and appropriate federal agencies being completely responsible for the preempted function, an intergovernmental problem may be caused by total preemption because Congress is a government of enumerated powers and may lack essential complementary powers and resources to ensure that it is capable of executing successfully a preempted responsibility. There are cases in which Congress is not capable of implementing the totally preempted responsibilities, for example, the above case of emergency evacuation of areas within ten miles of a nuclear power plant. In some cases the states will support and even urge total preemption for a particular function. Expressing its concern about the problems resulting from a lack of uniformity in allowable vehicle weights and dimensions among the states, the National

Governor's Association urged Congress to enact legislation establishing national standards for weights and lengths of vehicles.

Partial preemption assumes two general forms. First, Congress may enact a statute assuming complete responsibility for a portion of a regulatory field. Second, it may enact a law or federal administrative agencies, as authorized by law, may promulgate rules and regulations establishing minimum national standards and authorize the states to continue to exercise primary responsibility for the partially preempted function, provided their standards are at least as high as the national standards and are enforced.

Zimmerman identifies some of the major reasons for the sharp increase in federal preemptive action since 1965. These reasons include the growing recognition of the interstate nature of many public problems, the general failure of the states to launch effective corrective programs to solve the problems, the establishment of environmental and public-interest groups that have lobbied effectively in Washington, and concomitant public support for governmental action to solve environmental problems in particular.

In spite of the preemption momentum that has developed since 1965, *Imperium in Imperio* is still alive in the United States. The states possess certain powers that are not subject to formal federal preemption. Although it has placed limits on their tax-free borrowing power, Congress lacks authority to preempt formally the taxing powers of the states except in special circumstances such as the employment of taxes to place an undue burden on interstate commerce. It lacks authority to directly preempt directly the array of state powers to deliver services to their citizens unless the services are provided in a discriminatory manner. The federal judiciary plays an important role as an arbitrator of federal-state conflicts, but its decisions in recent years have given the states little comfort. The case of *Garcia v. San Antonio* is the prime example.

Zimmerman took a vehement position against federal mandating of state-law enactment and contingent preemption as the most undesirable forms of total federal preemption from the standpoint of the states. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 requires the states to comply with it through the enactment of state law. The one case of contingent total preemption is the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended. Zimmerman finds no solace in the sensitive nature of the primary constitutional rights that are being protected in these laws. Here we find the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments standing face to face against the Tenth Amendment, the foundation of Zimmerman's opposition to the above acts. All three amendments deal with basic rights and principles but in order to deal with long-standing problems, exceptional steps were taken in the area of civil rights. Since the Voting Rights Act was passed, this form of contingent total preemption has not been extended to other public policy areas.

Zimmerman describes a silent revolution which he is not seeking to end but would like to see changed by the use of different procedures and approaches. His recommendations include a "mutuality model," reflecting the interdependence of actors and the reliance of one plane on the other plane for the performance of certain functions, equity in the financing of subnational regulatory

activities, and periodic review of preemptive statutes by Congress to determine whether changes are needed to meet new conditions. In sum, Zimmerman is unhappy with the current status of federal preemption. He concedes that it has been successful in solving completely or partially a number of major public problems, but has not reached its full potential in several functional areas because of the failure of Congress to base its decisions to preempt upon a mutuality theory of federalism.

Although the basic content of this book can be found in different sources, the author has made a significant contribution by providing an in-depth analysis of federal preemption in a single volume. It is a lucid treatise with refrain-type presentation of the major themes. The book is geared to students of politics at the college and graduate levels. The preferred audience from the standpoint of the author would be the members of Congress.

Charles W. Harris
Howard University;
Woodrow Wilson International Center, The Smithsonian Institution

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) xiii + 286 pp.;ISBN 0–226–43529–6 (cloth); 0–226–43531–8 (paper).

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins are challenging accepted notions regarding the practice of congressional delegation of authority. The authors believe that such delegation contributes to the efficient operation of the Congress and, more importantly, helps to facilitate the policies of congressional parties. Kiewiet and McCubbins have set out to demonstrate that Congress's penchant for turning over its authority to others, a process they label the "abdication hypothesis," should not be viewed entirely as a strike against the Congress. In fact the authors posit that such delegation is purposeful and allows the Congress to accomplish its policy goals. This more positive approach is a break with past studies which have tended to look at the Congress's lack of accomplishments. Kiewiet and McCubbins are forcing a debate on matters thought settled that relate to Congress. They are raising questions as to whether committees reflect the policy positions of congressional parties; and we are being challenged to think about our less than enthusiastic regard for the practice of congressional delegation. We are also asked to rethink the relationship between congressional parties and the delegation of authority.

The authors chose to use the appropriation process to prove their hypothesis for three reasons: first the appropriation process is expressed in "dollars and cents"; thus it represents the clearest statement of policy put forward by the Congress; second, the appropriation process is the mechanism through which federal programs and activities are annually funded; and finally, there exists a large body of research on the appropriation process upon which the authors could draw.

Kiewiet and McCubbins believe that significant nuances are being missed by other political scientists when they view the delegation of authority as an abdication of authority. Such delegation allows for the efficient operation of a large body such as the Congress, and it allows for specialization on the part

of members. The authors do not ascribe to the common wisdom that Congress delegates primarily to avoid policy-making tasks that may be burdensome or likely to provoke controversy.

The advantages and drawbacks of such delegation or agency are obvious. Agents can frustrate the objectives of the principal through opportunistic actions, thus causing the principal to pursue time-consuming and resource depleting counteractions. In the opinion of Kiewiet and McCubbins, the advantages far outweigh the drawbacks; given the array of mechanisms at the disposal of Congress to minimize losses.

Kiewiet and McCubbins' arguments are somewhat less than convincing when they argue that there are a combination of mechanisms that Congress can employ to bring renegade agents back into line. The failure of oversight committees is legendary. The inability to force members of the executive branch to testify or to testify truthfully is documented. Congress's inability to obtain correct information from the executive branch is also a problem. And finally, Congress seldom withdraws funds from an agency that is defying congressional intent. The agent usually develops a constituency inside and outside of Congress, a constituency that is employed to deflect congressional criticism.

In defense of their hypothesis the authors present arguments on several propositions. First, congressional parties are viable entities within the Congress; second, these parties have discernible policy objectives; and last, through committee and subcommittee assignments the congressional party can effectively place these policies into legislation.

All of Kiewiet and McCubbins's propositions can be challenged. In fact, each proposition runs counter to a good deal of previous research. The writers acknowledge that what they are proposing is at odds with previous research. However, they dismiss most of the skepticism concerning the lack of cohesiveness of congressional parties. In the view of Kiewiet and McCubbins, party members act at their own peril when they continually stake out positions at odds with the congressional party. They risk losing voters who identify with the party label, and use the label as an indication of the candidates' positions on issues. The label becomes an asset at election time. The authors' argument falls short in this area because the heterogenous composition of parties in the United States has forced a tolerance for maverick behavior. U.S. parties find that they cannot sustain themselves if they adhere to the rather rigid European party standards of membership. In fact, sanctions are seldom invoked against errant members.

For decades Southern members of the Democratic party defied the national party position on policies related to civil rights and states' rights. It was not the congressional party that forced these Democrats out of the party, for a period, rather these maverick Democrats left of their own accord. In more contemporary times it has been the political demographics in their home states and districts that has forced Southern Democrats to change and be more reflective of the national position of the party on questions of civil rights and states' rights.

What has traditionally occurred is a split agenda for the national party, an agenda that allows the party to be all things to all of its constituents, thus, presenting a rather confusing

face to voters. In some instances, this confusion renders the usefulness of the party label problematic and maybe even a liability.

On the question of committee assignments, the authors hypothesize that assignments to the Appropriations Committee and the Budget Committee tend to ideologically mirror the party caucuses as a whole. More specifically the Democratic members of the House Appropriations Committee exhibited a conservative bias between 1947 and 1984, but at a smaller rate than the Republican members assigned to the committee.

Although Kiewiet and McCubbins are primarily concerned with the ideological criteria for committee assignments, they are sensitive to the role that seniority has played in the selection of committee chairs and members. In spite of this acknowledgement of seniority's role in the selection of committee members, Kiewiet and McCubbins do not give seniority a prominent role in their hypothesis regarding the more recent committee selection process. They are correct when they allude to the downgrading of seniority in the selection of committee chairs and to some extent committee members in the revolt of the mid to late 1970s. However, seniority was not entirely eliminated in the selection of either committee chairs or committee members. In the mid 1970s, a small number of committee chairs were dumped. At the time some characterized the revolt as younger members being piqued with the arbitrary manner in which some committee chairs chose to run their committees rather than a revolt against seniority. An example of the power of seniority is the longevity of Representative Jamie Whitten (D-MS), who has chaired the Appropriations Committee since 1979. The authors of the *Logic of Delegation* argue that party caucuses attempt to assign to committees members who represent the party's ideological commitment, and seniority plays a secondary role. We could accept the authors argument if seniority were truly a dead letter in the committee selection process.

There is support for Kiewiet and McCubbins' argument that longevity on committees can alter members' original ideological stance. Jamie Whitten admits to a change in his position. That is, he votes more in the liberal category then he did when he was originally assigned to the Appropriations Committee. This change in his voting is attributed to his desire to remain as chair of the committee. From this we may be able to conclude that the powers within the Democratic caucus are more liberal, and thus are prepared to support Whitten as long as he is prepared to moderate his voting stance. However, if we were to use Representative Whitten as a case study of voting change, we would possibly find that his Mississippi district and his state at-large has alter demographically. We may also find that when Whitten was elected chair of the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee in 1949, the Democratic caucus was more tolerant of Southern representatives' need to accommodate their constituents through a show of bucking the national party. Toleration of such behavior is less likely today.

Another shortcoming of the *Logic of Delegation* is its failure to fully appreciate the role played by avoidance, that is, the attempt by members of Congress to avoid blame. The authors do address this issue, but feel that it is not as conse-

quential as the assignment process used by congressional parties. Their view runs counter to what appears to be the norm, particularly in the area of budget construction. It may well be efficient to allow the executive branch to draw up and present a budget to the Congress, but this process allows members to avoid having to accept responsibility for deficits and giving priority to critical needs. Deficits of the last dozen years bear witness to the lack of direction in the area of the appropriations. Neither congressional party through the its appointments to the Appropriations Committee has been able to effectively stymie the hemorrhaging of the budget.

The *Logic of Delegation* does break new ground; however it does not give enough weight to the countervailing forces at work in the U.S. Congress. Readers are asked to believe that congressional parties are disciplined and have at their disposal effective ways of disciplining members. This belief would ask readers to forget the rather unaccountable and undisciplined nature of United States parties. These problems tend to confound this rather straightforward analysis.

William H. Boone
Clark Atlanta University

Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch, *Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality: The Dream Deferred* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xi + 214 pp.; ISBN: 0–521–40015–5

In their recent book, *The Closing Door*, a passionate indictment of the racial impact of a decade's worth of conservative politics in Washington, Gary Orfield, and Carole Ashkinaze argue that we know less about black Americans today than we did in the 1960s and 1970s. Government agencies at all levels substantially reduced the collection of data on the progress and status of racial minorities, and public and private funding for studies of racial issues all but dried up. As data gathering slowed or stopped, so too did scholarly interest. Set against this charge, the appearance of *Black Americans' Views of Racial Inequality* suggests the important beginning of an effort to address a knowledge deficit wrought by years of not-so--benign neglect. Relying principally on two national surveys conducted jointly by ABC News and the *Washington Post* in 1981 and 1986 and on the NORC General Social Surveys of 1985 and 1986, Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch have drawn a detailed portrait of the way in which black Americans assess and explain their place in the social structure. The format of the book is straightforward. Six chapters form the heart. Three are devoted to statistically sophisticated descriptions of (in order) black perceptions of the persistence of racial inequality, explanations for that inequality, and preferences for remedies. Each of these is followed by a chapter that seeks to explain the social and demographic correlates of black opinion, though the discussion that follows the remedies chapter also explores the relationship of black perceptions of and explanations for racial inequality to policy preferences. Where the appropriate data exist, Sigelman and Welch provide comparisons with white opinions regarding racial inequality.

At least three broad findings stand out. The first is that black perceptions, explanations, and preferences are fairly heterogeneous. For example, in answer to the question of whether

there is more, less, or the same amount of antiblack feeling among whites now than four or five years ago, 27 percent of blacks in 1986 said more, 35 percent said less, and 34 percent said about the same (p. 61). In the same survey blacks were asked if they thought that blacks did less well than whites because they lacked the motivation or willpower to pull themselves out of poverty. Just over half (51 percent) disagreed with this statement, but 42 percent thought this was a reasonable explanation (p. 91). Not surprisingly, such fragmented patterns produce areas of substantial overlap with white opinion: in the 1989 ABC/*Post* survey nearly identical proportions of the white sample disagreed (54 percent) and agreed (43 percent) with the notion that blacks lacked motivation or willpower.

If there is often significant racial convergence, it is hardly the norm, of course. The authors write that there is a "vast perceptual gulf" between the races in their respective estimates of how much racial prejudice and discrimination persist. Whites tend to believe that Klan-like views flourish only at the distant fringes of society, but most blacks believe that such sentiments are relatively common among whites (p. 53). Furthermore, about three-quarters of blacks believe that discrimination by white society is an important factor in explaining black poverty, but fewer than half of all whites (though only slightly fewer) agreed. It is true, then, that a gulf exists, but even here racial polarities are mitigated by a certain degree of convergence.

A second curious finding in the book is that the socioeconomic models of explanation of black opinion rarely explain very much. The authors, however, do little to help us understand why. Although blacks who consider themselves working class rather than middle class are slightly more likely to believe that they have been victims of discrimination, the effects are not strong. Neither are age, gender, education, or the existence of interracial friendships very important or consistent predictors of black views. Not a single socioeconomic variable affects black views on busing, for example, nor are there powerful social correlates of support for welfare programs. What does emerge as an important predictor of policy preferences is whether discrimination is attributed to societal (or what Sigelman and Welch call situational) factors, mainly white racism, or to individual (or dispositional) factors, principally failures of will, persistence, and character among blacks. This dichotomy turns out to be an important analytical key: blacks tend to embrace the cluster of situational explanations more readily than whites, and those blacks who attribute discrimination to situational or social rather than individual factors are more likely to support interventionist remedies by government.

Black support for government remedies to persistent economic and social disadvantage is, however, surprisingly muted. Instead—and here is the third interesting finding of the book—there is a clear strain of individualism that runs through black interpretations of the world, manifested especially as faith in the efficacy of personal striving. Although blacks attribute racial inequality to the racial intransigence of white society, they attribute black progress mainly to their own hard work and not to government assistance, legal remedies, or declining prejudice.

The conviction that hard work

and education lead to success in life is accompanied by a sense of optimism. Blacks in the surveys consistently perceive more discrimination against blacks as a group than against themselves, and a substantial majority believe that their own income and living conditions are better than for blacks in general. The sense that things are getting better and that the future is bright is widespread (though there may be indications of a very slight recent shift in such expectations). Sigelman and Welch do not make much of this optimistic individualism, except in scattered observations here and there. Perhaps the areas in which the racial divide is deep make for a more arresting analysis, as does the finding that most blacks across the socioeconomic spectrum believe that they have experienced discrimination in one form or another. Yet without minimizing the conclusion that in certain respects blacks inhabit a different perceptual world from whites, it is nevertheless important to point out how much of the culture is common property. This book makes clearer than the authors let on that despite the very different structure of opportunities afforded the two races, they nevertheless seem to share an American dream of economic security and personal autonomy. And perhaps most strikingly, at least for those nourished on the Great Society vision of benevolent federal intervention, most blacks seem to believe that the achievement of this dream lies within oneself.

Peter Eisinger
University of Wisconsin

Lorenzo Morris, ed., *The Social and Political Implications of the 1984 Jesse Jackson Presidential Campaign* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990) v + 273 pp.; ISBN 0-275-92785-7 (cloth).

The Reverend Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign generated tremendous public interest and excitement as well as immense public controversy. Though nearly a decade since Jackson first launched his bid for president on 3 November 1983 has passed, surprisingly few books by academics on his efforts to win the presidency have emerged. However, for those still intrigued by Jackson's controversial quest for the presidency, *The Social and Political Implications of the 1984 Jesse Jackson Presidential Campaign* represents a new addition to the sparse scholarly literature on Jackson and his presidential bids. Edited by Lorenzo Morris, this volume contains essays by fifteen noted social scientists and political activists and covers a broad range of topics that include Jackson's impact on the party system, his campaign organization, his public policy positions and political ideology, and his treatment by the press and party elites.

An important quality of this book is that many of its essays are richly theoretical and historically well grounded. For example, in their evaluations of Jackson, both Lorenzo Morris and Hanes Walton, Jr., place his 1984 bid in the framework of the two-party system. As former Republicans, Blacks had played an important role in the realignment of the party system and the ascendance of the Democratic party as the majority party during the 1930s. Walton interprets the emergence of Jackson in 1984 as a logical response to the attempt by Black voters to either form a new partnership with the Democratic party or to become independent players in presidential

elections. In "The Articulation of Black Interests by Black Civil Rights, Professional, and Religious Organizations," Dianne Pinderhughes provides new and valuable information on the linkages between Jackson's 1984 campaign and Black lobbying interests. Based on her own analysis, she concludes that Jackson's campaign generated "widespread voluntary participation by black elites and non-elites at the local level" (p. 133). Lorn S. Foster's essay is also very much worth highlighting here. In "Avenues for Black Political Mobilization," he skillfully employs the social movement literature focusing on the Black civil rights struggle to show how Jackson's 1984 campaign largely functioned as a political movement as opposed to a traditional political campaign.

A second strength of the collection lies in the originality of a number of the contributions. For instance, in "Lessons of the Jackson Campaign," Helen F. Page explores the set of inconsistencies and internal contradictions operating in the political sphere that Jackson's 1984 entry into the nominating process exposed. She contends that in addition to threatening established political interests, Jackson's presidential bid also challenged existing institutional arrangements and cultural norms. In its response to the nation's first non-token-Black presidential contender, the Democratic party and other political elites found it necessary to devise new methods of limiting or controlling the significance of Jackson's bid without appearing racist. One such strategy, she maintains, was to confirm in the "minds of the U.S. people the idea that certain black men who talk the right way might be acceptable, but not Jesse" (p. 143). In "The Reverend Jesse Jackson and the Palestinian Question," David Coolidge identifies the strong component of Jackson's political thinking, which, he argues, greatly explains his support for Palestinian self-determination. Opinions concerning the usefulness of Jackson's bid also vary among the contributors to this volume. There are those plainly critical of Jackson and his presidential aspirations, such as Joseph McCormick who criticizes the top-down approach implied in a black presidential strategy for group empowerment, and Rodney Green and Finley Campbell who argue that Jackson's economic program was not especially helpful to members of the working class and blacks.

As thought-provoking as this book is, some central questions remain unconsidered. For example, what implication does Jackson's campaign hold for other blacks who might choose to run for president later on? Although effects that can be directly attributable to Jackson (such as the Hymie affair) and those attributable to simply his race are difficult to separate, none of the contributors attempted to go beyond Jackson and explore what might lie ahead for future black presidential aspirants. In addition, although Morris promises in his introduction to this book to address the matter of the "substantive value of the Jackson candidacy," this issue was passed over by most of the book's contributors. However, the substantive versus symbolic contributions of Jackson's candidacy remain an important issue, especially to those calculating the future costs and benefits of a black presidential strategy. Even though Jackson's 1988 campaign was more successful than his 1984 bid, both his candidacies have failed to resolve any of the fundamental

political dilemmas that blacks face today. The vote-maximizing potential of a black presidential strategy that Ronald Walters outlines in *Black Presidential Politics in America* (SUNY Press, 1988) did not prove itself to be especially successful in Jackson's campaigns. The record-high black turnout in 1984 did not affect the outcome, nor did black voting (or the apparent nonvoting by Jackson supporters) make a difference in the 1988 presidential race. Jackson's candidacy may have, in fact, set off a new disenchantment with electoral politics among blacks, given their lack of influence on the 1984 electoral outcome and inability to arrest the conservative drift of the two major parties today. Similarly, Jackson's bids might have exacerbated blacks' political problems, pushing blacks further into a marginal and politically impotent corner of the party and in national politics in general. Other analysts have argued that Jackson clearly hurt the party's chances of winning the presidential election, pointing out that conservative and moderate white Democrats are unwilling to vote for a party that is seen as a captive of Jackson and black interests. Such claims may ultimately harm blacks politically, since they are used to justify the party's abandonment of blacks in favor of renewing its courtship of moderates and white Southerners.

Robert C. Smith's concluding piece, entitled "From Insurgency Toward Inclusion," however, is particularly instructive and well developed. Through a comparison of Jackson's 1984 and 1988 bids, Smith's contribution, in fact, remedies many of the problems inherent in the book's exclusive focus on Jackson's 1984 campaign. Thus, he argues, even while Jackson's 1984 campaign did, indeed, resemble a grass-roots social movement, his 1988 bid was strikingly less so. In 1988, he notes, "one observes evidence of the incipient institutionalization of the "campaign movement"; less insurgency, more inclusion; less protest, more working within the system; less movement, more traditional campaign" (p. 230). Interestingly enough, Smith also strongly disputes Ronald Walter's claims presented in the same volume that many of the issues taken up by Jackson and his followers found their way into the party's written platform. Based on his own work, as well as on information in *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, he writes that the 1984 party platform was the party's "most conservative in a generation" (p. 224). Smith's essay alone highlights the need for further printed scholarship on the matter of Jackson's *two* presidential bids.

In conclusion, *The Social and Political Implications of the 1984 Jesse Jackson Presidential Campaign* provides important and original material on Jackson's 1984 campaign. And while most of its conclusions are based solely on the observations of Jackson's 1984 campaign, the originality, wealth of information, and range of opinions and issues contained in the book will ensure that it will remain useful to students, scholars, and activists interested in Jackson and his impact on the Democratic party and presidential politics, and to those researching African-American politics in the post-civil rights era, more broadly.

Katherine Tate
Harvard University

Byran O. Jackson and Michael B. Preston, eds., *Racial and Ethnic Politics in California* (Berkeley: In-

stitute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1991) 405 pp.; ISBN 0–87772–328–1 (paper).

One might suspect that a book focusing on political phenomena in a particular state would be of limited interest beyond that state's borders. Even before the Rodney King verdict and its aftermath, such an inference would definitely have been erroneous in the case of a book examining racial and ethnic politics in California. While at any given time California is unlikely to be representative of any other specific part of the nation, the state is often a "leading indicator" of trends that will affect the nation as a whole. Thus it is not of limited interest to observe the increasing ethnic diversity in California's population and to study how the political environment and political institutions change (or fail to change) as the population becomes more heterogeneous. It is by no means predetermined exactly how, in what direction, or at what pace political change will occur. Byran Jackson and Michael Preston have collected fifteen studies that offer valuable insights on these issues and have framed these chapters with very brief essays.

Approximately one-fourth of the book is presented under the rubric of "Political Empowerment in Ethnic Communities." The five studies in this section provide the historical and contemporary context of ethnic and racial politics in California. In Bruce Cain's overview essay he argues that there is a cyclical pattern to the electoral prominence of racial and ethnic issues in California, arising because the centrifugal forces extant throughout the U.S. political system are no less present in California. The potential counterforces, especially political parties, are as weak in California as they are throughout the nation, leaving politics to become fractionalized and the domain of "special interests." Exacerbating this tendency is the diversity of interests and positions within each of the minority communities, making it less likely that a broad political coalition can be achieved. In a state where various mechanisms promote direct democracy, the future is likely to be more, rather than less, special-interest politics.

Each of the other four contributions in this section considers an individual minority group present in California. Don Nakanishi details the degree of political mobilization of California's extremely heterogeneous Asian-American population, drawing on the ongoing "UCLA Asian Pacific American Voter Registration Project." Susan Anderson offers a historical perspective on the development of black politics in the state, arguing that such politics have traditionally been exclusive, pragmatic, and oriented toward middle-class issues. Harry Pachon focuses on the issues of immigration and the process of acquiring citizenship as they affect Latinos and their participation in California politics. Raphael Sonenshein discusses the political behavior of a group not usually included in anthologies on minority politics, Jews.

A briefer section focuses on ethnic political leadership in California. Fernando Guerra documents the growth in the number of ethnic minorities holding significant elective positions in the state (i.e., those with at least 300,000 constituents as of 1988) and suggests some reasons for these success stories. Larry Berg and C.B. Holman focus on the most obvious example of a minority group member holding a powerful office in California, Assembly

Speaker Willie L. Brown, Jr., an African American. Their article is especially interesting because they examine both the evolution of Brown's electoral/financial coalition and the development of his legislative career.

The next section explores the ethnic and racial coalitions and cleavages in two of California's major urban centers—San Francisco and Los Angeles—as vehicles for reaching conclusions about political mobilization and electoral politics. Richard DeLeon shows how Art Agnos was able to amass a coalition of ethnic groups to achieve a progressive victory in the former city in 1987. Although DeLeon's speculation that "the Agnos victory may well prove to be a significant milestone in the history of American urban politics" (p. 158) has proven to be overly optimistic (Agnos decisively lost in his reelection bid), the analysis of multiethnic politics presented here is very well done. Likewise, Byran Jackson presents an excellent analysis of ethnic political involvement and bloc voting in Los Angeles in the process of assessing Dahl's ethnic political assimilation model.

Another one-quarter of the book is devoted to discussing ethnic participation in partisan politics in the state. William Middleton presents an essay on how structural, "good government" reforms have had an impact on minority populations. Dwaine Marvick reports on the characteristics and preferences of party activists in Los Angeles County, making comparisons across ethnic groups and political parties. Richard Santillan and Federico Subervi-Velez address the increasing support by Mexican Americans for the Republican party. They contrast the strategies of the two major parties for attracting Latino votes, focusing especially on the GOP's use of mass media and arguing that the GOP is more realistic in its treatment of the Latino community as a diversified group while the Democrats continue to see Latinos as a monolithic population.

The final section includes three assessments of interethnic conflict and the potential for interethnic coalitions in California. This is an important topic that has only recently been explored in any systematic fashion. Charles Henry and Carlos Munoz, Jr. discuss issues related to the possibility of building and sustaining a rainbow coalition in California, reaching the conclusion that "a broad-based progressive political coalition" in the state is unlikely (p. 338). Carole Uhlaner uses survey data to examine perceived prejudice among Blacks, Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans in the state and concludes that interethnic coalitions are feasible, but not inevitable. The evidence she presents, however, suggests that such a feat would be daunting. James Regalado recounts the litigation over redrawing the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisor's districts to document official resistance to the political incorporation of Latinos in that milieu.

Simply put, this is an outstanding edited volume. Its strengths are numerous. First, the range of ethnic groups and issues considered is broader than one usually finds in a single volume, and, unlike many treatments of minority politics, several of the chapters explicitly consider the attitudes and actions of whites where they impinge on minority politics. Second, the authors of these contributions generally avoid stereotyping individual ethnic groups as monolithic. There is an awareness

of—indeed an emphasis on—the intragroup diversity that exists. Third, there is only a minimal, probably unavoidable, amount of redundancy in the chapters. The editors are to be commended for producing a volume with coherent sections rather than one with fifteen chapters related only by allegation. Fourth, the contributors bring data to bear on important questions in an area where sermons often outnumber empirical analyses. In an era when data are avoided by those in power because they "know" what the answers are, it is important to be able to "speak truth" supported by something other than faith, assumptions, or stereotypes. These analyses strengthen the normative import of the conclusions.

Among the dangers inherent in academic publications are (1) that crucial events that demand consideration will occur between the time the manuscripts leave the authors' hands and the time the book is read and (2) that space limitations will necessarily lead to the exclusion of some important topics. Were this book being written today, the Rodney King verdict would, of course, be important for what it reveals about racial and ethnic politics in both California and in the country as a whole. The interactions of race and place (of residence) and race and poverty would be highlighted more than in the current volume. So too would the national context into which California fits—the United States after a dozen years of Reagan/Bush rule—be the subject of a greater amount of discussion. And perhaps more attention would be paid to minorities as targets or subjects of public policies rather than just as actors or potential actors on or in the public arena. Let it be clear though that these comments are not criticisms of the current excellent volume—only suggestions for the next edition.

While waiting for the editors' next edition, the current volume is useful on multiple levels—as a supplemental text on California politics, as part of a syllabus for an upper-division minority politics class, and as a scholarly resource. At the first level the book would add a dimension probably too often neglected in the state-mandated instruction. Even outside the state, the book provides enough background to be of use, even for a student who is totally unfamiliar with the details of the California situation, and addresses issues important in the study of minority politics wherever the setting. In sum, anyone who teaches or researches in the field of minority politics will find an extraordinarily large number of these pieces worthwhile. Professors Jackson and Preston have made a valuable contribution by editing this volume.

Joseph Stewart, Jr.
University of Texas at Dallas

Letters

Editorial Correction

To the Editor:

I was very happy to receive the last issue of the *NPSR* (volume 3) with my article on the NF vote in Paris ("Presence of Immigrants and National Front Vote: The Case of Paris [1984–1990]"). There is unfortunately an inversion between map 2 and map 3, suggesting to the reader unfamiliar with Paris geography that the Maghrebins are to be found in the gentrified West and the Spanish and Portuguese in the working-class North-East, while my chapter shows exactly the opposite. I would be very grateful if it were possible to signal the error in the next issue of the *NPSR*. Apart from that it is a very interesting issue and I thank you for giving me the opportunity to write in the *NPSR*.

Nonna Mayer
Centre D'Etude de la Vie Politique Francaise

Invitation to the Scholarly Community

The *National Political Science Review (NPSR)*, a publication of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, welcomes contributions on any important problem or subject in political science. In particular, the NPSR was designed with emphasis particularly on theoretical/empirical research on politics and policies that advantage or disadvantage groups by reason of race, ethnicity, or sex, or other such factors.

For 1994, the Editor contemplates a major issue on the historical, sociological, psychological, and cultural considerations related to civil rights movement, white response (supportive and hostile) to that movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the consequences of that Act.

The *National Political Science Review* also plans a symposium on the future of politics and society in Southern Africa and invites contributions.Other symposia under consideration include (1) the structure and process of major American political institutions and their relationship to racial stratification; (2) the African-American community and major policy questions (and institutional relationships, e.g. environmental problems; the role of the trial courts); (3) public policy, private governments, private action and the prospects of Africans (e.g., commercial and collegiate athletics; the entertainment industry; the church networks; corporate governance); (4) the relationships between democracy, racism, and constitutionalism as concepts in related phenomena in political science as a system of knowledge; (5) power, values, and behavior within the African- American family; (6) the structure, process, results, and consequences of African- American organizations; (7) the competing concepts, methods, and paradigms in "mainstream" political science and the study of race in the American political system; and (8) racism and xenophobia in the European Community.

As before, the *National Political Science Review* is interested in proposals that do not seem to fall within the topics above. Contributions should be no longer than thirty typewritten pages double-spaced, inclusive of notes. They should follow guidelines of the *Chicago Manual of Style.* An abstract of no more than 150 words should appear just beneath the title and before the text begins. Tables and figures must be submitted in camera-ready form. For tables, use a uniform typeface (preferably Times Roman). Use three rules, one under the table head, one under the column heads, and one under the table body but above any notes. Column heads are 9/11 Bold, caps and lower case; body is 9/11 upper and lower case, columns centered; notes are 8/10 upper and lower case, flush left. "Note" or "Source" is italic followed by a colon. Author's names should be placed on a separate cover sheet. One hard copy

and one computer diskette (3.5") WordPerfect 5.1 should be sent to Matthew Holden, Jr., Editor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 232 Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22901.

Requests for book reviews should be sent to Paula D. McClain, Book Review Editor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, 232 Cabell Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22901. Inquiries about standing orders should be addressed to Transaction Publishers, Rutgers—The State University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.